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Chapter1
Introduction
This thesis consists of eight self-contained essays on international trade and factor flows. In
these essays, I address three topics that center around the following questions: What deter-
mines the boundaries of the firm in the global economy? What type of migration can countries
expect to receive in the future, depending on their current migration profile? Can the labor
market effects of protection explain individual attitudes towards international trade? The
topics, though all drawn from the field of international economics, are not significantly related
to each other. If one is tempted to identify a common thread running through all topics, one
could argue that in all of them optimal (i.e. welfare-maximizing) levels of international trade
or factor flows are not achieved (due to market imperfections) or at least in danger of not
being achieved (due to trade protection). I shall present brief summaries of all essays in turn.1
What determines the boundaries of the firm in the global economy? In the first
part of this thesis (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), I use firm-level data from Spain in order to
investigate the boundaries of the firm in the global economy. Roughly one-third of world trade
is intra-firm trade (i.e., trade within multinational firms). Its distribution across countries
and across sectors is not random, but responds to some underlying structural features of
the economy. Antra`s (2003) finds that capital-intensive goods and goods imported from
capital-abundant countries are often traded within the boundaries of the firm, whereas labor-
intensive goods and goods imported from labor-intensive countries are traded at arm’s length
(i.e., between independent parties).
In this thesis, I look into the distribution of intra-firm trade across firms, and I show that
it is systematically related to the productivity of the firm. The Spanish data set that I use
1I discuss the specific contributions of all the essays collected in this thesis (and their related literature)
more comprehensively in the corresponding chapters.
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is exceptionally rich in terms of firms’ sourcing activities. It records whether a firm acquires
inputs within the firm or at arm’s length, and it does so separately for the inputs acquired
in the Spanish economy and, if applicable, for the inputs imported from a foreign economy.
This allows me to provide novel insights into the behavior of firms in terms of where and how
they acquire their inputs in the global economy.
Chapter 2: Sourcing premia with incomplete contracts: Theory and evi-
dence. In this chapter, I provide an in-depth exploration of the Spanish firm-level data. I
try to identify regularities in the input sourcing of firms, in order to establish key stylized
facts that have so far gone unnoticed in the literature due to lack of data. I document, first,
that on average across industries highly productive firms tend to engage in intra-firm sourcing
and in foreign sourcing, whereas low productive firms engage in arm’s length sourcing and in
domestic sourcing; second, that the different sourcing strategies appear to be complementary
to one another (rather than mutually exclusive, as often assumed in the theoretical literature
on input sourcing); and third, that the more productive firms tend to pursue various sourcing
channels simultaneously (for example foreign sourcing in addition to domestic sourcing). The
association between intra-firm sourcing and firm productivity found in the Spanish data must
be explained by a model that features firm heterogeneity, as in Melitz (2003). Such models
have been proposed by Grossman & Helpman (2004) and Antra`s & Helpman (2004), to name
the most influential papers. I briefly review these models in this chapter, and I spell out—in
the most general way possible—the conditions that result in an unambiguous mapping of a
firm’s productivity into the ownership structure of input sourcing (intra-firm or arm’s length).
Chapter 3: Global sourcing and firm selection. The Spanish data set is a
panel data set that observes firms over several periods of time. In this chapter, I exploit
the time variation in the data in order to address firm selection into sourcing strategies. By
this I mean that firms self-select into their sourcing strategy based on their productivity (in
the sense that causation runs from productivity to sourcing and not the other way around).
The correlations between productivity and sourcing found in Chapter 2 of this thesis could
be due to firms self-selecting into their sourcing strategies, or it could be the result of firms
becoming more productive subsequent to their sourcing decisions (or both). In this chapter,
I report evidence that on average across industries firms that select strategies of intra-firm
sourcing and foreign sourcing ex post have been more productive ex ante. This finding sup-
ports the notion of firm selection, which is a central ingredient in theoretical models of input
sourcing.
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Chapter 4: Global sourcing: Towards a firm-level test of the hold-up
model. In this chapter, I take a structural approach to the analysis of intra-firm trade in a
cross-section of firms. In particular, I look at the Spanish firm-level data through the lens of
the Antra`s & Helpman (2004) model, the workhorse model of global sourcing under hold-up
problems. It features incomplete contracts and relationship-specific investments that lead
to a hold-up problem (and a corresponding efficiency loss) in the firm-supplier relationship.
Minimization of this efficiency loss commands the firm to acquire property rights over the
supplier’s input (and thus trade the input within the firm boundaries of control), if the firm’s
own input in the production of a final good is sufficiently important (i.e., if what is called
the “headquarter intensity” is sufficiently large).
I first develop a novel representation of the model that draws upon the modularity prop-
erties of the firm’s maximum profit function with respect to the key parameters of the model,
as in Mra´zowa´ & Neary (2013). These parameters are the firm’s productivity; the industry’s
headquarter intensity; the ex-post distribution of revenue between the firm and the supplier;
and the unit cost of sourcing abroad (relative to the unit cost of sourcing domestically). I
then use this representation to derive novel firm-level predictions from the model. These
predictions point to relevant cross-industry heterogeneity in the effect of productivity on the
likelihood of a firm to rely on intra-firm sourcing and on foreign sourcing, respectively. In
particular, the headquarter intensity of the industry is supposed to govern the productiv-
ity effect in a systematic way, at least for a very large and plausible parameter subspace.
This suggests that the positive associations between productivity and intra-firm sourcing as
well as foreign sourcing, as described in Chapters 2 and 3, hide important cross-industry
variation that has gone unnoticed in existing literature.
I explore this possibility in a series of discrete choice models that I estimate with the
Spanish firm-level data. I find, first, that for a given sourcing location the productivity effect
on intra-firm sourcing is ambiguous: it is strictly positive in headquarter-intensive industries
and strictly negative in all other industries. I find, second, that the productivity effect on
foreign sourcing is strictly positive across all industries, while it is the weaker, the larger the
headquarter intensity of production. These empirical regularities that I find in all relevant
sourcing dimensions of the data are consistent with the predictions of the Antra`s & Helpman
(2004) model.
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What type of migration can countries expect to receive in the future, depend-
ing on their current migration profile? In the second part of this thesis (Chapters 5,
6, and 7), I use Spanish migration data to study network externalities in the international
migration of people. Network externalities occur when already settled migrants provide help
in the migration endeavors of those left behind. This reduces the costs of migration for those
left behind, which means that a country’s current endowment with migrants will have an
impact on the type of migration countries can expect to receive in the future.
I use publicly available administrative migration data from Spain, in order to shed light
on this phenomenon in a recent migration boom to Spain. I shall inform about the extremely
fascinating period from the mid-1990s up to the rise of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007/08.
Within a little more than a decade, Spain received about six million new migrants, and its
total population surged from less than 40 million people to more than 45 million people. In
the history of humans, there are arguably not many examples of a similarly dramatic influx
of people into a country over such a short period of time.
Chapter 5: Facts and figures on a recent migration boom to Spain. This
chapter is intended to provide some background information for the more substantial Chap-
ters 6 and 7. It starts with a very brief discussion of the institutional background in Spain.
It then provides a short descriptive analysis of the Spanish migration phenomenon. I am in-
terested in the development of the number of migrants over time (gross flows and stocks);
migrants’ countries of origin as well as their provinces of destination within Spain, and how
these have changed through time; and differences in the settlement pattern between migrants
and natives, as well as between the major migrant populations themselves. My results un-
cover some interesting regularities that can inspire future empirical work on migration.
Chapter 6: Networks and selection in international migration to Spain.
In this chapter, I provide new evidence on migrant networks as determinants of both the scale
and skill composition of migration. In the received literature, migrant networks, defined as
the migrants that are already settled in a certain destination, constantly rank among the
most important factors shaping migration; see for example Beine et al. (2011). Migrants
feel strongly attracted to destinations hosting other migrants that are culturally alike, for
example because they receive assistance in finding jobs or housing.
I develop and apply a three-level nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model of migra-
tion that accommodates varying degrees of substitutability across alternative destinations.
I purport it is easier for migrants to substitute one destination by another one if the two
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destinations belong to the same country or region, since they will share a common cultural,
legal, and economic background. Also, I argue that two destinations belonging to a region
with a very high degree of political autonomy (such as Catalonia) will be easier to substitute
for one another, because the set of shared rules will be larger for such destinations than for
others.
The three-level NMNL model that I propose can account for these features. It belongs to
the class of random utility models pioneered by McFadden (1974, 1978, 1984). Through its
nesting structure, the model introduces unobserved heterogeneity into the function describ-
ing aggregate migration flows, and it suggests estimated coefficients of the migrant network
variable to differ across destinations. These are important challenges in the estimation of
migration functions based on aggregate data (rather than micro-level data). I estimate the
model with the Spanish migration data, and I find strong positive network effects on the
scale of migration, as well as a strong negative effect on the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled
migrants. Both types of effects appear to be robust across different estimators, samples, and
control variables. I find significant heterogeneity in the estimated network elasticity across
regions, a result that would put the use of a simpler random utility framework into doubt.
Chapter 7: Co-national and cross-national pulls in international migra-
tion to Spain. In this chapter, I extend the analysis presented in Chapter 6 to allow
for a more flexible definition of a migrant network. The received literature typically assumes
that the network effect applies to migrants who share the same nationality (or the same
country of origin), but is muted across nationalities (or countries of origin). This is a very
strong assumption, and I relax this assumption in this chapter. In particular, I expand the
perspective of the attraction of a migrant network from co-national migrants to co-national
migrants along with migrants from “adjacent” nationalities. For example, I hypothesize that
a group of migrants from Ecuador will not only attract further migration from Ecuador, but
that it will also attract migration from other Latin American countries. In the estimations
based on the Spanish migration data, I find evidence for the network externality to operate
across nationalities, both independently and in conjunction with the usual co-national net-
work externality. This opens up an entirely new perspective on the composition of future
migration flows in relation to the current stocks of migrants in countries around the globe.
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Can the labor market effects of protection explain individual attitudes towards
international trade? Individuals hold vastly different opinions about international trade
and protection. A recent example is the highly controversial (and highly emotional) debate
about the free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union. Policy
makers argue the free trade agreement will make both regions better off. This argument
is backed by economic theory. Trade economists point out routinely that global economic
integration unlocks welfare gains, the so-called gains from trade, through a more efficient use
of resources and more products becoming available in both countries. However, economic
theory also tells us that the free trade agreement has the potential to benefit some groups at
the expense of others (in either country). The gains from trade will not be evenly distributed.
This might explain why some people and countries hold more sympathetic views towards free
trade than others.
In the third and final part of this thesis, I study whether the labor market effects of pro-
tection can explain the sorting of individuals into groups of trade skeptics and free traders.
In particular, I relate individual preferences towards international trade and protection to
the factor price effects of protection in the neoclassical trade model. For this purpose, I draw
on large-scale survey data on public opinion derived from two different sources, namely the
2005 wave of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the 2007 wave of the Pew
Global Attitudes Project (GAP). These data are internationally comparable and include a
large number of individuals from many different countries.
Chapter 8: Individual attitudes towards trade: Stolper-Samuelson revis-
ited. In this chapter, I draw upon the standard neoclassical trade model with two factors of
production and two goods. This model highlights the role of relative factor endowments as
a source of comparative advantage. The labor market effects of protection in this model are
summarized in the famous Stolper-Samuelson theorem. It states that protection of domestic
import-competing industries will hurt (in real terms) the relatively abundant factor, while it
will benefit the other factor.
I look into the Pew GAP survey data, in order to see if this logic is reflected in how
individuals perceive international trade in a large number of countries across the entire world
income distribution. I aim at improving upon an influential paper by Mayda & Rodrik (2005),
which does a similar job based on a different survey data source. I advance the literature
both methodologically (through a more convincing choice of estimator), as well as in terms of
the data employed (broader country coverage and more accurate measures of relative factor
endowments). In the model, I distinguish between two factors of production, high-skilled
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labor and low-skilled labor. I find that high-skilled individuals are substantially more pro-
trade than low-skilled individuals in high-skilled labor abundant countries, and vice versa in
a considerable share of low-skilled labor abundant countries. This finding strengthens the
results found in Mayda & Rodrik (2005) in that they are consistent with the predictions of
the neoclassical trade model.
Chapter 9: Does factor abundance shape free traders? Theory and evi-
dence. In this chapter, I broaden the analysis presented in Chapter 8, and I aim at an
empirical implementation that is as close as possible to economic theory. As an attempt
to embrace the highly segmented nature of modern labor markets, I split labor into many
distinct factors of production. Also, I allow for countries to differ in their technology level
(i.e., their productivity). I first show how in this general version of the neoclassical trade
model (the so-called Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model) trade protection produces groups of win-
ners and losers within a country (relative to each other). Whether individuals of a specific
skill belong to one or the other group depends on the relative abundance of their skill (i.e.,
their domestic supply relative to the world supply). I then translate this result into an em-
pirical model of preference formation for individuals of different skill in different countries.
Finally, I estimate this model based on the ISSP data set as well as the Pew GAP data set.
In either data set, I find that the group of individuals whose skills are relatively abundant
hold more positive views towards free trade than other individuals. Importantly, my empir-
ical design allows me to differentiate this effect from other (potentially confounding) effects
specific to individuals’ labor market skills; see Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) for a discussion.
Hence, my findings provide novel and strong evidence in favor of the neoclassical trade model.
Chapter 10: Summary and outlook. In the final chapter of this thesis, I provide a
very brief summary of selected aspects of my thesis and a short outlook on future research.
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Chapter2
Sourcing premia with incomplete
contracts: Theory and evidence
This chapter is based on joint work with Wilhelm Kohler. It was published as an article in
February 2011 in the B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (Contributions), 11(1),
1-39.
2.1 Introduction
In OECD countries, the share of intermediate inputs in total trade has steadily increased over
the past decades, reaching a level of 56.2 percent for goods trade and 73.2 percent for services
trade in 2006. From 1995 to 2006, intermediate goods trade has grown in real terms at an
average annual rate of 6.2 percent, while the corresponding figure for both final consumption
goods and capital goods is 5.9 percent. Over the same period, real trade in services has
increased by 7.0 percent per annum, compared to 6.3 percent for final services.1
This chapter sheds light on the global sourcing strategies of Spanish manufacturing firms.
Arguably, this is an interesting case to look at. Spain has seen above OECD-average real
growth rates for each year from 1997 up to 2008.2 Starting out from below OECD-average
shares of intermediates in total trade, Spain has also experienced strong growth in input trade
for both goods and services, to reach levels close to, or even above the OECD-average in 2005.
From 1995 to 2005, its average annual volume growth of intermediate input trade was 7.3
percent for goods and 10.7 percent for services, compared to 6.2 percent and 7 percent for the
average of OECD countries. By 2006, the share of intermediates in total Spanish imports has
1Lanz & Ragoussis (2009).
2OECD Economic Outlook 2010, Annex Table 1.
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reached values of 0.92 for the primary goods industry, 0.47 for manufacturing, and a value
of 0.87 for services, compared to OECD-averages of 0.87, 0.52, and 0.77, respectively.3
In this chapter, we use a survey-based data set for the years 2006-2008, in order to
highlight the micro-structure of input sourcing in Spanish manufacturing. We take a “high-
resolution-perspective” in two dimensions. First, our data set includes firm-level observations
on input sourcing. And secondly, we observe a firm’s organizational mode of sourcing, in ad-
dition to whether it is sourcing domestically or abroad. More specifically, our data distinguish
between a contractual relationship with an independent supplier (outsourcing), and sourc-
ing from a related party (vertical integration). We provide an in-depth exploration of firms’
global sourcing decisions and investigate the link between performance and sourcing behavior,
covering both the organizational and the location dimension.
The theoretical literature stresses the importance of a firm’s level of productivity, not
just for the global reach of its operations, but also for the organizational form of its sourcing
activities. This literature focuses on various forms of contractual imperfections that arise from
input specificity, which often follows from product differentiation of final goods, a hallmark of
modern trade theory. The pioneering contributions are Antra`s (2003), Grossman & Helpman
(2004), and Antra`s & Helpman (2004). These and other models of input sourcing differ in the
details of what is contractible as well as the organizational forms assumed available, but they
share a common implication: Production relationships are not brought to their full economic
potentials because of inefficient levels and composition of inputs. Inefficiency derives from
distorted incentives of input providers, due to holdup or agency problems, and the choice of
a specific organizational form aims at reducing this inefficiency. Although we do not dwell
on normative implications in this chapter, it is worth pointing out that these inefficiencies
have recently sparked interest also in new trade policy issues and a new rationale for trade
agreements; see Antra`s & Staiger (2012). In this chapter, our focus lies on the relationship
between firms’ productivity levels and their choice of sourcing strategies. In Section 2.2, we
set the stage for our subsequent empirical analysis through a comparative review of existing
models that deal with the productivity-sourcing nexus, with special emphasis on incomplete
contracts.4
Our empirical analysis comes in two steps. In Section 2.3 we first portray a stylized
picture of sourcing heterogeneity among Spanish manufacturing firms, as observed in 2006-
2008. In doing so, we highlight a number of patterns that, in our view, have so far not received
sufficient attention in the literature. We slice our data set along several dimensions, including
3Lanz & Ragoussis (2009), Tables 7 and 11.
4For extensive surveys, see Spencer (2005) and Helpman (2006).
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the number of sourcing strategies simultaneously pursued by any one firm. More specifically,
we explore the relative frequencies of different types of pure and combined strategies regarding
the location and organizational form of input sourcing, as well as their prevalence among small
and large, or exporting and non-exporting firms. In addition, we investigate the pattern of
interdependence between four principle sourcing strategies by estimating the “probabilities”
that a firm pursues any one strategy of input sourcing, say vertical integration, conditional
on pursuing others.
The second step of our empirical analysis is inspired by the literature on so-called “ex-
porter premia”, which was pioneered in the 1990s by Andrew Bernard and others and which
has subsequently lead to the development of theoretical models of trade that feature firm het-
erogeneity, most notably by Melitz (2003). A stylized fact brought to light by this literature
is that in many countries and industries the bulk of exports is concentrated among relatively
few firms that are typically larger and more productive than non-exporting firms. Bernard
et al. (2007) report similar patterns also for US imports, but overall, empirical research on
firm heterogeneity on the import side is somewhat scant, compared to exports. In Section
2.4 of this chapter, we contribute to this literature by providing econometric estimates of
performance premia on different strategies of input sourcing. We shall henceforth speak of
“sourcing premia”, and we shall cover both the location as well as the organizational form of
input sourcing.
Empirical knowledge of sourcing premia is important for two reasons. First, the presence
of such sourcing premia indicates the general empirical relevance of the above mentioned
strand of literature, even though, as we shall argue, they cannot per se be interpreted as
lending support to any one specific model, and even though we cannot establish the direction
of causality. And secondly, sourcing premia point to aggregate productivity effects through
firm selection. In particular, changes in the quality of the contractual environment or the costs
of operating certain organizational forms, domestically and abroad, will change the aggregate
productivity of an industry, by complete analogy to the selection effects of trade and FDI in
Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004). The empirical pattern of sourcing premia should
thus give an indication also for the pattern of such selection-based productivity effects.
However, empirical estimation of sourcing premia turns out to be less straightforward
than perhaps expected. We need a flexible econometric framework that allows us to estimate
premia with respect to both the location and the organizational dimension of sourcing in a
unified way. An important aspect of the empirical landscape is that firms tend to pursue
multiple strategies of input sourcing. This negates a straightforward mapping of firms into a
unique sourcing channel, thus complicating the estimation of sourcing premia. We develop a
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two-tier framework that also allows us to deal with this situation. Tier one aims at sourcing
premia on single strategies in a way comparable to the traditional exporter premia. Tier two
exploits information on multiple strategies in estimating marginal effects that derive from
adding further sourcing channels to a given sourcing strategy. In our estimations, we apply
labor productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) as measures of firm performance. TFP
is calculated through firm-specific residuals from econometric estimations of industry-specific
production functions.
In the empirical section, this chapter is related to a number of papers that have also
explored the productivity-sourcing nexus. Tomiura (2007) provides evidence on the relation-
ship between foreign sourcing and the productivity level of Japanese firms, based on a 1998
survey. He finds that firms which engage in foreign sourcing tend to be more productive, but
he does not formally estimate sourcing premia in a multi-sourcing context, as we do in this
chapter. In addition, his analysis does not cover different organizational modes of domestic
sourcing. Farin˜as et al. (2010) show that the productivity distribution of offshoring firms
dominates that of non-offshoring firms at first order. The authors refer to the same Spanish
data source as we do, but for the years 1990-2002. For this early period, however, the data
do not allow distinguishing firms’ organizational modes of sourcing, which lies at the heart
of recent innovations in trade theory and our empirical analysis. Defever & Toubal (2013)
aim at a test of the Antra`s & Helpman (2004, 2008) model by evaluating the explanatory
potential of firm-level productivity for the cross-firm variation in organizational modes of
foreign sourcing, based on French firm-level data for 1999. As we shall explain in Section 2.2,
our purpose here is not to test any specific model of sourcing. Instead, we pursue on “open
search” for sourcing premia. The study that comes closest to what we do in our empirical
section is Federico (2010) who estimates sourcing premia in a cross-section of Italian firms
in 1997. In this chapter, we explore a much more recent unbalanced panel of firms, which
seems important in an area where so much change has occurred in recent years. And it
seems of particular relevance in the present case, since the Spanish economy has experienced
above average dynamics in intermediate inputs trade over the past decade, as we have argued
above.
2.2 Theory of sourcing under input specificity
Product differentiation often affords market power, as stressed in modern trade theory, but
in most cases it comes with the need to secure provision of specific inputs, tailored to the fea-
tures of the differentiated final good. The detailed nature of the input required and the legal
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and institutional environment determine available contractual forms of input procurement.
Very often, complete contracts for production and delivery of inputs with idiosyncratic spec-
ifications cannot be written. Typically, firms face a discrete choice between a limited number
of organizational forms. Theoretical models of input sourcing mostly assume two forms that
go by the names of vertical integration, or intra-firm provision, and outsourcing, or arms-
length provision through an independent supplier. Loosely speaking, in these models vertical
integration features an advantage of greater control of the final goods producer over input
provision. But in one form or another, this comes at the expense of impairing the incen-
tive for the other party to put up effort and investment in securing the necessary quality or
quantity of the input. Therefore, if incentivizing the other party is sufficiently important,
an outsourcing relationship may be more advantageous for the final goods producer, even
though it implies a partial loss of control.
Under certain conditions the choice between vertical integration and outsourcing may be
influenced by a firm’s productivity level. Generally, we may conceive maximum profits Π as
a function of a firm’s productivity level θ as well as other characteristics of production, such
as the prices of various types of inputs and their importance for production. For simplicity,
we assume the contribution of these characteristics to be one-dimensional and measured
through a continuous variable Q. The key point then is that the profit function is specific
to the organizational form of sourcing, for reasons following below. We may write maximum
profits as ΠΩ = ΠΩ(θ,Q), where Ω = V,O indicates the organizational mode, i.e., vertical
integration or outsourcing.5 Without loss of generality, we assume that both θ and Q are
non-negative and parametric to the firm. A sufficient condition for a firm’s productivity level
to play no role for its choice of the organizational form is
[ΠV (θ,Q)− ΠO(θ,Q)][ΠV θ(θ,Q)− ΠOθ(θ,Q)] > 0 (2.1)
for all θ- and Q-values that satisfy ΠΩ(θ,Q) > 0, where we use a subscript to denote par-
tial derivatives. If vertical integration delivers a profit advantage for the minimum level of
productivity required to make a profit at all, then inequality (2.1) states that this advantage
gets reinforced if the productivity level increases. And accordingly if the profit advantage
lies with outsourcing.
If this condition is violated, then each of the two organizational forms may be advanta-
geous only for certain sub-ranges of the productivity level. In turn, these sub-ranges remain
5The notion of maximum profits implies that the firm (credibly) anticipates choosing profit-maximizing
production levels etc., given its choice of organizational form.
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unaffected by production characteristics other than productivity if
[ΠV (θ,Q)− ΠO(θ,Q)][ΠV Q(θ,Q)− ΠOQ(θ,Q)] > 0 (2.2)
Obviously, this inequality follows the same logic as inequality (2.1), but with respect to
changes in the production characteristic Q instead of the productivity level θ.
Why might these conditions be violated? A possible reason is highlighted in Grossman &
Helpman (2004) who model sourcing of inputs in a principle-agent framework. They assume
that in an outsourcing (arms-length) relationship the principal (firm) cannot monitor the
agent’s (input provider’s) efforts to ensure satisfactory quality of inputs. In contrast, vertical
integration facilitates monitoring and contractibility of effort for a subset of the tasks required.
The outcome of the relationship is binary in nature. If the input is of sufficient quality,
then total revenue is determined by the firm’s productivity level, otherwise it is zero. The
likelihood of sufficient quality depends on the agent’s effort level. An outsourcing contract
features a success-contingent payment serving as a “high-powered” incentive, in addition
to an unconditional payment (restricted to non-negative values) that secures participation.
With integration, the contract specifies a wage, to be paid conditional on contracted effort
for the sub-range of tasks where monitoring is possible, alongside a success-contingent bonus
payment that serves as a “high-powered” incentive for non-monitored tasks.
Integration appears advantageous because of contractibility of at least some tasks, but
it also means that the firm must bear the cost of material inputs directly, whereas with
outsourcing these inputs are acquired by the supplier, and the firm pays for the cost indirectly
through the participation constraint. Expected profits are equal to expected revenue, net of
effort-related as well as unconditional payments that secure participation of the agent, and
– with integration – net of material input costs, which are given independently of a firm’s
productivity.
Importantly, Grossman & Helpman (2004) assume that the marginal return of effort in
terms of a higher success probability is diminishing. For the firm, this implies an increasing
marginal cost of eliciting effort from the agent through the “high-powered” incentive. It
also implies that the agent is able to extract a rent from the contractual relationship. The
higher the productivity of the firm, the more it pays to elicit high effort from the agent. But
high effort implies high rent sharing. Intuitively, then, the fact that outsourcing allows to
shift the (fixed) input cost to the supplier becomes increasingly attractive to the firm as its
productivity increases. It is a vehicle to retard rent sharing.
In terms of the above notation, if integration seems more attractive because of con-
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tractibility of at least some of the tasks, i.e., ΠV (θ,Q) > ΠO(θ,Q), for high productivity
levels we may observe ΠV θ(θ,Q) < ΠOθ(θ,Q), eventually leading to ΠV (θ,Q) < ΠO(θ,Q)
for very high productivity levels. Conversely, for a sufficiently low initial level of productiv-
ity, shifting the materials cost onto the supplier may be useful for a different reason: It is
a useful “high-powered” incentive vehicle when, due to low productivity, the optimal effort
level, and thus the rent to be extracted, is small. For low enough productivity values, we
may therefore observe ΠV (θ,Q) < ΠO(θ,Q) coupled with ΠV θ(θ,Q) > ΠOθ(θ,Q). Thus, the
above condition is violated and the productivity level becomes an important determinant in
the organizational choice.
Given the dominance of outsourcing for low, as well as for high productivity levels, the
question is whether the key advantage of integration, viz. observability and contractibility of
some tasks, will ever become large enough to render integration a superior form of sourcing.
Grossman & Helpman (2004) show that under certain conditions, particularly if the share of
tasks for which integration permits contractibility is large enough, this is true for intermediate
levels of productivity. Figure 2.1 borrows from Grossman & Helpman (2004) in depicting
maximum expected profits (solid lines) for alternative productivity-levels and organizational
forms of sourcing.6
<<Figure 2.1 about here>>
In very influential papers, Antra`s (2003) and Antra`s & Helpman (2004) tell a different
story of why productivity might be important for organizational choice. They focus on
a holdup-problem that arises from a concurrence of incomplete contracts and relationship-
specificity of inputs. Production of final goods requires two essential inputs: a headquarter
service provided by the final goods producer herself, and an intermediate input provided
by a second party. Both inputs have zero value outside the production relationship, and
lack of contractibility pits the two parties against each other in ex post negotiation about
revenue sharing. Revenue from the production relationship derives from selling the final
good in a market with monopolistic competition. Since neither party may expect to fully
appropriate the marginal revenue of her input, both inputs will be provided in less than
optimal amounts. Moreover, production will also suffer from a distorted input mix. A clever
choice of the organizational form will minimize the loss due to this inefficiency.
Available organizational forms differ in terms of the outside option in the bargaining
process. Following the property rights literature, Antra`s & Helpman (2004) define integration
6The piecewise linear profit-line for outsourcing reflects a two-step piecewise linearity of the concave
relationship between individual effort and the probability of successful completion of the final good.
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as affording residual claims on the input, should bargaining break down. With this outside
option, the expected revenue share accruing to the final goods producer (input supplier) is
higher (lower) with vertical integration than with outsourcing. However, vertical integration
tends to erode the incentive for the non-headquarter input, hence it does not clearly dominate
the outsourcing strategy. If the input is sufficiently important, the final goods producer will
find outsourcing to be a more profitable sourcing strategy. In terms of the above notation, if
we identify Q as the intensity of the production relationship in the headquarter input, then
for low values of Q we have ΠV (θ,Q) < ΠO(θ,Q) with ΠV Q(θ,Q) > ΠOQ(θ,Q), which will
eventually lead to ΠV (θ,Q) > ΠO(θ,Q) for high enough values of Q. We cannot, therefore,
expect an unambiguous relationship between a firm’s productivity level and its organizational
form of input sourcing.
However, for a given value of Q the incentive implications of the two organizational
forms will either favor outsourcing or integration. In Antra`s & Helpman (2004), the produc-
tivity level of the firm then acts as an unambiguous leverage for this incentive advantage:
∂|ΠV (θ,Q)−ΠO(θ,Q)|/∂θ. But it is the expected profit, not the incentive advantage alone,
that determines the organizational form. Assuming, plausibly, that there are fixed costs of
running the production relationship and that these costs are specific to the organizational
form then renders a decisive influence of productivity. For instance, if ΠV θ(θ,Q) > ΠOθ(θ,Q)
and if vertical integration entails a higher fixed cost, then the firm needs a sufficient leverage
from a high level of productivity for the incentive advantage to choose vertical integration.
In this model, the leverage property of θ implies linear profit lines for either organizational
form, as opposed to the strictly convex line for outsourcing in Grossman & Helpman (2004).
Figure 2.1 anchors the comparison of the two models through a common profit line ΠV (θ,Q)
and a dashed profit line Π′O(θ,Q) for outsourcing, as emerging in Antra`s & Helpman (2004).
This latter framework assumes unavoidable organizational fixed costs for both of the two
forms, whereas in Grossman & Helpman (2004) outsourcing avoids all fixed cost by shifting
upfront purchasing of materials to the agent. Hence, in Antra`s & Helpman (2004) there
exists a unique cut-off level θb which separates outsourcing from integration, whereas the
principle-agent framework has outsourcing “reappear” as an optimal form of sourcing for
high-enough productivity levels larger than θd.
7
It is now relatively straightforward to envisage an extension of these models to include
a foreign source of input provision. It seems plausible that some (or all) of the structural
details that govern the choice of vertical integration or outsourcing in the above frameworks
are different for foreign sourcing (offshoring) compared to domestic sourcing. For instance,
7There also exists a threshold level for positive profits.
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in the Grossman & Helpman (2004) framework, the range of monitored tasks, the cost of
material inputs and the outside option of partners may all be lower abroad than in the
domestic economy. In the Antra`s & Helpman (2004) framework, the fixed cost of operating
the two alternative modes of sourcing, as well as the cost of the input as such, may be
different for foreign compared to domestic sourcing.8 The same may apply for the residual
claims afforded by vertical integration, or the range of contractible inputs in the generalized
framework presented in Antra`s & Helpman (2008). It is relatively obvious that superimposing
an “offshoring equivalent” to the above organizational choice generates a richer pattern of
sourcing strategies, with associated ranges of productivity levels.
Even with this extension, however, a profit-maximizing firm with a given productivity
level would see no reason for pursuing multiple modes of sourcing. This contrasts with
casual observation, and we shall see below that multiple-mode sourcing strategies are quite
common also among Spanish firms. On a very general level, some explanatory candidates
seem straightforward. For instance, a risk-averse principal may want to hedge against the
risk associated with the cost of materials inputs. She may also consider running multiple-
mode strategies to build up a fallback position so as to enhance her outside option for the
bargaining in any one of the organizational modes. For reasons of space, we abstain from
any detailed theoretical reasoning for the occurrence of multiple-mode sourcing, but we shall
return to this issue in our empirical section below.9
While it is thus clear why a firm’s productivity level should have an influence on or-
ganizational choice, it is also obvious that available models do not permit a clear-cut and
unconditional prediction on the ranking of organizational forms in terms of the firm’s pro-
ductivity level.10 The predictions vary across models, as witnessed by Figure 2.1, and even
within a given model the ranking depends on a host of variables, many of which are diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to observe. In the next sections, we turn to a micro-level empirical
analysis of input sourcing strategies pursued by Spanish manufacturing firms. Although our
analysis cannot purport to test any specific model of input sourcing, it will nonetheless reveal
informative insights into the Spanish case, and it should give us a general impression of the
empirical relevance of recent literature on global sourcing which stresses the role of a firm’s
8In view of the Spanish case, we want to stress that in a multi-factor context the foreign cost advantage
may well lie with comparatively cheap high-skilled labor. Moreover, it may also have to do with the search
process for suppliers of suitably specified inputs, whence issues of market thickness and country size may
play a role; see Grossman & Helpman (2005).
9For a model focusing on the fallback position, see Du et al. (2009). We deliberately abstain from
calling such multi-mode sourcing a complex sourcing strategy, so as to avoid confusion with the term complex
integration strategy as used in the literature on multinational firms; see Grossman et al. (2006).
10Feenstra & Hanson (2005) present a holdup-model of inputs trade akin to the models portrayed above,
but without any explicit role for productivity levels to influence the organizational form of sourcing.
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productivity level for organizational choice.
2.3 Stylized facts of input sourcing
Before turning to an econometric analysis of sourcing premia, we want to highlight the spe-
cific advantages of our data as well as some important stylized facts pertaining to Spanish
firms’ input sourcing. This section provides a comprehensive picture of Spanish firms’ sourc-
ing behavior, including several new features that should inspire refinement of existing and
development of new theoretical models of input sourcing.
2.3.1 Data description
The data come from the “Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales” (ESEE)11, an annual
survey of Spanish manufacturing firms carried out by the SEPI Foundation, Madrid.12 The
survey generates an unbalanced panel of some 4,600 legal entities with information on firms’
strategies of input sourcing, as well as revenue and balance sheet statistics, covering the years
2000-2008. The SEPI Foundation applies a complex random sampling procedure, sending
out survey questionnaires13 to all firms with more than 200 employees, and to a subset of
firms with 200 or less but more than 10 employees. This subset is selected according to a
stratified sampling scheme, in which each combination of a single industry (out of a total of
20 industries, each formed by a group of products at NACE-1993 level)14 and a single size
group (out of four)15 is fixed as a distinct and independent stratum in advance, giving rise to
a total of 80 strata. This way of sampling guarantees that we can establish representativeness
of the data for different industries (at distinct points in time) and the manufacturing sector at
large. Importantly, the SEPI Foundation preserves these highly desirable sample properties
over time by controlling for the dynamics in the panel due to market entry and exit.16 In both,
the descriptive data exploration and the econometric analysis, we always use the sampling
information in order to obtain consistent and efficient estimates, and to draw conclusions
11“Survey on Business Strategies”.
12“Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales”. The SEPI Foundation promotes research and study
opportunities in Spain. For more information, see http://www.funep.es.
13The SEPI Foundation uses an extended questionnaire every four years and a reduced annual question-
naire for the years in between.
14See Table A.1 in Appendix A for a comprehensive list of industries.
15Size groups are (i) between 10 and 20 employees, (ii) between 21 and 50 employees, (iii) between 51 and
100 employees, and (iv) between 101 and 200 employees.
16For more information on this procedure, see http://www.funep.es/esee/en/einfo que es.asp.
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about the Spanish manufacturing industry as a whole.17
The key advantage of our data is that from 2006 onwards they fully cover both, the
location and the organization dimension of firms’ sourcing decisions. To avoid ambiguity as
to the precise meaning of the various organizational modes, we list the questions to which
firms were responding in the questionnaire.18
• Of the total amount of purchases of goods and services that you incorporate (transform)
in the production process, indicate according to the type of supplier the percentage
which these represent in the total amount of purchases of your firm in [year].
1. Spanish suppliers which belong to your group of companies or which participate
in your firm’s joint capital. [yes/no] / [if yes, then percentage rate]
2. Other suppliers located in Spain. [yes/no] / [if yes, then percentage rate]
• For the year [year], indicate whether you imported goods and services that you incorpo-
rate (transform) in the production process, and the percentage which these imports –
according to the type of supplier – represent in the total value of your imports. [yes/no]
1. From suppliers which belong to your group of companies and/or from foreign firms
which participate in your firm’s joint capital. [yes/no] / [if yes, then percentage
rate]
2. From other foreign firms. [yes/no] / [if yes, then percentage rate]
Since the survey also includes information on the total amount of purchases as well as
the total value of imports for each observation, we can compute – for each firm and each
year (2006,2007,2008) – the extent to which intermediate inputs were acquired from a related
or an unrelated party, respectively, in the home and in a foreign economy. Note that the
framing of the above questions defines an input supplier as a different legal entity (either
related or unrelated to the firm). In turn, inputs are defined such that the good in ques-
tion is transformed in the production process.19 In what follows, we distinguish among four
17Specifically, we weight each observation by the inverse of its probability of being sampled, using size-
group-specific information on the total number of firms in a given NACE-1993 industry (provided by the
Social Security Directorate through the SEPI Foundation) and the representation of each size group in the
sample.
18The original survey questions are given in Spanish. The original questionnaires are downloadable at
http://www.funep.es/esee/sp/svariables/indice.asp.
19The sourcing information obtained from this survey does not refer to single, well-defined transactions
of firms. Hence, we cannot trace a firm’s acquisition of a certain input at a specific point in time back to a
particular sourcing mode. What we observe are the pure extensive and intensive margins of firms (with a
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sourcing options: foreign integration (FI), foreign outsourcing (FO), domestic integration
(DI), and domestic outsourcing (DO). Coherent coverage of all sourcing modes generates
a comprehensive picture of global sourcing behavior that goes well beyond existing studies
which are mostly restricted to a subset of sourcing strategies. The precise way in which we
exploit the sourcing information contained in the data will become evident below.
An important further improvement made possible by our data relates to the strategic
relationship between headquarter firms and affiliated firms. Earlier studies typically lack
information on which party occupies the parental status and, thus, has complete discretion
over the strategic decision of interest; see, for example, Federico (2010) and Nunn & Trefler
(2008). Models of global sourcing typically do not consider situations in which the input
supplier has a controlling stake in a producer’s joint capital and may therefore manipulate
the sourcing decision to her own advantage. In our data, all firms are categorized by the
extent to which other companies participate in a firm’s joint capital. Hence, we can construct
a unique subsample of true headquarter firms, which helps us circumvent this entire issue
in a straightforward way. A related question has to do with the distinction between firms
and establishments or plants. Note that our survey collects data at the level of the firm (a
unique legal entity), whereby about five out of six firms in the sample operate by means of
a single establishment only. Naturally, a single firm/legal entity may well be part of a group
of companies, but the data always refer to a single firm’s sourcing strategy and balance sheet
statements, instead of consolidated information for conglomerates.
2.3.2 Stylized facts
In what follows, we want to establish what we believe to be important stylized facts that
may be drawn from our data set. We slice our data in the sourcing dimensions (domestic vs.
foreign and outsourcing vs. integration), and we draw lines between small and large firms,
as well as exporting and non-exporting firms. As we have emphasized above, the survey
underlying our data provides for firms to report multiple sourcing strategies. We exploit
this by looking at sourcing strategies in two different ways. First, we identify all possible
strategies spanned by our two-by-two dimension of sourcing. This gives rise to the distinction
between single-mode-and-location strategies, denoted in a self-explanatory way by FI, FO,
DI and DO, and combined strategies where firms pursue more than one mode or location of
sourcing. Overall, there are 15 different strategies that may arise, with a one-to-one mapping
potentially large number of different products, inputs, and/or sourcing markets), not product-country-firm
combinations. As a consequence, our econometric analysis cannot exploit information on firms’ sourcing
markets other than the distinction between the home and a foreign economy.
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of firms into strategies, as in Table 2.1. The second approach simply asks about the number
of times any one of our four principle combinations of sourcing mode and location arises,
irrespective of whether it is observed as a single-mode-and-location strategy, or as part of
a combined strategy. With this approach, followed in Table 2.2, each firm is potentially
observed more than once.
<<Tables 2.1 and 2.2 about here>>
The first question we want to ask is how likely small and large firms are to pursue pure
outsourcing modes, meaning that they acquire intermediates exclusively from unrelated par-
ties. Conversely, how likely are they to entirely abstain from independent suppliers (vertical
integration)? Summing up percentages for DO, FO and DOFO (and correspondingly for
DI, FI and DIFI), we summarize the following observation.
Stylized fact 1. Pure outsourcing strategies are relatively common, while pure integration
is a very rare phenomenon. This pattern is largely independent of firm size.20
How likely are firms to pursue combined strategies that involve two or more combinations
of organizational mode and location of sourcing? Comparing columns (1) through (4) and
(5) through (15), the answer may be stated as
Stylized fact 2. Combined strategies are almost as prevalent as single organization and
location strategies, whereby large firms and exporting firms, respectively, are more likely to
pursue multiple ways of sourcing than are small and non-exporting firms.
The most common example of multiple sourcing is a combination of domestic and foreign
outsourcing (DOFO). One might be tempted to explain multiple ways of sourcing by the
presence of multi-product firms maintaining multiple contractual relationships with various
suppliers. Our data allow us to examine this explanation, and we find contrary evidence. For
instance, 85 percent of firms in the 2008 sample report production of a “single good” (using
the 3 digit NACE-1993 product level). And of these single-product firms, almost one-half are
engaged in multiple ways of sourcing.
Counting our four principle ways of sourcing independently of whether or not they appear
in multi-mode or multi-location strategies, Table 2.2 reveals that provision of inputs from
independent domestic suppliers looms large in the sourcing modes, appearing in more than
90 percent of all reporting firms. In contrast, foreign outsourcing is reserved to a minority
20Note that the percentages of Tables 2.1 and 2.2 relating to all firms weight the number of firms in each
size class by the inverse probability of being sampled, based on the size distribution of all Spanish firms.
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(37 percent) of all firms. However, Spanish manufacturing firms’ overall engagement in
international sourcing is still quite pronounced, if compared to other developed countries.
For example, Tomiura (2007) reports that only five percent of Japan’s manufacturing firms
in 1998 are engaged in foreign sourcing, whether through offshore outsourcing, vertical FDI,
or both.21 This remarkable difference reflects the strong economic integration in Europe, and
we provide further support for this statement later in this section.
Vertical integration is significantly less prevalent among Spanish firms. To the extent
present, it is more likely to be found for domestic input provision than for offshoring. More-
over, there are huge differences between small and large firms. More than a third (fourth)
of large firms purchase intermediates through vertical integration at home (abroad), with
percentages that are larger by the factor four (seven) than those for small firms. Almost
two thirds of large firms do offshore outsourcing, with percentages almost twice as high as
those for small firms. These differences between small and large firms are reduced somewhat
once we drop small non-exporting firms from the sample. Indeed, the smallest share of firms
engaging in international sourcing can be found among small firms with purely domestic
sales. However, the ranking of the relative importance of each of the four sourcing categories
is preserved across size and export status groups. We may summarize these findings as
Stylized fact 3. Domestic sourcing is significantly more common than foreign sourcing,
independently of the organizational form of sourcing. Outsourcing is significantly more com-
mon than integration, independently of the location choice. And large as well as exporting
firms are much more likely to pursue strategies of offshoring and vertical integration than are
small and non-exporting firms.
Although of a purely descriptive nature, Stylized fact 3 is a hint towards a fixed cost
ranking of global sourcing strategies, if interpreted against models of global sourcing such as
those presented in Section 2.2. Since, arguably, fixed costs should constitute an especially
high hurdle for smaller firms, our data point towards an ordering that satisfies f lV > f
l
O and
fFΩ > f
D
Ω , ` ∈ {F,D}, where f represents fixed costs and superscripts F and D refer to the
foreign and the domestic economy, respectively. The type of ranking is essential for deriving
predictions from any model of global sourcing that allows for firm heterogeneity.
Table 2.2 brings up a further interesting feature of our data worth discussing: It refers to
firms that we classify as “non-sourcing”. These are firms that do not report acquiring any
intermediate inputs from a different legal entity. Such firms appear as pursuing a particularly
21We should add a caveat in that the data in Tomiura (2007) do not impose any threshold value on firm
size, while the Spanish data do not include manufacturing firms with less than ten employees.
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deep vertical integration strategy in the home economy, incorporating all steps of the pro-
duction chain into a single legal entity. For our purpose, the question arises as to whether we
should treat such firms on the same footing as firms that follow domestic integration in input
provision. For example, such firms might seem as having full discretion over all decisions
related to provision of inputs, which would in turn rule out any kind of hold-up problem.
However, we argue that such non-sourcing firms should still be regarded as pursuing domes-
tic integration, as long as the economic nature of the production relationship (and thus the
strategic game) between headquarter and supplier is not affected by whether or not the legal
system treats the supplier as a different legal entity.22 We shall return to this point in our
econometric analysis below.
What is the likelihood that a firm pursues foreign integration, conditional upon also in-
cluding foreign outsourcing among its sourcing modes, compared to the unconditional prob-
ability of choosing vertical integration? This question can be asked for all four principle
sourcing modes, leading to a whole matrix of unconditional and conditional probabilities. To
answer these questions, we estimate a multivariate probit model, regressing all relevant indi-
cator variables for sourcing strategies on year dummies, and using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane (GHK) simulator to evaluate higher-order integrals of the multivariate normal distri-
bution; see Cappellari & Jenkins (2003) for details on this estimation. We do so separately
for each firm size group, and we subsequently calculate unconditional and conditional proba-
bilities, based on estimated correlations of the residuals across equations (and thus sourcing
categories). Table 2.3 summarizes the essential results, averaging out the estimates across the
years 2006, 2007, and 2008.23 A first message from this table is that, with the sole exception
domestic outsourcing, the probability is higher for large firms than for small firms for any
sourcing channel.
<<Table 2.3 about here>>
More interestingly, a row-wise comparison of the numbers presented in Table 2.3 suggests
a significant degree of interdependence between sourcing strategies. For instance, the prob-
ability of a large (small) firm pursuing foreign integration increases from 27 (4) percent to
22Still, this interpretation is challenged by the question of why, after all, we should then observe this kind
of heterogeneity of different legal regimes between headquarters and suppliers in the data. This concern is
strengthened by the fact that it does not appear to follow a random distribution: 0.7 percent of small firms
report a single domestic integration sourcing strategy, whereas as much as about 5 percent report no sourcing
at all.
23In the interest of clarity, we abstain from presenting all estimated conditional probabilities of being
active in a specific sourcing mode. Instead, we show each estimated “success probability”, conditional on the
firm also using the mode indicated in the row or column label as a further sourcing mode. This gives rise to
the two 4× 4 matrices for large and small firms presented in Table 2.3.
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36 (9) percent, if this firm outsources internationally, and to 32 (12) percent if it integrates
domestically. Similarly, the probability of offshore outsourcing and domestic integration, con-
ditional on foreign integration, is higher than the corresponding unconditional probability.
This basic pattern is independent on firm size. However, what does depend on firm size is
the relationship between the foreign outsourcing and the domestic integration group. For
small firms, there is a positive correlation between the two modes, while for large firms this
is not the case. We summarize this as
Stylized fact 4. There is a strong interdependence between all sourcing strategies other than
domestic outsourcing. In particular, there is positive correlation between the probabilities of
(i) vertically integrating a foreign supplier (ii) outsourcing internationally, and (iii) vertically
integrating domestically.
Theoretical accounts of global sourcing tend to characterize firms’ offshoring decisions in a
set-up in which final-good producers in high-cost North may relocate part of their production
chain to low-cost South. Against this backdrop, we examine the breakdown of total imports
(including imported inputs) of each firm according to four regions of origin: European Union
(EU), Latin America, other OECD countries (excluding EU countries and Latin America),
and the rest of the world (ROW; excluding EU countries, countries in Latin America, and
other OECD countries).24
<<Table 2.4 about here>>
Table 2.4 compares the regional distribution of aggregate Spanish imports of the man-
ufacturing sector with that of the Spanish economy as a whole. What we can learn from
this is, in our view, a major qualification of the common understanding of offshoring as a
phenomenon involving relocation of input production from high wage to low wage countries.
Indeed, from each Euro-equivalent imported by the Spanish manufacturing industry in 2006,
75 cents came from a member state of the European Union.25 Of the overall value of imports
in that year, less than six percent originate in low wage countries such as the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia, while the top five
source countries are Germany (22 percent), France (20), Italy (13), United Kingdom (8), and
24In 2006, roughly 60 percent of Spanish manufacturing imports are classified as inputs incorporated
(transformed) in the production process.
25To make sure that this figure is not overstated due to imports of final goods, we restrict the sample to
firms for which the total value of imports is equal to the total value of imports of intermediate inputs. Then,
the share of the value of imports from the European Union in the overall value of imports is even higher (83
percent); see Table 2.4.
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the Netherlands (6). Generally speaking, high technology EU-countries seem to matter more
for input provision in the manufacturing sector than for supply of finals and inputs in the
Spanish economy at large. We summarize
Stylized fact 5. Offshoring in Spain mainly takes place by means of importing intermediate
inputs from high wage countries in the European Union.
<<Table 2.5 about here>>
In Table 2.5 we again differentiate between large and small firms and their imports from
different world regions, independently of the amount of imports. First, we see that more
than 90 percent of importing firms source from member states of the European Union, with
a much smaller fraction of goods and services coming from elsewhere. This observation
reinforces our above statements. Second, a significantly higher share of large firms than
of small firms imports from Latin American countries (12 versus 6 percent), other OECD
countries (42 vs. 20 percent), and countries of the rest of the world (42 vs. 27 percent).
Third, large firms are more likely to import simultaneously from two, three, or all four world
regions than small firms. We can draw similar conclusions from distinguishing small exporters
from small non-exporters. We thus have
Stylized fact 6. Virtually all importers source from EU countries. Large firms and exporting
firms have well above-average probabilities of (i) acquiring intermediate inputs from distant,
non EU countries and (ii) spreading their sourcing activities among a large number of import
regions.
2.4 Estimating sourcing premia
In this section, we turn to an econometric analysis of the relationship between a firm’s
productivity level and its sourcing behavior. Following the literature on exporter premia, we
estimate sourcing premia.26 By this we mean differences in estimated means of productivity
across firms, conditional on how and where a firm obtains its inputs. Such premia are
suggested by the models of input sourcing that we have briefly reviewed in Section 2.2 above.
According to these models, vertical integration and outsourcing entail different incentive
patterns in sourcing relationships that are plagued by incomplete contracts. In turn, under
26Our approach borrows from Bernard & Jensen (1999) who focus on exporter status of a firm. The
methodology has also been applied in a refined way by Helpman et al. (2004) who distinguish between
multinational and non-multinational exporters.
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plausible conditions a firm’s productivity level is an important determinant of whether one
or the other organizational form of sourcing (incentive pattern) is more attractive in terms
of expected profits. We should thus expect to observe a systematic pattern of productivity
differences between firms that pursue different sourcing strategies.
However, as emphasized in Section 2.2, the precise pattern of sourcing premia depends
on several characteristics that we do not observe, such as organizational fixed cost. Hence,
the subsequent econometric analysis should not be interpreted as an empirical test of any
one model of input sourcing. Nor do we intend to establish causality running from a firm’s
sourcing behavior to its productivity level. Rather, we examine whether our Spanish data for
2006-2008 lend empirical support to the general idea of within-industry firm heterogeneity
in productivity and sourcing. More specifically, our econometric results reveal the detailed
pattern of correlation, if any, between Spanish firms’ productivity levels and their global
sourcing decisions, consistently covering both, the location and the organization dimension
of sourcing.
2.4.1 Measures of firm productivity
We must first clarify how to measure firm productivity in our subsequent regression analysis.
Our first measure is labor productivity, computed as the log of real value added over the hours
effectively worked. Real value added is defined as production plus other operating income
net of total outlays for intermediate inputs and external services, everything expressed in
prices of the year 2000. As an alternative measure, we compute a firm’s level of total factor
productivity (TFP) relative to the industry average, relying on estimation of sector-specific
production functions. Taking advantage of several convenient features of our data, we apply
the Olley & Pakes (1996) three-step estimation algorithm in order control for the estimation
biases originating in endogenous selection into markets (selection bias) and simultaneous
choice of input factors (simultaneity bias).
We feed the Olley & Pakes (1996) estimation routine with the ESEE firm-level data from
2000-2008, using year-specific information on each firm’s real value added, real investment,
real capital stock, labor employment, and exit decisions. Real value added is defined as
above. Real investment is the value of investment (in Euros) in real estate, construction, and
equipment. The real capital stock is the value (in Euros) of real estate, constructions, and
equipment, net of depreciation. Labor employment enters the production function in terms
of effective work hours, which reduces the probability of non-stochastic measurement errors.
Exit decisions are well documented in the Spanish data, so that we can differentiate between
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firms shutting down production, i.e., market exit, and mere panel exit.
For deflation of production and other operating income, we use firm-level variations in
goods prices as reported by the ESEE. For years in which a firm is not sampled, we use
an industry-level price index from the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE). Relying
on a firm-specific goods price index is important for at least three reasons. First, if firms
have market power (say due to product differentiation) and if firm-specific mark-ups behave
differently over time, then the use of industry price indexes results in a correlation between
the input choices and the error term. Second, if unobserved firm-specific demand shocks
cause price fluctuations, then estimation based on industry-level deflation would lead to
inconsistent estimates; see Klette & Griliches (1996) and De Loecker (2007). The same holds
true, thirdly, if different firms within the same industry (say exporters versus non-exporters)
face different market structures; see De Loecker (2007). For deflation of variables other than
real value added, we use industry-level price indexes from the Spanish INE.
2.4.2 Econometric specifications
We apply a simple unified econometric framework in which we regress firm productivity
on up to four binary variables which fully describe a firm’s sourcing strategy. In much
of the theoretical literature on global sourcing, firms face a discrete choice of intermediate
input production according to which the unique profit-maximizing strategy is either foreign
integration (FI), or foreign outsourcing (FO), or domestic integration (DI), or domestic
outsourcing (DO). We operationalize this concept by computing “sourcing dummies” in a
mutually exclusive way. If a firm is active in two or more sourcing modes simultaneously, we
assign it to the category which is the least prevalent one in the overall sample.27 Technically
speaking, when observing multiple sourcing strategies, we apply a strict “sourcing hierarchy”
that states FI > DI > FO > DO. As a robustness check, we have applied an alternative
hierarchy, viz. FI > FO > DI > DO. This requires that we re-label four percent of firms in
the weighted sample. We comment briefly on relevant similarities and differences in the text.
Detailed results for this alternative case are available from the authors upon request. All of
this implies that, for the time being, we ignore the empirical fact that some firms do combine
different sourcing channels at a given point in time. We do so deliberately, however, so as
to mimic the theoretical case of pure sourcing strategies. We turn to a more differentiated
approach geared towards multiple sourcing strategies below.
27The prevalence of sourcing strategies in the data is found in the final column of Table 2.2 above. Thus,
since FI is the least prevalent of all strategies, any firm pursuing FI is treated as an FI-firm, regardless of
whether it relies on FI alone or as part of a more complex strategy. Analogously for all other strategies.
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Formally, we estimate the following panel model.
θit = β0 + β1FIit + β2FOit + β3DIit + β4Ageit + β5Exportit + γj + γt + µit, (2.3)
where θit is firm i’s productivity level at time t, FIit, FOit, DIit are mutually exclusive
sourcing dummies as explained above, Ageit is the age of the firm, Exportit is a dummy
variable that controls for a firm’s exporter status, γj is an industry fixed effect, γt is a year
fixed effect, and µit = ci + it is a composite error term including an unobserved firm-effect
ci and an idiosyncratic error it.
Since our sample spans several industries, we need to control for industry-specific deter-
minants of a firm’s performance by including industry dummies. We do so in all regressions.
The exporter status appears in our set of regressors in order to capture the traditional ex-
porter premium; see Bernard et al. (2007). This reduces the probability of observing spurious
positive correlation between foreign sourcing modes and performance measures. This could
happen, for instance, if firms obtain access to new information through exporting, and if
that information reduces the fixed cost of offshoring. We shall return to this below when
comparing results obtained upon including and excluding exporter status in the estimated
equation.
Finally, we also follow the empirical literature on productivity premia in that we control
for a firm’s age, and by including year dummies which isolate our estimates from any year-
specific productivity shocks that equally affect all Spanish manufacturing firms in the sample.
Equation (2.3) describes a model in which domestic-outsourcing firms (FIit = FOit =
DIit = 0) serve as the baseline category against which all potential performance premia
need to be interpreted. To give an example, the premium (in percent) of foreign-integration
firms relative to domestic-outsourcing firms is equal to λFIDO = 100× [exp(β1)− 1]. Thus, an
estimated coefficient of β1 = 0.5 means that, other things equal, foreign-integration firms are
roughly 65 percent more productive than domestic-outsourcing firms.
With mutually exclusive sourcing dummies, we see three plausible ways of dealing with
what we have classified as “non-sourcing” firms before. The first is to argue that these firms
are acquiring all inputs in the home economy without reverting to independent suppliers and
to treat them on an equal footing with domestic-integration firms. The second way simply
drops “non-sourcing” firms from the estimation sample, given that they do not acquire any
inputs from a party that would be considered a legal entity in our sample. A third possibility
is to treat them as an entirely distinct group of firms which serves as the baseline category
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in estimating sourcing premia. For this last case, the regression model (2.3) turns into
θit = β0 + β1FIit + β2FOit + β3DIit + β4DOit + β5Ageit + β6Exportit + γj + γt + µit, (2.4)
where DOit is an indicator variable for domestic outsourcing, again based on mutually ex-
clusive coding. Here, we only report estimates for the first type of coding and comment on
what seem to be interesting differences in the text; see Tables 2.6 and 2.7. The regression
results for the alternative firm codings can be found in Appendix B.
Mutually exclusive coding has the advantage of being in line with the theoretical models
reviewed in Section 2.2. However, it does not fully exploit all information contained in
the data. In the previous section, we have therefore suggested broaden the analysis by
alternatively constructing our sourcing indicators in what we call mutually inclusive coding;
see Tables 2.8 and 2.9. To see the difference, consider a firm that engages in both vertical
FDI and offshore outsourcing, but not in domestic sourcing. With mutually inclusive coding,
the dummies FI and FO both take on a value of one, and the dummies for DI and DO a
value of zero. In comparison with the more restrictive coding structure that satisfies mutual
exclusion, this opens up an entirely new perspective on sourcing premia. It uncovers marginal
effects from adding a new specific location and/or organizational form to the firm’s existing
sourcing activities. With mutually inclusive sourcing dummies, non-sourcing firms form the
baseline group throughout all regressions, as in equation (2.4).28
We conduct the entire empirical analysis twice, relying on two types of samples. The
first is restricted to true headquarter firms, meaning that we exclude a firm if some other
company owns more than 50 percent of the firm’s capital and/or if the firm is subject to
foreign ownership.29 Restricting the sample along this dimension seems important in the
present context, since we would otherwise risk including firms whose sourcing strategies are
in fact dictated by their parental companies. The presence of such firms in the sample is a
potentially troubling source of estimation bias that, to the best of our knowledge, has not
been addressed rigorously in existing empirical studies. We regard the possibility to avoid
this bias as a key advantage of our data set. Since this comes at the expense of a lower
number of observations, we also run all regressions on the unrestricted sample.30 It turns out
28Re-labeling or excluding non-sourcing firms in this estimation would not allow for a unique baseline
category.
29The threshold value of control is not decisive. For example, in 2008 we exclude roughly 30 percent of
the total number of firms (N = 1, 976). Reducing the threshold value to 25 percent would eliminate only a
slightly larger number of firms but leave any of our results unchanged.
30Restricting the sample along the ownership dimension also significantly decreases the share of large firms
in the sample.
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that the restriction matters less for estimation outcomes than we have expected. A possible
explanation is that the bulk of firms which are subject to external ownership still have full
control over their very sourcing decisions. We report estimation results for both the restricted
and the unrestricted sample in the text.
We implement three routines for estimating sourcing premia. The first simply pools the
data and applies ordinary least squares (OLS). This estimator yields consistent estimates as
long as there is no systematic contemporaneous correlation between the composite error term
and the explanatory variables. Second, we explicitly treat the data as a panel and account
for unobserved heterogeneity across firms by estimating a population-averaged model (PA).
This model allows incorporating different correlation structures for the error term but is
asymptotically equivalent to the random-effects model if estimated with an equal-correlation
linear regression estimator.31 Provided that all explanatory variables are (i) independent from
the firm-specific fixed effect ci and (ii) strictly exogenous, conditional on ci, the model delivers
consistent and efficient estimates. Lastly, we allow for correlation between the realization of
each sourcing dummy of firm i at time t and time-varying firm unobservables cit at time t
by adopting a simple instrumental variables (IV) approach whereby each sourcing dummy is
instrumented by its lagged value.
We deliberately abstain from estimating a fixed-effects panel model in which we could
get rid of the constant firm-effect ci. In a world with two sourcing strategies, a fixed-effects
estimator would no doubt lead to well identified parameter estimates that may be interpreted
as indicating the presence of a sourcing premium. However, with multiple sourcing strategies,
fixed effects estimation runs into a problem of interpretation with respect to the indicator
variables for sourcing strategies. A given change in such a variable, say a firm dropping out of
the foreign integration category, no longer has a clear-cut interpretation. It obtains economic
meaning only if we know the category it drops into. As a result, fixed-effects parameter
estimates do not lend themselves to ready conclusions about sourcing premia in the same
way as estimates based on “between-variation” do. Therefore, our focus squarely lies on
between-, not within-variation in our data.
2.4.3 Regression results for mutually exclusive sourcing dummies
Table 2.6 presents the first set of results with mutually exclusive sourcing dummies and with
non-sourcing firms coded as domestic-integration firms. The estimation sample is restricted
to true headquarter firms. A first observation is that in virtually all regressions all three
31We report regression results with this estimator below but have also experimented with an autoregressive
correlation structure for the panels. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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sourcing dummies (FI, FO,DI) are positively and significantly correlated with both firm
productivity measures. We conclude that, on average, firms which pursue a plain outsourcing
strategy in the home economy (baseline category) exhibit the lowest level of labor and total
factor productivity.
<<Table 2.6 about here>>
More importantly, however, we recognize a robust ranking of coefficients for sourcing
dummies: Throughout almost all regressions, coefficients for FI are largest and those for DI
are lowest. Loosely speaking, firms which rely on foreign affiliates in organizing intermediate
input production abroad perform better than all other firms in terms of productivity. At the
same time, firms engaging in offshore outsourcing are doing better than firms sourcing from
related parties in the domestic economy. Interestingly, this general pattern does not depend
on the productivity measure, the estimator, or the exporter status of a firm.
What is especially sensitive to a firm’s exporter status, however, is the magnitude of
the foreign sourcing premium, as we would expect. To give an example, column (7), which
employs total factor productivity as the dependent variable and does not control for exporter
status, tells us that foreign-integration (foreign-outsourcing) firms are 60 (30) percent more
productive than domestic-outsourcing firms. Column (8) suggests that controlling for whether
or not the firm is an exporter reduces both premia by about 30 percent.
By contrast, controlling for exporter status reduces the estimated sourcing premium for
domestic-integration firms relative to domestic outsourcers by a mere point from 14 to 13
percent.32 Relatedly, in the majority of cases the exporter premium is highly significant and
larger than that of domestic-integration firms, but comparable in size to the average of the
premia for foreign-integration and foreign-outsourcing firms, ranging from 15 to 23 percent
for the two productivity measures.33
In Table 2.6, the second panel from below reports p-values for two-tailed tests of equality
across sourcing dummy coefficients. Dropping the exporter dummy as a regressor, we find
that in the majority of cases the differences among sourcing premia are statistically significant
32We checked whether controlling for a firm’s age is responsible for these changes, and we found it is not.
33As a robustness check, we have also employed firm-size in terms of the number of employees as a
measure of firm performance. Recent trade theory on firm heterogeneity (Melitz, 2003) stipulates perfect
correlation between firm size and firm productivity. Estimated sourcing premia with this alternative mea-
sure (not reported) are larger than those obtained with labor and total factor productivity. We find that
foreign-integration firms are on average almost five times as large as firms which outsource domestically.
Analogously, foreign-outsourcing (domestic-integration) firms are more than 60 (30) percent larger than do-
mestic outsourcers. This finding complements the result established in Bernard & Jensen (1999) that the
employment premium of exporters (in percent) is larger than the corresponding TFP premium, and it is in
line with the results reported in Federico (2010).
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at the ten percent confidence level. Yet, controlling for exporter status typically increases
the corresponding p-values, so that we often fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal values
across sourcing dummy coefficients. Looking at the OLS estimates of TFP premia, how-
ever, we still find significant performance differentials among all types of firms, even after
segregating these differentials from the exporter premium. The IV approach comes with a
sizable loss of precision in estimation and thus makes it difficult to establish differences among
sourcing dummies at reasonable levels of confidence. More importantly, however, even our
IV regressions leave the ranking of estimated sourcing dummy coefficients unchanged.
The results for the same regression exercise, but with the alternative sourcing hierarchy
(not reported: FI > FO > DI > DO) are very similar, with a single exception. The sourcing
premia of firms engaging in domestic integration are significantly reduced while those of firms
labeled as pursuing foreign outsourcing are slightly increased. This renders the ranking of
sourcing dummy coefficients even more distinct than before, with mode-wise productivity
differentials significant at the ten percent confidence level in the overwhelming majority of
regressions. We interpret this as an indication that firms which combine strategies of foreign
outsourcing and domestic integration perform better than those which use either of the two
sourcing channels alone.
Table 2.7 reports regression results obtained by imposing the original sourcing hierarchy
(FI > DI > FO > DO) but employing the unrestricted estimation sample which includes
both headquarter and non-headquarter firms. Most of our previous qualitative and quan-
titative observations survive or become even stronger, given that the precision with which
coefficients are estimated increases with the sample size. An exception is the relative rank-
ing of estimated coefficients for the foreign-outsourcing and domestic-integration categories.
In particular, point estimates of the coefficient on DI are significantly larger than before,
exceeding those for FO in several specifications. This finding is consistent with empirical
evidence reported by Federico (2010), who cannot identify true headquarter status in his
sample of Italian manufacturing firms.
<<Table 2.7 about here>>
Similar and instructive changes in estimated coefficients are also obtained by excluding
non-sourcing firms from the estimation sample; see Tables B.1 and B.3 in Appendix B. These
results suggest relevant productivity differentials even between “true” domestic-integration
firms and non-sourcing firms. The fact that non-sourcing firms, which are included again in
Tables B.2 and B.4 in Appendix B as the baseline category, appear to be no more productive
than domestic-outsourcing firms is additional support for this interpretation. Indeed, our
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results suggest robust productivity premia relative to non-sourcing firms for all categories
other than domestic outsourcing. Comparing sourcing premia from these regressions across
performance measures, and evaluating the significance of potential differences in these premia
across sourcing modes, we find that “true” domestic-integration firms and foreign-outsourcing
firms are comparable to each other in labor productivity and TFP. Similar conclusions can
be drawn from regressions in which we impose the alternative sourcing hierarchy.
To conclude this subsection, our point estimates of sourcing dummy coefficients with
mutually exclusive coding feature a general pattern of productivity differentials according to
which foreign-integration firms perform best and domestic-outsourcing firms perform worst,
while foreign-outsourcing and domestic-integration firms exhibit intermediate performance
levels both in terms of labor and total factor productivity. This result is independent of the
estimation sample, sourcing hierarchy, and the way in which we deal with non-sourcing firms.
Thus, for a given sourcing location (organizational form), there is a productivity premium
for integrating (offshoring) over outsourcing (non-offshoring) firms.
2.4.4 Regression results for mutually inclusive sourcing dummies
In this subsection we explicitly address the large incidence of combined sourcing strategies,
i.e., firms that source inputs from both locations and/or through both organizational forms.
Such firms are quite common in our data, and we now capture this feature by coding sourcing
dummies in a mutually inclusive way. We argue that this opens up a new perspective, allowing
us to extract further information from our data set.
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 reveal the importance of distinguishing between the two types of coding
structures. We recognize significant correlation between firm productivity and the various
sourcing indicators. The coefficient of the FI dummy lacks significance in some specifica-
tions, but this only reflects the small number of single-mode foreign-integration firms in the
restricted sample. We find reassuring evidence for this statement from regressions with the
unrestricted sample, where we obtain similar point estimates and reject the null hypothesis
of a zero FI-coefficient at the ten percent confidence level in virtually all specifications; see
Table 2.9.
More importantly, however, our estimates in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 no longer suggest a robust
ranking of sourcing dummy coefficients, although the evidence still detects “pure” domes-
tic outsourcers and non-sourcing firms as the least productive firms in the entire Spanish
manufacturing industry. Among the other types of firms, we do not find any productiv-
ity differentials that are robustly significant at the ten percent confidence level. This last
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finding leads us to the conclusion that, strictly speaking, any sourcing category contributes
equally to a firm’s productivity premium, relative to single mode domestic outsourcers and
non-sourcing firms. For each additional sourcing channel, the performance premium rises by
roughly 15 percentage points.
<<Tables 2.8 and 2.9 about here>>
Foreign-integration firms thus appear to be performing exceptionally well with mutually
exclusive sourcing dummies, because they simultaneously combine various sourcing channels
more often than any other type of firm in the sample; see also Table 2.1. That said, from
unreported regressions in which we use firm-employment as a measure of firm performance,
we find comparatively large and significant size differentials between firms which outsource in
a foreign economy and those which adopt strategies of integrating input production into the
firm boundaries at home and abroad, even after controlling for exporter status. There, the
ranking of sourcing dummy coefficients that we have found using the earlier approach, i.e.,
FI > DI > FO > DO, is largely reproduced. Again, this is consistent with Federico (2010).
Indeed, these differentials are even more significant in our estimates with the unrestricted
sample.
Naturally, the appearance of multi-mode and multi-location sourcing strategies at the
level of the individual firm goes unattended with aggregate data on intra-firm trade and
offshoring. Yet, it points to the need for further refinements to theory, so that it may explain
the incidence of such sourcing behavior at the micro-level and contribute to the understanding
of its implications for the aggregate economy. It would be interesting to explore in more detail
the dynamics of how firms develop their sourcing behavior over their lifecycles. Indeed,
our data show that firm performance is positively correlated with the degree to which a
firm combines organizational modes and locations when organizing its intermediate input
production. However, with the short period of time for which the data were available at the
time this chapter was written, a more extensive empirical investigation of this phenomenon
is not within reach of this chapter.
2.5 Final remarks
What have we learned from this analysis? First, we find pronounced heterogeneity among
Spanish manufacturing firms in terms of where and how they source their inputs of goods and
services. Heterogeneity is not random, but has conspicuous patterns. A phenomenon that
we have been able to describe in detail, but has so far not received much attention in theory,
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is firms’ tendency to pursue sourcing strategies that combine domestic and offshore supply
of inputs as well as different organizational forms of sourcing, viz. arms-length relationships
and vertical integration. We find that firms seldom rely on vertically integrated input supply
as their only form of sourcing. Conversely, strategies that avoid integrating input suppliers
altogether are relatively common. In a similar vein, strategies that include offshoring are
far less common than strategies that rely entirely on domestic sourcing. In turn, combined
sourcing strategies are particularly common among exporting and large firms. We also ob-
serve a characteristic pattern of interdependence across modes and locations of sourcing.
Specifically, once a firm takes up any mode or location beyond pure domestic outsourcing, it
also becomes more likely to pursue any of the remaining combinations of sourcing channels.
A second major lesson that we learn from our empirical analysis is that there are significant
performance premia on certain sourcing strategies over others. Theoretical models lead us
to expect such premia, reflecting firms’ sourcing decisions in an environment of incomplete
contracts. Most models would predict that under plausible conditions there should be premia
on offshore sourcing as well as sourcing through vertical integration, relative to domestic arms-
length sourcing. By and large, the sourcing premia that we estimate on micro-level data for
Spanish manufacturing firms corroborate this view. Although we are careful to point out
that this finding should not be interpreted as a test of any specific model of global input
sourcing, it is still reassuring to find a robust picture of such premia. Conditional means
of productivity levels are generally largest (lowest) for firms pursuing foreign integration
(domestic outsourcing). This ranking generally survives controlling for the exporter status of
firms. Moreover, estimated premia are larger if defined in terms of employment than in terms
of labor or total factor productivity. For productivity, we find premia on foreign integration
and foreign outsourcing in the vicinity of 60 percent or 30 percent, respectively.
A third empirical lesson relates to marginal effects of increasing the number of sourcing
channels. Utilizing information on single firms pursuing multiple combinations of sourcing
channels, as available in our firm-level data set, we find that such marginal effects are quite
pervasive. Starting out with a zero premium of domestic outsourcing, relative to a baseline
category of non-sourcing firms, adding any further combination of sourcing channels increases
this premium by about 15 percentage points. This is a sizable effect, and it is quite robust.
However, beyond this we do not find a clear ranking of premia associated with any specific
combination of sourcing channels. This points to a premium on the number of utilized
sourcing channels as such. Available theoretical models of input sourcing are unable to
explain such marginal effects. Indeed, they imply that a given firm would always find a
single dominating channel of sourcing.
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Where to move from here? We see a theoretical and an empirical challenge. We are con-
vinced and, indeed, we present some empirical evidence that the picture of multiple sourcing
strategies is not simply an artifact of aggregation over products and transactions. The perva-
siveness of sourcing strategies that combine several sourcing channels, as well as the evidence
of marginal effects on performance premia, calls for a corresponding refinement of theoret-
ical models. On the empirical side, the challenge is to construct micro-level data sets and
develop suitable empirical frameworks that would permit a proper test of, and statistical
discrimination between, specific models of input sourcing under incomplete contracts.
Figures and tables
Figure 2.1. Maximum profits for different sourcing regimes
Figure 1: Maximum profits for different sourcing regimes 
In this model, the leverage property of ߠ implies linear profit lines for 
either organizational form, as opposed to the strictly convex line for outsourcing 
in Grossman & Helpman (2004). Figure 1 anchors the comparison of the two 
models through a common profit line Π௏ሺߠ, ܳሻ and a dashed profit line Πை′ ሺߠ, ܳሻ
for outsourcing, as emerging in Antràs & Helpman (2004). This latter framework 
assumes unavoidable organizational fixed costs for both of the two forms, 
whereas in Grossman & Helpman (2004) outsourcing avoids all fixed cost by 
shifting upfront purchasing of materials to the agent. Hence, in Antràs & Helpman 
(2004) there exists a unique cut-off level ߠ௕ which separates outsourcing from 
integration, whereas the principle-agent framework has outsourcing “reappear” as 
an optimal form of sourcing for high-enough productivity levels larger than ߠௗ.7 
It is now relatively straightforward to envisage an extension of these 
models to include a foreign source of input provision. It seems plausible that some 
(or all) of the structural details that govern the choice of vertical integration or 
outsourcing in the above frameworks are different for foreign sourcing 
(offshoring) compared to domestic sourcing. For instance, in the Grossman & 
                                                
7 There also exists a threshold level for positive profits. 
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Table 2.1. Spanish manufacturing firms’ sourcing strategies in 2008
6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Large Firms (> 200 Employees)
DO DI FO FI DODI DOFO DOFI DODIFO DODIFI DOFOFI DIFO DIFI DIFOFI FOFI DODIFOFI
95 8 13 2 52 131 8 68 6 74 3 1 2 4 49
18.0 1.5 2.5 0.4 9.8 24.8 1.5 12.9 1.1 14.0 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.8 9.3
Small Firms (< 201 Employees)
DO DI FO FI DODI DOFO DOFI DODIFO DODIFI DOFOFI DIFO DIFI DIFOFI FOFI DODIFOFI
793 10 19 0 38 401 7 51 1 33 2 0 0 3 15
54.9 0.7 1.3 0.0 2.6 27.8 0.5 3.5 0.1 2.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0
Exporting Firms Among Small Firms
DO DI FO FI DODI DOFO DOFI DODIFO DODIFI DOFOFI DIFO DIFI DIFOFI FOFI DODIFOFI
307 3 16 0 22 304 7 39 1 32 2 0 0 3 15
39.3 0.4 2.0 0.0 2.8 38.9 0.9 5.0 0.1 4.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.9
Non-Exporting Firms Among Small Firms
DO DI FO FI DODI DOFO DOFI DODIFO DODIFI DOFOFI DIFO DIFI DIFOFI FOFI DODIFOFI
485 7 3 0 16 96 0 12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
73.3 1.1 0.5 0.0 2.4 14.5 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Firms (Weighted)
DO DI FO FI DODI DOFO DOFI DODIFO DODIFI DOFOFI DIFO DIFI DIFOFI FOFI DODIFOFI
53.8 0.7 1.3 0.0 2.8 27.7 0.5 3.8 0.1 2.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.3
Note: In each panel of the table the second and third rows give the numbers and the percentages of firms in the various sourcing
categories, respectively. All percentages are of the total number of firms in the respective size or export status category in the 2008
sample (N=529 for large firms, N=1,445 for small firms, N=781 for small exporting firms, N=662 for small non-exporting firms; two
small firms do not report export status). We represent foreign integration (ܨܫ), foreign outsourcing (ܨܱ), domestic integration (ܦܫ),
and domestic outsourcing (ܦܱ), as well as all combinations thereof. Percentages in the last row have been obtained after weighting
the number of firms in each size category by the inverse of the probability of being sampled, given the size distribution of all Spanish
firms. Percentage points in each row do not sum up to 100 percent due to non-sourcing firms.
Counting our four principle ways of sourcing independently of whether they appear in single or
complex strategies, table 2 reveals that provision of inputs from independent domestic suppliers
looms large in the sourcing modes, appearing in more than 90 percent of all reporting firms. In
contrast, foreign outsourcing is reserved to a minority of firms, about 37 percent. However, Spanish
manufacturing firms’ overall engagement in international sourcing is still quite pronounced, if
compared to other developed countries. For example, Tomiura (2007) reports that only five percent
of Japan's manufacturing firms in 1998 are engaged in foreign sourcing, whether through offshore
outsourcing, vertical FDI, or both.10 This seems to reflect the high degree of economic integration in
Europe, and we provide further support for this statement later in this section.
10 We should add a caveat in that the data in Tomiura (2007) do not impose any threshold value on firm size, while the
Spanish data do not include manufacturing firms with less than ten employees.
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Table 2.2. Spanish manufacturing firms in mutually inclusive sourcing categories in 2008
7
Large Firms Small Firms Small Exporters Small Non-Exporters All Firms (Weighted)
Number in % Number in % Number in % Number in % in %
Domestic Outsourcing 483 91.3 1,339 92.7 727 93.1 610 92.1 92.6
Domestic Integration 189 35.7 117 8.1 82 10.5 35 5.3 8.9
Foreign Outsourcing 344 65.0 524 36.3 411 52.6 112 16.9 37.1
Foreign Integration 146 27.6 59 4.1 58 7.4 1 0.2 4.7
Non-Sourcing 13 2.5 72 5.0 30 3.8 42 6.3 4.9
Note: With mutually inclusive strategies, a single firm may show up in more than one sourcing category. All percentages are of the
total number of firms in the respective size or export status category in the 2008 sample (N=529 for large firms, N=1,445 for small
firms, N=781 for small exporting firms, N=662 for small non-exporting firms; two small firms do not report export status). Large
firms have more than 200 employees. We obtain percentages in the last column after weighting the number of firms in each size
category by the inverse of the probability of being sampled.
Vertical integration is significantly less prevalent among Spanish firms. To the extent present, it
is more likely to be found for domestic input provision than for offshoring. Moreover, there are
huge differences between small and large firms. More than a third (fourth) of large firms purchase
intermediates through vertical integration at home (abroad), with percentages that are larger by the
factor four (seven) than those for small firms. Almost two thirds of large firms do offshore
outsourcing, with percentages almost twice as high as those for small firms. These differences
between small and large firms are reduced somewhat once we drop small non-exporting firms from
the sample. Indeed, the smallest share of firms engaging in international sourcing can be found
among small firms with purely domestic sales. However, the ranking of the relative importance of
each of the four sourcing categories is preserved across size and export status groups. We may
summarize these findings as
Stylized fact 3: Domestic sourcing is significantly more common than foreign sourcing,
independently of the organizational form of sourcing. Outsourcing is significantly more common
than integration, independently of the locational choice. And large as well as exporting firms are
much more likely to pursue strategies of offshoring and vertical integration than are small and non-
exporting firms.
Although of a purely descriptive nature, stylized fact 3 is a hint towards a fixed cost ranking of
global sourcing strategies, if interpreted against models of global sourcing such as that in Antràs &
Helpman (2004). Since, arguably, fixed costs should constitute an especially high hurdle for smaller
firms, our data point towards an ordering that satisfies ݂ிூ> ݂ிை and ݂஽ூ> ݂஽ை, as well as ݂ி఑ >
݂஽఑, ߢ∈ {ܫ,ܱ}, where ݂ represents fixed costs. The type of ranking is essential for deriving
predictions from any model of global sourcing that allows for firm heterogeneity.
Table 2 brings up a further interesting feature of our data worth discussing: It refers to firms
that we classify as “non-sourcing”. These are firms that do not report acquiring any intermediate
inputs from a different legal entity. Such firms appear as pursuing a particularly deep vertical
Table 2.3. Estimated probabilities of the use of sourcing channels (2006-2008)
8
integration strategy in the home economy, incorporating all steps of the production chain into a
single legal entity. For our purpose, the question arises as to whether we should treat such firms on
the same footing as firms that follow domestic integration in input provision. Looked at through the
lens of Antràs & Helpman (2004), for example, such firms might seem as having full discretion
over all decisions related to provision of inputs, which would in turn rule out any kind of hold-up
problem. However, we argue that such non-sourcing firms should still be regarded as pursuing
domestic integration, as long as the economic nature of the production relationship (and thus the
strategic game) between headquarter and supplier is not affected by whether or not the legal system
treats the supplier as a different legal entity.11 We shall return to this point in our econometric
analysis below.
Foreign Foreign Domestic Domestic
Integration Outsourcing Integration Outsourcing
Foreign
I tegration 26.9 3.7 35.8 9.0 31.5 12.1 27.3 3.8
Foreign
Outsourcing 86.4 82.1 64.8 34.3 64.2 49.8 66.6 35.5
Domestic
Integration 41.1 28.1 34.7 12.6 35.0 8.7 35.3 8.5
Domestic
Outsourcing 92.5 94.2 93.5 95.7 91.8 90.1 91.0 92.4
Note: The table gives estimated probabilities of being active in each of the four sourcing modes, averaged across years. In each cell
of the above 4 × 4 matrix, the first number refers to large firms (> 200 employees) and the second number to small firms (< 201
employees). The numbers are percentage rates and give the estimated probabilities that a randomly selected firm (within firm size
groups) is active in the sourcing modes indicated in rows, conditional on being active in the sourcing modes indicated in columns. All
numbers on the leading diagonal (in bold letters) represent unconditional estimated success probabilities.
Next, we take a probit view on our data. What is the likelihood that a firm pursues foreign
integ ation, conditional upon also including foreign outsourcing among its sourcing modes,
compared to the unconditional probability of choosing vertical integration? This question can be
asked for all four principle sourcing modes, leading to a whole matrix of unconditional and
conditional probabilities. To answer these questions, we estimate a multivariate probit model,
regressing all relevant indicator variables for sourcing strategies on year dummies, and using the
Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator to evaluate higher-order integrals of the multivariate
normal distribution. We do so separately for each firm size group, and we subsequently calculate
unconditional and conditional probabilities based on estimated correlations of the residuals across
11 Still, this interpretation is challenged by the question of why, after all, we should then observe this kind of
heterogeneity of different legal regimes between headquarters and suppliers in the data. This concern is strengthened by
the fact that it does not appear to follow a random distribution: 0.7 percent of small firms report a single domestic
integration sourcing strategy, whereas as much as about 5 percent report no sourcing at all.
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Table 2.4. Regional distribution of aggregate Spanish import values in 2006
10
Table 4 compares the regional distribution of aggregate Spanish import values of the
manufacturing sector with that of the Spanish economy as a whole. What we can learn from this is,
in our view, a major qualification of the common understanding of offshoring as a phenomenon
involving relocation of input production from high wage to low wage countries. Indeed, from each
Euro-equivalent imported by the Spanish manufacturing industry in 2006, 75 cents came from a
member state of the European Union.17 Importantly, of the overall value of imports in that year, less
than six percent originate in low wage countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia, while the top five source countries are Germany
(22 percent), France (20), Italy (13), United Kingdom (8), and the Netherlands (6). Generally
speaking, proximate high technology countries seem to matter more for input provision in the
manufacturing sector than for supply of finals and inputs in the Spanish economy at large.
Stylized Fact 5. Offshoring in Spain takes mainly place by means of importing intermediate
inputs from high wage countries in the European Union.
Manufacturing Sector All Sectors
European Union 75 (83) 44
Latin America 3 (3) 5
OECD Rest 11 (6) 11
Rest of the World 10 (7) 40
Note: All numbers represent percentage rates. Data for the manufacturing sector come from the ESEE, data for all sectors come
from the Spanish National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España). We obtain the numbers in parentheses
by exclusively considering firms for which the total value of imports is equal to the total value of imports of intermediate inputs.
There are almost no differences between large and small firms in terms of the regional distribution of aggregate import values,
which is why we do not report them separately here.
In table 5 we differentiate, again, between large and small firms and their exposures to
importing from different world regions, independently of the import amounts. We point out three
facts from this table. First, we see that more than 90 percent of importing firms source from
member states of the European Union, while a substantially smaller fraction imports goods and
services from countries in other world regions. We interpret this observation as further
strengthening our statements above. Second, a significantly higher share of large firms than of small
firms imports from Latin American countries (12 versus 6 percent), other OECD countries (42 vs.
20 percent), and countries of the rest of the world (42 vs. 27 percent). Third, large firms are more
likely to import simultaneously from two, three, or all four world regions than small firms. We can
draw similar conclusions upon distinguishing small exporters from small non-exporters. In
particular, a firm’s export status is significantly correlated with a firm’s import status.
17 To make sure that this figure is not overstated due to imports of final goods, we restrict the sample to firms for which
the total value of imports is equal to the total value of imports of intermediate inputs. As provided in table 3, the share
of the value of imports from the European Union in the overall value of imports is even higher then (83 percent).
Table 2.5. Import characteristics of Spanish manufacturing firms in 2006
11
Stylized Fact 6. Virtually all importers source from EU countries. Large firms and exporting
firms have well above-average probabilities of (i) acquiring intermediate inputs from distant, non
EU countries and (ii) spreading their sourcing activities among a large number of import regions.
Large Firms Small Firms Small Exporters Small Non-Exporters All Firms (Weighted)
Number in % Number in % Number in % Number in % in %
Import Region
European Union 469 95.7 671 90.4 502 91.4 169 86.7 90.7
Latin America 59 12.0 44 5.9 36 6.6 8 4.1 6.2
OECD Rest 206 42.0 148 20.0 121 22.0 27 13.8 21.0
Rest of the World 204 41.6 202 27.2 177 32.2 26 13.3 27.9
# of Import Regions
1 169 34.5 444 59.8 302 55.0 144 73.9 58.6
2 201 41.0 205 27.6 172 31.3 33 16.9 28.3
3 79 16.1 54 7.3 50 9.1 4 2.1 7.7
4 41 8.4 39 5.3 25 4.6 14 7.2 5.4
Total Number of Importers 490 92.5 742 51.4 549 74.6 195 27.6 52.57
Note: Overall numbers of large and small firms in the 2006 sample equal 530 and 1,443, respectively. Large firms have more than
200 employees. Overall numbers of small exporters and small non-exporters equal 736 and 707, respectively. All percentage
numbers except those in the last row are relative to importing firm in the respective size and export tatus gr up. All pe centage
numbers in the last row are relative to all firms in the respective size and export status group.
3.1. Measures of Firm Producticity
A pivotal variable in our analysis is a firm's relative productivity level in a given industry. It is
now well-known that firm-level estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) are often plagued by
biases originating in endogenous selections into markets, simultaneous choices of input factors,
omitted firms' input and ouput prices, and endogenous product mixes. Taking advantage of several
unique features of our data, we apply the Olley & Pakes (1996) estimation algorithm and provide
consistent estimates of total factor productivity as a firm-specific, time-variant phenomenon.
In the next two sections, we proceed in two steps, each of which employs a different sample of
the overall survey data set at hand. First, we exploit the comprehensive 2000-2008 data coverage
with the main purpose of convincingly computing total factor productivity, carefully addressing the
various sources of inconsistency in the estimates. Second, we use our TFP estimates from the first
step in order to investigate the link between firms’ global sourcing decisions and their relative
productivity levels, restricting our sample to the years 2006-2008. Remember that these are the only
years in which explicit information on each of the four sourcing categories is available in the
survey.
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Table 2.6. Sourcing premia with mutually exclusive hierarchical sourcing dummies (FI > DI > FO > DO)
(true headquarter firms, 2006-2008)†Table 6: Sourcing Premia with Mutually Exclusive Hierarchical Sourcing Dummies (ܨܫ ≻ ܦܫ ≻ ܨܱ ≻ ܦܱ); True Headquarter Firms (2006-2008)
Baseline Category: Domestic-Outsourcing Firms; Non-Sourcing Firms Coded as Domestic-Integration Firms (ܦܫ) 
Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity 
OLS   PA   IV   OLS   PA   IV   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Sourcing Dummies 
ܨܫ 0.432A 0.280B 0.316A 0.236B 0.364 0.134 0.472A 0.343A 0.274A 0.228B 0.571B 0.389 
(0.121) (0.118) (0.116) (0.109) (0.271) (0.254) (0.130) (0.125) (0.096) (0.092) (0.279) (0.253) 
ܨܱ 0.239A 0.150A 0.159A 0.103A 0.326A 0.221A 0.273A 0.198A 0.121A 0.088A 0.373A 0.292A 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.043) (0.047) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.049) (0.053) 
ܦܫ 0.147A 0.134A 0.092A 0.083B 0.190B 0.182B 0.132A 0.121A 0.063C 0.057 0.148 0.143 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.092) (0.088) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.107) (0.105) 
Other Variables 
ܣ݃݁ 0.004A 0.005A 0.004A 0.004A 0.004A 0.003A 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ 0.211A 0.202A 0.185A 0.185A 0.163A 0.144A 
(0.021) (0.026) (0.032) (0.022) (0.027) (0.037) 
Constant 2.831A 2.629A 2.855A 2.651A 2.769A 2.610A 0.075 -0.059 0.067 -0.110 0.107 -0.027 
(0.058) (0.057) (0.081) (0.078) (0.086) (0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.120) (0.122) (0.136) (0.142) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܨܱ 0.11 0.27 0.18 0.22 0.89 0.73 0.13 0.25 0.11 0.13 0.48 0.70 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܦܫ 0.02 0.23 0.06 0.18 0.55 0.86 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.38 
ܪ0: ܨܱ ൌ ܦܫ 0.02 0.67 0.08 0.60 0.14 0.66 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.42 0.04 0.18 
Observations 4,050 4,032 4,050 4,032 2,491 2,480 3,995 3,978 3,995 3,978 2,454 2,443 
ܴଶ 0.13 0.17 . . 0.13 0.18 0.05 0.09 . . 0.05 0.08 
Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where the dependent 
variable is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (ܨܫ), foreign outsourcing (ܨܱ), domestic integration (ܦܫ), and a firm's age (ܣ݃݁) and export status 
(ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ). Labor productivity is the natural log of real value added over the hours effectively worked. Total factor productivity is estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) 
three-step algorithm. The sourcing dummies are mutually exclusive. If a firm is active in two or more sourcing modes simultaneously, we assign it to the category which is 
the least prevalent one in the data; see table 2. The estimation sample excludes firms with domestic or foreign parental companies. Non-sourcing firms are coded as 
domestic-integration firms (ܦܫ). The lower part of the table gives ݌-values of tests for equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Superscripts 
C, B, and A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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† Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression
where the dependent variable is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (FI), foreign outsourcing (FO), domestic integration (DI),
and a firm’s age (Age) and export status (Export). L bor productivity is the natural log of real value a ded over the hours effectivel worked. Total
factor productivity is stimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) th ee- tep algorithm. Th rcing dummies are mutually exclusive. If firm is a tive
in two or more sourcing mo es simultan ously, we assig it to th ategory which is th least prevalent one in the data; see Table 2.2. The stimation
sa ple excludes firms with domestic or foreign p r ntal companies. Non-sourcing firms are coded as domestic-integr tion firms (DI). The lower part
of the table gives p-values of tests for equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Superscripts C, B, and A indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.7. Sourcing premia with mutually exclusive hierarchical sourcing dummies (FI > DI > FO > DO)
(all firms, 2006-2008)†Table 7: Sourcing Premia with Mutually Exclusive Hierarchical Sourcing Dummies (ܨܫ ≻ ܦܫ ≻ ܨܱ ≻ ܦܱ); All Firms (2006-2008)
Baseline Category: Domestic-Outsourcing Firms; Non-Sourcing Firms Coded as Domestic-Integration Firms (ܦܫ) 
Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity 
OLS   PA   IV   OLS   PA   IV   
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Sourcing Dummies 
ܨܫ 0.495A 0.338A 0.332A 0.229A 0.612A 0.457A 0.440A 0.298A 0.216A 0.145B 0.558A 0.427A 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.066) (0.063) (0.085) (0.087) (0.048) (0.049) (0.061) (0.060) (0.091) (0.094) 
ܨܱ 0.234A 0.141A 0.137A 0.084A 0.343A 0.238A 0.269A 0.185A 0.099A 0.070A 0.393A 0.305A 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.041) (0.045) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.047) (0.051) 
ܦܫ 0.277A 0.227A 0.174A 0.149A 0.354A 0.299A 0.251A 0.207A 0.122A 0.106A 0.318A 0.272A 
(0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.069) (0.065) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.077) (0.075) 
Other Variables 
ܣ݃݁ 0.004A 0.005A 0.004A 0.003A 0.004A 0.003A 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ 0.221A 0.212A 0.178A 0.211A 0.174A 0.164A 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.030) (0.021) (0.025) (0.035) 
Constant 2.834A 2.652A 2.866A 2.676A 2.792A 2.640A 0.024 -0.119 0.042 -0.124 0.057 -0.067 
(0.058) (0.058)   (0.085) (0.082)   (0.091) (0.089)   (0.078) (0.078)   (0.110) (0.111)   (0.126) (0.131) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܨܱ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.20 0.08 0.20 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܦܫ 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.25 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.10 0.17 0.56 0.04 0.18 
ܪ0: ܨܱ ൌ ܦܫ 0.19 0.01   0.27 0.05   0.88 0.37   0.60 0.51   0.52 0.31   0.35 0.68 
Observations 5,914 5,876 5,914 5,876 3,637 3,612 5,827 5,790 5,827 5,790 3,582 3,557 
ܴଶ   0.14 0.19   . .   0.15 0.20   0.05 0.09   . .   0.05 0.08 
Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where the dependent 
variable is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (ܨܫ), foreign outsourcing (ܨܱ), domestic integration (ܦܫ), and a firm's age (ܣ݃݁) and export status 
(ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ). Labor productivity is the natural log of real value added over the hours effectively worked. Total factor productivity is estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) 
three-step algorithm. The sourcing dummies are mutually exclusive. If a firm is active in two or more sourcing modes simultaneously, we assign it to the category which is 
the least prevalent one in the data; see table 2. The estimation sample includes firms with domestic or foreign parental companies. Non-sourcing firms are coded as 
domestic-integration firms (ܦܫ). The lower part of the table gives ݌-values of tests for equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Superscripts 
C, B, and A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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† Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression
where the depende t variable is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (FI), foreign outsourcing (FO), domestic integration (DI),
and a firm’s age (Age) and expor status (Export). L bor productivity is the natural log of real value added over the hours effectivel worked. Total
factor product vity is timated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) th ee-step algorithm. Th urcing dummies re mutually exclusive. If firm is a tive
in two or mor sourcing mo es simultaneously, we ass g it to the ategory which is th least prevalent one in the data; see Table 2.2. The stimation
sa ple includes firms with domestic or foreign parental companies. Non-sourcing firms are coded as domestic-integr tion firms (DI). The lower part
of the table gives p-values of tests for equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Superscripts C, B, and A indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.8. Sourcing premia with mutually inclusive sourcing dummies
(true headquarter firms, 2006-2008)†Table 8: Sourcing Premia with Mutually Inclusive Sourcing Dummies; True Headquarter Firms (2006-2008)
Baseline Category: Non-Sourcing Firms 
Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity 
OLS   PA   IV   OLS   PA   IV   
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Sourcing Dummies 
ܨܫ 0.147 0.065 0.151 0.106 0.044 0.166 0.203C 0.132 0.182B 0.156C 0.149 0.052 
(0.117) (0.118) (0.112) (0.109) (0.277) (0.260) (0.115) (0.117) (0.085) (0.087) (0.283) (0.255) 
ܨܱ 0.244A 0.156A 0.170A 0.114A 0.322A 0.220A 0.268A 0.193A 0.118A 0.085A 0.374A 0.297A 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.041) (0.046) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.047) (0.052) 
ܦܫ 0.250A 0.251A 0.171B 0.170B 0.291B 0.308A 0.206A 0.207A 0.107 0.105 0.176 0.190 
(0.063) (0.062) (0.072) (0.071) (0.114) (0.114) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.168) (0.169) 
ܦܱ -0.014 -0.012 -0.021 -0.017 0.078 0.073 -0.015 -0.013 -0.006 -0.003 0.024 0.020 
(0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.096) (0.088) (0.036) (0.035) (0.040) (0.040) (0.098) (0.094) 
Other Variables 
ܣ݃݁ 0.004A 0.005A 0.004A 0.004A 0.004A 0.003A 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ 0.203A 0.196A 0.176A 0.179A 0.162A 0.133A 
(0.021) (0.026) (0.032) (0.022) (0.026) (0.037) 
Constant 2.824A 2.628A 2.880A 2.656A 2.675A 2.531A 0.092 -0.059 0.080 -0.114 0.060 -0.058 
(0.065) (0.064)   (0.086) (0.083)   (0.123) (0.118)   (0.088) (0.089)   (0.124) (0.128)   (0.161) (0.163) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܨܱ 0.42 0.45   0.87 0.94   0.20 0.15   0.59 0.62   0.49 0.44   0.44 0.36 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܦܫ 0.47 0.19 0.89 0.64 0.30 0.13 0.98 0.61 0.51 0.66 0.94 0.68 
ܪ0: ܨܱ ൌ ܦܫ 0.93 0.15 1.00 0.45 0.80 0.47 0.39 0.85 0.87 0.77 0.27 0.56 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܦܱ 0.19 0.53 0.14 0.28 0.68 0.39 0.07 0.24 0.04 0.09 0.68 0.91 
ܪ0: ܦܫ ൌ ܦܱ 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.18 0.41 0.35 
ܪ0: ܨܱ ൌ ܦܱ 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.02 0.17   0.00 0.00   0.01 0.07   0.00 0.02 
Observations 4,049 4,031 4,049 4,031 2,491 2,480 3,994 3,977 3,994 3,977 2,454 2,443 
ܴଶ   0.13 0.18   . .   0.14 0.19   0.06 0.09   . .   0.06 0.09 
Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where the dependent 
variable is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (ܨܫ), foreign outsourcing (ܨܱ), domestic integration (ܦܫ), domestic outsourcing (ܦܱ), and a firm's age 
(ܣ݃݁) and export status (ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ). Labor productivity is the natural log of real value added over the hours effectively worked. Total factor productivity is estimated with the 
Olley & Pakes (1996) three-step algorithm. The sourcing dummies are mutually inclusive. The estimation sample excludes firms with domestic or foreign parental 
companies. Non-sourcing firms are included as the baseline category. The lower part of the table gives ݌-values of tests for equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors 
are given in parentheses. Superscripts C, B, and A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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† Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression
where the dependent variable is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (FI), foreign outsourcing (FO), domestic integration (DI),
domestic outsourcing DO), and a firm’s age (Age) and export status (Export). Labor productivity is the natural log of real value added over the hours
effectively worked. Total factor productivity is estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) three-step a gorithm. The sourcing dummies are mutually
inclusiv . The estimation ample excludes firm with domestic or foreign parental companies. Non-sourcing firms are coded as the baseline cat gory.
The lower pa t of the tabl gives p-values of tests for equality of co fficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Superscripts C, B, and
A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
2.
S
O
U
R
C
IN
G
P
R
E
M
IA
W
IT
H
IN
C
O
M
P
L
E
T
E
C
O
N
T
R
A
C
T
S
43
Table 2.9. Sourcing premia with mutually inclusive sourcing dummies
(all firms, 2006-2008)†Table 9: Sourcing Premia with Mutually Inclusive Sourcing Dummies; All Firms (2006-2008) 
Baseline Category: Non-Sourcing Firms 
Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity 
OLS   PA   IV   OLS   PA   IV   
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Sourcing Dummies 
ܨܫ 0.239A 0.160A 0.170B 0.110C 0.277A 0.207B 0.173A 0.102B 0.105C 0.058 0.189C 0.133 
(0.050) (0.048) (0.069) (0.065) (0.095) (0.090) (0.051) (0.050) (0.062) (0.060) (0.097) (0.096) 
ܨܱ 0.206A 0.124A 0.131A 0.083A 0.273A 0.179A 0.250A 0.177A 0.096A 0.070A 0.358A 0.281A 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.039) (0.043) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.045) (0.049) 
ܦܫ 0.282A 0.253A 0.201A 0.183A 0.314A 0.292A 0.232A 0.206A 0.141A 0.127A 0.227A 0.209A 
(0.039) (0.037) (0.045) (0.043) (0.070) (0.065) (0.041) (0.040) (0.047) (0.047) (0.079) (0.079) 
ܦܱ -0.036 -0.031 -0.029 -0.027 0.046 0.047 -0.056C -0.052 -0.036 -0.036 -0.004 -0.002 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.081) (0.074) (0.033) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.089) (0.083) 
Other Variables 
ܣ݃݁ 0.004A 0.005A 0.004A 0.003A 0.004A 0.003A 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ 0.215A 0.207A 0.181A 0.201A 0.171A 0.157A 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.030) (0.021) (0.025) (0.035) 
Constant 2.821A 2.662A 2.893A 2.668A 2.755A 2.595A 0.009 -0.080 0.076 -0.119 0.061 -0.065 
(0.062) (0.062)   (0.086) (0.084)   (0.112) (0.109)   (0.080) (0.081)   (0.112) (0.116)   (0.143) (0.145) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܨܱ 0.56 0.51 0.61 0.71 0.98 0.80 0.19 0.20 0.91 0.86 0.15 0.21 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܦܫ 0.52 0.15 0.71 0.35 0.76 0.47 0.40 0.13 0.66 0.39 0.78 0.58 
ܪ0: ܨܱ ൌ ܦܫ 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.63 0.15 0.68 0.51 0.38 0.25 0.18 0.46 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܦܱ 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.14 0.28 
ܪ0: ܦܫ ൌ ܦܱ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 
ܪ0: ܨܱ ൌ ܦܱ 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.02 0.15   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.01   0.00 0.01 
Observations 5,913 5,875 5,913 5,875 3,637 3,612 5,826 5,789 5,826 5,789 3,582 3,557 
ܴଶ 0.15 0.19   . .   0.16 0.21   0.06 0.09   . .   0.06 0.09 
Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where the dependent 
variable is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (ܨܫ), foreign outsourcing (ܨܱ), domestic integration (ܦܫ), domestic outsourcing (ܦܱ), and a firm's age 
(ܣ݃݁ሻ and export status (ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ). Labor productivity is the natural log of real value added over the hours effectively worked. Total factor productivity is estimated with the 
Olley & Pakes (1996) three-step algorithm. The sourcing dummies are mutually inclusive. The estimation sample includes firms with domestic or foreign parental 
companies. Non-sourcing firms are included as the baseline category. The lower part of the table gives ݌-values of tests for equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors 
are given in parentheses. Superscripts C, B, and A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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† Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression
where the dependent variable is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (FI), foreign outsourcing (FO), domestic integration (DI),
domestic outsourcing DO), and a firm’s age (Age) and export status (Export). Labor pr ductivity is the natural log of real value added over the hours
effectively worked. Total factor productivity is estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) three-step a gorithm. The sourcing dummies are mutually
inclusiv . The estimation sample include firms w th domestic or f reign parental companies. Non-sourcing firms are included a the baseli e cat gory.
The lower t of the tabl gives p-values of tests for equality of co fficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Superscripts C, B, and
A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
44 CHAPTER 2. SOURCING PREMIA WITH INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
Appendices
A Data appendix
Table A.1. List of Spanish manufacturing industries
NACE-1993 Classification Industry
151 Meat
159 Beverage
361 Furniture Industry
152-158, 160 Food Products & Tobacco
171-177, 181-183 Textile
191-193 Leather & Footwear
201-205 Timber & Wooden Products
211-212 Pulp & Paper Products
221-223 Publishing & Graphics Design
241-247 Chemical Products
251-252 Plastic & Rubber Products
261-268 Mineral Products (Non-Metal Products)
271-275 Ferrous Metals & Non-Ferrous Metals
281-287 Metal Products
291-297 Industry & Agricultural Machinery
300, 331-335 Office Machinery & Data Processing
311-316, 321-323 General & Electric Machinery
341-343 Motorized Vehicles
351-355 Other Transportation Equipment
362-366, 371-372 Miscellaneous Manufacturing
B Further estimation results
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
2.
S
O
U
R
C
IN
G
P
R
E
M
IA
W
IT
H
IN
C
O
M
P
L
E
T
E
C
O
N
T
R
A
C
T
S
45
Table B.1. Sourcing premia with mutually exclusive hierarchical sourcing dummies (FI > DI > FO > DO)
(true headquarter firms, 2006-2008)†
 2 
 
Table W1: Sourcing Premia with Mutually Exclusive Hierarchical Sourcing Dummies (ܨܫ ظ ܦܫ ظ ܨܱ ظ ܦܱ); True Headquarters (2006-2008) 
      Baseline Category: Domestic Outsourcing Firms; Non-Sourcing Firms Excluded 
Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity 
OLS   PA   IV   OLS   PA   IV   
    (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Sourcing Dummies 
ܨܫ 0.429A 0.287B 0.345A 0.260B 0.345 0.137 0.471A 0.347A 0.297A 0.246B 0.561B 0.397 
(0.121) (0.118) (0.118) (0.112) (0.268) (0.252) (0.130) (0.125) (0.100) (0.097) (0.279) (0.254) 
ܨܱ 0.241A 0.157A 0.172A 0.113A 0.319A 0.225A 0.276A 0.204A 0.130A 0.094A 0.370A 0.298A 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.043) (0.047) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.048) (0.052) 
ܦܫ 0.346A 0.313A 0.234A 0.211A 0.448A 0.421A 0.318A 0.288A 0.155B 0.139C 0.364B 0.344C 
(0.067) (0.066) (0.076) (0.074) (0.128) (0.124) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.071) (0.177) (0.176) 
Other Variables 
ܣ݃݁ 0.004A 0.005A 0.004A 0.004A 0.004A 0.003A 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ 0.195A 0.197A 0.163A 0.174A 0.166A 0.125A 
(0.021) (0.027) (0.033) (0.023) (0.028) (0.038) 
Constant 2.770A 2.627A 2.838A 2.643A 2.757A 2.613A 0.046 (0.111 0.053 (0.123 0.071 (0.052 
    (0.059) (0.060)   (0.082) (0.079)   (0.086) (0.086)   (0.088) (0.091)   (0.124) (0.125)   (0.145) (0.150) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܨܱ 0.12 0.27 0.14 0.19 0.92 0.73 0.14 0.25 0.10 0.12 0.50 0.70 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܦܫ 0.55 0.85 0.41 0.70 0.74 0.33 0.30 0.68 0.20 0.32 0.57 0.87 
ܪ0: ܨܱ ൌ ܦܫ   0.12 0.02   0.42 0.19   0.33 0.13   0.57 0.26   0.73 0.53   0.97 0.80 
Observations 3,829 3,811 3,829 3,811 2,308 2,297 3,777 3,760 3,777 3,760 2,275 2,264 
ܴଶ   0.13 0.18   . .   0.14 0.18   0.06 0.09   . .   0.06 0.09 
Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where the dependent variable is a function of 
dummy variables for foreign integration (ܨܫ), foreign outsourcing (ܨܱ), domestic integration (ܦܫ), and a firm's age (ܣ݃݁) and export status (ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ). Labor productivity is the natural log of 
real value added over the hours effectively worked. Total factor productivity is estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) three-step algorithm. The sourcing dummies are mutually exclusive. If a 
firm is active in two or more sourcing modes simultaneously, we assign it to the category which is the least prevalent one in the data; see table 2. The estimation sample excludes firms with 
domestic or foreign parental companies. Non-sourcing firms are excluded. The lower part of the table gives ݌-values of tests for equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses. Superscripts C, B, and A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
  
† Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression
where the dependent variable is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (FI), foreign outsourcing (FO), domestic integration (DI),
and a firm’s age (Age) and export status (Export). Labor productivity is the natural log of real value added over the hours effectively worked. Total
factor productivity is estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) three-step algorithm. The sourcing dummies are mutually exclusive. If a firm is active
in two or more sourcing modes simultaneously, we assign it to the category which is the least prevalent one in the data; see Table 2.2. The estimation
sample excludes firms with domestic or foreign parental companies. Non-sourcing firms are excluded. The lower part of the table gives p-values of
tests for equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Superscripts C, B, and A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%
levels, respectively.
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Table B.2. Sourcing premia with mutually exclusive hierarchical sourcing dummies (FI > DI > FO > DO)
(true headquarter firms, 2006-2008)†
 3 
 
Table W2: Sourcing Premia with Mutually Exclusive Hierarchical Sourcing Dummies (ܨܫ ظ ܦܫ ظ ܨܱ ظ ܦܱ); True Headquarters (2006-2008) 
Baseline Category: Non-Sourcing Firms 
Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity 
OLS   PA   IV   OLS   PA   IV   
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Sourcing Dummies 
ܨܫ 0.398A 0.249B 0.313B 0.234B 0.376 0.141 0.444A 0.316B 0.267B 0.222B 0.591B 0.405 
(0.126) (0.121) (0.122) (0.115) (0.289) (0.269) (0.134) (0.129) (0.107) (0.104) (0.297) (0.271) 
ܨܱ 0.205A 0.118A 0.132A 0.080B 0.346A 0.234B 0.244A 0.170A 0.094B 0.065 0.398A 0.310A 
(0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.114) (0.106) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.116) (0.112) 
ܦܫ 0.309A 0.276A 0.197B 0.179B 0.471A 0.432A 0.286A 0.256A 0.116 0.106 0.389C 0.357C 
(0.076) (0.073) (0.082) (0.080) (0.165) (0.156) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.208) (0.204) 
ܦܱ -0.034 -0.034 -0.029 -0.026 0.026 0.016 -0.030 -0.030 -0.029 -0.025 0.029 0.019 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.116) (0.106) (0.039) (0.038) (0.042) (0.042) (0.117) (0.110) 
Other Variables 
ܣ݃݁ 0.004A 0.005A 0.004A 0.004A 0.004A 0.003A 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ 0.208A 0.201A 0.181A 0.182A 0.163A 0.140A 
(0.021) (0.026) (0.032) (0.022) (0.027) (0.036) 
Constant 2.854A 2.654A 2.874A 2.669A 2.735A 2.590A 0.093 -0.039 0.090 -0.090 0.071 -0.050 
    (0.067) (0.066)   (0.087) (0.084)   (0.136) (0.129)   (0.091) (0.089)   (0.126) (0.128)   (0.169) (0.169) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܨܱ 0.11 0.26 0.12 0.17 0.91 0.71 0.13 0.24 0.08 0.10 0.49 0.71 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܦܫ 0.52 0.84 0.38 0.67 0.76 0.32 0.28 0.67 0.17 0.28 0.56 0.88 
ܪ0: ܨܱ ൌ ܦܫ 0.13 0.02 0.39 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.57 0.25 0.76 0.57 0.96 0.80 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܦܱ 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.62 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.13 
ܪ0: ܦܫ ൌ ܦܱ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 
ܪ0: ܨܱ ൌ ܦܱ   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
Observations 4,050 4,032 4,050 4,032 2,491 2,480 3,995 3,978 3,995 3,978 2,454 2,443 
ܴଶ   0.13 0.18   . .   0.14 0.18   0.06 0.09   . .   0.06 0.09 
Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where the dependent variable is a function of 
dummy variables for foreign integration (ܨܫ), foreign outsourcing (ܨܱ), domestic integration (ܦܫ), domestic outsourcing (ܦܱ), and a firm's age (ܣ݃݁) and export status (ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ). Labor 
productivity is the natural log of real value added over the hours effectively worked. Total factor productivity is estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) three-step algorithm. The sourcing 
dummies are mutually exclusive. If a firm is active in two or more sourcing modes simultaneously, we assign it to the category which is the least prevalent one in the data; see table 2. The 
estimation sample excludes firms with domestic or foreign parental companies. Non-sourcing firms are included as the baseline category. The lower part of the table gives ݌-values of tests for 
equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Superscripts C, B, and A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
† Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression
where the dependent variable is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (FI), foreign outsourcing (FO), domestic integration (DI),
domestic outsourcing (DO), and a firm’s age (Age) and export status (Export). Labor productivity is the natural log of real value added over the hours
effectively worked. Total factor productivity is estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) three-step algorithm. The sourcing dummies are mutually
exclusive. If a firm is active in two or more sourcing modes simultaneously, we assign it to the category which is the least prevalent one in the data;
see Table 2.2. The estimation sample includes firms with domestic or foreign parental companies. Non-sourcing firms are included as the baseline
category. The lower part of the table gives p-values of tests for equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Superscripts
C, B, and A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table B.3. Sourcing premia with mutually exclusive hierarchical sourcing dummies (FI > DI > FO > DO)
(all firms, 2006-2008)†
 4 
 
Table W3: Sourcing Premia with Mutually Exclusive Hierarchical Sourcing Dummies (ܨܫ ظ ܦܫ ظ ܨܱ ظ ܦܱ); All Firms (2006-2008) 
Baseline Category: Domestic-Outsourcing Firms; Non-Sourcing Firms Excluded 
Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity 
OLS   PA   IV   OLS   PA   IV   
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Sourcing Dummies 
ܨܫ 0.500A 0.355A 0.363A 0.254A 0.601A 0.466A 0.446A 0.313A 0.238A 0.161A 0.552A 0.439A 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.065) (0.063) (0.085) (0.087) (0.048) (0.049) (0.061) (0.059) (0.092) (0.095) 
ܨܱ 0.237A 0.151A 0.155A 0.098A 0.331A 0.241A 0.271A 0.193A 0.111A 0.078A 0.382A 0.307A 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.041) (0.044) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.047) (0.051) 
ܦܫ 0.435A 0.362A 0.324A 0.274A 0.497A 0.429A 0.390A 0.324A 0.231A 0.198A 0.439A 0.383A 
(0.042) (0.040) (0.050) (0.048) (0.077) (0.073) (0.045) (0.044) (0.051) (0.051) (0.090) (0.089) 
Other Variables 
ܣ݃݁ 0.004A 0.005A 0.004A 0.003A 0.004A 0.003A 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ 0.197A 0.203A 0.149A 0.192A 0.175A 0.139A 
(0.020) (0.025) (0.031) (0.021) (0.025) (0.036) 
Constant 2.817A 2.607A 2.850A 2.658A 2.782A 2.645A 0.011 -0.136C 0.028 -0.209C 0.026 -0.082 
  (0.059) (0.058)   (0.084) (0.082)   (0.092) (0.090)   (0.079) (0.080)   (0.111) (0.113)   (0.132) (0.137) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܨܱ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.08 0.17 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܦܫ 0.29 0.90 0.62 0.79 0.36 0.74 0.38 0.86 0.94 0.63 0.38 0.67 
ܪ0: ܨܱ ൌ ܦܫ 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.04 0.02   0.01 0.00   0.02 0.02   0.54 0.43 
Observations 5,630 5,596 5,630 5,596 3,399 3,378 5,548 5,515 5,548 5,515 3,350 3,329 
ܴଶ 0.16 0.19   . .   0.16 0.20   0.06 0.09   . .   0.06 0.09 
Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where the dependent variable is a function of 
dummy variables for foreign integration (ܨܫ), foreign outsourcing (ܨܱ), domestic integration (ܦܫ), and a firm's age (ܣ݃݁) and export status (ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ). Labor productivity is the natural log of 
real value added over the hours effectively worked. Total factor productivity is estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) three-step algorithm. The sourcing dummies are mutually exclusive. If a 
firm is active in two or more sourcing modes simultaneously, we assign it to the category which is the least prevalent one in the data; see table 2. The estimation sample includes firms with 
domestic or foreign parental companies. Non-sourcing firms are excluded. The lower part of the table gives ݌-values of tests for equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses. Superscripts C, B, and A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
  
† Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression
where the dependent variable is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (FI), foreign outsourcing (FO), domestic integration (DI),
and a firm’s age (Age) and export status (Export). Labor productivity is the natural log of real value added over the hours effectively worked. Total
factor productivity is estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) three-step algorithm. The sourcing dummies are mutually exclusive. If a firm is active
in two or more sourcing modes simultaneously, we assign it to the category which is the least prevalent one in the data; see Table 2.2. The estimation
sample includes firms with domestic or foreign parental companies. Non-sourcing firms are excluded. The lower part of the table gives p-values of
tests for equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Superscripts C, B, and A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%
levels, respectively.
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Table B.4. Sourcing premia with mutually exclusive hierarchical sourcing dummies (FI > DI > FO > DO)
(all firms, 2006-2008)†
 5 
 
Table W4: Sourcing Premia with Mutually Exclusive Hierarchical Sourcing Dummies (ܨܫ ظ ܦܫ ظ ܨܱ ظ ܦܱ) ; All Firms (2006-2008) 
Baseline Category: Non-Sourcing Firms 
Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity 
OLS   PA   IV   OLS   PA   IV   
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Sourcing Dummies 
ܨܫ 0.435A 0.291A 0.308A 0.208A 0.574A 0.429A 0.376A 0.245A 0.187A 0.118C 0.505A 0.384A 
(0.058) (0.056) (0.071) (0.069) (0.130) (0.123) (0.059) (0.059) (0.070) (0.069) (0.137) (0.132) 
ܨܱ 0.172A 0.091B 0.101A 0.054 0.311A 0.213B 0.202A 0.128A 0.060 0.033 0.345A 0.264B 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.105) (0.097) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.111) (0.105) 
ܦܫ 0.371A 0.304A 0.266A 0.226A 0.473A 0.402A 0.321A 0.261A 0.169A 0.143B 0.395A 0.337A 
(0.053) (0.050) (0.057) (0.055) (0.122) (0.112) (0.056) (0.055) (0.062) (0.062) (0.135) (0.129) 
ܦܱ -0.063C -0.054 -0.042 -0.036 -0.025 -0.022 -0.067C -0.059 -0.045 -0.041 -0.042 -0.039 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.107) (0.098) (0.038) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.112) (0.104) 
Other Variables 
ܣ݃݁ 0.004A 0.005A 0.004A 0.003A 0.004A 0.003A 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ܧݔ݌݋ݎt 0.212A 0.207A 0.170A 0.203A 0.172A 0.157A 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.030) (0.021) (0.025) (0.034) 
Constant 2.875A 2.691A 2.901A 2.696A 2.806A 2.655A 0.072 (0.074 0.070 (0.095 0.090 (0.035 
  (0.067) (0.065)   (0.089) (0.087)   (0.133) (0.126)   (0.085) (0.084)   (0.116) (0.117)   (0.159) (0.159) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܨܱ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.09 0.21 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܦܫ 0.30 0.82 0.61 0.82 0.38 0.81 0.39 0.81 0.82 0.75 0.39 0.72 
ܪ0: ܨܱ ൌ ܦܫ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.60 0.44 
ܪ0: ܨܫ ൌ ܦܱ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
ܪ0: ܦܫ ൌ ܦܱ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ܪ0: ܨܱ ൌ ܦܱ 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
Observations 5,914 5,876 5,914 5,876 3,637 3,612 5,827 5,790 5,827 5,790 3,582 3,557 
ܴଶ 0.15 0.19   . .   0.17 0.21   0.06 0.09   . .   0.06 0.09 
Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where the dependent variable is a function of 
dummy variables for foreign integration (ܨܫ), foreign outsourcing (ܨܱ), domestic integration (ܦܫ), domestic outsourcing (ܦܱ), and a firm's age (ܣ݃݁) and export status (ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ). Labor 
productivity is the natural log of real value added over the hours effectively worked. Total factor productivity is estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) three-step algorithm. The sourcing 
dummies are mutually exclusive. If a firm is active in two or more sourcing modes simultaneously, we assign it to the category which is the least prevalent one in the data; see table 2. The 
estimation sample includes firms with domestic or foreign parental companies. Non-sourcing firms are included as the baseline category. The lower part of the table gives ݌-values of tests for 
equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Superscripts C, B, and A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
† Note: The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression
where the dependent variable is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (FI), foreign outsourcing (FO), domestic integration (DI),
domestic outsourcing (DO), and a firm’s age (Age) and export status (Export). Labor productivity is the natural log of real value added over the hours
effectively worked. Total factor productivity is estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) three-step algorithm. The sourcing dummies are mutually
exclusive. If a firm is active in two or more sourcing modes simultaneously, we assign it to the category which is the least prevalent one in the data;
see Table 2.2. The estimation sample includes firms with domestic or foreign parental companies. Non-sourcing firms are included as the baseline
category. The lower part of the table gives p-values of tests for equality of coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Superscripts
C, B, and A indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Chapter3
Global sourcing and firm selection
A discussion paper of this chapter is available as University of Tu¨bingen Working Papers in
Economics and Finance No. 63.
3.1 Introduction
The sourcing of inputs is of key importance for a firm’s success. Firms face a two-dimensional
choice problem: they decide about the location of sourcing (foreign vs. domestic) as well as
the ownership structure of sourcing (vertical integration vs. outsourcing). Which firms se-
lect which sourcing strategy has been the subject of intensive research, but remains an open
question. This letter aims to provide novel empirical evidence on this interesting question by
exploring the relationship between pre-existing productivity differentials across manufactur-
ing firms in Spain and subsequent choice (or selection) of different sourcing strategies.
Identification of productivity-based firm selection is important, because it points to aggre-
gate productivity effects. Changes in the costs of operating a strategy of vertical integration
or of outsourcing, domestically or abroad, have the potential to change the aggregate produc-
tivity of an industry, by analogy to the selection effects of trade and foreign direct investment
discussed in Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004).
We use data from the Spanish “Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales” (ESEE) from
2006-2011 to investigate how firms’ selection of sourcing strategies in year t is related to their
productivity in years prior to t. Overall, we find evidence that firms that select strategies of
vertical integration and of offshoring ex post tend to have been more productive ex ante. We
call this an “ex ante sourcing premium” of vertical integration and offshoring, respectively.
It points to causation running from productivity to sourcing modes, as required for the above
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mentioned aggregate productivity effects.
This finding is in line with the recent literature on global sourcing by heterogeneous firms.
This literature studies the boundaries of the firm—a classical question in economics dating
back to Coase (1937)—against the backdrop of a global economy that allows for firms to
move the source of their inputs abroad; see Helpman (2006) and Antra`s (2013) for surveys.
In an application of the property-rights theory of the firm (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart
& Moore, 1990), Antra`s & Helpman (2004) introduce a monopolistic competition model in
which vertical integration and offshoring can be advantageous in terms of variable production
costs, but disadvantageous in terms of fixed costs. Hence there is a trade-off, and the optimal
sourcing strategy depends on the firm’s productivity.
Existing empirical literature focuses on the contemporaneous relationship between a firm’s
productivity and its sourcing behaviour, and it has produced mixed evidence. Defever &
Toubal (2013) find that French firms relying on an outsourced (rather than an integrated)
foreign supplier tend to be more productive. Corcos et al. (2013) document the opposite pat-
tern in an extended sample of the same French data source. Federico (2010, 2012) provides
evidence that firms choosing strategies of vertical integration and of offshoring tend to be
more productive than firms that source their inputs domestically and from independent sup-
pliers. Tomiura (2007) and Kohler & Smolka (2011, 2012) find similar patterns in Japanese
data and ESEE data, respectively. A common feature of these studies is that time-series
information is not available or, where available, has not been exploited to address firm selec-
tion. Hence causality remains an open issue. Farin˜as et al. (2010) and Wagner (2011) find
evidence for productivity-based firm selection into offshoring. However, they do not study
(or condition on) the ownership structure of sourcing due to lack of data. We contribute
to the literature by addressing firm selection in both dimensions of sourcing, location and
ownership structure, and by exploiting panel data towards estimating the corresponding “ex
ante sourcing premia”.
3.2 Data and identification
ESEE is a longitudinal dataset of Spanish manufacturing firms with 10 or more employees.
There are at least three advantages of using ESEE data for this work. The first is that it
is based on a truly representative sample. The initial selection of firms in 1990 was carried
out through a two-way sampling scheme, distinguishing between large firms (more than 200
employees; exhaustive sampling) and small firms (10-200 employees; stratified, proportional,
and systematic sampling with a random seed). Subsequent sampling was carried out in a way
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that preserves representativeness of the sample with respect to the Spanish manufacturing
sector with 10 or more employees.1
The second advantage of this data set is the level of detail. The ESEE survey collects
data on a large set of firm characteristics, including firms’ main activities, their accounting
statements, as well as information on their customers and suppliers. Importantly, information
on output and the use of labor as well as capital allow for firms’ productivity levels to be
estimated using standard estimation routines. Of special importance for the present purpose,
the survey obtains answers to the following questions:
• Of the total amount of purchases of goods and services that you incorporate (transform)
in the production process, indicate − according to the type of supplier − the percentage
that these represent in the total amount of purchases of your firm in [year].
(a) Spanish suppliers that belong to your group of companies or that participate in
your firm’s joint capital. [yes/no] / [if yes, then percentage rate]
(b) Other suppliers located in Spain. [yes/no]/[if yes, then percentage rate]
• For the year [year], indicate whether you imported goods and services that you incor-
porate (transform) in the production process, and the percentage that theses imports −
according to the type of supplier − represent in the total value of your imports. [yes/no]
(a) From suppliers that belong to your group of companies and/or from foreign firms
that participate in your firm’s joint capital. [yes/no]/[if yes, then percentage rate]
(b) From other foreign firms. [yes/no]/[if yes, then percentage rate]
We are thus able to identify foreign integration (FI), foreign outsourcing (FO), domestic
integration (DI) and domestic outsourcing (DO) as distinct sourcing strategies. In 2011,
5.0% of small firms and 34.1% of large firms have relied on FI. The corresponding numbers
are 40.2% and 70.1% for FO, 10.9% and 33.6% for DI, and 93.6% and 93.5% for DO. Thus,
the sourcing strategies are not mutually exclusive, but appear complementary to one another
(Kohler & Smolka, 2011).
The third advantage of our data is given by its panel structure and time horizon. Firms
rarely change their sourcing from one year to another. This means that a relatively long time
horizon is essential in order to have sufficient variation in the data that can be exploited for
identification purposes. ESEE data on both dimensions of sourcing (location and ownership
1More information on ESEE data and its sampling properties are available at
http://www.fundacionsepi.es/esee/en/epresentacion.asp (accessed on 25/10/2013).
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structure) has been collected for six consecutive years from 2006 to 2011. The average
number of sourcing strategies used in 2006 was 1.37 for small firms and 2.11 for large firms.
In 2011, the same numbers were 1.50 and 2.31, respectively. This trend towards a stronger
fragmentation of the production process was largely driven by firms adding either FI or FO
to their existing sourcing portfolios, which indicates growing importance of offshoring.
We use regression analysis in order to compare the ex ante productivity across firms
that select the same sourcing strategy in year t − 1 (the pre-selection period), but select
different sourcing strategies in year t (the selection period). Key to our approach are suitable
sample restrictions imposed to identify productivity-based firm selection into both vertical
integration (conditional on the location of sourcing) and foreign sourcing (conditional on the
ownership structure of sourcing). Figure 3.1 illustrates the identification of firm selection
into vertical integration, conditional on the firm sourcing abroad: we first restrict the sample
to firms that select FO, DI, and DO at both t − 1 and t, and to firms that do not select
FI at t− x, with x = 1, . . . , t− 1. This sample restriction leaves us with a sufficient number
of firms that differ in their FI status (the strategy of interest) in the selection period, but
that behave identical otherwise, both in the pre-selection period as well as in the selection
period.2 We then estimate the pre-selection productivity differences (in both levels and first
differences) between firms choosing to select FI in the selection period and firms choosing
not to change their sourcing strategy, controlling for a host of other firm characteristics. We
do so in a linear regression framework where selection into FI is captured through a (0, 1)
indicator variable (the selection variable).3
We apply the Olley & Pakes (1996) estimation algorithm, henceforth called OPA, in order
to estimate total factor productivity (TFP) as a firm-specific, time-variant variable. The
OPA avoids estimation biases due to endogenous selection into markets and simultaneous
choice of input factors. We feed the OPA with ESEE data from 2000-2011, using annual
information on each firm’s real output, real investment, real capital stock, real purchases,
labor employment, and exit decisions. Real output is the total production value plus other
operating income (income from rent and leasing, industrial property, commissions, and certain
services), expressed in terms of prices of the year 2000. We deflate production values and
other types of operating revenue by using firm-level ESEE data on goods price variations
along with an industry-level price index from the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica
2We include firms that—in addition to sourcing abroad—choose to source domestically as well, since we
would otherwise be left with an almost empty set of firms.
3Notice that for a given firm the selection variable can be equal to zero in one period and equal to one in
another (subsequent) period. In principle, the model could therefore be identified even in case we observed
just a single firm through time.
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(INE) for years with missing data. This avoids estimation biases due to firm-specific mark-up
pricing, firm-specific demand shocks, or firm-specific market access (Klette & Griliches, 1996;
De Loecker, 2007). Real investment is the total investment value in real estate, construction,
and equipment, deflated with an industry-level INE price index. The real capital stock is
the reported value of real estate, construction, and equipment, deflated with an industry-
level INE price index. We use a firm-level price index along with industry-level INE data to
compute real purchases, defined as the total expenditure on intermediate inputs and external
services. Labor employment is measured by effectively worked hours. Exit decisions of firms
documented in ESEE data allows us to distinguish firms shutting down production from firms
staying in the market, but exiting the sample.
3.3 Results
Table 3.1 reports the main results from the analysis of firm selection into vertical integration.
There is strong evidence that the more productive firms self-select into strategies of vertical
integration, whether in the foreign or in the domestic economy. We obtain an estimated
coefficient of the selection variable which is above 0.2 and significantly different from zero,
when estimating TFP differences in levels and not including any firm-level controls. If we
control for a firm’s age, skill intensity, capital intensity, technological effort, export status,
and foreign ownership, the estimated coefficient of the selection variable is slightly below
0.2, but with a strictly positive lower confidence limit. This means that in the pre-selection
period the firms self-selecting into vertical integration are on average somewhat less than
twenty percent more productive than their competitors in the same industry with otherwise
identical characteristics. These are quite strong and interesting results, also because the
two samples employed in Table 3.1 are entirely disjunct. There is, however, no evidence
that pre-selection TFP growth is larger for firms selecting vertical integration—the estimated
coefficient of the respective selection variable has a negative sign throughout and is not
significantly different from zero. This is in line with existing theory, where sourcing is driven
by productivity levels, not productivity growth.
Table 3.2 looks at firm selection into foreign sourcing. While there is again little evidence
for differences in TFP growth in the pre-selection period, we find clear evidence for differences
in TFP levels prior to selecting into strategies of foreign sourcing. The estimated coefficient
of the corresponding selection variable is between +0.074 and +0.139 when we condition on
firms relying exclusively on an outsourced production structure, and between +0.219 and
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+0.279 when we condition on firms operating an integrated production structure.4 With a
single exception, the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5% level.
These results strongly suggest that the more productive firms self-select into strategies of
foreign sourcing, whether they operate an integrated or an outsourced production structure.
3.4 Conclusions
We present novel evidence on sourcing behavior, based on direct observation of firms’ self-
selection. Using panel data information on Spanish firms, we find that among the firms
that abstain from vertical integration to start with, it will be the more productive ones that
subsequently self-select into strategies of vertical integration (at home or abroad). The same
pattern is found for self-selection of firms into foreign sourcing (integrated or outsourced).
Two comments on these findings are in order. First, our results only hold on average
across industries. Hence, it is possible that in some industries it is the less productive firms
(rather than the highly productive ones) that select into vertical integration. This could
explain the seemingly contradictory results found in Defever & Toubal (2013) and Corcos
et al. (2013). Second, and relatedly, while the productivity-based firm selection evidenced
by our data supports a central tenet of the recent heterogeneous-firm literature on global
sourcing, it should not be interpreted as lending support to any specific model of sourcing.
To see whether the selection patterns found in this chapter are in line with the predictions
of a certain theoretical model of sourcing, we need an empirical strategy that goes beyond
establishing the mere presence and direction of self-selection. In particular, we must establish
a connection between the detailed pattern of self-selection and certain industry- and firm-
specific variables that theoretical models propose, over and above a firm’s productivity level,
as key explanatory variable for the ownership structure and the location of sourcing.
4In this latter case, we include firms that—in addition to domestic integration—rely on domestic out-
sourcing as well, in order to have a sufficiently large number of firms in the sample. The two samples employed
in Table 3.2 are nevertheless entirely disjunct.
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Figures and tables
Figure 3.1. Identification of productivity-based firm selection into vertical integration
(conditional on foreign sourcing)
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Table 3.1. Productivity-based firm selection into vertical integration
Selection variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
FI status at t (left panel) OR 0.216** 0.182** -0.023 -0.031 0.242** 0.169* -0.043 -0.047
DI status at t (right panel) (0.101) (0.092) (0.025) (0.030) (0.097) (0.093) (0.041) (0.041)
Firm-level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of observations 379 359 379 359 3,359 3,331 3,351 3,323
% of switching firms >5% >5% >5% >5% >1% >1% >1% >1%
R-squared 0.532 0.649 0.429 0.468 0.047 0.124 0.059 0.061
Selection variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
FO status at t (left panel) OR 0.139*** 0.074*** 0.003 0.001 0.279** 0.219 0.112 0.112
FI status at t (right panel) (0.026) (0.026) (0.015) (0.015) (0.137) (0.142) (0.157) (0.151)
Firm-level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of observations 3,287 3,260 3,281 3,254 289 280 286 277
% of switching firms >8% >8% >8% >8% >1% >1% >1% >1%
R-squared 0.054 0.129 0.058 0.060 0.437 0.507 0.555 0.573
The table reports estimated coefficients of the selection variable for foreign sourcing, as explained in Section 3.2. The left panel (outsourced production) looks at foreign
sourcing conditional on the firm operating an outsourced production structure only; the right panel (integrated production) looks at foreign sourcing conditional on the firm
operating an integrated production structure. The variables FI status , FO status , DI status, and DO status are dummy variables for the respective sourcing strategies.
Industry-year constants are always included. Firm-level controls are a firm's age, skill intensity (graduate workers over total workers, in logs), capital intensity (capital assets
over average number of workers, in logs), technological effort (R&D costs plus technology imports over total sales, in logs), export status, and an ordered variable for the
ratio of foreign capital in the firm's joint capital (zero;one:0-25;two:25-50;three:>50). Robust standards errors (clustered by firm) are given in parenthesis. *,**,*** indicate
statistical signficance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
at t-x: FO status=0; with x=1,…,t-1 at t-x: FI status=0; with x=1,…,t-1
at t-1 and t: DI status=0 & FI status=0 & DO status=1 at t-1 and t: FO status=0 & DI status=1 & DO status=1
TFP level TFP growth TFP level TFP growth
The table reports estimated coefficients of the selection variable for vertical integration, as explained in Section 3.2. The left panel (offshore production) looks at vertical
integration conditional on the firm sourcing abroad; the right panel (domestic production) looks at vertical integration conditional on the firm sourcing domestically only.
The variables FI status , FO status , DI status, and DO status are dummy variables for the respective sourcing strategies. Industry-year constants are always included. Firm-
level controls are a firm's age, skill intensity (graduate workers over total workers, in logs), capital intensity (capital assets over average number of workers, in logs),
technological effort (R&D costs plus technology imports over total sales, in logs), export status, and an ordered variable for the ratio of foreign capital in the firm's joint
capital (zero;one:0-25;two:25-50;three:>50). Robust standards errors (clustered by firm) are given in parenthesis. *,**,*** indicate statistical signficance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
Outsourced production Integrated production
Sample restrictions: Sample restrictions:
at t-1 and t: FO status=1 & DI status=1 & DO status=1 at t-1 and t: FI status=0 & FO status=0 & DO status=1
TFP level TFP growth TFP level TFP growth
Offshore production Domestic production
Sample restrictions: Sample restrictions:
at t-x: FI status=0, with x=1,…,t-1 at t-x: DI status=0, with x=1,…,t-1
Table 3.2. Productivity-based firm selection into foreign sourcing
Selection variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
FI status at t (left panel) OR 0.216** 0.182** -0.023 -0.031 0.242** 0.169* -0.043 -0.047
DI status at t (right panel) (0.101) (0.092) (0.025) (0.030) (0.097) (0.093) (0.041) (0.041)
Firm-level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of observations 379 359 379 359 3,359 3,331 3,351 3,323
% of switching firms >5% >5% >5% >5% >1% >1% >1% >1%
R-squared 0.532 0.649 0.429 0.468 0.047 0.124 0.059 0.061
Selection variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
FO status at t (left panel) OR 0.139*** 0.074*** 0.003 0.001 0.279** 0.219 0.112 0.112
FI status at t (right panel) (0.026) (0.026) (0.015) (0.015) (0.137) (0.142) (0.157) (0.151)
Firm-level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of observations 3,287 3,260 3,281 3,254 289 280 286 277
% of switching firms >8% >8% >8% >8% >1% >1% >1% >1%
R-squared 0.054 0.129 0.058 0.060 0.437 0.507 0.555 0.573
The table reports estimated coefficients of the selection variable for foreign sourcing, as explained in Section 3.2. The left panel (outsourced production) looks at foreign
sourcing conditional on the firm operating an outsourced production structure only; the right panel (integrated production) looks at foreign sourcing conditional on the firm
operating an integrated production structure. The variables FI status , FO status , DI status, and DO status are dummy variables for the respective sourcing strategies.
Industry-year constants are always included. Firm-level controls are a firm's age, skill intensity (graduate workers over total workers, in logs), capital intensity (capital assets
over average number of workers, in logs), technological effort (R&D costs plus technology imports over total sales, in logs), export status, and an ordered variable for the
ratio of foreign capital in the firm's joint capital (zero;one:0-25;two:25-50;three:>50). Robust standards errors (clustered by firm) are given in parenthesis. *,**,*** indicate
statistical signficance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
at t-x: FO status=0; with x=1,…,t-1 at t-x: FI status=0; with x=1,…,t-1
at t-1 and t: DI status=0 & FI status=0 & DO status=1 at t-1 and t: FO status=0 & DI status=1 & DO status=1
TFP level TFP growth TFP level TFP growth
The table reports estimated coefficients of the selection variable for vertical integration, as explained in Section 3.2. The left panel (offshore production) looks at vertical
integration conditional on the firm sourcing abroad; the right panel (domestic production) looks at vertical integration conditional on the firm sourcing domestically only.
The variables FI status , FO status , DI status, and DO status are dummy variables for the respective sourcing strategies. Industry-year constants are always included. Firm-
level controls are a firm's age, skill intensity (graduate workers over total workers, in logs), capital intensity (capital assets over average number of workers, in logs),
technological effort (R&D costs plus technology imports over total sales, in logs), export status, and an ordered variable for the ratio of foreign capital in the firm's joint
capital (zero;one:0-25;two:25-50;three:>50). Robust standards errors (clustered by firm) are given in parenthesis. *,**,*** indicate statistical signficance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
Outsourced production Integrated production
Sample restrictions: Sample restrictions:
at t-1 and t: FO status=1 & DI status=1 & DO status=1 at t-1 and t: FI status=0 & FO status=0 & DO status=1
TFP level TFP growth TFP level TFP growth
Offshore production Domestic production
Sample restrictions: Sample restrictions:
at t-x: FI status=0, with x=1,…,t-1 at t-x: DI status=0, with x=1,…,t-1
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Chapter4
Global sourcing: Towards a firm-level
test of the hold-up model
This chapter is based on joint work with Wilhelm Kohler (previously unpublished).
4.1 Introduction
Modern trade theory emphasizes that buyers and sellers of intermediate inputs enter a con-
tractual relationship that is fundamentally different from a transaction in final goods. Input
specifications often do not lend themselves to third-party verification, which rules out en-
forceable contracts. At the same time, product differentiation implies that such inputs have
little, if any, use outside the production relationship they have been specifically designed for.
As a result, trade in intermediate inputs is often plagued by a hold-up problem, and the gains
from this trade are not fully exploited.
The canonical model of input trade under such hold-up problems is due to Antra`s (2003)
who draws on the property rights theory of the firm as developed by Grossman & Hart
(1986). The model explains a firm’s decision to vertically integrate (rather than outsource)
the input supply as an attempt to minimize the efficiency loss that derives from the hold-up
problem.1 Through integration, also called intra-firm sourcing, the firm acquires a residual
property right in the input produced, which enhances its relative bargaining position vis-
1Policy implications of hold-up problems in input trade have been addressed in Ornelas & Turner (2008,
2012) and Antra`s & Staiger (2012). The general thrust of this literature is that hold-up problems may justify
subsidization or taxation of imported inputs, depending on whether the problem is more severe (or present
only) for foreign sourcing, as in Antra`s & Staiger (2012), or domestic sourcing, as in Ornelas & Turner (2008).
However, as emphasized by Ornelas & Turner (2012), the optimal policy also depends on how firms react to
the hold-up problem by choosing a specific ownership structure of input trade.
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a`-vis the supplier in ex-post negotiation over the production surplus. However, integration
is costly because it reduces the supplier’s incentive to invest in the production relationship
at the time this relationship is established. Hence, integration tends to be favored in in-
dustries where the supplier’s contribution to the production relationship is small relative to
the contribution made by the firm, so-called headquarter-intensive industries (as opposed to
component-intensive industries).
This chapter develops and applies an empirical strategy towards a firm-level test of the
hold-up model of global sourcing proposed by Antra`s & Helpman (2004), henceforth called
AH model. The AH model extends Antra`s (2003) by allowing for firms to differ in their
productivity, as in Melitz (2003), and by explaining a firm’s decision on the location of
sourcing (domestic versus foreign) along with the ownership structure of sourcing (integration
versus outsourcing). The model delivers an intriguing set of industry-level predictions on how
the prevalence of intra-firm sourcing and foreign sourcing (as fractions of firms) is determined
through the headquarter intensity of the industry and the dispersion of productivity across
firms within the industry. In this chapter we propose a novel representation of the AH model
that allows us to rigorously derive firm-level predictions, which we test on a unique survey
data set of Spanish firms covering both the location and the ownership structure of sourcing
over the period from 2006-2011.
At the industry level, a proper test of the AH model allowing for discrimination against
other models of input sourcing hinges on two assumptions.2 The first is that in any given
industry the productivity distribution of firms has a certain shape (such as Pareto). This
is a relatively mild assumption that can be verified with observable (or estimable) data,
although such verification is rarely carried out in practice. The second assumption is that
the true ranking of fixed costs associated with alternative locations and ownership structures
of sourcing is in line with the ranking imposed by the researcher when formulating the tested
hypothesis. This is a problematic assumption because the fixed costs are impossible to
observe, nor is there a natural ranking of fixed costs that could safely be assumed to apply.
Knowledge of the fixed cost ranking is in fact crucial for an industry-level test of the AH
model. To see why, suppose that integration demands higher fixed costs than outsourcing,
a case discussed in detail in Antra`s & Helpman (2004). In headquarter-intensive industries,
2Other models are presented, for example, in Grossman & Helpman (2002, 2003) where firms avoid
search and contracting costs by vertically integrating (rather than outsourcing) its input supply, at the
expense of foregone specialization gains. Grossman & Helpman (2004) invoke a principal-agent framework in
which the nature (and subject) of a contract between firm and manager are different for the two ownership
structures available. Grossman & Helpman (2005) develop a model that focuses on the trade-off between
a cost advantage of foreign sourcing on the one hand and the disadvantage of a more difficult search for a
suitable input supplier in an incomplete contracts environment.
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there will be firm selection into different ownership structures of sourcing, since integration
is beneficial in terms of variable production costs. High-productivity firms choose integration
and low-productivity firms choose outsourcing.3 In component-intensive industries, where the
variable cost advantage lies with outsourcing, there will be no selection at all. Now suppose,
instead, that integration demands lower fixed costs than outsourcing. In this case the above
statement is reversed: Firm selection occurs only in component-intensive industries and,
strikingly, it occurs in reverse fashion. This possibility of reversed predictions is a strength
of the AH model, since it reflects great generality, but it also makes the model hard to test
empirically.4
The industry-level predictions derived by Antra`s & Helpman (2004) are based on the
assumption that firms in the same industry are identical in all respects but their productivity.
What emerges from this assumption is a characteristic sequence of “productivity cut-offs”
that uniquely separates firms into groups that pursue different sourcing strategies. In this
chapter, we allow for the fixed costs of sourcing to include a randomly distributed firm-specific
component, a channel by which we introduce a second dimension of firm heterogeneity into
the model. This extension is part of an empirical strategy towards a firm-level test of the
AH model that is robust across all possible rankings of fixed costs for the different sourcing
strategies. Nor does our strategy depend on any assumptions regarding the distribution of
productivity across firms.
The key to our approach is to first pin down the difference in a firm’s maximum profit
across alternative locations and ownership structures, respectively, and to then study the vari-
ation in this difference induced by exogenous changes in the industry’s headquarter intensity
and the firm’s productivity level. While Antra`s & Helpman (2004) carve out productivity
cut-offs that eliminate the difference in maximum profits across any two sourcing strategies,
we explore the variation in this difference across the entire parameter space. In so doing,
we exploit the fact that this variation is independent of the fixed costs of sourcing, whether
specific to the industry or the firm. Technically speaking, our approach involves examining
the modularity properties of the firm’s maximum profit function with respect to key param-
eters of the model, as in Mra´zowa´ & Neary (2013). These are the industry’s headquarter
3If productivity is distributed Pareto, this equilibrium implies that a higher dispersion of productivity
across firms will lead to a higher prevalence of intra-firm sourcing. An alternative equilibrium involving no
selection will arise in headquarter-intensive industries, if the fixed cost disadvantage of integration relative
to outsourcing is sufficiently small.
4In a regression analysis of industry-level data, this possibility of reversed predictions renders any attempt
to “control” for the fixed cost ranking (for example through fixed effects in a panel estimation) meaningless.
The reason for this is that in theory the sign of the effect of a greater productivity dispersion across firms on
the prevalence of intra-firm sourcing depends on this very fixed cost ranking.
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intensity; the firm’s productivity level; the ex-post distribution of revenue between the firm
and the input supplier; and the unit cost of sourcing abroad (relative to the unit cost of
sourcing domestically). For a very large and plausible parameter subspace, we find modu-
larity properties that are straightforward to translate into a firm-level probability model of
sourcing.
The firm-level predictions that we derive from the AH model are reminiscent of the
industry-level predictions derived in Antra`s & Helpman (2004), but they are novel in several
important ways. First, for a given ownership structure of sourcing the probability of a firm
to source its input abroad (rather than domestically) is monotonically decreasing in the
industry’s headquarter intensity. The effect of the firm’s productivity is strictly positive
throughout, but it is the weaker, the larger the headquarter intensity of production. Second,
for a given sourcing location the probability of a firm to vertically integrate (rather than
outsource) its input supply is monotonically increasing in the industry’s headquarter intensity,
while the effect of the firm’s productivity is ambiguous: it is strictly positive in headquarter-
intensive industries and strictly negative in component-intensive industries. This prediction
is the firm-level analogue to what has been dubbed the Antra`s effect by Nunn & Trefler
(2008). With minor qualifications rooted in the empirical fact that firms pursue more than
one sourcing strategy at a time (Kohler & Smolka, 2011), the patterns that we find in the
Spanish firm-level data are fully compatible with all of these predictions. Importantly, since
these predictions do not hinge upon unobserved fixed cost rankings across alternative sourcing
strategies, our approach amounts to a proper test of the AH model. And the outcome is strong
empirical support of the model.
Our data are drawn from an annual survey of about 2,000 manufacturing firms in Spain.
They are particularly well suited for a firm-level test of the AH model, for two reasons.
First, the firms report the ownership structure of their input sourcing (integration versus
outsourcing) separately for either sourcing location (domestic versus foreign). Hence, we
can test the firm-level predictions of the AH model in all relevant sourcing dimensions.
Secondly, the survey classifies firms into 20 different industries based on the three-digit NACE
Rev. 2 standard industrial classification of the European Union. This allows us to exploit
the cross-industry variation in headquarter intensity for identification purposes, and to treat
unobserved fixed cost differences across alternative sourcing strategies as a constant, industry-
specific probability shifter in favor of one or the other sourcing alternative.
This chapter is related to a series of papers that have tried, in one way or another, to
bring the AH model to the data. Studies using data at the industry-level (widely or narrowly
defined) are Yeaple (2006), Nunn & Trefler (2008), Bernard et al. (2010), and Nunn & Trefler
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(2013).5 These studies robustly find that measures of an industry’s headquarter intensity,
especially capital intensity, are positively associated with the prevalence of intra-firm trade
in the industry. A subset of these studies also finds that firm heterogeneity, captured by
the dispersion of productivity in the industry, plays an important role for the prevalence of
intra-firm trade. By and large, the conclusion drawn in these studies is that the evidence
lends support to the AH model. However, this conclusion rests on untested assumptions
about the fixed cost ranking of alternative sourcing strategies as well as about the shape of
the productivity distribution of firms. Furthermore, these studies focus exclusively on the
choice between integration and outsourcing abroad. They do not look at the same choice in
the domestic economy, nor do they study the trade-off between domestic and foreign sourcing
in relation to the AH model.
Studies using data at the firm-level fall into two parts. The studies by Tomiura (2007),
Federico (2010), Kohler & Smolka (2011), and Kohler & Smolka (2012) search for charac-
teristic differences across groups of firms pursuing different sourcing strategies. It turns out
that for a given sourcing location there are robust “performance premia” in terms of produc-
tivity, size, capital intensity and the like on vertical integration strategies over strategies of
outsourcing. The same is true for the comparison between firms sourcing their inputs abroad
and firms sourcing domestically, a finding that is independent of the “exporter premia” that
are also well-documented in the literature.6 While indicative of a productivity-dependent
selection of firms, a result that features prominently in the AH model, these studies do not
investigate whether (and how) this selection is governed by the headquarter intensity of the
industry; hence they fall short of an empirical test of the AH model.
The second type of firm-level studies, namely Federico (2012), Defever & Toubal (2013),
and Corcos et al. (2013), estimates decision models for the firm’s choice between foreign
integration and foreign outsourcing in the spirit of the AH model. The evidence reported
in these studies seems contradictory. Investigating a cross-section of French firms Defever
& Toubal (2013) find that firm productivity is negatively correlated with the prevalence of
intra-firm trade, while this same correlation is positive in Federico (2012) (using a cross-
section of Italian firms) and in Corcos et al. (2013) (using an extended cross-sectional sample
5Feenstra & Hanson (2005) test a variant of the hold-up model in relation to multinational operations
in China’s processing trade; see also Fernandes & Tang (2012). Costinot et al. (2011) find that industries
in which non-routine activities loom large have higher shares of intra-firm trade. This is explained by non-
routine activities often requiring ex-post “adaptation” on the part of the contractual partners (for example
because problems arising ex post call for renegotiation), and by adaptation being less costly if carried out
intra-firm.
6In Kohler & Smolka (2013), we use changes in sourcing strategies through time to show that firms select
their sourcing strategy based on their productivity.
66 CHAPTER 4. TESTING THE HOLD-UP MODEL OF GLOBAL SOURCING
of the same French firm-level data source).7 One is tempted to argue that all of these studies
potentially lend empirical support to the AH model, provided only that the (unobservable)
fixed cost ranking underlying their respective samples is of suitable (opposite) sign. We show
that this reading of the firm-level empirical literature is misleading, because the AH model
implies an ambiguous effect of productivity at the firm-level, independently of the fixed cost
ranking.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we reformulate the AH
model and investigate the modularity properties of the firm’s maximum profit function. Based
on these properties, we derive firm-level predictions from the model. Section 4.3 introduces
the Spanish firm-level data we use in order to test these predictions. It also looks at the
prevalence of different sourcing strategies in our data, and how their use has changed over
the past few years. In Section 4.4 we bring our novel firm-level predictions of the AH model
to the data. We do so by drawing on a set of discrete choice models on alternative locations
and ownership structures of sourcing. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The hold-up model of global sourcing
4.2.1 Model assumptions
In the AH model, firms, interchangeably referred to as headquarters and headquarter firms,
produce differentiated varieties of a final good by securing (and entering) a production rela-
tionship with an input supplier. Production relies on two types of intermediates, a headquar-
ter service provided by the firm and a manufacturing component (henceforth simply called
input) provided by the input supplier. Both intermediates are essential for the production
of the final good, and both are highly customized. The headquarter service is produced do-
mestically, while input suppliers may either be located (and produce) in the domestic or the
foreign economy. Customization of intermediates for a specific variety of the final good has
two consequences. First, due to impossible third party verification, the two agents cannot
enter an enforceable contract about the exact quality of the intermediates to be delivered.
And secondly, once produced both intermediates are entirely relationship-specific and have
no use outside the production relationship. As a result, the two agents have to bargain about
sharing the revenue generated from producing and selling the final good.
7Federico (2012) also looks at the choice between domestic integration and domestic outsourcing. Con-
trary to all three of the aforementioned studies, we also explore the choice between foreign sourcing and
domestic sourcing conditional on the ownership structure of sourcing.
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The model assumes ex-post Nash bargaining according to some underlying (i.e., exoge-
nous) relative bargaining power as well as ex-post outside options of the two agents. Under an
outsourcing relationship, either party has a zero ex-post outside option. Under integration,
the headquarter acquires a property right that secures part of the revenue in case bargaining
breaks down. Hence, integration affords the headquarter a positive ex-post outside option.8
Once an agreement has been reached, the final good is produced, with revenue generated on
monopolistically competitive markets, and shared according to the bargaining agreement.9
In a preceding stage, the two agents decide about the quantity of intermediates to produce,
based on expected revenue shares as well as the marginal costs prevailing in their respective
locations. In the first stage of the game, anticipating decisions in all subsequent stages, the
headquarter decides about whether to secure participation of a foreign or a domestic input
supplier, and whether to rely on an outsourcing or an integrated production relationship.10
We use indices h = d, f and j = v, o to denote the two available locations (domestic and
foreign) and ownership structures (vertical integration and outsourcing) of input supply. We
refer to `h as the inverse unit cost of the input, with a value equal to `d if it is produced
domestically, and `f if it is produced abroad. Following Antra`s & Helpman (2004), we assume
`d < `f , which implies a foreign cost advantage for the manufacturing component. Without
loss of generality, we normalize the unit cost for the headquarter service to unity. The ex-post
revenue share accruing to the headquarter is denoted by mj, so that 1 −mj accrues to the
input supplier. The outside option deriving from the residual property right implies that
mv > mo. Each combination of location and ownership structure of sourcing requires its own
fixed cost Fhj, which is specific to the industry that a firm belongs to. We emphasize that
the model does not take a stance on the differences in fixed costs across sourcing strategies,
and that it even allows for “reversals” in fixed cost differences across industries.
In order to nail down the headquarter’s choice of a sourcing strategy {h, j}, Antra`s &
Helpman (2004) make three further assumptions: i) a Cobb-Douglas technology for final
goods production relying on the two intermediates, ii) a uniform and constant perceived
8Assuming a zero outside option for the outsourcing relationship is a mere normalization. What matters,
in line with Grossman & Hart (1986), is that the headquarter enjoys a larger outside option with integration
than with outsourcing.
9The underlying assumption is that the bargaining agreement as such can be contracted with perfect
enforcement.
10Antra`s & Helpman (2008) allow both intermediates to be composed of a continuum of tasks that falls into
two ranges of contractible and non-contractible tasks, respectively. Schwarz & Suedekum (2013) similarly
allow for a continuum of intermediates, modeled on an interval of variable length that is endogenously
determined by the headquarter. Although the entire continuum of intermediates is assumed non-contractible,
it falls into two subranges where the headquarter relies on outsourcing and integration, respectively, vis-a`-vis
multiple suppliers of intermediates. See also Antra`s (2012) for a survey.
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price elasticity of final goods demand, and iii) a zero ex ante outside option of the input
supplier. Assumptions i) and ii) generate concavity of the revenue function. Assumption
iii) ties down the participation constraint such that the return that the input supplier may
expect from entering the production relationship is zero.11
4.2.2 Setup for decision making
We write Π(`h,mj; η, θ) for the headquarter’s maximum operating profit, given the sourcing
strategy {h, j}. In this expression, η denotes the industry-specific elasticity of final output
with respect to the headquarter service, referred to as the headquarter intensity, and θ de-
notes the firm’s total factor productivity.12 The headquarter’s operating profit is equal to its
revenue share minus the cost of the headquarter service, plus a transfer payment from the
supplier that just secures the supplier’s participation. It is easy to show that this profit is
equal to the total revenue from the production relationship minus the cost of both interme-
diates, minus the supplier’s ex-ante outside option. Calling Π(`h,mj; η, θ) a maximum profit
means that the levels of both intermediates have been chosen optimally, given monopolistic
competition on goods markets as well as prices of the intermediates, and given the sourcing
strategy.
The headquarter’s choice of the sourcing strategy {h, j} is then dictated by
max
h,j
{Π(`h,mj; η, θ)− Fhj}. (4.1)
In a long-run general equilibrium, maximum profits as given in (4.1) are approaching zero if
there is free entry into this industry. Antra`s & Helpman (2004) show that under the above
assumptions we have
Π(`h,mj; η, θ) = Z(`h,mj; η)θ
ε−1, (4.2)
where ε > 1 denotes the perceived price elasticity of demand for final goods (in absolute
11As with the zero ex-post outside option, this is a mere normalization that is not crucial for the results
obtained.
12To avoid cluttered notation, we abstain from indexing firms and industries until we get to the point
where it is necessary.
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value) in a market environment of monopolistic competition, and where
Z(`h,mj; η) := Az(mj; η)C(`h,mj; η), (4.3)
z(mj; η) := 1− ε− 1
ε
[
mjη + (1−mj)(1− η)
]
, (4.4)
and C(`h,mj; η) :=
[
mηj (`h(1−mj))1−η
]ε−1
. (4.5)
In these definitions, A captures the size of the market.13 The term C(`h,mj; η) highlights
the efficiency cost of the hold-up problem. This is best seen by realizing that C(`h,mj; η)
ε−1
is equal to the inverse minimum unit-cost function for the final good, dual to the assumed
Cobb-Douglas technology, with the prices of the two inputs inflated by 1/mj and 1/(1−mj),
respectively. Thus, the hold-up problem acts like an input tax that implies a lower than
optimal overall input provision (and thus lower revenue) as well as a distorted input mix
(unless mj = 0.5). From C(`h,mj; η), as well as from the definition of z(mj; η) in (4.4), it
follows that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the headquarter’s profit and its
revenue share mj.
The decision rule in (4.1) requires a discrete comparison of the operating profit for `h =
`d, `f and mj = mo,mv. To describe this comparison, we introduce the following definitions:
∆`Π(mj; η, θ) := Π(`f ,mj; η, θ)− Π(`d,mj; η, θ), (4.6)
∆mΠ(`h; η, θ) := Π(`h,mv; η, θ)− Π(`h,mo; η, θ), (4.7)
∆`Fj := Ffj − Fdj, (4.8)
and ∆mFh := Fhv − Fho. (4.9)
The term ∆`Π(mj; η, θ) gives the difference in operating profits across the two locations
of sourcing, conditional on sourcing under the ownership structure j. Under the above
assumption that `d < `f , this difference is strictly positive. It is therefore a measure for the
location advantage of foreign sourcing. Similarly, the term ∆mΠ(`h; η, θ) gives the difference
in operating profits across the two ownership structures of sourcing, conditional on sourcing
in location h. If this difference is positive, there is a strategic advantage of integration; if it
is negative, there is a strategic advantage of outsourcing. Definitions analogous to (4.6) and
(4.7) hold for ∆`Z(mj; η) and ∆mZ(`h; η). If positive, the term ∆`Fj measures the industry-
specific fixed cost disadvantage of foreign sourcing. A fixed cost disadvantage of domestic
13More specifically, if B denotes the entire expenditure falling on differentiated varieties of the good in
question, the term A may be written as B[(ε − 1)/ε]ε−1. Remember that the unit cost of the headquarter
service has been normalized to unity.
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sourcing is easily accommodated by ∆`Fj < 0. Similar statements apply to the term ∆mFh.
If ∆mFh > 0, we speak of a fixed cost disadvantage of integration; if ∆mFh < 0, we have a
fixed cost disadvantage of outsourcing.
4.2.3 Firm-level predictions
We aim at firm-level predictions going beyond the cut-offs in productivity that separate
firms with different sourcing strategies, as described in detail in Antra`s & Helpman (2004).
We therefore introduce a second dimension of firm heterogeneity that concerns the fixed
costs of sourcing and that is independent of the firm’s productivity. More specifically, we
assume that when sourcing in location h firm i faces a fixed cost disadvantage of integration
equal to ∆mFh + µi,h. Thus, in addition to ∆mFh, which is common to all firms in the
same industry, there is a firm-specific element µi,h that adds to the fixed cost difference
across the two ownership structures of sourcing. By complete analogy, the firm-specific fixed
cost disadvantage of foreign sourcing is equal to ∆`Fj + µi,j when sourcing under ownership
structure j.
It is straightforward to translate the above setup into simple decision rules for a firm’s
input sourcing. We define a binary variable Vi,h, such that Vi,h = 1 if the firm i decides to
integrate its input supply, conditional upon sourcing in location h, and Vi,h = 0 otherwise.
Likewise, a variable Vi,j describes firm i’s choice of the sourcing location, conditional upon
its ownership structure j. Foreign sourcing implies Vi,j = 1, and domestic sourcing implies
Vi,j = 0. Then, the decision rule for firm i choosing the ownership structure of its sourcing,
conditional on sourcing in location h, emerges as
Vi,h =
1 if ∆mΠ(`h; η, θi)− (∆mFh + µi,h) ≥ 00 otherwise. (4.10)
A similar representation exists with respect to the firm’s decision rule for the location of
sourcing, given the ownership structure j. Given a firm’s productivity θi, there exists a unique
threshold value µ˜i,h which makes the firm indifferent between integration and outsourcing in
location h. The same applies to µ˜i,j, which denotes the threshold value for the location of
sourcing, given the ownership structure j. If µi,h < µ˜i,h, then according to (4.10) firm i
chooses integration if sourcing in h; if µi,h > µ˜i,h, it chooses outsourcing. Analogously, if
µi,j < µ˜i,j, then firm i prefers foreign sourcing if in ownership structure j, and if µi,j > µ˜i,j it
will source domestically.
We now derive firm-level predictions on the location advantage of foreign sourcing and
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the strategic advantage of integration or outsourcing, respectively. In doing so, we ex-
ploit certain modularity properties of the maximum profit function Π(`h,mj; η, θ) as defined
in (4.2) through (4.5). These properties describe the responsiveness of ∆`Π(mj; η, θ) and
∆mΠ(`h; η, θ), respectively, to changes in η and θ.
14
Definition 1. (a) The function H(g, q) is called supermodular with respect to g and q, if
for any two values g1 > g0 and q1 > q0 the following is true: ∆gH(q1) > ∆gH(q0), where
∆gH(q) := H(g1, q) − H(g0, q). (b) The function H(g, q) is called submodular, if −H(g, q)
is supermodular with respect to g and q. (c) If H(g, q) is twice differentiable, then it is called
supermodular, if ∂2H/(∂g∂q) > 0, and vice versa for submodularity.
Proposition 1 (location of sourcing, conditional on the ownership structure j).
(a) A higher productivity of the firm strengthens the location advantage of foreign sourcing.
(b) Within a very large and plausible parameter subspace of {mj, η}, a higher headquarter
intensity of the industry weakens the location advantage of foreign sourcing. (c) In this
same parameter subspace, a higher headquarter intensity of the industry weakens the positive
interaction between the location advantage of foreign sourcing and the firm’s productivity (as
described in part a).
Proof. Part (a) of the proposition follows from ∆`Π(mj; η, θ) = ∆`Z(mj; η)θ
ε−1 and ε > 1.
Part (c) is equivalent to the profit function Π(·) being submodular in ` and η. In Appendix
A we show that submodularity obtains for a large and plausible parameter subspace of mj
and η. This will also prove part (b) of the proposition.
Part (a) of Proposition 1 is familiar from existing literature. It tells us that a firm’s
productivity is a leverage for the location advantage of foreign sourcing. Figure 4.1 illustrates
this leverage effect by plotting the location advantage of foreign sourcing as an increasing
function of Θi := θ
ε−1
i , which is a positive monotonic transformation of firm i’s productivity.
The plot is linear with a slope equal to ∆`Z(mj; η0), and it holds for an industry with a
certain headquarter intensity η0. If we depict the industry-specific fixed cost difference across
sourcing locations on the vertical axis, the plot is a demarkation line for domestic and foreign
sourcing. In the figure, we compare the case of a fixed cost disadvantage of foreign sourcing,
∆`0Fj > 0, with the case of a fixed cost disadvantage of domestic sourcing, ∆`1Fj < 0.
The threshold values for the firm-specific fixed cost differences µ˜i,j are found as vertical
arrows between the industry-specific fixed cost differences and the demarkation line. Positive
14We propose a “modularity view“ on firm-level sourcing decisions in Kohler & Smolka (2011). Mra´zowa´
& Neary (2013) point out more generally that modularity properties lie at the heart of the selection effects
discussed in modern trade literature focusing on firm heterogeneity.
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(negative) threshold values are represented by upward (downward) arrows. For instance, for
an industry-specific fixed cost disadvantage of foreign sourcing equal to ∆`0Fj > 0 a firm
positioned at Θi will face a negative threshold value µ˜i,j for foreign sourcing, indicated by
the downward arrow, while for ∆`1Fj < 0 it will face a positive threshold, indicated by the
upward arrow. A more productive firm positioned at Θi′ will face positive threshold values
for ∆`0Fj as well as ∆`1Fj, but the threshold will be higher in absolute value for ∆`1Fj.
<<Figure 4.1 about here>>
The key point is that, irrespective of the sign and magnitude of the fixed cost difference
across sourcing locations, a firm with a higher productivity faces a lower algebraic threshold
value µ˜i,j. In the empirical section below, we shall translate this relationship into a probability
model for Vi,j, and the upshot will be that, other things equal, a more productive firm is more
likely to choose foreign sourcing, whatever the fixed cost difference ∆`Fj.
Parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 1 are novel to the literature and essentially rely on the
same submodularity property of the profit function; see the proof. In Figure 4.1, this property
appears as a counter-clock-wise rotation of the demarkation line caused by any decrease in
the headquarter intensity. Part (b) of Proposition 1 means that, other things equal, firms
belonging to an industry with a higher headquarter intensity face threshold values for their
respective fixed cost differences that are lower in algebraic value. Again, this holds true
independently of the industry-specific fixed cost difference across sourcing locations.
Intuitively, a foreign cost advantage for the input should become less compelling for for-
eign sourcing, if the headquarter intensity η increases, since this means the foreign input
becomes less important for the production relationship. However, Proposition 1 states that
the relevant submodularity property does not hold for the entire parameter space. In Ap-
pendix A, we demonstrate the ambiguity and we show by means of numerical simulations
that submodularity does hold for a very large and plausible parameter subspace. Part (c) of
Proposition 1 implies an interaction between the firm’s productivity and the industry’s head-
quarter intensity in a firm’s decision about its sourcing strategy. The positive relationship
between the firm’s productivity and the likelihood of it choosing foreign sourcing becomes
stronger, if it belongs to an industry with a lower headquarter intensity.
Proposition 2 (ownership structure of sourcing, conditional on location h). (a)
Industries with a headquarter intensity above a threshold value η˜(mo,mv) feature a strate-
gic advantage of integration; industries with a headquarter intensity below η˜(mo,mv) feature
a strategic advantage of outsourcing. (b) A higher productivity of the firm strengthens any
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strategic advantage of sourcing, whether this advantage lies with integration or with outsourc-
ing. (c) Within a large and plausible parameter subspace of {mj, η}, a higher headquarter
intensity of the industry strengthens any strategic advantage of integration, while it weak-
ens any strategic advantage of outsourcing. (d) In this same parameter subspace, a higher
headquarter intensity of the industry strengthens any positive interaction between a strategic
advantage of integration and the firm’s productivity (as described in part b), while it weakens
any positive interaction between a strategic advantage of outsourcing and the firm’s produc-
tivity (as described in part b).
Proof. Part (a) of the proposition follows from Antra`s (2003). In terms of the present nota-
tion, his Proposition 1 and Lemma 3 state that Z(`h,mv; η, θ)/Z(`h,mo; η, θ) is monotoni-
cally increasing in η, with a unique threshold level η∗ implicitly defined through
Z(`h,mv; η
∗, θ)/Z(`h,mo; η∗, θ) = 1. In view of our Proposition 2, we may write η∗ =
η˜(mo,mv). Moreover, we have ∆mZ(`h; η, θi) < 0 for all η < η˜(mo,mv) and vice versa for all
η > η˜(mo,mv). Part (b) derives readily from the fact that ∆mΠ(`h; η, θ) = ∆mZ(`h; η)θ
ε−1.
Part (d) is equivalent to the profit function Π(·) being supermodular in m and η. In Appendix
A we show that supermodularity obtains within a large and plausible parameter subspace of
{mj, η}. This will also prove part (c) of the proposition.
<<Figure 4.2 about here>>
Part (a) of Proposition 2 is the familiar Antra`s effect. Integration offers a higher ex-post
revenue share for the headquarter. But for a low enough headquarter intensity the revenue
share effect is dominated by the adverse incentive effect that integration exerts on the input
supplier. Intuitively, the threshold η˜(mo,mv) is higher for a higher value of mo and lower for
a higher value of mv. Importantly, the Antra`s effect interacts with the firm’s productivity,
as stated in part (b) of Proposition 2. Figure 4.2 illustrates Proposition 2, with demarkation
lines familiar from Figure 4.1. The bottom part of the figure depicts a demarkation line for an
industry with low headquarter intensity η1 < η˜(mo,mv), with the strategic advantage lying
with outsourcing. If this is paired with a fixed cost disadvantage of integration, ∆m0Fh > 0,
then a firm with a productivity measured at Θi faces a negative threshold µ˜i,h < 0, indicated
by a downward arrow. A firm with a higher productivity measured at Θi′ similarly faces a
negative threshold µ˜i′,h > 0, which is even higher in absolute value. The reason is that the
strategic advantage of outsourcing is magnified by a high productivity. With a fixed cost
disadvantage of outsourcing, ∆m1Fh < 0, firm i faces a positive threshold µ˜i,h > 0, measured
by the upward arrow. For firm i′ the threshold is still negative, but has become smaller in
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magnitude. Thus, whatever the industry-specific fixed cost difference ∆mFh, the firm-specific
threshold value µ˜i,h is increasing in the firm’s productivity. In terms of the probability model
developed below, a more productive firm in an industry with η < η˜(mo,mv) is less likely to
choose integration, irrespective of the fixed cost difference across ownership structures. This
statement is reversed for any industry with η > η˜(mo,mv), such as η2 in Figure 4.2.
The supermodularity between m and η that we claim in parts (c) and (d) of Proposition
2 implies a counter-clockwise rotation of the demarkation line caused by an increase in
the industry’s headquarter intensity. Repeating the above exercise of identifying threshold
values µ˜i,h and µ˜i′,h, this has two implications. i) The relationship between the likelihood
of integration and a firm’s productivity must include a positive interaction between the
productivity of the firm and the headquarter intensity of the industry. ii) Other things equal,
the likelihood of integration is increasing in the headquarter intensity of the industry that
the firm belongs to. Again, all of this this holds true irrespective of the sign and magnitude
of the industry-specific fixed cost differences across ownership structures.
4.3 Firm-level data
4.3.1 Source
Our firm-level data are drawn from the “Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales” (ESEE),
an annual survey of roughly 2,000 manufacturing firms in Spain. It is arranged by the
“Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales”, a public foundation based in Madrid.15
To date the ESEE covers a representative panel of Spanish manufacturing firms for the years
1990-2011. Its panel structure allows us to track manufacturing firms in Spain over time.
The initial selection of surveyed firms (in 1990) followed a two-way sampling procedure.
Questionnaires were sent out to all firms that employed more than 200 workers and to a
subset of firms that employed between 10 and 200 workers. Firms in this latter subset were
selected through a stratified, proportional and systematic sampling (with a random seed).
Later, special efforts have been made in order to keep the sample representative with respect
to the population of reference. The survey distinguishes 20 different industries and four
different size groups for firms that employ between 10 and 200 individuals. Industries are
defined according to sets of products at the NACE-2009 level.16
15Detailed information on the foundation’s history and activities are available at
http://www.fundacionsepi.es/.
16Table B.1 in Appendix B gives a list of manufacturing industries considered in the survey. Prior to 2009,
firms have been classified into industries according to the older NACE-1993 classification. We have used
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A central feature of our data is that from 2006 onwards they include information on
the global sourcing activities of firms along the two dimensions of sourcing, location and
ownership structure. The two relevant questions in the survey, pivotal for the quality of the
data, read as follows:17
1. Of the total amount of purchases of goods and services that you incorporate (transform)
in the production process, indicate − according to the type of supplier − the percentage
that these represent in the total amount of purchases of your firm in [year].
(a) Spanish suppliers that belong to your group of companies or that participate in
your firm’s joint capital. [yes/no] / [if yes, then percentage rate]
(b) Other suppliers located in Spain. [yes/no]/[if yes, then percentage rate]
2. For the year [year], indicate whether you imported goods and services that you incor-
porate (transform) in the production process, and the percentage that theses imports −
according to the type of supplier − represent in the total value of your imports. [yes/no]
(a) From suppliers that belong to your group of companies and/or from foreign firms
that participate in your firm’s joint capital. [yes/no]/[if yes, then percentage rate]
(b) From other foreign firms. [yes/no]/[if yes, then percentage rate]
We use answers to question 1.(a) to construct a dummy variable for domestic integration
(abbreviated DI) that takes on the value one if the firm answers “yes”, and zero if it an-
swers “no”. We proceed accordingly for domestic outsourcing (question 1.(b): DO), foreign
integration (question 2.(a): FI), and foreign outsourcing (question 2.(b): FO). We can then
characterize observations by defining a tuple of variables Ω = 〈DI,DO,FI, FO〉. For ex-
ample, we attach Ω = 〈1, 0, 1, 0〉 to any observation that reports to source inputs from both
a foreign and a domestic integrated supplier (but not from another independent supplier in
Spain or abroad). Sometimes it shall prove convenient to refer to Ω as a set of tuples. An
example is: Ω = {〈1, 0, 1, 0〉, 〈0, 0, 1, 0〉}, which we write shorthand as Ω = {〈·, 0, 1, 0〉}.
concordance information provided by the SEPI foundation, in order to take care of this change in industrial
classification. More information on the survey and its sampling properties are available in English from
SEPI’s website at http://www.fundacionsepi.es/esee/en/epresentacion.asp.
17The survey questionnaire is distributed in Spanish and available for download at
http://www.fundacionsepi.es/esee/sp/svariables/indice.asp.
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4.3.2 Firm productivity
A pivotal variable in our empirical analysis is a firm’s productivity level. Firm-level estimates
of total factor productivity (TFP) are often plagued by biases originating from endogenous
selection into markets, simultaneous choice of input factors, omitted firms’ input and out-
put prices, and endogenous product mixes. We apply the Olley & Pakes (1996) estimation
algorithm, henceforth called OPA, in order to estimate industry-specific production func-
tions. From these estimates we recover each firm’s TFP level as a firm-specific, time-variant
variable. The OPA takes care of the selection bias as well as the simultaneity bias.
We employ the ESEE firm-level data from 2000-2011 in applying the OPA, using annual
information on each firm’s real output, real investment, real capital stock, real purchases,
labor employment, and exit decisions. Real output is the total production value plus other
operating income (i.e., income from rent and leasing, industrial property, commissions, and
certain services), expressed in terms of prices of the year 2000. We deflate production values
and other types of operating revenue by using firm-level information on goods price varia-
tions from the ESEE, coupled with an industry-level price index from the INE for years with
missing data. Using goods price variations at the level of individual firms is important to
avoid estimation biases due to firm-specific mark-up pricing, firm-specific demand shocks,
or firm-specific market access; see Klette & Griliches (1996) and De Loecker (2007). Real
investment is the total investment value in real estate, construction, and equipment, deflated
with an industry-level price index from the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE). The
real capital stock is the reported value of real estate, construction, and equipment, deflated
with an industry-level price index from the INE. We use a firm-level price index, coupled with
industry-level data from INE, to compute real purchases, defined as the total expenditure
on intermediate inputs and external services. Labor employment is measured by effectively
worked hours, which reduces the possibility of measurement bias relative to standard mea-
sures used in the literature. Exit decisions of firms are also reported in the data, which allows
us to distinguish between firms shutting down production and firms staying in the market,
but exiting the ESEE panel.
4.3.3 Prevalence of sourcing activities
Table 4.1 reports the prevalence of certain sourcing activities for two different years, 2006
and 2011, separately for small firms (with at most 200 employees) and large firms (with
more than 200 employees). We define sourcing activities in a mutually inclusive way, so
that a firm may count for more than one sourcing activity due to multiple ways of sourcing.
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The first four rows from above distinguish among four sourcing activities: domestic sourcing
(Ω = {〈1, 1, ·, ·〉, 〈1, 0, ·, ·〉, 〈0, 1, ·, ·〉}), foreign sourcing (Ω = {〈·, ·, 1, 1〉, 〈·, ·, 1, 0〉, 〈·, ·, 0, 1〉}),
outsourcing (Ω = {〈·, 1, ·, 1〉, 〈·, 1, ·, 0〉, 〈·, 0, ·, 1〉}), and integration (Ω = {〈1, ·, 1, ·〉, 〈1, ·, 0, ·〉,
〈0, ·, 1, ·〉}). There is a fifth group that we refer to as non-sourcing firms (Ω = 〈0, 0, 0, 0〉).
These firms report zero volumes for input sourcing in the survey questionnaire.18 We find that
domestic sourcing is more common than foreign. More than 90% of firms source domestically,
with just marginally higher values for large than for small firms. For foreign sourcing, the
difference is much larger: for small firms we observe shares of 33.7% and 41% in 2006 and
2011, for large firms the corresponding figures are 65.9% and 76%, respectively. While the
shares increase for all four types of sourcing, with a corresponding fall in the non-sourcing
category, the increase over time is clearly strongest for foreign sourcing, and more so for large
firms than for small firms.
<<Table 4.1 about here>>
In the bottom part of Table 4.1, we look at all combinations of the two sourcing dimensions
(location and ownership structure). We see that domestic outsourcing (Ω = {〈·, 1, ·, ·〉}) is
by far the most widely used sourcing strategy (roughly 90% of firms). Domestic integration
(Ω = {〈1, ·, ·, ·〉}) is a less common phenomenon, observed in 10% of the small and 30% of the
large firms in 2011. Even wider gaps are observed for foreign integration (Ω = {〈·, ·, 1, ·〉})
and foreign outsourcing (Ω = {〈·, ·, ·, 1〉}): 5% and 40.2% for small, and 34.1% and 70.1% for
large firms, respectively. Looking at changes through time, we find the strongest increases for
large firms, with 8.8% for foreign outsourcing and 9.3 for foreign integration. Interestingly,
small firms show a very modest increase of 1% in foreign integration, and large firms even
show a decrease in domestic integration.
4.4 Empirical model
We now turn to a firm-level analysis of firms’ sourcing behavior in the spirit of the AH model.
The purpose of this section is to develop and apply a test of Propositions 1 and 2 with our
firm-level data. Either proposition identifies the productivity of the firm as a key determinant
of the firm’s sourcing decision (along with the headquarter intensity of the industry to which
the firm belongs). We will first study the relationship between firm productivity and the
location of sourcing, conditional on the ownership structure of sourcing (Proposition 1).
18See Kohler & Smolka (2011) for a discussion of the incidence of non-sourcing firms.
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Parts (a) and (c) of Proposition 1 imply that a higher productivity encourages firms to
source their inputs offshore (rather than domestically), but that this productivity effect is
the weaker the larger the headquarter intensity of the corresponding industry. We will then
inspect the role of firm productivity for the ownership structure of sourcing, conditional on
the location of sourcing (Proposition 2). Parts (a), (b), and (d) of Proposition 2 imply that
the likelihood of a firm to engage in vertical integration (rather than outsourcing) may be
increasing or decreasing in the productivity of the firm, depending on the corresponding
industry’s headquarter intensity: in industries with high headquarter intensities (above the
threshold η˜), the productivity effect is positive and increasing in the headquarter intensity,
but it is negative in industries with low headquarter intensities (below the threshold η˜) and
decreasing (in absolute value) in the headquarter intensity.
4.4.1 The location of sourcing
Let firms be indexed by i = 1, . . . , I, and let industries by indexed by s = 1, . . . , S, with
S = 20. Let the set of firms belonging to industry s be given by Is. We writeDi,j(mj; ηs, θi) :=
∆`Π(mj; ηs, θi) − ∆`Fs,j + µi,j, i ∈ Is, for firm i’s total profit difference between foreign
sourcing and domestic sourcing, conditional on the ownership structure j = v, o of sourcing.
We assume that this total profit difference can be approximated by the following linear
expression:
Di,j(mj; ηs, θi) = β1 · θi + β2 · (θi × ηs) + β3 · ηs −∆`Fs,j + µi,j, i ∈ Is. (4.11)
This parametrization satisfies part (a) of Proposition 1 as long as
∂Di,j(mj ;ηs,θi)
∂θi
= β1+β2·ηs > 0
for all values of ηs. Parts (b) and (c) require that
∂Di,j(mj ;ηs,θi)
∂ηs
= β2 · θi +β3 < 0 for all values
of θi and
∂2Di,j(mj ;ηs,θi)
∂θi∂ηs
= β2 < 0, respectively.
A number of empirical challenges arise in our setup. First, the profit difference
Di,j(mj; ηs, θi) is a latent variable that is not observed by the econometrician. In the estima-
tion, we will therefore revert to an observable binary variable V˜i,j (to be described below) that
mirrors the decision variable Vi,j as defined above in the AH model. Recall that Vi,j is equal
to one if Di,j(mj; ηs, θi) ≥ 0, and equal to zero otherwise. Second, and relatedly, we have
seen in the previous section that in our data multiple ways of sourcing are the rule rather
than the exception, and that sourcing strategies appear to be complementary to one another
(rather than mutually exclusive). We must therefore find and impose suitable sample restric-
tions that lead to an empirical model which closely resembles the firm’s decision problem as
it is framed in the AH model. We must do so separately for the two ownership structures
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of sourcing. Third, the industry-specific headquarter intensity of production is not directly
observed. Antra`s (2003) argues that headquarter firms engage in cost sharing with their sup-
pliers through capital investments (rather than labor investments). A high capital intensity
thus comes with high levels of cost sharing, reflected in high values of the parameter ηs ∈ R.
Hence we follow Antra`s (2003), Yeaple (2006), and Nunn & Trefler (2008), among others, in
that we proxy an industry’s headquarter intensity by its (logged) capital intensity, computed
as the weighted average over all firms active in the industry (pooled from 2000 to 2011). The
industries featuring the lowest headquarter intensity are “Leather & Footwear” (ηs = 3.91),
“Furniture” (4.07), and “Textile & Wearing Apparel” (4.19). The industries featuring the
highest headquarter intensity are “Beverages” (5.90), “Ferrous Metals & Non-Ferrous Met-
als” (5.21), and “Mineral (Non-Metal) Products” (5.08). The average headquarter intensity
across industries is equal to η¯s = 4.64, with a standard deviation of ση = 0.47. Finally, in
addition to the factors discussed in the AH model, there are a number of other factors (both
at the industry level and at the firm level) that could exert a potentially important influence
on the firm’s preferred location of sourcing. We must therefore look for an empirical strategy
that takes care of these other (confounding) factors, with the aim of obtaining consistent and
unbiased estimates of our parameters of interest β = (β1, β2, β3).
Recall that our data allow us to track individual firms over time. Individual observations
are thus of dimension it (rather than just i), where t = 1, . . . , T is an index for years. We
write Ωit for the sourcing tuple of individual observations. Let Ωj denote the set of admissible
tuples Ω when studying the location choice of sourcing and conditioning on the ownership
structure j of sourcing. As a baseline specification, we then write:
V˜it,j = β1 · θit + β2 · (θit × ηs) + γs,j + γt,j + µit,j, i ∈ Is,Ωit ∈ Ωj, (4.12)
where the firm’s productivity θit is a time-varying variable, and where the industry’s head-
quarter intensity ηs is a time-invariant variable whose value is dictated by technology. Three
comments on this equation are in order. First, γs,j is an industry fixed effect capturing (i)
the main effect of the headquarter intensity, β3 · ηs, and (ii) the (unobservable) industry-
specific fixed cost difference between foreign and domestic sourcing, ∆`Fs,j. Under standard
assumptions on the distribution of µit,j, this means that controlling for the fixed cost differ-
ence through industry fixed effects implies that the parameter β3 is not identified, and that
therefore a test of part (b) of Proposition 1 is not within reach of our model.19 Second, γt,j is
19We see no way to circumvent this problem at the firm-level. We shall later provide some tentative
evidence on the relation between the industry’s headquarter intensity and the prevalence of foreign sourcing
at the industry-level.
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a year fixed effect absorbing the influence of year-specific global shocks affecting all firms in
Spain in exactly the same way. Third, we assume that µit,j is an independently distributed
random variable with E[µit,j|·] = 0, which implies that (4.12) is the linear probability model
(LPM):20
E[V˜it,j|·] = Pr(V˜it,j = 1|·) = β1 · θit + β2 · (θit × ηs) + γs,j + γt,j, i ∈ Is,Ωit ∈ Ωj. (4.13)
The restriction to observations that satisfy Ωit ∈ Ωj is crucial. It reflects the fact that we
condition on the ownership structure j of sourcing, and that in this setup we are interested
purely in the firm’s choice of the location of sourcing. Our choice of restrictions is largely
dictated by the data. For example, we never exclude firms that rely on domestic outsourcing
(Ωit = 〈·, 1, ·, ·〉), since we would otherwise be left with an almost empty set of firms due to
the large incidence of this sourcing strategy (cf. Table 4.1). When conditioning on vertical
integration (j = v), we impose Ωv = {〈1, 1, 0, 0〉, 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉}. In words, we exclude all firms
that do not rely on vertical integration and domestic outsourcing at home, as well as all firms
that do rely on outsourcing abroad.21 When conditioning on outsourcing (j = o), we impose
Ωo = {〈0, 1, 0, 0〉, 〈0, 1, 0, 1〉}, and thus exclude all firms that pursue foreign integration or
domestic integration (or both), as well as all firms that do not rely on domestic outsourcing.
We define V˜it,v to take on the value one if Ωit ∈ {〈1, 1, 1, 0〉}, and zero if Ωit ∈ {〈1, 1, 0, 0〉}.
This leads to a model that explains which firms are more likely to choose foreign integration
among the set of firms relying on both domestic integration and domestic outsourcing (but not
on foreign outsourcing). Similarly, we define V˜it,o to take on the value one if Ωit ∈ {〈0, 1, 0, 1〉},
and zero if Ωit ∈ {〈0, 1, 0, 0〉}. This, in turn, leads to a model that explains which firms
are more likely to choose foreign outsourcing among the set of firms relying on domestic
outsourcing alone (and not on any strategy of vertical integration). Due to the definitions
20We revert to the LPM instead of the non-linear Probit model, because the interaction effect,
∂2 Pr(V˜it,j=1|·)
∂θit∂ηs
, is not identified in the Probit model with industry fixed effects. To see this, notice that
in the Probit model the analogue to (4.13) is Pr(V˜it,j = 1|·) = Φ(β1 · θit + β2 · (θit × ηs) + γs,j + γt,j), where
Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Straightforward differentiation yields:
∂2 Pr(V˜it,j = 1|·)
∂θit∂ηs
= Φ′(·)β2 + Φ′′(·)×
(
β1
∂γs,j
∂ηs
+ β1β2θit + β2ηs
∂γs,j
∂ηs
+ β22θit,jηs
)
.
Since the industry fixed effect absorbs the main effect of the industry’s headquarter intensity, the derivative
∂γs,j
∂ηs
is not identified (and neither is the interaction effect).
21Instead of excluding firms that do not rely on domestic outsourcing, we could impose Ωo =
{〈1, ., 0, 0〉, 〈1, ., 0, 1〉} and then control for the firm’s domestic outsourcing status through a dummy vari-
able DOit. It turns out that with this alternative approach the results reported in this chapter do not change
in any significant way.
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of V˜it,v and V˜it,o as well as the fact that Ωv and Ωo are disjunct sets, we are thus testing
Proposition 1 in two independent ways.
The model given by equations (4.12) and (4.13) assumes that the fixed cost difference
between foreign and domestic sourcing is specific to the industry (and thus captured by
γs,j). In light of the revolutionary improvements in transport and communication technology
seen over the past decades, it seems plausible that over the recent past the fixed costs of
foreign sourcing have decreased by more than the fixed costs of domestic sourcing, so that
the difference ∆`Fs,j has decreased over time (for either ownership structure). To the extent
that this development has affected all industries in Spain in the same way, this is captured
by the year fixed effects, γt,j. It is however easy to imagine that some industries (e.g. those
intensive in complex capital goods) have benefitted more from this development than other
industries. This leads us to expect that changes in the fixed cost difference between foreign
and domestic sourcing do not apply equally to all industries, but, rather, that they are
specific to the industry. We allow for this possibility by extending the model to include
industry-and-year fixed effects γst,j (rather than just industry effects γs,j and year effects
γt,j).
Our model uses two sources of variation in the data to identify the parameters β1 and
β2. The first is variation across firm-year pairs within industries, and the second is variation
across industries. This approach has the advantage that the variation in the variables of
interest is large. Under the given set of assumptions, the OLS estimator is asymptotically
consistent. However, if there is an omitted firm-specific variable that is correlated with the
other covariates, the assumptions on the error term are violated and the estimates suffer from
omitted variables bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. A more satisfying approach could
therefore be to exploit the within-firm variation in the data over time, along with the variation
across industries. This would allow us to control for any time-invariant firm-specific variable
that influences the firm’s decision in favor of one or the other sourcing strategy.22 However,
because of the sample restrictions employed, there is very little within-firm variation in the
dependent variable that could be exploited for identification purposes.23 We therefore follow
an alternative route in order to reduce the risk of omitted variables bias. In particular, we
augment the model by a number of explanatory variables at the firm-level that could explain
22A way to get rid of these variables is to within-transform the data and compute all variables relative to
the firm-specific mean value over time. The so-called within-group estimator (or fixed effects estimator) is
asymptotically consistent, whether the (time-invariant) firm-specific variables are correlated with the other
covariates or not.
23Although we use data for six years (2006 to 2011), over that period the average number of years in which
we observe a firm is three.
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the firm’s decision to engage in foreign sourcing. These variables are a firm’s age, capital
intensity, skill intensity, employment, export status, and ownership status (measuring other
firms’ capital in the reporting firm’s joint capital).24
<<Table 4.2 about here>>
Table 4.2 reports the estimated parameters of interest in (4.12) and (4.13), along with the
corresponding heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.25 The estimates show, first, whether
(and how) the decision to engage in foreign sourcing is governed by the productivity of the
firm; they show, second, whether the correspondence between foreign sourcing and produc-
tivity (if any) is stronger in some industries than in others, depending on the headquarter
intensity of the industry. Columns (I) to (III) condition on the firm relying on vertical inte-
gration (j = v); columns (IV) to (VI) condition on the firm relying on outsourcing (j = o). In
either case, the first column reports the estimates of the baseline specification, as spelled out
in (4.12) and (4.13); in the second column, we augment the model by industry-and-year fixed
effects; in the third column, we extend the model to include the above-mentioned firm-specific
control variables.
In all the specifications employed, we obtain a positive estimate for β1 and a negative
estimate for β2. When conditioning on vertical integration, we obtain estimates of β1 in the
interval between +0.20 and +0.28, and estimates of β2 between −0.03 and −0.05. The same
intervals when conditioning on outsourcing lie between +0.47 and +0.55 for β1 and between
−0.04 and −0.10 for β2. In the model with industry-and-year fixed effects and firm-level
controls, either parameter is statistically significant at high levels of confidence. To facilitate
the interpretation of our results, we use the estimates in columns (III) and (VI) to plot in
Figure 4.3 the productivity effect on the probability of foreign sourcing as a function of the
industry’s headquarter intensity (in the range of sample values):
∂ ̂Pr(V˜it,j=1|·)
∂θit,j
= β̂1+β̂2 ·ηs. We
also include the corresponding 90 percent confidence interval in this figure. The figure shows
that there is a statistically significant positive productivity effect on the probability of foreign
sourcing in all industries of our sample26, and that this effect is the smaller, the larger the
headquarter intensity of the industry. This holds true irrespective of the ownership structure
of sourcing that we condition on (vertical integration in the left panel and outsourcing in the
right panel). This is notable support for parts (a) and (c) of Proposition 1.
24See Table B.2 in Appendix B for a precise definition of these variables.
25The errors in the LPM are by construction heteroskedastic.
26The industry with the highest headquarter intensity (“Beverages”) is the only exception, where the
productivity effect is essentially zero.
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<<Figure 4.3 about here>>
How important, quantitatively, is the productivity effect? In the “average” industry with
ηs = η¯s, a unit-increase in log productivity (i.e., a doubling of productivity) increases the
probability of a firm to engage in foreign sourcing by roughly 5.5%-points when conditioning
on vertical integration (j = v), and by 11.1%-points when conditioning on outsourcing (j =
o). The effects are significantly larger in industries with lower headquarter intensities, and
smaller in industries with higher headquarter intensities, as suggested by the AH model.
Overall, the productivity effect is large enough to be economically relevant, also because
on average across firms the predicted probability of foreign sourcing is as low as 3% under
vertical integration and roughly 28% under outsourcing.27
Regarding the firm-level control variables, we find that firm size and export status are sig-
nificantly correlated with foreign sourcing, irrespective of the ownership structure of sourcing.
Larger firms and exporting firms are more likely to source their inputs from abroad. When
conditioning on outsourcing (j = o), we also find a positive role for the firm’s age, capital
intensity, and skill intensity for its probability to engage in foreign sourcing. The ownership
situation of the firm, i.e., whether and how other firms participate in the reporting firm’s
joint capital, does not seem to exert a relevant influence on the firm’s decision to source its
inputs abroad.
4.4.2 The ownership structure of sourcing
We now analyze how firms choose the ownership structure for their sourcing. We write
Di,h(`h; ηs, θi) := ∆mΠ(`h; ηs, θi) − ∆mFs,h + µi,h, i ∈ Is, for firm i’s total profit difference
between vertical integration and outsourcing, conditional on the sourcing location h = f, d of
sourcing. We assume that this total profit difference can be approximated by the following
linear expression:
Di,h(`h; ηs, θi) = δ1 · θi + δ2 · (θi × ηs) + δ3 · ηs −∆mFs,h + µi,h, i ∈ Is. (4.14)
Parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 2 require that
∂Di,h(`h;ηs,θi)
∂θi
= δ1 + δ2 · ηs is positive for all
values of ηs > η˜s, and negative for all values of ηs < η˜s. Part (c) is true for
∂Di,h(`h;ηs,θi)
∂ηs
=
27One of the drawbacks of the LPM is that predicted success probabilities can lie outside the unit interval.
It turns out that in our application the predicted probability of foreign sourcing is below zero for as much
as 130 out of 618 observations in column (III) (when j = v). On average across these observations, however,
it is equal to −0.02 and thus only sightly below zero. In column (VI) (when j = o), there are only 354
observations (out of 8,388) that feature predicted probabilities of foreign sourcing above one (26) or below
zero (328).
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δ2 · θi + δ3 > 0 for all values of θit, while part (d) is true for ∂
2Di,h(`h;ηs,θi)
∂θi∂ηs
= δ2 > 0.
We face the same empirical challenges as above, and we deal with them in a completely
analogous way. Let V˜i,h be an observable binary variable that mirrors the decision variable
Vi,h which is equal to one if Di,h(`h; ηs, θi) ≥ 0, and equal to zero otherwise. Let Ωh denote the
set of admissible tuples Ω when studying the ownership structure of sourcing and conditioning
on the location h of sourcing. We thus write:
V˜it,h = δ1 · θit + δ2 · (θit × ηs) + γs,h + γt,h + µit,h, i ∈ Is,Ωit ∈ Ωh, (4.15)
where µit,h is an independently distributed random variable with zero conditional mean,
E[µit,h|·] = 0, so that:
E[V˜it,h|·] = Pr(V˜it,h = 1|·) = δ1 · θit + δ2 · (θit × ηs) + γs,h + γt,h, i ∈ Is,Ωit ∈ Ωh. (4.16)
The industry fixed effect, γs,h, absorbs the fixed cost difference between vertical integration
and outsourcing, ∆mFs,h, as well as the main effect of the industry’s headquarter intensity,
which is why the parameter δ3 is not identified in this model. Hence, we cannot test part (c)
of Proposition 2.28 For domestic sourcing (h = d), we impose Ωd = {〈0, 1, 0, 0〉, 〈1, 1, 0, 0〉}
as a sample restriction. The variable V˜it,d is set to one if Ωit ∈ {〈1, 1, 0, 0〉} and to zero if
Ωit ∈ {〈0, 1, 0, 0〉}. The model thus explains which firms among the set of domestic out-
sourcing firms (not involved in any type of foreign sourcing) choose to additionally source
from an integrated domestic supplier. For foreign sourcing (h = f), we proceed similarly.
We impose Ωf = {〈·, 1, 0, 1〉, 〈·, 1, 1, 1〉} and set V˜it,f to one if Ωit ∈ {〈·, 1, 1, 1〉} and to zero
if Ωit ∈ {〈·, 1, 0, 1〉}. A problem with this model could be collinearity between the foreign
integration dummy (FIit) and the domestic integration dummy (DIit). We have checked
for (and ruled out) this possibility, by including the domestic integration dummy (DIit) as
explanatory variable in the regression equation, and, alternatively, by conditioning on the
domestic integration dummy, such that Ωf = {〈1, 1, 0, 1〉, 〈1, 1, 1, 1〉}. Our results are robust
to these modifications.29 Therefore, and because Ωf and Ωd are disjunct sets, our approach
amounts to two independent tests of Proposition 2.
<<Table 4.3 about here>>
In Table 4.3, we report estimates of the parameters δ1 and δ2, as given in equations (4.15)
28We shall later provide some tentative evidence on the relation between the industry’s headquarter
intensity and the prevalence of vertical integration at the industry-level.
29Whether or not we condition on domestic outsourcing is not important for the results obtained either.
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and (4.16). The table is structured in the same way as Table 4.2. In columns (I) to (III), we
restrict the sourcing location to the domestic economy (h = d); in columns (IV) to (VI), we
condition on the firm sourcing in the foreign economy (h = f). In either case, we start with
the baseline specification in the first column; we then include industry-and-year fixed effects
in the second column; and we finally control for a number of firm-level variables in the third
column.
Our estimates paint a remarkably consistent picture of the role of firm productivity for
the ownership structure of sourcing, and how this role depends on the headquarter intensity
of the industry to which the firm belongs. For either sourcing location, we find a negative
and highly significant estimate for δ1 and a positive and highly significant estimate for δ2
(throughout all the specifications employed). When conditioning on the domestic economy
(h = d), we find point estimates that lie between −0.603 and −0.436 for δ1, and between
+0.102 and +0.151 for δ2. When conditioning on the foreign economy (h = f), the point
estimates range from −0.724 to −0.514 for δ1, and from +0.118 to +0.188 for δ2. This means
that the effect of productivity on the firm’s ownership decision is ambiguous: in industries
with low headquarter intensities (ηs < η˜s), the firms with high productivity are deterred from
vertical integration, while in industries with high headquarter intensities (ηs > η˜s), they are
attracted by it.
In Figure 4.4, we use the estimates in columns (III) and (VI) to plot the productivity effect
on the probability of vertical integration as a function of the industry’s headquarter intensity,
by complete analogy to Figure 4.3:
∂ ̂Pr(V˜it,h=1|·)
∂θit,h
= δ̂1 + δ̂2 · ηs. We see that, irrespective of
the location of sourcing (domestic in the left panel and foreign in the right panel), there is a
statistically significant negative productivity effect on the probability of vertical integration
in industries with sufficiently low headquarter intensities. This same productivity effect is
positive in industries with sufficiently high headquarter intensities. This is strong support
for parts (a), (b), and (d) of Proposition 2.30
The productivity of the firm can make a huge difference for the firm’s decision to vertically
integrate its supplier, especially in industries with high headquarter intensities. For exam-
ple, in the “Beverages” industry, a doubling of the firm’s productivity increases the firm’s
likelihood to vertically integrate the supplier by more than 15%-points (in either sourcing lo-
cation). In the “average” industry with ηs = η¯s, the productivity effect is positive albeit small
30On average across firms, the predicted probability of vertical integration is equal to 5% when h = d and
equal to 9% when h = f . In column (III) (h = d), the predicted probability of vertical integration is below
zero for 1,372 out of 5,795 observation and equals −0.02 on average across these observations. In column
(VI) (h = f), it is below zero for 727 out of 4,774 observations and equals −0.05 on average across these
observations.
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(but still statistically different from zero). In both sourcing locations, the threshold value
separating industries that are headquarter-intensive from those that are component-intensive
is found in the vicinity of ηs = 4.3.
31
<<Figure 4.4 about here>>
Our estimates more generally suggest that the ownership decision in the domestic economy
is governed by the same variables (and in similar ways) as the ownership decision in the foreign
economy. Large firms as well as skill-intensive firms have significantly higher probabilities
of vertical integration both at home and abroad. The same applies to firms whose joint
capital is (partly) under the control of other firms.32 The export status of the firm enters the
regression equation with a positive sign, but it is only statistically significant in the case of
the foreign economy. Firms operating an integrated production structure at home are more
likely to do so in the foreign economy as well.
4.4.3 Industry-level relationships
As we have shown above, estimating the main effect of the industry’s headquarter intensity on
a firm’s probability to engage in foreign sourcing or in vertical integration is not within reach
of our firm-level analysis. However, we can study the prevalence of both foreign sourcing
and intra-firm sourcing at the industry-level in relation to the headquarter intensity of the
industry. We have argued in the introduction that knowledge of the fixed cost ranking of
alternative locations and organizational forms of sourcing is crucial for an industry-level test
of the model. Having said that, there are two industry-level predictions of the model that are
robust across all possible fixed cost configurations.33 More specifically, the AH model implies
that the prevalence of foreign sourcing and of intra-firm sourcing (as fractions of firms in a
given industry) are respectively weakly decreasing and weakly increasing in the headquarter
intensity of the industry. Intuitively, the economic mechanisms behind these relationships are
not any different from those discussed in Section 4.2. Formally, they follow straightforwardly
from the analysis presented in Antra`s & Helpman (2004). If our data, when aggregated to
the industry level, were to contradict these relationships, the validity of the AH model would
have been in doubt.
31In the AH model, if the ex-post outside option under vertical integration is different in the domestic
economy from what it is in the foreign economy, so that mv,d > mv,f , we have η˜d 6= η˜f .
32Our results (both on the location as well as on the ownership structure of sourcing) are qualitatively
similar if we exclude such firms from the estimation.
33These predictions do however require that the fixed costs be the same across industries. Moreover, they
hinge upon a certain shape of the productivity distribution of firms, such as Pareto, as assumed in Antra`s &
Helpman (2004).
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<<Figures 4.5 and 4.6 about here>>
We find the opposite. In Figure 4.5, we plot the share of firms choosing foreign sourcing
in a given industry against the headquarter intensity of the industry (both averaged across
the years 2006-2011). We find a negative association between the two variables, both under
vertical integration (left panel) as well as under outsourcing (right panel).34 We do the same
in Figure 4.6 for the share of firms choosing vertical integration in a given industry. We find a
positive association between this share and the industry’s headquarter intensity, both in the
domestic economy (left panel) as well as in the foreign economy (right panel). This is some
tentative evidence supporting the notion that higher headquarter intensities tend to favor the
domestic economy as the preferred location of sourcing, and the integrated input production
as the preferred ownership structure of sourcing. The firm-level analogue to these industry-
level relationships are given in part (b) of Proposition 1 and in part (c) of Proposition 2,
respectively.
4.5 Conclusion
Recently developed models of international trade study the global sourcing activities of firms
through the lens of the property rights theory of the firm. In this chapter, we have developed
an empirical strategy towards a firm-level test of one such model, namely the hold-up model
of global sourcing by Antra`s & Helpman (2004). Drawing on recent work by Mra´zowa´ &
Neary (2013), we have reframed this model in terms of its properties of supermodularity and
submodularity, respectively, between a firm’s productivity and the key characteristics of a
sourcing strategy relating to the location and the ownership structure of sourcing. We have
derived firm-level predictions that can be brought to suitably rich firm-level data sets. A
merit of our approach is that these predictions do not depend upon (unobserved) fixed cost
differences across alternative sourcing strategies.
We have applied our firm-level test to a unique data set for Spanish manufacturing firms.
The Spanish data allow us to identify sourcing activities of firms that correspond very closely
to those featured in the AH model. We bring our novel firm-level predictions to the data
by drawing on a series of discrete choice models of sourcing. These models are set up to
explain a firm’s location of sourcing, conditional on the ownership structure of sourcing
(vertical integration versus outsourcing), as well as a firm’s ownership structure of sourcing,
34We employ the same sample restrictions in this subsection as in the preceding two subsections.
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conditional on the location of sourcing (domestic versus foreign). In all relevant dimensions,
our empirical findings are consistent with the hold-up model of global sourcing.
The first finding is that highly productive firms are more likely to choose foreign sourcing
(under either ownership structure). The reason for this is that foreign sourcing is associated
with a location advantage that becomes strengthened by the firm’s productivity. Since the
location advantage of foreign sourcing tends to be large when the foreign input is very im-
portant, the productivity effect is stronger in industries with lower headquarter intensities.
The second finding of our empirical analysis is that it is not generally the case that highly
productive firms are more likely to choose vertical integration. Rather, this relationship
holds true only in industries featuring a strategic advantage of vertical integration (so-called
headquarter-intensive industries). In industries featuring a strategic advantage of outsourc-
ing (so-called component-intensive industries), the highly productive firms are less likely to
choose vertical integration. The reason for this is that any strategic advantage (whether with
integration or with outsourcing) is strengthened by the firm’s productivity.
Figures and tables
Figure 4.1. The location advantage of foreign sourcing
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Figure 4.2. The strategic advantage of integration or of outsourcing
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Figure 4.3. The marginal effect of productivity on the probability of foreign sourcing
(conditional on the ownership structure of sourcing)
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Figure 4.4. The marginal effect of productivity on the probability of vertical integration
(conditional on the location of sourcing)
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Figure 4.5. Share of foreign sourcing firms plotted against headquarter intensity, by industry
(conditional on the ownership structure of sourcing)
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Figure 4.6. Share of integrating firms plotted against headquarter intensity, by industry
(conditional on the location of sourcing)
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Table 4.1. Sourcing decisions of Spanish firms (2006/2011)
2006 2011 ∆ 2006/2011 2006 2011 ∆ 2006/2011
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Domestic sourcing: Ω={‹1,1,.,.›,‹1,0,.,.›,‹0,1,.,.›} 91.6 94.6 +3.0 92.4 95.8 +3.4
Foreign sourcing: Ω={‹.,.,1,1›,‹.,.,1,0›,‹.,.,0,1›} 33.7 41.0 +7.3 65.9 76.0 +10.1
Outsourcing: Ω={‹.,1,.,1›,‹.,1,.,0›,‹.,0,.,1›} 92.0 94.6 +2.6 93.1 96.6 +3.6
Integration: Ω={‹1,.,1,.›,‹1,.,0,.›,‹0,.,1,.›} 13.0 14.5 +1.5 49.3 55.2 +5.9
Non-sourcing: Ω={‹0,0,0,0›} 6.9 4.5 -2.4 3.2 1.3 -1.9
Domestic outsourcing: Ω={‹.,1,.,.›} 90.4 93.6 +3.2 88.8 93.5 +4.7
Domestic integration: Ω={‹1,.,.,.›} 10.2 10.9 +0.7 35.6 33.6 -2.0
Foreign outsourcing: Ω={‹.,.,.,1›} 32.6 40.2 +7.6 61.3 70.1 +8.8
Foreign integration: Ω={‹.,.,1,.›} 4.0 5.0 +1.0 24.8 34.1 +9.3
Columns (I), (II), (IV), and (V) give the percentages of firms that pursue the respective sourcing strategies. All percentages are of the total number of firms in the
respective size category. Columns (III) and (VI) give the percentage point changes from 2006 to 2011.
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Table 4.2. Linear probability model for foreign sourcing, conditional on the ownership structure of sourcing
(pooled regressions 2006-2011)
Ownership structure: Vertically integrated Ownership structure: Outsourced
Estimation sample: Ω it Є{‹1,1,1,0›,‹1,1,0,0›} Estimation sample: Ω it Є{‹0,1,0,1›,‹0,1,0,0›}
Dep. var. equal to one if Ω it Є{‹1,1,1,0›}, zero otherwise Dep. var. equal to one if Ω it Є{‹0,1,0,1›}, zero otherwise
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Total factor productivity 0.203 0.279** 0.268** 0.475*** 0.478*** 0.543***
(0.125) (0.129) (0.114) (0.145) (0.146) (0.118)
Total factor productivity X -0.031 -0.045* -0.046** -0.048 -0.048 -0.093***
Headquarter intensity (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.030) (0.030) (0.025)
Firm-level controls
Age 0.000 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
Capital intensity 0.003 0.033***
(0.007) (0.005)
Skill intensity -0.008 0.147***
(0.022) (0.033)
Employment 0.030*** 0.055***
(0.007) (0.007)
Export dummy 0.032** 0.189***
(0.014) (0.013)
Ownership -0.001 0.010
(0.004) (0.006)
Observations 645 645 618 8,492 8,492 8,388
R-squared 0.112 0.167 0.227 0.134 0.140 0.223
Industry FE YES COLLINEAR COLLINEAR YES COLLINEAR COLLINEAR
Year FE YES COLLINEAR COLLINEAR YES COLLINEAR COLLINEAR
Industry-and-year FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Firm-level controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
The table reports estimated coefficients (robust standard errors in parenthesis) of a linear probability model (LPM) that explains the likelihood of a firm to source inputs from a
foreign supplier, conditional on the ownership structure of sourcing. Columns (I) to (III) look at foreign sourcing conditional on operating a vertically integrated production
structure, restricting the sample to observations that report strictly positive sourcing from a domestic integrated as well as outsourced supplier, but zero sourcing from a foreign
outsourced supplier. Columns (IV) to (VI) look at foreign sourcing conditional on operating an outsourced production structure, restricting the sample to observations that report
zero sourcing from both domestic and foreign integrated suppliers, but strictly positive sourcing from domestic outsourced suppliers. Total factor productivity is a time-varying,
firm-specific variable estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) algorithm. Headquarter intensity is a time-constant, industry-specific variable, measured as the average capital
intensity of all firms in the respective industry. Both variables are given in logs. For a detailed description of all variables (including the firm-level controls), see Table B.2 in
Appendix B. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.3. Linear probability model for vertical integration, conditional on the location of sourcing
(pooled regressions 2006-2011)
Sourcing location: Domestic economy Sourcing location: Foreign economy
Estimation sample: Ω it Є{‹1,1,0,0›,‹0,1,0,0›} Estimation sample: Ω it Є{‹ ·,1,1,1›,‹·,1,0,1›}
Dep. var. equal to one if Ω it Є{‹1,1,0,0›}, zero otherwise Dep. var. equal to one if Ω it Є{‹·,1,1,1›}, zero otherwise
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Total factor productivity -0.603*** -0.602*** -0.436*** -0.674*** -0.724*** -0.514***
(0.104) (0.103) (0.093) (0.121) (0.112) (0.109)
Total factor productivity X 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.102*** 0.176*** 0.188*** 0.118***
Headquarter intensity (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024)
Firm-level controls
Age -0.001*** -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Capital intensity 0.001 0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
Skill intensity 0.032* 0.106***
(0.018) (0.020)
Employment 0.018*** 0.045***
(0.004) (0.005)
Export dummy 0.005 0.026***
(0.007) (0.007)
Ownership 0.090*** 0.059***
(0.007) (0.005)
DI dummy COLLINEAR 0.038*
(0.023)
Observations 5,878 5,878 5,795 4,875 4,875 4,774
R-squared 0.103 0.114 0.248 0.114 0.124 0.261
Industry FE YES COLLINEAR COLLINEAR YES COLLINEAR COLLINEAR
Year FE YES COLLINEAR COLLINEAR YES COLLINEAR COLLINEAR
Industry-and-year FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Firm-level controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
The table reports estimated coefficients (robust standard errors in parenthesis) of a linear probability model (LPM) that explains the likelihood of a firm to operate a vertically
integrated production structure, conditional on the location of sourcing. Columns (I) to (III) look at vertical integration in the domestic economy, restricting the sample to
observations that report zero sourcing from abroad and positive sourcing from domestic independent suppliers. Columns (IV) to (VI) look at vertical integration in the foreign
economy, restricting the sample to observations that report positive sourcing from foreign independent suppliers (as well as domestic independent suppliers). Total factor
productivity is a time-varying, firm-specific variable estimated with the Olley & Pakes (1996) algorithm. Headquarter intensity is a time-constant, industry-specific variable,
measured as the average capital intensity of all firms in the respective industry. Both variables are given in logs. For a detailed description of all variables (including the firm-level
controls), see Table B.2 in Appendix B. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendices
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1, parts (b) and (c)
Statements (b) and (c) of Proposition 1 require that the maximum profit function
Π(`,m; η, θ), as defined in (4.2) to (4.5), be submodular with respect to ` and η, accord-
ing to Definition (1). Although the proposition uses discrete comparisons, as defined in
(4.6) to (4.9), since Π(`,m; η, θ) is twice differentiable we may treat ` and m as continuous
variables. The proof thus requires demonstrating that ∂2Π(`,m; η, θ)/ ∂`∂η < 0, which is
equivalent to ∂2Z(`,m; η)/ ∂`∂η < 0. This is, in turn, equivalent to ∂2Z(`,m; η)/ ∂η∂` < 0
(Young’s theorem). In what follows, we simplify by writing Z instead of Z(`,m; η), and
similarly for z.
It proves convenient to work with lnZ. We generally have
∂ lnZ
∂η
=
1
Z
∂Z
∂η
, hence
∂Z
∂η
= Z
∂ lnZ
∂η
, (A.1)
and therefore
∂2Z
∂η∂`
= Z
∂2 lnZ
∂η∂`
+
∂Z
∂`
∂ lnZ
∂η
. (A.2)
Remember that Z = AzC, with z = 1 − [(ε − 1)/ε][mη + (1 − m)(1 − η)] and C =
[mη(`(1−m))1−η]ε−1. Thus, lnZ = lnA+ ln z + lnC.
Evaluating the different terms in (A.2) in turn, we first note that z > 0, whence Z > 0.
Secondly, we have
∂2 lnZ
∂η∂`
=
∂2 lnC
∂η∂`
=
∂2 lnC
∂`∂η
= −(ε− 1)1
`
< 0. (A.3)
This inequality is related to the location advantage that we have discussed in Section 4.2.
The location advantage of foreign sourcing derives from the assumption that `f > `d, coupled
with the input cost effect ∂Z/∂` > 0, which simply means that lower input costs raise
profits. Remember that ` denotes the inverse input cost. In view of Young’s theorem, the
inequality in (A.3) states that the input cost effect on log-profits falls as the headquarter
intensity rises. Thus, the first product on the right-hand side of (A.2) is negative, which
works in favor of Π(`,m; η, θ) being submodular with respect to ` and η. Intuitively, a higher
headquarter intensity makes the manufacturing component less important for the production
relationship, which dampens the input cost effect. Note that the dampening effect on log-
profits is increasing in magnitude, as the perceived demand elasticity ε increases.
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Having established submodularity of log-profits does not prove Proposition 1, which im-
plies submodularity of the profit function. Towards this end, we must now look at the second
term in (A.2). We first write the input cost effect as
∂Z
∂`
=
∂ lnZ
∂ ln `
Z
`
=
∂ lnC
∂ ln `
Z
`
= (ε− 1)(1− η)Z
`
> 0. (A.4)
The sufficient condition for submodularity thus emerges as ∂ lnZ/∂η < 0. However, the sign
of ∂ lnZ/∂η is ambiguous. To see this, we write
∂ lnZ
∂η
=
∂ lnC
∂η
+
∂ ln z
∂η
= (ε− 1)[lnm− ln(1−m)− ln `] + ε− 1
ε
1− 2m
z
. (A.5)
The derivative ∂ lnC/∂η in (A.5) gives the direct cost effect of a small increase in the head-
quarter intensity. It is easy to see that this is negative for large enough values of `. More
importantly, for given ` it approaches a value of plus infinity, if we let m converge to the
value of 1. Obviously, the second term in (A.5) involves no strong enough counter effect of
an increase in m. The ambiguous sign of ∂ lnZ/∂η reflects a core feature of the AH model:
In the presence of the hold-up problem, optimization requires aligning η and m, i.e., bringing
the ex post revenue share for the headquarter in line with the importance of the headquarter
service for the production relationship. In (A.5), it therefore turns out that, given some ini-
tial value of η, a further increase in η increases profits by increasing lnZ in (A.5), provided
that the value of m is large enough. The opposite obtains for a low enough value of m.
This limiting behavior of (A.5) along with (A.4) leads to potential violations of submod-
ularity, because the first term in (A.2) remains unaffected by variations in m. We therefore
revert to a numerical simulation to demonstrate that, assuming a reasonable value of ε, sub-
modularity obtains for a very large subspace. For this purpose, we define ζ := 1 − η and
set ε = 6 (following Bergstrand et al. (2013)), A = 1, and `d = 1. Moreover, rather than
evaluating ∂
2Z
∂η∂`
, we look at ∂
∂η
∆`Z (in line with the model). Figure A.1 plots isoclines for
∂
∂η
∆`Z = 0, thus separating the parameter space into subspaces where Z is submodular and
supermodular, respectively, with respect to η and ` for different values of `f . Notice that
submodularity of Z with respect to η and ` requires that ∂
∂η
∆`Z > 0, because due to the
definition of ζ we have sign
(
∂
∂η
∆`Z
)
= sign
(
− ∂
∂ζ
∆`Z
)
.
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Figure A.1. Modularity properties of Z, Proposition 1, parts (b) and (c)
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Proof of Proposition 2, parts (c) and (d)
We proceed in complete analogy to the proof of Proposition 1 above, treating m and η as con-
tinuous variables and making use of Young’s theorem. We need to show that
∂2Π(`,m; η, θ)/ ∂m∂η < 0, which is equivalent to ∂2Z(`,m; η)/ ∂η∂m < 0. As above, we
work with lnZ. We have
∂2Z
∂η∂m
= Z
∂2 lnZ
∂η∂m
+
∂Z
∂m
∂ lnZ
∂η
, (A.6)
whereby Z > 0. Again, we consider each term on the right hand side in turn. From (A.5),
we have
∂2 lnZ
∂η∂m
=
ε− 1
m−m2 +
ε− 1
ε
[−2
z
− 1− 2m
z2
(α− 2αη)
]
=
ε− 1
m−m2 +
α
z2
[−(1− 2m)(α− 2αη)− 2z] ,
=
ε− 1
m−m2 +
α2 − 2α
z2
(A.7)
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This cross-derivative is strictly positive. To see this, recall that α, m, and η lie strictly
between zero and 1. Moreover, note that the first term on the right-hand side of the final
equation (call it x) is strictly negative, and the second term (call it y) is strictly positive.
For any given value of α, the values of m and η that minimize the denominator in x and
thus maximize the (absolute) value of the function x are m = 1/2 and η = 1/2. In turn, for
any given value of α the value of m that minimizes the value of the function y is m = 1/2.
Hence, it suffices to show that
4α
1− α +
α2 − 2α
(1− α/2)2 > 0. (A.8)
Straightforward manipulation of this expression yields 2α − α2 > 0, which is always true.
This demonstrates supermodularity of log-profits.
As with submodularity in Proposition 1, the supermodularity implied by Proposition 2
relates to profits, not log-profits. Hence, we must also look at the second term in (A.6). We
have explored the properties of ∂ lnZ/∂η above: It is positive for large enough values of m
and negative for small enough values of m. As regards the derivative ∂Z/∂m, we may write
∂Z/∂m = A
[
C ∂z
∂m
+ z ∂C
∂m
]
. Again, we look at each of these two terms in turn. We have
∂z
∂m
=
ε− 1
ε
(1− 2η), (A.9)
This captures the strategic implication of a variation in m. The cost channel is described by
∂C
∂m
= C
[
(ε− 1)ηm−1 − (ε− 1)(1− η)(1−m)−1]
= C(ε− 1)
[
η
(
1
m−m2
)
− 1
1−m
]
(A.10)
Putting things together, we have
∂Z
∂m
= AC
[
ε− 1
ε
(1− 2η) + z(ε− 1)
(
η
m−m2 −
1
1−m
)]
= AC(ε− 1)
(
1− 2η
ε
+
z
1−m
η −m
m
)
(A.11)
Unlike the term ∂Z/∂` in the previous proof, this term is ambiguous, again reflecting the
hold-up problem that is at the core of the model. The term becomes negative for a sufficiently
high value of m, depending on the industry’s headquarter intensity η. Considering that high
values of m also tend to generate positive values of ∂ lnZ/∂η, this works against the kind
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of supermodularity presently at stake. However, it is not necessarily true that low values
of m work for supermodularity. They tend to generate a negative value of ∂ lnZ/∂η, but
a sufficiently low value of η might still render a positive value of ∂Z/∂m, which then again
works against supermodularity.
We must thus conclude that extreme values for m and η may lead to potential violations
of supermodularity, because the unambiguously positive sign of the first term in (A.6) may
be offset by a negative sign of the second term. As with Proposition 1, the statements (c)
and (d) of Proposition 2 are true only for certain ranges of parameter values. We explore this
issue further by means of numerical simulation. As before, we use ζ := 1−η. Assuming ε = 6
as well as A = 1, Figure A.2 depicts isoclines for ∂2Z/∂ζ∂m = ∂2Z/∂η∂m = 0 separating the
parameter space into an inner subspace of supermodularity (∂2Z/∂η∂m > 0 or, equivalently
∂2Z/∂ζ∂m < 0) and outer subspaces of submodularity (∂2Z/∂η∂m < 0 or, equivalently
∂2Z/∂ζ∂m > 0), respectively. To look at these results through the lens of our theoretical
model, we must, however, inspect the term ∂
∂η
∆mZ (instead of the cross-partial derivative
∂2Z/∂ζ∂m as such). This is what we do in Figure A.3, where we assume that m0 = 1/2.
In this figure we see that supermodularity of Z with respect to m and η ( ∂
∂η
∆mZ > 0 or,
equivalently, ∂
∂ζ
∆mZ < 0) obtains within a large and plausible parameter subspace of {mv, η}.
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Figure A.2. Sign of ∂2Z/∂ζ∂m
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Figure A.3. Modularity properties of Z, Proposition 2, parts (c) and (d)
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B Data appendix
Table B.1. List of industries
CNAE-09 Classification Industry
101 Meat
102-109, 120 Food Products and Tobacco
110 Beverages
131-133, 139, 141-143 Textile
151-152 Leather & Footwear
261-262 Timber & Wooden Products
171-172 Paper Products
181-182 Graphics Design
201-206, 211-212 Chemical & Pharmaceutical Products
221-222 Plastic & Rubber Products
231-237, 239 Mineral Products (Non-Metal Products)
241-245 Ferrous Metals & Non-Ferrour Metals
251-257, 259 Metal Products
281-284, 289 Industry & Agricultural Machinery
261-268 Informatics, Electronics, Optics
271-275, 279 General & Electric Machinery
291-293 Motorized Vehicles
301-304, 309 Other Transportation Equipment
310 Furniture Industry
321-325, 329 Miscellaneous Manufacturing
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Table B.2. Definition of firm-specific variables
Variable Definition
Total factor productivity Log of total factor productivity obtained from
production function estimates a` la Olley &
Pakes (1996)
Age Age of the firm in years
Capital intensity Ratio of capital assets to the average number
of workers during the year (expressed in thou-
sands of Euros per worker)
Skill intensity Number of graduate workers (university and
three-year degrees) over the total number of
workers as of December 31st
Employment Log of the average number of workers during
the year
Export dummy Equal to one if the firm repots positive export
values, zero otherwise
Ownership Proportion of other firm’s capital in the re-
porting firms’s joint capital: equal to zero for
0%; one for 0 − 25%; two for 25 − 50%; three
for > 50%
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Chapter5
Facts and figures on a recent migration
boom to Spain
This chapter is based on joint work with Nina Neubecker (previously unpublished).
5.1 Introduction
Thanks to its strong economic growth over the past twenty years and its liberal immigration
policy, today Spain ranks among the world’s major countries of immigration. From 1995 to
2010, the stock of foreign-born individuals in Spain has risen by 5.3 million people. This is
the second largest increase observed in any country in the world.1 From 2000 to 2008, Spain
experienced the highest growth rate of the foreign-born population recorded in any OECD
country over such a short period of time after World War II; see OECD (2010).
In this chapter, we use publicly available migration data, in order to identify some of the
characteristic traits of this unique migration episode. We provide answers to questions such
as: When did migration start to pick up momentum? How strongly was migration affected
by the Global Financial Crisis in 2007/08? What countries did migrants come from, and
where in Spain did they settle? Has the settlement pattern changed over time, and how does
it compare to the settlement pattern of natives? These are interesting questions that can
inspire future theoretical and empirical work on migration.
In Section 5.2, we give some information on the institutional background in Spain over
the relevant period of time, and we briefly discuss the data source. Section 5.3 explores our
1The United States received 14.3 million people over the same period. Italy ranks third (2.7), followed by
the United Kingdom (2.3), Canada (2.2), and Germany (1.8); see the World Development Indicators 2010,
The World Bank.
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migration data, in order to derive stylized facts on the recent migration boom to Spain.
5.2 Institutional background and data source
According to Ortega Pe´rez (2003), it was not until the 1990s that migration became a vital
policy issue in Spain. Before, European legislation had prompted the socialist government
to approve the rather restrictive “Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Aliens in Spain” in
1985 (Ley Orga´nica 7/1985 ). Its 1996 amendment marks a relevant political turning point in
that it recognizes migration as a “structural phenomenon” and grants foreigners important
rights such as access to education and legal counsel. This is reflected in the “Law on the
Rights and Freedoms of Aliens in Spain and their Social Integration” (Ley Orga´nica 4/2000 ),
which was meant to foster integration and further expanded the rights of foreigners in Spain.
The law provoked quite a controversial debate, and the rights it granted to undocumented
migrants were partly withdrawn by the conservative party after winning the absolute ma-
jority in the general elections of March 2000; see Ley Orga´nica 8/2000. More recently, the
socialist government initiated measures to fight undocumented migration and to better inte-
grate documented migrants; see OECD (2006, 214). For example, in 2005, an unprecedented
regularization process took place and a well-endowed integration fund was introduced. The
latest reform of the “Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Aliens in Spain and their Social
Integration” provides migrants, whether legally or illegally residing in Spain, with rights of as-
sembly, demonstration, unionisation and strike; see OECD (2010) and Ley Orga´nica 2/2009.
In addition, it facilitates sanctions against people housing visa overstayers.
We use data on migration flows and stocks from the Spanish Residential Variation Statis-
tics and the Municipal Register, respectively. Both series are freely available from the website
of the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica (INE).2 A major advantage of these data
is that they include both documented and undocumented migrants registering at Spanish
municipalities (municipios). Spanish legislation requires all individuals residing in Spain to
register at the local Municipal Register. Through registration, local authorities keep record
of the individual’s name, surname, sex, usual domicile, nationality, passport number, as well
as the place and date of birth.3 Most importantly, migrants are strongly incentivized to
register, given that the Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Aliens in Spain and their Social
Integration in 2000 (Ley Orga´nica 4/2000, art´ıculo 12 ) entitles all foreigners with or without
2See Chapters 6 and 7 for more detailed information on the data.
3For further information, see INE at http://www.ine.es/en/metodologia/t20/t203024566 en.htm,
accessed on 08/19/2011.
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legal residence permits to free medical care under the same conditions as Spanish nationals.
Foreigners with valid residence permits have furthermore access to free legal support and
public assistance in housing issues under the same conditions as Spanish nationals; see arti-
cles 1.10 and 1.16 of Ley Orga´nica 8/2000 and articles 13 and 20 of Ley Orga´nica 4/2000.
These rights are only conditional on having registered at the Municipal Register. Since the
registry data is confidential and must not be communicated to the Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs, registration is essentially costless; see article 18 of the Ley Reguladora de las Bases del
Re´gimen Local and its amendment in 1996.
5.3 Stylized facts
From 1997 to 2009, a total of 5,960,312 migrants registered at Spanish municipalities. By
migrants we mean people who were born outside Spain, hold a foreign nationality, and come
from a foreign country. Abstracting from a stagnation of the inflow in 2003, the data series
from 1997 to 2007 report a strictly monotone upward trend in both the size of the total
migrant population and the number of new migrants per year. This suggests that Spanish
migration is more of a permanent nature, rather than just temporary. The inflow peaked in
2007 at 915 thousand migrants, a number that is 26 times the inflow in 1997. Beginning in
2007, the Global Financial Crisis has hit the Spanish economy hard, with many firms shutting
down or reducing production and laying off workers. The economic downturn coincides with
a sharp decline in the number of newly arriving migrants in 2008 and 2009, relative to the
pre-crisis years. We may summarize these findings as follows.
Stylized fact 1. From 1997 to 2007, continuous and considerable increases in annual migrant
inflows have boosted the foreign-born population in Spain. The Global Financial Crisis marks
a preliminary end to the Spanish migration boom.
Aggregate numbers on migrant stocks and flows hide important cross-country variation.
The following statistics paint a more differentiated picture of the Spanish migration expe-
rience. More precisely, we portray changes at the intensive margin as well as the extensive
margin of migration. By intensive margin we mean annual migration flows from a given sub-
set of traditional migrant-sending countries, while we refer to the number of migrant-sending
countries as the extensive margin. From 1997 to 2009, a total of 39 countries have sent at
least 100 migrants to Spain in each and every year. The aggregate inflow of these countries
was equal to 32.5 thousand people in 1997, and climbed to 762.6 thousand in 2007. Figure
5.1 compares yearly stock and flow data for the six major origin countries over the period
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considered. Together, these countries account for more than 2.9 million new migrants in
Spain, which is roughly half of the overall migration to Spain.4 Leaving aside the year 2009,
we see a steady and significant increase in the migrant population of people with Romanian,
Moroccan, Bolivian, and British nationality. In contrast, the number of migrants born in
Ecuador (Colombia) stagnates around 450 (250) thousand people since 2004 (2003). The
development of migrant inflows over time is more heterogenous across origin countries than
that of migrant stocks. The general upward trend in the number of new migrants beginning
in 1997 applies to all nationalities, but it is most extensive (in time and size) for Romanian
and Moroccan people. Such differences must be explained by time-variant source country
characteristics or time-variant bilateral factors. In contrast, the joint decrease in the number
of new migrants in 2009 can be attributed to the Global Financial Crisis. This time-specific
shock has, at least in principle, a uniform impact on all migration flows to Spain.
<< Figure 5.1 about here >>
In addition to the sharp increases at the intensive margin, Spain has also experienced
considerable changes at the extensive margin of migration. In 1997, Spain was the destination
of at least 100 migrants from each of a total of 39 countries. For 2009, this number was 100
countries. At the same time, migrants have targeted ever more provinces of destination. For
example, in 1997, individuals from the 39 traditional migrant-sending countries moved to
approximately 30 of a total of 52 different provinces on average. For 2007, this number was
48 provinces, and it remained high in the two subsequent years. This same trend can be
observed for all origin countries, albeit on a lower level.5 We summarize this as follows.
Stylized fact 2. In quantitative terms, the Spanish migration boom is borne by huge increases
at the intensive margin of migration. Changes at the extensive margin have greatly expanded
the degree of ethnic diversification of recent migration flows. On average, new migrants have
spread among an ever more extensive set of provinces of destination.
We next take a closer look at the regional distribution of foreign-born individuals in
Spain. A first observation is that migrants are not evenly distributed across provinces. The
four major provinces of destination account for 50% of all new migrants between 1997 and
2009. These provinces are Madrid (22.2%), Barcelona (13.6%), Alicante (7.4%), and Valencia
4Romanians make up 13.6% of all new migrants from 1997-2009, followed by Moroccans (11.1%), Ecuado-
rians (8.2%), Colombians (6.1%), Britons (5.3%), and Bolivians (4.7%).
5In 1997, migrants from all different countries of origin moved to nine provinces of destination on average.
In 2008, this number peaked at 25 provinces.
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(5.6%). They also represent the most populous locations in general. Our primary interest
therefore lies with the distribution of migrants across provinces relative to that of natives.
Figure 5.2 depicts concentration curves for each of the six major countries of origin.
Each subfigure plots the cumulative proportion of Spanish nationals (ordinate) against the
cumulative proportion of foreign nationals (abscissa), separately for the years 1999 and 2009.
The units of geographical reference are provinces of destination, sorted in descending order
based on the share of migrants in the total province’s population; see Duncan & Duncan
(1955, 210-211) for the same approach.6 The 45-degree line is a benchmark indicating no
difference in the spatial concentration between migrants and natives. Two patterns stand out.
First, all concentration curves deviate from the 45-degree line to a significant extent. Hence,
there is what we may call clustering of migrants. The spatial diffusion of each of the groups
of migrants differs from that of natives both at the beginning and the end of the Spanish
migration boom. These differences are more pronounced for some countries of origin than
for others. For example, in 1999, approximately 70% of all migrants from Ecuador resided in
provinces hosting 20% of all Spaniards, while the same number for Moroccan and Colombian
migrants is 50%. Second, each country’s concentration curve for the year 1999 lies strictly to
the right of the corresponding curve for the year 2009. Thus, the geographic distribution of
the major migrant populations has become more similar to that of natives over time, although
there are again relevant differences across countries of origin. This convergence may be the
result of changes in new migrants’ location choices, but they may also be due to internal
migration moves.7
<< Figure 5.2 about here >>
This trend can also be seen by tracking indexes of spatial diffusion over time. The index
of dissimilarity reads as D = 0.5
∑k
1 |xi − yi|, where xi is the share of a certain migrant
group residing in province i, yi is the corresponding share for Spanish nationals, and k is
the total number of provinces in Spain; see Duncan & Duncan (1955). Graphically speaking,
D measures the maximum vertical distance between a given migrant group’s concentration
curve as in Figure 5.2 and the 45-degree line. Alternatively, D gives the minimum share of
migrants who have to move to another province in order to replicate the spatial distribution
6We do not follow Duncan & Duncan (1955) in labeling the curve “segregation curve” because we study
spatial concentration of migrants at a higher level of aggregation than is usually done in the residential
segregation or assimilation literature. We rather employ the term “concentration curve” as done by Jones
(1967).
7We have also looked at concentration curves where we do not distinguish among different countries of
origin. Both observations, clustering and convergence, carry over to the migrant population at large.
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of Spanish nationals. Thus, D can only take on values in the closed unit interval, with higher
numbers indicating stronger dissimilarity in location choices between migrants and natives.
The left panel of Figure 5.3 depicts the index of dissimilarity for the four major countries
of origin from 1997 to 2009. For these countries, the index takes on values between 0.2 and
0.6. For Ecuadorian and Romanian migrants, the index reports the highest degree of spatial
dissimilarity, but the values for 2009 are always smaller than those for 1997. From 2001
onwards, we observe a general downward trend in spatial dissimilarity over time.8 This is
summarized as follows.
Stylized fact 3. The location choices of migrants in Spain do not match the spatial distri-
bution of natives. The degree of this dissimilarity steadily declined since the early 2000s.
<< Figure 5.3 about here >>
The index of dissimilarity proves useful in detecting differences in location choices between
natives and migrants. Yet, it has its limits in describing the extent of spatial concentration.
For example, positive values of the index of dissimilarity do not imply that a larger proportion
of migrants than of natives is located in each group’s single most attractive province of
destination. The right panel of Figure 5.3 therefore shows the development of the “migration
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index” (henceforth HHI) for different ethnic groups over time. It allows
us to assess differences in spatial concentration across groups of migrants and natives, and to
track these differences over time.9 Following Conway & Rork (2010, 768), we calculate this
index as the total sum of the squared shares of migrants in each province in total migrants in
Spain, separately for the different ethnic groups in Spain. In our case of n = 52 destination
provinces, it ranges from n · (1/n · 100)2 ≈ 192 (individuals are evenly distributed across all
provinces) to 10,000 (individuals are completely concentrated in a single province). Since the
HHI for a given migrant group is independent of the spatial distribution of natives in Spain,
we also compute the HHI for Spanish nationals as a reference group. For Spanish nationals,
the HHI is very stable over time and takes on values in the vicinity of 475 in each year
from 1997 to 2009. For each of the four major migrant groups, the HHI is above that of the
reference group, indicating stronger spatial concentration of migrants relative to natives. The
8We have also computed the coefficient of geographic association, which is another common measure
of spatial diffusion. Among other things, it differs from the index of dissimilarity in its choice of reference
group; see Haggett et al. (1977, 299-300) for details. The values of the coefficient of geographic association
are very similar to those of the index of dissimilarity for all major migrant groups both in terms of the order
of magnitude and the development over time.
9As a drawback, the HHI cannot detect location choice differences between migrants and natives as long
as the exact same shares of population are located in different provinces.
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most concentrated groups of migrants are people with Ecuadorian and Romanian nationality.
We also see a time trend similar to that of the index of dissimilarity. We summarize these
findings as follows.
Stylized fact 4. The major migrant groups in Spain are more strongly concentrated in space
than are natives. The degree of concentration steadily declined since the early 2000s.
The analysis presented so far provides valuable information on migrants’ tendency to
cluster in space. However, it cannot identify migrants’ preferred provinces of destination.
Figure 5.4 illustrates differences in the spatial distribution of each of the four major migrant
groups and the group of natives in the year 1999. The darker the color of a certain province,
the larger is the share of migrants settled in this province relative to the corresponding share
of natives.
<< Figure 5.4 about here >>
The maps show that migrants from all four countries were more strongly attracted by
the province of Madrid than were natives. For Ecuador, the difference in the population
shares in Madrid was almost 50.0 percentage points. This is an extremely large number.
For Romania (31.6), Colombia (26.0), and Morocco (4.6) the corresponding differences are
smaller but still significant. We see relevant cross-country heterogeneity in the settlement of
migrants. For example, a relatively large share of migrants from Morocco targeted provinces
in the North-East (Barcelona and Girona) and in the South-East (Murcia) of Spain, whereas
Romanians were underrepresented (relative to natives) in the provinces of Barcelona and
Murcia. Migrants from Colombia, in contrast to those from Ecuador, had disproportionately
large representations in the North of Spain, especially in the provinces of Cantabria, La
Rioja, Navarra, and A´lava. Such differences are not trivial to explain and require further
investigation. We sum these observations up as
Stylized fact 5. The major migrant groups had disproportionately large, some of them
extremely large, representations in the province of Madrid. There is significant cross-country
heterogeneity in the settlement pattern in Spain, even for countries with a supposedly similar
cultural background.
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Figures
Figure 5.1. Migration stocks and inflows in thousands, Spain 1997 to 2009.†
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† This figure shows migrant stocks in Spain (bars; left ordinate) and inflows to Spain (lines; right
ordinate) by nationality for the six major origin countries over the period 1997-2009. Numbers
are given in thousands (’000s). Source: Authors’ tabulations using data from INE.
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Figure 5.2. Concentration curves for foreign nationals in Spain, 1999 and 2009.†
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† This figure shows concentration curves for foreign nationals in Spain for the years 1999 (dashed
curves) and 2009 (solid curves). Each subfigure plots the cumulative proportion of Spanish people
(ordinate) against the cumulative proportion of foreign nationals (abscissa). The units of geograph-
ical reference are Spanish provinces. In total there are 52 provinces, sorted in descending order
based on the share of migrants in the total province’s population. Source: Authors’ tabulations
using data from INE.
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Figure 5.3. Spatial clustering of migrant groups in Spain, 1997 to 2009.†
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† This figure shows the index of dissimilarity (left panel) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
(right panel) for the stock of selected ethnic groups in Spain over the period 1997-2009. Both
indexes use Spanish provinces as units of geographical reference. For definitions of the indexes,
see the text. Source: Authors’ tabulations using data from INE.
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Figure 5.4. Comparison of the spatial distribution of major migrant groups in Spain and natives, 1999.†
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† This figure illustrates differences in the spatial distribution of natives and major migrant groups in Spain for the year
1999. The units of geographical reference are Spanish provinces. The numbers are percentage points and computed
from the difference between the share of migrants living in a certain province and the corresponding share for natives.
Dark colors represent strong concentration of migrants relative to natives. Light colors represent strong concentration
of natives relative to migrants. The provinces Las Palmas and Santa Cruz de Tenerife are grouped together as Islas
Canarias. Source: Authors’ tabulations using data from INE.
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Chapter6
Networks and selection in international
migration to Spain
This chapter is based on joint work with Nina Neubecker and Anne Steinbacher. A discussion
paper of this chapter is available as DIW Discussion Paper No. 1306. An earlier draft
appeared as University of Tu¨bingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance No. 35 and
as IAW Discussion Paper No. 83.
6.1 Introduction
An established body of literature argues that already settled migrants, often simply called a
migrant network, alleviate the burden of migration for prospective newcomers, for example
through informal job referrals among co-national peers (Munshi, 2003).1 In this paper, we
provide new evidence on migrant networks as determinants of the total size (scale) and skill
structure of migration, drawing on aggregate data from a recent migration boom to Spain.
Spain is an interesting case to look at. The country has become one of the world’s most
attractive destinations for migrants due to its strong economic growth ahead of the Global
Financial Crisis. From 1997 to 2009, Spain received roughly six million new migrants.2 The
foreign-born share among the total population has increased dramatically over the past few
years, starting out from 4.9% in 2000 and approaching 14.1% in 2008 (OECD, 2010, 240).
1Massey (1988, 396) defines migrant networks as “[...] sets of interpersonal ties that link migrants,
former migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through the bonds of kinship, friendship,
and shared community origin.”
2Of these migrants, 13.6% are Romanians, followed by Moroccans (11.1%), Ecuadorians (8.2%), Colom-
bians (6.1%), Britons (5.3%), and Bolivians (4.7%). Unless stated otherwise, all migration figures in this
paper are own calculations based on data from the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica (INE).
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In order to identify network effects in migration to Spain, we develop and apply a three-
level nested multinomial logit (NMNL) migration model along the lines of McFadden (1984,
1422-1428). The model generalizes the standard multinomial logit (MNL) model described
in McFadden (1984, 1411-1415), which assumes that, conditional on observables, any two
migration destinations are equally substitutable for one another. This assumption is largely
at odds with the fact that destinations located in the same territorial entity (e.g. a sovereign
state or a country subdivision with independent legislative authority) are similar in many
respects that are difficult or impossible to observe. They share the same legal and political
framework; they have a common cultural background; and they engage in similar economic
activities. Our NMNL framework allows for such similarities in the multi-level hierarchy of
territorial entities, featuring the highest degree of substitutability across destinations that are
located in the same region of a given country, and the lowest one across destinations that are
located in different countries. In doing so, our model introduces unobserved heterogeneity into
the migration function that challenges previous identification strategies based on aggregate
cross-sectional migration data.
Previous attempts to model cross-destination substitutability in migration are further-
more challenged by the so-called “Dispositive Principle”, an important feature of the Span-
ish political system. As part of the Spanish constitution, it grants regional authorities the
right to define the extent of their legislative autonomy (Morales & Mole´s, 2002, 180). Hence,
destinations in regions with a high demand for self-government are rendered more similar
to each other than destinations in other regions. Related arguments derive from the fact
that some, but not all, regions have a second official language that is actively used by the
population (in addition to castellano). Therefore, as a general rule, destinations in regions
with a pronounced political and cultural autonomy should appear as close substitutes, rel-
ative to destinations in other regions. Our NMNL framework allows us to model this issue
by introducing similarity parameters that are specific to the different regions of destination
in Spain.3 Although we cannot estimate these parameters directly, our model suggests that
estimated network coefficients are not homogeneous across destinations, a possibility that we
explore in detail and that requires a careful interpretation of the network effect.
Obtaining consistent and unbiased estimates of network effects in migration is not triv-
ial. The main endogeneity concern is the two-way relationship between migration costs and
migrant networks, defined as the number of migrants from a certain nationality that are
3To the best of our knowledge, no other random utility model that could be estimated with our data
would allow us to do likewise. For example, the generalized nested logit (GNL) model by Wen & Koppelman
(2001) could be used to closely approximate our three-level NMNL, but its estimation is not feasible with
our data.
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already settled in a certain destination. On the one hand, the migrant network appears as an
argument in the migration cost function determining future migration. On the other hand,
the migrant network is the result of past migration, and is thus itself influenced by migration
costs. Our data distinguish among both different countries of origin and different provinces
of destination in Spain. This allows us to go beyond the existing literature in the way we
control for unobserved heterogeneity in migration costs through fixed effects. By grouping
countries of origin into world regions, we control for all migration costs specific to the world
region of origin and the province of destination (e.g. Latin American people being especially
well-received in the province of Murcia).4 By grouping provinces of destination into regions,
we control for all migration costs specific to the country of origin and the region of destination
in Spain (e.g. the short distance between France and Catalun˜a). To further strengthen our
analysis, we instrument migrant networks by historical internal migration flows in Spain.
Our estimates reveal robustly positive network effects on the scale of migration. The
effects are of considerable size, although smaller than those reported in the received litera-
ture. Since individual migration moves are independent of the effect they have on others’
migration decisions our results have important policy implications. In a dynamic model of
labor migration, network effects indicate a welfare loss in the laissez-faire transition path
equilibrium (Carrington et al., 1996; Chau, 1997). From the perspective of a social planner
who wants to maximize world welfare, they call for migration subsidies that accelerate the
speed of migration. Our estimates also attest to strong negative effects of migrant networks
on the skill structure of migration, defined as the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled migrants.
This finding accords with the idea that high-skilled individuals have lower effective migration
costs than low-skilled individuals (Chiswick, 1999). Intuitively, migrant networks are more
important for low-skilled individuals than they are for high-skilled individuals, biasing the
skill structure of migration toward the low-skilled individuals.
Our estimates strongly reject a uniform degree of substitutability across alternative des-
tinations, working against the standard MNL model in our application to the Spanish case.
We find pronounced heterogeneity in the estimated network coefficients across destinations,
an observation that has (to the best of our knowledge) received no attention at all in the
literature. We use the structural interpretation of our network coefficients in order to exploit
this heterogeneity and compute elasticity values for the network effect. The estimated elas-
ticity is lowest for the destinations located in the region of Extremadura, slightly exceeding a
4This approach also controls for the fact that migrants are attracted to destinations hosting migrants from
countries that are culturally and geographically close to their own country of origin (Neubecker & Smolka,
2013).
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value of 0.1. It is highest for the destinations located in the region of Catalun˜a, lying in the
vicinity of 0.55. We can conclude from our results that the ease with which one destination
can be substituted for another one is highest in the region of Catalun˜a, arguably the region
with the highest degree of political and cultural autonomy in Spain.
Our paper is related to recent estimates of network effects based on aggregate migration
data. Beine et al. (2011) investigate the determinants of the scale and skill structure of mi-
gration between the years 1990 and 2000 to 30 OECD countries. They find that economies
that already host migrants from a given country attract both a larger number of new mi-
grants as well as a larger fraction of low-skilled migrants from that country.5 Similar results
are obtained by Beine & Salomone (2013) who study potential gender differences in network
effects. The paper by Beine et al. (2012) disentangles what the authors call local and na-
tional network externalities, saying that local migrant networks facilitate the assimilation of
migrants in the host society, while nation-wide migrant networks help overcome the legal
entry barriers to migration. However, all of these papers derive the estimated migration
functions from a standard MNL model that assumes a uniform degree of cross-destination
substitutability.6
Our paper is also related to a number of macro-level studies that are more generally con-
cerned with the determinants of international migration.7 In this literature, migrant networks
robustly rank among the most important factors shaping migration, but the estimated migra-
tion functions often lack an explicit micro-foundation (Clark et al., 2007; Lewer & den Berg,
2008; Pedersen et al., 2008; Mayda, 2010). Two recent papers, Bertoli & Ferna´ndez-Huertas
Moraga (2013) and Ortega & Peri (2013), develop micro-founded random utility migration
models in order to estimate the determinants of migration. In both papers, the standard
MNL assumption of a uniform degree of cross-destination substitutability is relaxed. Bertoli
& Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013) use the same Spanish data source as we do in this pa-
per. They argue that the Common Correlated Effects (CCE) estimator, a panel estimator
5See Grogger & Hanson (2011, 53) for complementary evidence. Mckenzie & Rapoport (2010) find positive
self-selection on education from Mexican migrants to the U.S. to be more likely, the larger the number of
return migrants in the origin community. Bertoli (2010) finds a positive interaction between the number of
migrants abroad and the extent of negative self-selection, using individual-level data on Ecuadorian emigrants.
6While revising this paper, we became aware of research by Bertoli & Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2012).
They use the same migration data as Beine et al. (2011) in order to estimate network effects in migration,
relaxing the assumption of a uniform degree of substitutability across alternative destinations. The most
general version of their estimated model reduces to a two-level NMNL model with a single similarity parameter
for all “nests” (territorial entities in our paper); see Appendix A for details.
7For the location choice of migrants within borders, see Bartel (1989), Zavodny (1997, 1999), Chiswick &
Miller (2004), Card & Lewis (2007), Jayet et al. (2010). Selected survey-based studies on migration decisions
at the micro-level include A˚slund (2005), Baghdadi (2005), Bauer et al. (2005, 2009), and Dolfin & Genicot
(2010).
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proposed by Pesaran (2006), yields consistent estimates of the migration function under ar-
bitrary specifications of the cross-nested logit (CNL) model due to Vovsha (1997). The CNL
model allocates a “portion” of each destination to a set of “nests” (territorial entities in our
paper), assuming, contrary to our model, that there is a single similarity parameter for all
nests.8 Ortega & Peri (2013) investigate the impact of income and immigration policies on
migration to OECD countries, using panel data detailed by country of origin and country
of destination.9 Their model, best understood as a two-level NMNL model with a single
similarity parameter for all nests, allows for a higher degree of substitutability across desti-
nations that are located outside the individual’s country of origin. However, neither Bertoli
& Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013) nor Ortega & Peri (2013) identify the effects of migrant
networks on the scale and skill structure of migration, as we do in this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 characterizes individual
decision making in a three-level NMNL model. From this model, we derive estimable equa-
tions for the scale and skill structure of migration. In Section 6.3 we present our estimation
strategy and introduce in detail the data that we employ in our econometric analysis. Section
6.4 presents our estimation results. We provide a structural interpretation of these results in
terms of our NMNL migration model. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 The model
In this section we develop a multi-country random utility framework with many countries of
origin and many provinces of destination at the sub-country level.
6.2.1 Basic setup
We assume that the decision making process leading to migration follows a hierarchical
structure in which provinces of destination (the final migration destinations) are grouped into
higher-level territorial entities (nests). Individuals “eliminate” nests until a single province
remains. Decision making can be described in a hierarchical manner10: first to which country
to migrate (including the country of origin), second which region to move to within the chosen
8The CNL model is a special case of the GNL model. Unlike the GNL model, the CNL model cannot be
used to approximate our three-level NMNL model (Wen & Koppelman, 2001). Bertoli et al. (2013) employ
the CNL model in order to study the effect of the recent economic crisis in Europe on migration to Germany.
9In Ortega & Peri (2009), a previous version of Ortega & Peri (2013), the authors also study the effects
of migration on employment, investment, and productivity.
10We assume that each decision in this hierarchy is made conditional on both the fixed preceding decisions
and the optimal succeeding decisions. Hence, one can think of individuals as deciding on all aspects of their
migration moves simultaneously (Domencich & McFadden, 1975).
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country, and third which province to pick within the preferred region.11 Let i = 1, . . . , I,
index countries of origin, j or k = 1, . . . , J, index provinces of destination, z or y = 1, . . . , Z,
index the primary nests (countries of destination), and r or ` = 1, . . . , R, index the secondary
nests (regions of destination within countries), as perceived by individuals living in country
i.12 Let the country of origin i be one element in each of the sets {1, . . . , Z}, {1, . . . , R}, and
{1, . . . , J}; it represents a degenerate nest with a single final migration destination. Define
Azr as the set of provinces belonging to region r in country z, and Az as the set of regions
belonging to country z.
We write the utility of individual o who migrates from country i to province j and lives
in province j as:
U oij = Yj − Cij + eoij, (6.1)
where the index o = 1, . . . ,mi, identifies individuals originating from country i, the terms Yj
and Cij are sub-utility functions relevant for moving from country i to province j and living in
province j, and the term eoij is a stochastic (random) utility variable with individual-specific
realizations for each province j = 1, . . . , J . The function Yj summarizes utility-relevant
characteristics of province j such as the wage rate, the state of the housing market, and the
climate. It is assumed to be independent of the individual’s country of origin. The function
Cij captures the costs of moving and assimilation, henceforth called migration costs. Similar
to Beine et al. (2011, 33-34), we hypothesize that these costs are a decreasing and globally
convex function of the migrant network, Mij, defined as the number of co-national migrants
already settled in province j. A convenient specification of migration costs that incorporates
the idea of positive but diminishing returns to the migrant network uses the log of Mij:
Cij = ciz + cir + cij − θ ln(1 +Mij), j ∈ Azr, r ∈ Az, (6.2)
where the parameter θ > 0 is a measure for the strength of the network effect, and where
we add one to the variable Mij before taking logs in order to abstract from infinitely large
migration costs. The other cost components not related to the migrant network will be
described in more detail below. Suffice it to say here that, for a given country of origin i, they
vary either across countries of destination (ciz), across regions of destination (cir), or across
provinces of destination (cij). For expositional convenience, we define Uij ≡ U oij−eoij = Yj−Cij
and ξij ≡ Yj − cij + θ ln(1 +Mij).
11In Ortega & Peri (2013), the first decision of individuals is between going abroad and staying at home.
Our econometric implementation is compatible with this additional structure.
12Strictly speaking, the final migration destinations j and the nests r and z are i-specific. We omit this
index in order to avoid notational clutter.
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Individuals are assumed to choose from the set of provinces the alternative from which
they derive the highest utility:
jo = argmax(U oi1, . . . , U
o
iJ), j
o ∈ {1, . . . , J}. (6.3)
The probability that individual o from country i migrates to province j is equal to the
probability that this individual associates the largest utility with moving to province j:
P oi (j
o = j) = Pr(U oij > U
o
ik ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . , J} : k 6= j)
= Pr(eoik − eoij < Uij − Uik;
∀ k ∈ {1, . . . , J} : k 6= j). (6.4)
By the laws of conditional probability, we can express this probability as a product of tran-
sition probabilities:
P oi (j
o = j) = P oi (j
o = j|jo ∈ Azr)P oi (jo ∈ Azr|r ∈ Az)P oi (r ∈ Az), j ∈ Azr, r ∈ Az. (6.5)
These probabilities depend on the distribution assumed for the random utility variables,
eoi1, . . . , e
o
iJ . Let gi = (gi1, . . . , giJ) be a (1× J) row vector with non-negative entries, and let
Hi be a non-negative function of gi with:
lim
gij→∞
Hi(gi) = +∞ for j = 1, . . . , J. (6.6)
Furthermore, assume that Hi is homogeneous of degree one in gi, and let Hi have mixed par-
tial derivatives of all orders, with non-positive even and non-negative odd mixed derivatives.
It can be shown that the function
Fi(e
o
i1, . . . , e
o
iJ) = exp [−Hi (exp[−eoi1], . . . , exp[−eo1J ])] (6.7)
is a multivariate extreme value distribution function, and that, if (eoi1, . . . , e
o
iJ) is distributed
Fi, (6.4) can be written as:
P oi (j
o = j) =
exp[Uij]
Hi(exp[Ui1], . . . , exp[UiJ ])
∂Hi(exp[Ui1], . . . , exp[UiJ ])
∂ exp[Uij]
=
∂ lnHi(exp[Ui1], . . . , exp[UiJ ])
∂Uij
; (6.8)
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see McFadden (1978, 80-81) and McFadden (1981, 226-230).13
We depart from the received literature in that we introduce a function Hi that generates
the response probabilities of a three-level NMNL model. It allows for the random utilities
associated with provinces belonging to the same region (or the same country) to be mutually
correlated, whereas the random utilities associated with provinces in different countries are
independent. Define on the half-open unit interval two parameters, λz and κr (0 < κr, λz ≤
1), measuring the similarity of the provinces located in country z and region r, respectively.
These two parameters govern the degree of substitutability across alternative destinations;
they are allowed to vary across countries and across regions, respectively. High parameter
values indicate little similarity among provinces (and weak correlations among the random
utilities), low parameter values indicate much similarity (and strong correlations). As we
have argued in the introduction, cross-regional differences in the similarity parameter κr in
Spain could derive, for example, from the constitutionally anchored “Dispositive Principle”,
which allows for region-specific degrees of legislative autonomy. We assume:
Hi(exp[Ui1], . . . , exp[UiJ ]) =
∑
z
(∑
r∈Az
(∑
j∈Azr
exp[Uij/(κrλz)]
)κr)λz
=
∑
z
exp[−ciz]×
(∑
r∈Az
exp[−cir/λz]
(∑
j∈Azr
exp[ξij/(κrλz)]
)κr)λz
. (6.9)
It is instructive to note that the function Hi(·) nests the generating function for the response
probabilities of the standard MNL model as a special case with κr = λz = 1 ∀r, z. This rules
out any correlation among the random utilities. We shall return to this in more detail below.
From equations (6.8) and (6.9) it follows that each transition probability in equation (6.5)
has a closed-form analytical solution14:
P oi (r ∈ Az) = exp[Ωizλz − ciz −Ψi], (6.10)
P oi (j
o ∈ Azr|r ∈ Az) = exp[Φirκr − cir/λz − Ωiz], (6.11)
P oi (j
o = j|jo ∈ Azr) = exp[ξij/(λzκr)− Φir], (6.12)
13We show in Appendix B how to derive (6.8).
14For example, in order to derive P oi (r ∈ Az), one simply has to compute ∂ lnHi(·)/∂(−ciz), and similarly
for the other transitional probabilities. We show in Appendix A how to compute P oi (j
o = j) = ∂ lnHi(·)/∂Uij .
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where Φir, Ωiz, and Ψi are “inclusive values” defined as:
Φir ≡ ln
∑
k∈Azr
exp[ξik/(λzκr)], (6.13)
Ωiz ≡ ln
∑
`∈Az
exp[Φi`κ` − ci`/λz], (6.14)
Ψi ≡ ln
∑
z
exp[Ωizλz − ciz]. (6.15)
The inclusive values Φir, Ωiz, and Ψi summarize, respectively, the characteristics of all
provinces belonging to region r, all provinces belonging to country z, and all provinces
belonging to the complete set of final migration destinations. Using equation (6.5) together
with equations (6.10) to (6.15) and aggregating over all individuals from country i, we can
write the expected rate of migration from country i to province j as:
mij
mi
=
exp[ξij/(λzκr)− cir/λz − ciz]
exp[Ψi + (1− κr)Φir + (1− λz)Ωiz] , (6.16)
where mij is the number of individuals migrating from i to j, and mi is the initial population
size of country i. This ij-specific migration rate depends on the inclusive values Φir, Ωiz,
and Ψi. It is therefore responsive to the attractiveness of all provinces k = 1, . . . , J , whether
in the same region r (or the same country z) as province j or not. It is in this sense that
we refer to the inclusive values as “multilateral resistance” terms.15 For example, consider
the elasticity of the ij-specific migration rate, mij/mi, with respect to Yk, the utility-relevant
characteristics of province k, where j ∈ Azr, r ∈ Az, and k ∈ Ay`, ` ∈ Ay. Straightforward
though cumbersome differentiation yields16:
∂ ln(mij/mi)
∂ ln(Yk)
= Yk
[
I(j, k)
λzκr
−
(
mik
mi
)
−I(`, r)
λzκr
(1− κr)
(
mik
mir
)
− I(y, z)
λz
(1− λz)
(
mik
miz
)]
, (6.17)
where mir =
∑
j∈Azr mij, miz =
∑
r∈Az mir, and I(a, b) = 1 if a = b and zero otherwise.
17
15Mayda (2010) speaks of “multilateral pull” effects. The idea of multilateral resistance here is similar
to that in the gravity equation for international trade flows (Anderson & van Wincoop, 2003). Anderson
(2011) sketches a general equilibrium migration model with multilateral resistance. See also Hanson (2010,
4373-4375) for a discussion.
16We show in Appendix D how to compute this elasticity.
17Notice that I(j, k) = 1 implies that I(`, r) = I(y, z) = 1 but not the other way around.
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Given that 0 < κr, λz ≤ 1, this elasticity is positive for k = j and negative for all other
provinces k 6= j.
Any change in the conditions in some province k 6= j induces non-uniform effects on the
ij-specific migration rate, depending on whether this province belongs to the same country
or region as province j. In particular, the elasticity in (6.17) is largest (in absolute value)
for any change in the conditions in other provinces in the same region, I(`, r) = I(y, z) =
1. The fact that these substitution effects are strongest within regions and weakest across
countries is due to the similarity of provinces located in the same region (and in the same
country). In the standard MNL model with λz = κr = 1 ∀r, z, the pattern of cross-elasticities
becomes strikingly simple: for k 6= j, (6.17) collapses to ∂ ln(mij/mi)/∂ ln(Yk) = −Ykmik/mi,
independently of whether or not the provinces j and k are located in the same region or in
the same country.
The flexible structure of cross-destination substitutability in our NMNL model notwith-
standing, the issue of multilateral resistance is not a special feature of the NMNL model.
It is a key element of the standard MNL model as well. To see this, note that with
λz = κr = 1 ∀r, z, the ij-specific migration rate reads as:
mij
mi
∣∣∣∣
λz ,κr=1
=
exp[ξij − cir − ciz]
exp[Ψi]
=
exp[Uij]∑
k exp[Uik]
, (6.18)
which depends not only on the conditions in i and j, but also on the conditions in all other
provinces through the multilateral resistance term Ψi. Based on the standard MNL model of
equation (6.18), a common approach in the literature is to compute the ij-specific migration
rate (namely, the fraction of the population in i who migrate to j) relative to the i-specific
stay rate (namely, the fraction of non-migrants of the population in i):
mij
mii
= exp[Uij − Uii], (6.19)
where the multilateral resistance term Ψi cancels out. In the standard MNL model, the
odds ratio between any two provinces is thus independent of the number and characteristics
of other provinces, a property known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
assumption (McFadden 1974, 1978).18 Thus, estimating a log-linearized version of equation
(6.19) (instead of estimating a log-linearized version of equation (6.18)) has the advantage
that no attention needs to be paid to the multilateral resistance term, provided that the IIA
18Strictly speaking, the standard MNL model as such does not imply the IIA property. The IIA property
would indeed be absent in the standard MNL model if Uij was a function of any of the characteristics of
province k 6= i, j.
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assumption is not violated. In our more general NMNL modeling framework, the relative
odds become:
mij
mii
=
exp[ξij/(λzκr)− ξii − cir/λz + ci` − ciz + ciy]
exp[(1− κr)Φir + (1− λz)Ωiz] , (6.20)
where j ∈ Azr, r ∈ Az and i ∈ Ay`, ` ∈ Ay, and where we have used the fact that the country
of origin i represents a single final migration destination. It is thus easy to verify that the
odds ratio between any two provinces belonging to two different regions is not independent
of the number and characteristics of other provinces. This involves a partial relaxation of the
IIA assumption. Hence, in our NMNL framework, the issue of multilateral resistance needs
to be addressed explicitly, whether we estimate a log-linearized version of equation (6.16) or
of equation (6.20).19 Given that the variable mi in equation (6.16) is exogenous, while the
variable mii in equation (6.20) is endogenous and potentially difficult to observe, we use the
ij-specific migration rate in equation (6.16) for our econometric implementation.
6.2.2 Scale of migration
Substituting ξij in equation (6.16), taking logs, and rearranging terms yields the following
migration function for j ∈ Azr, r ∈ Az:
ln(mij) =
θ
λzκr
ln(1 +Mij) + ln(mi) +
1
λzκr
Yj − ciz − 1
λz
cir − 1
λzκr
cij,
−Ψi − (1− λz)Ωiz − (1− κr)Φir︸ ︷︷ ︸
Multilateral resistance
. (6.21)
Identification of the network effect is thus complicated by the presence of both the different
cost components and the multilateral resistance terms. Moreover, the network coefficient,
defined as ηzr ≡ η(λz, κr) = θλzκr , is a decreasing function of λz and κr; it is larger the larger
the similarities of provinces in country z and region r, respectively. For low values of λz
and κr, it is easy to substitute one province for another one in the same country or region,
respectively. In this case, a small increase in the migrant network in province k ∈ Azr, r ∈ Az,
leads a large number of individuals to substitute another province j ∈ Azr by province k, other
things held constant. We expect to find higher degrees of cross-destination substitutability
(and thus larger network coefficients) in regions that put a lot of emphasis on their political
and cultural autonomy.
19The same applies to the CNL migration model estimated in Bertoli & Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013).
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6.2.3 Skill structure of migration
We now distinguish between high-skilled and low-skilled individuals, denoted by h and l,
respectively. We augment the utility function by a parameter γs > 0, s ∈ {h, l}, representing
the ease with which individuals are able to cope with migration costs (decreasing with higher
values):
U oij = Yj − γsCij + eoij, (6.22)
where s = h if individual o is high-skilled and s = l otherwise. We assume that γh < γl, so
high-skilled individuals have lower effective migration costs than low-skilled individuals. This
assumption is in line with Chiswick (1999), who argues that the high-skilled can handle their
migration process more efficiently than the low-skilled. We can thus derive one migration
function for each skill group by complete analogy to equation (6.21). Subtracting the equation
for low-skilled migrants from the same equation for high-skilled migrants, we obtain:
ln
(
mhij
mlij
)
=
θγ∗
λzκr
ln(1 +Mij) + ln
(
mhi
mli
)
− γ∗ciz − γ
∗
λz
cir − γ
∗
λzκr
cij
−Ψ∗i − (1− λz)Ω∗iz − (1− κr)Φ∗ir, (6.23)
where the variables with an asterisk (∗) are differences between the corresponding parameters
(or variables) for high-skilled and low-skilled individuals. Since γ∗ < 0, the ratio of new high-
skilled to new low-skilled migrants is a decreasing function of the migrant network. This
result is due to the fact that individuals differ in their effective costs of migration, and that
this difference is less important for low levels of migration costs. Hence, it is the low-skilled
individuals who benefit the most from a reduction in migration costs through a larger migrant
network.20
6.3 Estimation strategy and data
In this section we describe our estimation strategy and we present the different variables that
we use in the estimation. We estimate different variants of the models given by equations
(6.21) and (6.23), each augmented by a stochastic error term. We consider two different
aggregation levels for final migration destinations in Spain. The model for the scale of
migration is estimated at the level of provinces in Spain. Due to reasons of data availability,
20This is reflected in the following inequality: ∂Uij(γ
l)/∂Mij > ∂Uij(γ
h)/∂Mij . In this respect, our
modeling approach is akin to the one in Beine et al. (2011).
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the model for the skill structure of migration is estimated at the level of regions in Spain.21
For both models, our benchmark estimates are based on a sample comprising the 55 most
important countries of origin listed in Table E.1 in Appendix E. These are all countries with
at least 630 migrants in Spain in the year 1996. All migration data come from the Spanish
Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica (INE). The full internet sources of our data are listed in
Table E.2 in Appendix E.
6.3.1 Scale of migration
The dependent variable is the log of the migration flow to provinces of destination in Spain,
obtained from the Spanish Residential Variation Statistics and aggregated from the beginning
of 1997 until the end of 2006.22 This period covers Spain’s unprecedented migration boom,
which was eventually attenuated by the global financial and economic crisis starting in 2007.
The migrant network, Mij, is measured by the number of already settled migrants in 1996,
as reported by the Spanish Municipal Register. We rely on population figures disaggregated
by nationalities and by provinces in Spain as of May 1, 1996.
From the year 2000 onwards, our migration data are likely to include both documented
and undocumented migrants due to the incentives deriving from the “Law on the Rights and
Freedoms of Aliens in Spain and their Social Integration” (Ley Orga´nica 4/2000, art´ıculo
12 ). This law became effective in 2000 and entitled all registered foreigners to free medical
care under the same conditions as Spanish nationals, irrespective of their legal status.23 Each
registrant must provide his or her name, surname, sex, usual domicile, nationality, passport
number, as well as the place and date of birth.24 Since this information is confidential and
must not be communicated to other administrative units, the probability of forced repatria-
tion is plausibly independent of registration.
We identify the model from the within-cluster variation across provinces in the data.
21Spain is divided into 52 provinces which are nested in 19 regions. We exclude the provinces (enclaves) of
Ceuta and Melilla due to their specific geographical location and thus we end up with 50 provinces nested in
17 regions. See http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/codmun/cod provincia.htm and http://www.ine.es/
daco/daco42/codmun/cod ccaa.htm (both accessed on 04/17/2012) for a list of provinces and regions, re-
spectively.
22Migrants are defined as individuals whose last country of residence (other than Spain) corresponds to
their country of birth and nationality. In their raw form, the migration flow data are observed for periods
of less than a year. We aggregate the data over time because the model cannot deal with a time dimension
in any convenient way, unless we assume that in every period individuals left in the home country draw new
realizations of the random utility variables eoi1, . . . , e
o
iJ , an assumption too strong to be plausible.
23As part of its austerity measures in 2012, the Spanish government has—with some exceptions—restricted
this access to health care for undocumented migrants from September 2012 onwards.
24See INE at http://www.ine.es/en/metodologia/t20/t203024566 en.htm, accessed on 08/19/2011.
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We start with a parsimonious fixed effects (FE) specification in which we define as clusters
the different countries of origin, computing all variables in equation (6.21) as deviations from
their country means (within-transformation).25 This approach wipes out, first, all terms with
subscript i and thus controls for the initial population size in the country of origin as well
as for the multilateral resistance term Ψi; and second, it wipes out all terms with subscript
iz because our migration data refer to a single country of destination z. By eliminating
ciz, it thus controls, for example, for the impact of country-specific migration policies and
the geographical and cultural distance between the country of origin and the country of
destination. By eliminating Ωiz, it is compatible with a model in which the degree of cross-
destination substitutability is larger within than across countries of destination.
In more demanding specifications of our FE model, we define as clusters the different
pairs of countries of origin and regions of destination, computing all variables as deviations
from their country-and-region means. In addition to the above-described country effects, this
approach wipes out all terms with subscript ir. These terms include, first, the multilateral
resistance term Φir, so that this approach is fully compatible with our three-level NMNL
model; and second, they include the cost term cir representing the geographical and cultural
distance between the country of origin and the region of destination. Important elements
of this distance derive from a cultural, political, and historical context. For example, the
different regions in Spain feature substantial heterogeneity in terms of native languages;
the Basque Autonomous Community and Navarre both have strong cultural ties with the
Northern Basque Country, which is part of French national territory26; the region of Galicia
has long been suffering from a chronic growth weakness leading to mass emigration in the
19th and 20th century, in particular to Latin American countries.
All other migration costs are summarized in the term cij. Some of these costs, for example
those related to the attitudes of the native population toward migrants, may be specific to
the province of destination j but independent of the country of origin i. We control for
these province-specific migration costs by including a set of province fixed effects in the
estimation. The province fixed effects also absorb the impact of province-specific pull factors
summarized in the term Yj. Some other migration costs may be specific to both the province
of destination and the world region of origin (grouping countries of origin). An example
would be that individuals from Ecuador feel attracted not only by a network of co-national
25When zero values inflate the dependent variable, the FE estimator delivers inconsistent estimates (San-
tos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006). In our sample we observe only a modest number of zero migration flows (5.75%
of all country-province pairs) and therefore apply the FE estimator.
26The Basque Autonomous Community and Navarre form the Spanish part of the Basque Country (Pa´ıs
Vasco in Spanish; Euskal Herria in Basque language).
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migrants (i.e., migrants from Ecuador) but also by a network of migrants from other Latin
American countries (Neubecker & Smolka, 2013). This additional effect, a “cross-national”
network externality, would lower the migration costs for potential migrants from Ecuador,
leading to a higher incidence of migration. In more demanding specifications of our model,
we therefore control for these other migration costs with a set of world region-and-province
fixed effects.27
As further control variables, we include bilateral trade and capital flows where possible.
Both variables could be part of the cost term cij. Trade is not only facilitated by, but is
also conducive to a good infrastructure for traveling and transportation. Capital invested by
foreign firms could create demand for specific types of labor, especially foreign labor. Data
on both trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) are provided by the Spanish Ministry
of Industry, Tourism and Trade. We measure ij-specific trade flows by the sum of exports
and imports (in Euros) in the year 1996. These information are taken from DataComex
Statistics on Spanish Foreign Trade. Ideally, we would like to use FDI stocks to measure
inward investment but we only have information on gross FDI inflows (in Euros). These
are available from DataInvex Statistics on Foreign Investments in Spain and detailed by the
country of the last owner and by the region of destination in Spain.28 Due to limited data
availability, we have to use FDI flows for the year 1997. We think that endogeneity is unlikely,
however, because the decision to engage in FDI is often made some time before the actual
investments are carried out.
In case we omit ij-specific variables that are correlated with both mij and Mij, the
migrant network is endogenous to the subsequent migrant flow. In view of our extended FE
specification, it is difficult to think of any such omitted variable. However, suppose there is a
province-specific labor demand for workers from a certain nationality, such as the demand for
German engineers in SEAT’s car production in Barcelona. Then, the FE model may produce
biased and inconsistent estimates. Consistent estimation would call for an instrument that
is uncorrelated with the structural error term but correlated with the endogenous regressor.
We instrument country i’s migrant network in province j with historical internal migration
flows in Spain, defined as the log of the number of people holding country i’s nationality and
migrating from province j to any other province k 6= j in Spain in 1988 (henceforth simply
27In terms of world regions, we distinguish among East Asia & Pacific; Eastern Europe & Central Asia;
Latin America & Caribbean; Middle East & North Africa; North America, Australia & New Zealand; South
& South-East Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa; as well as Western Europe. For a similar classification used by the
IMF, see http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/region.htm, accessed on 07/25/2012.
28Hence, the effect of FDI on migration is not identified in the model controlling for country-and-region
fixed effects.
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called internal migration).29
Because it indicates a large historical network, internal migration can be expected to
correlate positively with the migrant network in 1996.30 Our first-stage regressions attest
to a statistically significant positive (partial) correlation. Its significance is also reflected in
relatively high values for the first-stage F statistics. For internal migration to be a valid
instrument, it must be uncorrelated with the structural error term.31 This assumption could
be violated if a large internal migration observed for a certain province reflects and signals
a poor matching quality (for example in terms of jobs) between this province and the cor-
responding migrants, thus leading to a lower incidence of migration today. However, this
signaling effect does not necessarily render our instruments endogenous. One reason is that
most, if not all, of the variation in the matching quality across countries and across provinces
is absorbed into our fixed effects. Another, probably more important, reason is that the
signaling effect should be captured by the (observable) migrant network itself, given that
this network is a function of all past migration flows. We use internal migration in 1989 as a
second excluded instrument. This allows us to perform tests on overidentifying restrictions
and check for instrument exogeneity.
6.3.2 Skill structure of migration
Aggregate migration data with reliable information on the skill structure of migration can
only be constructed at the level of regions rather than at the level of provinces. We therefore
simplify the structure of our model to a two-level NMNL model in which the regions of
destination (indexed here by j) are the final migration destinations within the primary nest
of Spain. Equation (6.23) then becomes:
ln
(
mhij
mlij
)
=
θγ∗
λz
ln(1 +Mij) + ln
(
mhi
mli
)
− γ∗ciz − γ
∗
λz
cij −Ψ∗i − (1− λz)Ω∗iz. (6.24)
The dependent variable measures the skill structure of migration. Skill-specific migration
flows are obtained from the National Immigrant Survey 2007 (NIS). The survey gathers
unique information on a total of 15,465 migrants through field interviews conducted between
29The year 1988 is the first year for which these information are available. It is well before the start
of the Spanish migration boom. We add one to the number of people before taking logs in order to keep
observations with zero migration flows.
30It follows from its definition, however, that internal migration also reduces the size of the historical
network.
31Therefore, the focus on internal migration is on purpose because it excludes return migrants who could
shape future migration in one way or the other.
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November 2006 and February 2007.32 Migrants report, inter alia, their year of arrival in
Spain, their first destination in Spain, as well as their highest level of education they com-
pleted before migrating. They are defined as individuals aged 16 years or older who were
born abroad and have lived in Spain for more than a year, or at least intended to stay for
more than a year at the time the survey was conducted.33 Importantly, this definition is
independent of the individual’s legal status, so the data again include documented and un-
documented migrants. We aggregate the number of migrants by country of birth and region
of destination, distinguishing between individuals with completed tertiary education before
migrating (high-skilled) and all other individuals (low-skilled) and applying the provided
population weights. Although the data can be considered representative of migrants who
arrived shortly before the survey was taken, the numbers for earlier cohorts are less reliable
due to the lack of information on migrants who died, returned, or migrated onward. We deal
with the trade-off between a large number of individuals and data representativeness in that
we consider only migrants who arrived in Spain between January 1, 2002, and December 31,
2006.
The migrant network, Mij, is measured by the number of settled migrants as of January
1, 2002. These data, detailed by country of origin and region of destination, are taken from
the Spanish Municipal Register. The sum of import and export values in 2001 is collected
at the level of regions. Investment stocks as of 2001 are approximated by gross FDI inflows
from the beginning of 1998 until the end of 2001. Country-specific fixed effects, absorbing,
among other things, the multilateral resistance terms Ψ∗i and Ω
∗
iz, are wiped out by applying
the corresponding within-transformation to the data. Hence, cross-regional differences in
the migrant network of a given country of origin are used as identifying variation so that
we cannot control for country-and-region fixed effects. We instead augment the model by
observable variables that are likely to influence the migration costs. We control for the
geographical distance between the country of origin i and the region of destination j, using
the STATA module GEODIST by Picard (2010) in combining geographical data on the
countries of origin from Mayer & Zignago (2006) and on the regions of destination from
the Spanish Wikipedia/GeoHack webpage. We control for a common language through an
indicator variable that is equal to one if at least 80% of the region’s total population are
native speakers of a language spoken by at least 20% of the people living in the country of
32The sample was obtained through a relatively complex three-stage sampling scheme designed to offer
reliable and representative data to policy makers and researchers. More detailed information on both the
survey and the sampling can be found in Reher & Requena (2009) as well as in INE (2007).
33Foreign-born individuals with Spanish nationality from birth who migrated to Spain within two years
after birth are not considered as migrants.
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origin, and zero otherwise. The information on native languages in Spain are taken from
a number of recent survey studies.34 Language information on the countries of origin come
from Mayer & Zignago (2006). The influence of all terms indexed j is absorbed by a set of
dummy variables for the different regions of destination. The complete specification of our
model furthermore controls for world region-and-region fixed effects.
We also apply the instrumental variables approach to this model, by analogy to the model
for the scale of migration. In particular, we instrument the migrant network in 2002, Mij,
with the log of the number of people holding country i’s nationality and migrating from region
j in Spain to any other region k 6= j in Spain in 1988. As before, we use the corresponding
migration flow in 1989 as a second excluded instrument.
6.4 Estimation results
In this section we present and discuss our estimation results. We start with a descriptive
look at the relationship between migrant networks and the scale and skill structure of migra-
tion to different destinations in Spain. Figure 6.1(a) is a scatter plot for migration between
1997 and 2006 versus migrant networks in 1996, where each dot represents a different pair
of country of origin and province of destination. We observe a positive correlation between
the two variables. Figure 6.1(b) is a scatter plot for the skill structure of migration between
2002 and 2006 versus migrant networks at the beginning of 2002, where now each dot rep-
resents a different pair of country of origin and region of destination. The figure suggests a
weak negative correlation between the two variables. In what follows, we test whether these
correlations reflect a causal relationship running from migrant networks to the scale and skill
structure of migration, and we provide a structural interpretation of our estimation results
in terms of our NMNL migration model. We also discuss the results of several robustness
checks.35
<<Figures 6.1(a) and 6.1(b) about here>>
6.4.1 Results for the scale of migration
In this subsection we present the estimation results of the model for the scale of migration
as specified in equation (6.21). We first estimate an average network coefficient, abstracting
from potential differences in the parameter κr across regions. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the
34See Table E.2 in Appendix E for a list of surveys.
35The detailed results of these robustness checks are available from the authors upon request.
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results from the FE model and the two stage least squares (2SLS) FE model, respectively. In
columns (a) and (b) of both tables, we eliminate country fixed effects via an adequate within-
transformation of the data. The number of observations is equal to 2,592, which is the result
of having 55 countries of origin, 50 provinces of destination, and 158 undefined values for
the dependent variable due to zero migrant flows (55 × 50 − 158 = 2, 592). In columns (c)
to (f), we eliminate country-and-region fixed effects by modifying the within-transformation
accordingly. This excludes all regions consisting of a single province and thus reduces the
number of observations to 2,209.36
In the most parsimonious specification of the FE model in column (a) of Table 6.1, the
estimated network coefficient is equal to 0.688.37 The coefficient is statistically significant
at the 1% level and estimated with very high precision (heteroskedasticity-robust standard
error, clustered by countries of origin, equal to 0.029). When we augment the model by FDI
and trade flows in column (b), we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient of
the FDI variable. Yet, the point estimate of this coefficient is equal to 0.012 and thus implies
a moderate quantitative importance only. Trade relations, instead, do not seem to have a
significant impact on the scale of migration. More importantly, the estimates of the network
coefficient are virtually unchanged in this version of the model. However, once we control
for country-and-region fixed effects in columns (c) and (d), we see a drop in the estimated
network coefficient down to 0.539, which corresponds to a decrease by roughly 20%. We see
a further reduction by more than 10% once we take out the variation that is constant for
each pair of world regions of origin and provinces of destination via dummy variables.
Unobserved heterogeneity in our model has two sources: first, the multilateral resistance
terms, and second, the different cost components. Failing to account for the multilateral
resistance terms leads to downward-biased estimates of the network coefficient due to a
positive covariance between the migrant network and the terms Ψi, Ωiz, and Φir, respectively.
Failing to account for the different cost components, in turn, leads to upward-biased estimates
of the network coefficient due to a negative covariance between the migrant network and the
terms ciz, cir, and cij, respectively. Given that our estimation results point towards a sizeable
upward bias in the estimation of the network coefficient in specifications (a)-(d), the second
source of unobserved heterogeneity clearly “dominates” the first one.
<<Tables 6.1 and 6.2 about here>>
36Seven regions consist of a single province. Applying the within-transformation to such observations
yields all zeros.
37This estimate of the average network coefficient is virtually identical to the local network externality
estimated by Beine et al. (2012).
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The 2SLS FE estimations in Table 6.2 strengthen our interpretation of a quantitatively im-
portant causal effect of migrant networks on the scale of migration. They suggest a somewhat
larger role for the network effect, with a coefficient ranging between 0.732 and 0.958. The
difference between the FE estimates and the 2SLS FE estimates could be due to stochastic
measurement errors in the migrant network, which would result in downward-biased esti-
mates of the network coefficient when applying the FE estimator (Hausmann, 2001). As in
the FE estimations, the network coefficient is lowest when we control for country-and-region
effects as well as for world region-and-province effects. The loss in precision from using the
2SLS FE approach is fairly small if interpreted relative to the FE model. The effects of both
trade and FDI on the scale of migration are essentially zero.
The 2SLS diagnostics are all encouraging. The first-stage F statistic for the joint signif-
icance of the excluded instruments is relatively high and thus points to the relevance and
strength of the instruments. In all the specifications employed, it exceeds the critical value of
10, which is required for reliable inference in the case of a single endogenous regressor (Stock
et al., 2002, 522). Wooldridge’s robust score χ2 test of overidentifying restrictions checks for
instrument exogeneity. The null hypothesis (exogeneity) of this test can never be rejected at
any reasonable significance level. This suggests that our instruments are uncorrelated with
the structural error term, and that our structural equation is correctly specified. We also
report the results from an exogeneity test for the migrant network. The robust regression-
based F test rejects the null hypothesis that the migrant network is exogenous at the 1%
level. It should thus be treated as endogenous.
Our next specification allows for cross-regional differences in the similarity parameter κr,
which implies region-specific network coefficients, ηzr. The specification employed is equiva-
lent to the one reported in column (f) of Table 6.1, except for the fact that we now interact
the migrant network with dummy variables for the different regions of destination. Table
6.3 reveals substantial heterogeneity in the estimated network coefficient across regions. It is
largest for the region of Catalun˜a (0.795) and smallest for the region of Extremadura (0.155).38
Hence, individuals seem to consider the provinces in the region of Catalun˜a (Barcelona,
Girona, Lleida, and Tarragona) to be very similar to each other, relative to the provinces in
the region of Extremadura (Badajoz and Ca´ceres). This result accords with the pronounced
autonomy of Catalun˜a in terms of its political and cultural life. It is not surprising either
that two other regions with a second official language, Comunitat Valenciana and Galicia,
38In the estimation, the region of Catalun˜a serves as the reference region. The differences between the
network coefficients estimated for Catalun˜a and for either of the other regions (except for the regions of
Comunitat Valenciana and Canarias) are statistically significant at least at the 10% level according to t-tests.
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rank next to Catalun˜a in terms of the size of the estimated network coefficient. At any rate,
the large and significant cross-regional differences in the estimated network coefficient show
that the assumption of a uniform degree of cross-destination substitutability featured in the
standard MNL model is too restrictive to be plausible in the Spanish case.
<<Table 6.3 about here>>
The estimated network coefficients can be used to compute both the network elasticity of
migration as well as the cross-elasticities of the network defined as:
∂ ln (mij)
∂ ln (1 +Mik)
= θ
[
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(
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(
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. (6.25)
The network elasticity (j = k) is a function of the network parameter θ, the similarity
parameters κr and λz, and the relative attractiveness of the province of destination j (reflected
by the shares mij/mi, mij/mir, and mij/miz). Neither κr nor λz can be estimated directly
due to the use of aggregate migration data. This implies an uncertainty about the true
network elasticity, which would prevail even if the true network coefficient, ηzr, was known
with certainty.39 However, we can compute estimates of the upper and lower bounds for
this elasticity, separately for each region of destination. For this purpose, we use the results
reported in Table 6.3 in order to compute estimates of the ratio κr/κ` = ηz`/ηzr,∀r, ` ∈
Az. Since the region of Extremadura features the lowest estimated network coefficient, its
similarity parameter κr can take on any value between zero and one, while the similarity
parameters for all other regions κ`, ` 6= r, must be strictly lower than one. For example, the
range of permissable similarity parameter values for the region of Catalun˜a runs from zero
to 0.195 (= 0.155/0.795).
Figure 6.2(a) shows counterfactual network elasticities by region of destination as a func-
tion of the similarity parameter of the region of Extremedura, κr. The exact value of κr is
unknown, but fixing this parameter also fixes the similarity parameters of all other regions.
In order to focus on the heterogeneity in the network elasticity that is due to differences in
the similarity parameters across regions, we have imposed the following assumptions: first,
39Schmidheiny & Bru¨lhart (2011) discuss a related type of uncertainty in a two-level NMNL model. They
show that the Poisson model and the standard MNL model are the polar cases of a two-level NMNL model
with two nests, one being a degenerate nest with a single alternative, and the other one featuring many
alternatives with a single similarity parameter λ ∈ (0, 1). When λ is unknown, the elasticities of the Poisson
model and of the standard MNL model can thus serve as boundary values for the true elasticities.
CHAPTER 6. NETWORKS AND SELECTION IN MIGRATION TO SPAIN 139
there are 200 countries of destination outside the country of origin i; second, each of these
countries consists of 51 provinces that are uniformly distributed across 17 regions; and third,
all provinces abroad are equally attractive destinations, with an overall fraction of migrants
in the total population equal to three percent,
∑
j 6=imij/mi = 0.03. These assumptions
imply: mij/mi = 1/340, 000, mij/mir = 1/3, and mij/miz = 1/51. For the provinces in the
region of Extremadura, we find a network elasticity that slightly exceeds a value of 0.1. For
the provinces in the region of Catalun˜a, the same elasticity lies in the vicinity of 0.55. These
are quite large differences. For any given region, the difference between the upper and the
lower bound (i.e., the permissable range) of the network elasticity is roughly equal to 0.05,
so the uncertainty about the network elasticity is a minor issue here. Importantly, the figure
also incorporates the uncertainty about the country-specific similarity parameter λz, which
can take on any value between zero and one. This uncertainty, which turns out to be almost
irrelevant for the computation of the network elasticity, is reflected in the thickness of the
upward-sloping lines.40
<<Figures 6.2(a) and 6.2(b) about here>>
We have also computed the cross-elasticities of the network based on (6.25), by analogy
to the network elasticity. Cross-elasticities for two provinces belonging to one of the regions
listed in Table 6.3 are depicted in Figure 6.2(b). For the provinces in the region of Ex-
tremadura, we find an extremely low cross-elasticity that ranges between 0.0 and -0.05. For
the provinces in the region of Catalun˜a, the same cross-elasticity lies between -0.22 and -0.27.
In Figures F.6.1(a) and F.6.1(b) in Appendix F, we also depict the cross-elasticities when
the two provinces j and k are located in different regions of the same country and when they
are located in different countries, respectively. These cross-elasticities are not specific to any
region of destination in Spain, they are lower (in absolute value) than the cross-elasticities
depicted in Figure 6.2(b), and they are characterized by a higher uncertainty about their
true values.
Robustness analysis
We have conducted two types of robustness checks. Both of them seem to indicate, if any-
thing, a slightly larger average network coefficient than do our estimates in Tables 6.1 and
6.2. The first robustness check addresses a potential estimation bias due to non-stochastic
40Individual lines are upward-sloping because, for a given similarity parameter λz and a given estimate of
the network coefficient ηzr, a larger similarity parameter κr for the region of Extremadura is only compatible
with a larger network parameter θ.
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measurement errors in our migration data. The migration data that we have considered
above covers the period 1997-2006. To the extent that undocumented migrants arrived in
or before 1996 and registered in later years (especially due to the Ley Orga´nica 4/2000 in
2000), we understate the true size of the migrant network in 1996 and overstate the true size
of the migrant flow over the period 1997-2006. We show in Appendix G that our extended
FE specification is entirely immune to both types of measurement errors under a relatively
mild assumption, namely that the ratio of “mismeasured” to observed migrants is constant
within clusters. However, we have also employed the migrant network as of January 2002
along with the migrant flow from 2002 to 2006.41
In a second robustness check, we have applied alternative sample selection criteria in
order to see whether our results suffer from endogenous sample selection. In particular, we
have considered all observations (country-province pairs) with a migrant network of more
than either 10, 20, or 50 migrants in the year 1996.42,43 Applying these criteria results in
unbalanced samples of 98, 90, or 74 countries, respectively.
6.4.2 Results for the skill structure of migration
Table 6.4 reports the results from FE estimations of our model for the skill structure of
migration as specified in equation (6.24). The full data matrix would contain 935 pairs of
55 countries of origin and 17 regions of destination. However, for some observations we lack
the information on the migrant skill ratio (the dependent variable) due to the limited sample
size of the NIS. The FE estimator is therefore applied to 241 observations with non-missing
values for the migrant skill ratio. In all the specifications employed in Table 6.4, we find a
robustly significant negative impact of migrant networks on the skill structure of migration,
as suggested by theory. The estimated coefficient varies between -0.506 and -0.637, so the
differences across specifications are rather small in magnitude. Neither the trade variable
nor the FDI variable turns out to be statistically significant. This accords with the poorly
suggestive evidence in favor of a positive effect of trade or FDI on the scale of migration.
Maybe surprisingly, the effects of a common language and geographical proximity are often
estimated to be zero and have an unexpected sign, but one should keep in mind here that
identification comes only from within-cluster variation.
<<Tables 6.4 and 6.5 about here>>
41For trade and FDI flows we have used the observations from 2001.
42Sample selection based on explanatory variables is a type of exogenous sample selection.
43Identification requires, of course, that we have at least two observations within each cluster.
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Table 6.5 reports the results from the 2SLS FE estimations. They do not alter our causal
interpretation in any significant way. As with the previous model for the scale of migration,
the first-stage F test and the test on overidentifying restrictions suggest that our instruments
are both relevant and exogenous. In all the specifications considered, the estimated coefficient
of the migrant network is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The point
estimates range between -0.374 and -0.609 and are thus found to be slightly smaller than
those obtained from the FE estimations. In the full specification of the model in columns
(e) and (f), the migrant network is the only structural explanatory variable whose effect is
statistically different from zero.
In order to interpret our results in terms of elasticities, we compute:
∂ ln(mhij/m
l
ij)
∂ ln(1 +Mij)
= θγ∗
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where we have assumed, for simplicity, that mij/mi = m
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iz. We assume, as before, that there are 200 countries of destination
outside the country of origin i; that each of these countries consists of 17 regions; and that
all regions abroad are equally attractive destinations, with an overall fraction of migrants
in the total population equal to three percent.44 Then, because the similarity parameter λz
can take on any value between zero and one, an estimated coefficient of the migrant network
equal to -0.621 (as in column (f) of Table 6.4) implies that the corresponding elasticity lies
between -0.621 and -0.584.
Robustness analysis
We have checked the robustness of these results and the validity of some underlying assump-
tions in various ways. First, we have tested for sample selection bias that could be due to
the large number of missing values for the migrant skill ratio. We have found contrary ev-
idence, using a Heckman (1976)-style procedure similar to the one proposed by Wooldridge
(1995, 123-124).45 This procedure is described in detail in Appendix H. Second, following the
methodology proposed by Grogger & Hanson (2011, 53-54), we have excluded the possibility
that individuals group regions of destination into nests at the sub-country level. To do so,
we have repeatedly estimated the scale model as given by equation (6.21), using regional
44This implies that mij/mi = 3/340, 000 and mij/miz = 1/17.
45Technically, the two-step Heckman procedure for testing and correcting for sample selection bias could
be applied if the country fixed effects were not differenced out but, rather, if they were estimated by including
a set of country dummy variables. However, this approach would result in inconsistent estimates due to the
incidental parameters problem described in Neyman & Scott (1948).
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data instead of provincial data and each time excluding the observations for one region. The
estimated network coefficient is very stable across regressions, ranging from 0.665 to 0.719.
Third, we have restricted the sample to observations for which the dependent variable is
constructed on the basis of at least ten migrants in the underlying survey data. The negative
and significant effect of migrant networks on the skill structure of migration proves to be
robust to this restriction, even though it reduces the sample size down to 110 observations.
Finally, we have estimated a migration function that describes migration into regions of
destination but derives from the three-level NMNL model featuring provinces as the final
migration destinations. The starting point is to use equations (6.10) and (6.11) in order to
compute the probability P oi (j
o ∈ Azr) = P oi (jo ∈ Azr|r ∈ Az)P oi (r ∈ Az), separately for each
skill group. It is easy to show that this alternative migration function depends, among other
things, on the number of provinces in each regional nest and on the within-nest distribution
of migrant networks across provinces. This last argument is part of a highly non-linear term,
which collapses to zero if we look at regions that consist of a single province. Hence, we
have estimated the model excluding all regions that consist of more than one province. In
spite of the reduced number of observations, our estimates continue to reflect a negative and
statistically significant impact of migrant networks on the skill structure of migration.46
6.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have documented strong positive network effects on the scale of migration
and a strong negative effect on the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled migrants. Both types
of effects are robust across alternative estimators, estimation samples, and sets of control
variables. Our identification strategy is based on a three-level NMNL model that allows for
varying degrees of substitutability across alternative migration destinations. The ease with
which one destination in Spain can be substituted by another one depends on whether the
two destinations are located in the same region or not; in case they are, it also depends on
the degree of political and cultural autonomy of that region. Our approach is corroborated
by the significant degree of heterogeneity in the estimated network elasticity across regions.
Our findings add to the understanding of the recent migration phenomenon in Spain.
This migration has gained momentum through Spain’s strong economic growth in the years
before the Global Financial Crisis. It has changed the size and composition of the country’s
46We have also experimented with two alternative estimation approaches following Quigley (1976)and
Lerman (1976). Both include the full set of regions in Spain and are summarized in McFadden (1978, 91-94).
Again, we have obtained a robustly significant, negative impact of migrant networks on the skill structure of
migration.
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population and labor supply, with potentially important effects on a number of key macroe-
conomic variables such as wages, unemployment, and production, as well as on the national
welfare state. The recent economic recession in Spain is reflected in a sharp decline in new
migration and a significant amount of return migration in the very short run. The analysis
of the structural relationships among past migration, future migration, and the labor market
outcomes involves non-trivial dynamics. Attempts to study these dynamics seem to appear
as a challenging yet promising avenue for future research.
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Figures and tables
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Figure 6.2. Counterfactual network elasticities and cross-elasticities
Cataluña
Comunitat Valenciana 
Galicia
Canarias
Aragón
Andalucía
Castilla y León
País Vasco
Castilla-la-Mancha
Extremadura
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(b) Cross-elasticities for j, k ∈ Azr
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Table 6.1. Scale of migration – FE model†
Dependent Variable: Migration Flow (Province-Level 1997-2006)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Stock of Migrants 0.688*** 0.682*** 0.539*** 0.539*** 0.469*** 0.469***
(Province-Level 1996) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.035)
FDI Flow 0.012**
(Region-Level 1997) (0.005)
Trade Flow 0.005 0.004 0.008
(Province-Level 1996) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 2.357*** 2.215*** 2.566*** 2.619*** 2.322*** 2.313***
(0.124) (0.171) (0.089) (0.139) (0.125) (0.162)
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested
Country Effects Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested Nested
Country-and-Region Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
World Region-and-Province E. No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,592 2,592 2,209 2,209 2,209 2,209
Within R2 0.791 0.792 0.670 0.670 0.764 0.764
† All variables are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered by countries
of origin or pairs of countries of origin and regions of destination) are given in parentheses. *,**,***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. The regressions include all countries of
origin with at least 630 nationals residing in Spain in 1996 (55 countries of origin). See Section 6.3
for a detailed description of all variables.
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Table 6.2. Scale of migration – 2SLS FE model†
Dependent Variable: Migration Flow (Province-Level 1997-2006)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Stock of Migrants 0.958*** 0.955*** 0.826*** 0.829*** 0.732*** 0.735***
(Province-Level 1996) (0.068) (0.069) (0.078) (0.079) (0.096) (0.097)
FDI Flow 0.004
(Region-Level 1997) (0.005)
Trade Flow 0.005 0.007 0.010
(Province-Level 1996) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Constant 0.169 0.156 0.107 0.112 0.047 0.053
(0.117) (0.120) (0.097) (0.098) (0.103) (0.103)
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested
Country Effects Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested Nested
Country-and-Region Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
World Region-and-Province E. No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,592 2,592 2,209 2,209 2,209 2,209
Within R2 0.769 0.769 0.632 0.631 0.740 0.740
Robust first-stage F test 32.33 31.70 19.18 19.15 12.92 12.91
Test on Overidentifying R.
Robust score χ2 test 0.014 0.022 0.467 0.416 0.308 0.243
- p-value 0.905 0.881 0.494 0.519 0.579 0.622
Exogeneity Test
Robust regression F test 20.14 19.40 12.33 12.43 5.29 5.37
- p-value 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.022 0.021
† All variables are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered by countries
of origin or pairs of countries of origin and regions of destination) are given in parentheses. *,**,***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. The regressions include all countries of
origin with at least 630 nationals residing in Spain in 1996 (55 countries of origin). The (log) stock
of migrants in 1996 is instrumented with the (log) migration flows of foreign nationals within Spain
in 1988 and in 1989. See Section 6.3 for a detailed description of all variables.
Table 6.3. Estimated network coefficients, by region†
Region r Estimate of ηzr Region r Estimate of ηzr
Catalun˜a 0.795 Andaluc´ıa 0.507
Comunitat Valenciana 0.699 Castilla y Leo´n 0.447
Galicia 0.544 Pa´ıs Vasco 0.287
Canarias 0.525 Castilla-La Mancha 0.186
Arago´n 0.509 Extremadura 0.155
† This table reports region-specific estimates of the network coefficient, ηzr. The specification em-
ployed is equivalent to that reported in column (f) of Table 6.1, except that we interact the migrant
network with dummy variables for the different regions of destination. F tests reveal that each
of the above-reported network coefficients – with the exception of the one for Extremadura – is
significant at least at the 5% level. The number of observations is 2,209, and the within R2 is 0.771.
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Table 6.4. Skill structure of migration – FE model†
Dependent Variable: Migrant Skill Ratio (Region-Level 2002-2006)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Stock of Migrants -0.513*** -0.510*** -0.506*** -0.626*** -0.637*** -0.621***
(Region-Level 2002) (0.090) (0.089) (0.093) (0.110) (0.106) (0.115)
FDI Flow -0.006 -0.012
(Region-Level 1998-2001) (0.020) (0.018)
Trade Flow -0.001 0.080
(Region-Level 2001) (0.084) (0.112)
Language 0.248 0.246 0.463** 0.559***
(Region-Level) (0.221) (0.223) (0.175) (0.154)
Distance -0.636 -0.657 -1.450 -1.388
(Region-Level) (0.394) (0.392) (1.358) (1.353)
Constant 2.991*** 8.216** 8.443** 3.733*** 15.770 13.755
(0.729) (3.388) (3.894) (0.857) (11.275) (11.692)
Region Effects Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
World Region-and-Region E. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 241 241 241 241 241 241
Within R2 0.245 0.261 0.261 0.466 0.477 0.481
† All variables except for the language dummy are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust stan-
dard errors (clustered by countries of origin) are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. See Section 6.3 for a detailed description of all variables.
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Table 6.5. Skill structure of migration – 2SLS FE model†
Dependent Variable: Migrant Skill Ratio (Region-Level 2002-2006)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Stock of Migrants -0.374*** -0.382*** -0.405** -0.506** -0.579** -0.609**
(Region-Level 2002) (0.144) (0.145) (0.169) (0.214) (0.238) (0.265)
FDI Flow 0.005 -0.003
(Region-Level 1998-2001) (0.022) (0.022)
Trade Flow 0.063 0.094
(Region-Level 2001) (0.070) (0.074)
Language 0.134 0.158 0.010 0.084
(Region-Level) (0.205) (0.199) (0.353) (0.313)
Distance -0.649* -0.562 -0.927 -0.824
(Region-Level) (0.386) (0.380) (0.573) (0.552)
Constant 0.077 0.077 0.033 0.143 0.194 0.137
(0.177) (0.183) (0.173) (0.206) (0.226) (0.214)
Region Effects Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
World Region-and-Region E. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 241 241 241 241 241 241
Within R2 0.208 0.220 0.225 0.412 0.417 0.419
Robust first-stage F test 24.11 19.77 13.57 14.48 11.42 10.34
Test on Overidentifying R.
Robust score χ2 test 1.070 0.769 0.909 0.310 0.284 0.430
- p-value 0.301 0.381 0.340 0.577 0.594 0.512
Exogeneity Test
Robust regression F test 0.794 0.867 0.860 0.873 0.678 0.618
- p-value 0.070 0.029 0.032 0.026 0.175 0.253
† All variables except for the language dummy are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust stan-
dard errors (clustered by countries of origin) are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. The (log) stock of migrants in 2002 is instrumented with
the (log) migration flows of foreign nationals within Spain in 1988 and in 1989. See Section 6.3 for
a detailed description of all variables.
Appendices
A Comparison with Bertoli & Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2012)
We show that our three-level NMNL model is more general than the migration model esti-
mated in the paper “Visa Policies, Networks and the Cliff at the Border” by Bertoli, Simone,
and Jesu´s Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga, IZA Discussion Paper No. 7094 (2012) (henceforth
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BFM, 2012). The response probability generating function in BFM (2012) can be written as:
Hi =
∑
z
(∑
j∈Az
a
1/λz
ijz exp[Uij/λz]
)λz
, (A.1)
where we use the notation employed in our paper but should stress that in BFM (2012)
the final migration destinations are countries (indexed here by j) while the nests (indexed
here by z) have no specific interpretation. In BFM (2012), the J × Z matrix Ai collects the
allocation parameters aijz that characterize the portion of destination j assigned to nest z for
individuals from country i. The most general version of Hi used to estimate the determinants
of migration in BFM (2012) assumes (i) that there is a single similarity parameter for all
nests, λz = λ, (ii) that the nest corresponding to the country of origin i includes the country
of origin i as a single element, and (iii) that all row vectors of Ai contain only a single
non-zero element (assumed to be equal to one).47 These assumptions imply that equation
(A.1) becomes:
Hi =
∑
z
(∑
j∈Az
exp[Uij/λ]
)λ
, (A.2)
where the number and composition of nests is chosen arbitrarily by the authors. Equation
(A.2) gives rise to a two-level NMNL model with a single similarity parameter for all nests.
The pattern of cross-elasticities generated by equation (A.2) is thus more restrictive than
the one generated by our three-level NMNL model with heterogeneous similarity parameters
across nests.
B Derivation of P oi (j
o = j)
We show that
P oi (j
o = j) =
exp[Uij]
Hi(·)
∂Hi(·)
∂ exp[Uij]
. (B.1)
47Bertoli & Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013) invoke assumptions (i) and (ii) as well, but they relax (iii)
in the spirit of the CNL model.
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The proof follows McFadden (1978, 81). The probability that individual o chooses destination
1 is equal to:
P oi (j
o = 1) = Pr(U oi1 > U
o
ik ∀ k ∈ {2, . . . , J})
= Pr(Ui1 − Uik + eoi1 > eoik ∀ k ∈ {2, . . . , J})
= Pr(Ui1 − Ui2 + eoi1 > eoi2, . . . , Ui1 − UiJ + eoi1 > eoiJ). (B.2)
Since Fi(e
o
i1, . . . , e
o
iJ) = exp[−Hi(exp[−eoi1], . . . , exp[−eoiJ ])] is a joint cumulative distribution
function, (B.2) can be written as:
P oi (j
o = 1) =
∫ ∞
−∞
(∫ Ui1−Ui2+eoi1
−∞
. . .
(∫ Ui1−UiJ+eoi1
−∞
f(eoi1, . . . , e
o
iJ)de
o
iJ
)
. . . deoi2
)
deoi1, (B.3)
where f(eoi1, . . . , e
o
iJ) is the joint probability density function corresponding to F (e
o
i1, . . . , e
o
iJ).
Since
f(eoi1, . . . , e
o
iJ) =
∂JF (eoi1, . . . , e
o
iJ)
∂eoi1 . . . ∂e
o
iJ
(B.4)
(B.3) can be written as:
P oi (j
o = 1) =
∫ ∞
−∞
(∫ Ui1−Ui2+eoi1
−∞
. . .
(∫ Ui1−UiJ+eoi1
−∞
∂JF (eoi1, . . . , e
o
iJ)
∂eoi1 . . . ∂e
o
iJ
deoiJ
)
. . . deoi2
)
deoi1
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∂F (eoi1, Ui1 − Ui2 + eoi1, . . . , Ui1 − UiJ + eoi1)
∂eoi1
deoi1
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∂
(
exp
[−Hi (e−eoi1 , eUi2−Ui1−eoi1 , . . . , eUiJ−Ui1−eoi1)])
∂eoi1
deoi1
=
∫ ∞
−∞
e−e
o
i1
∂Hi(e
−eoi1 , eUi2−Ui1−e
o
i1 , . . . , eUiJ−Ui1−e
o
i1)
∂e−eoi1
×
× exp [−Hi (e−eoi1 , eUi2−Ui1−eoi1 , . . . , eUiJ−Ui1−eoi1)] deoi1, (B.5)
where
∂Hi(e
−eoi1 , eUi2−Ui1−e
o
i1 , . . . , eUiJ−Ui1−e
o
i1)
∂e−eoi1
=
∑
j
(
eUij−Ui1
∂Hi(·)
∂eUij−Ui1−eoi1
)
. (B.6)
Recall that Hi is linearly homogeneous. Hence,
Hi
(
e−e
o
i1 , eUi2−Ui1−e
o
i1 , . . . , eUiJ−Ui1−e
o
i1
)
= e−e
o
i1−Ui1Hi
(
eUi1 , eUi2 , . . . , eUiJ
)
(B.7)
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and
∂Hi(e
−eoi1 , eUi2−Ui1−e
o
i1 , . . . , eUiJ−Ui1−e
o
i1)
∂e−eoi1
=
∂Hi(e
Ui1 , eUi2 , . . . , eUiJ )
∂eUi1
. (B.8)
Thus, (B.5) can be written as:
P oi (j
o = 1) =
∫ ∞
−∞
e−e
o
i1
∂Hi(e
Ui1 , eUi2 , . . . , eUiJ )
∂eUi1
exp
[−e−eoi1−Ui1Hi (eUi1 , eUi2 , . . . , eUiJ)] deoi1
=
∂Hi(·)
∂ exp[Ui1]
∫ ∞
−∞
e−e
o
i1 exp
[−e−eoi1−Ui1Hi (eUi1 , eUi2 , . . . , eUiJ)] deoi1
=
∂Hi(·)
∂ exp[Ui1]
∫ ∞
−∞
e−ζ+Ui1−lnHi(·) exp
[−e−ζ] dζ
=
∂Hi(·)
∂ exp[Ui1]
exp[Ui1]
Hi(·) , (B.9)
where we have changed variables according to ζ ≡ eoi1+Ui1−lnHi(·) in the third line. Finally,
notice that this argument can be applied to any other alternative j 6= 1 as well.
C Derivation of ∂ lnHi(·)/∂Uij
Since
lnHi(·) = ln
∑
z
(∑
r∈Az
(∑
j∈Azr
exp[Uij/(κrλz)]
)κr)λz
(C.1)
we have
∂ lnHi(·)
∂Uij
= Hi(·)−1 exp[Uij/(κrλz)]QX, (C.2)
where
Q =
(∑
j∈Azr
exp[Uij/(κrλz)]
)κr−1
= (exp[(−ciz − cir)/(κrλz)])κr−1
(∑
j∈Azr
exp[ξij/(κrλz)]
)κr−1
(C.3)
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and
X =
(∑
r∈Az
(∑
j∈Azr
exp[Uij/(κrλz)]
)κr)λz−1
(C.4)
= (exp[−ciz/λz])λz−1
(∑
r∈Ai
(exp[−cir/λz])
(∑
j∈Azr
exp[ξij/(κrλz)]
)κr)λz−1
.
By defining Φir = ln
∑
k∈Azr exp[ξik/(κrλz)], Ωiz = ln
∑
`∈Az exp[Φi`κ` − ci`/λz] and Ψi =
ln
∑
z exp[Ωizλz − ciz], equation (C.2) can be written as:
∂ lnHi(·)
∂Uij
=
exp[ξij/(κrλz)− cir/λz − ciz]
Hi(·) exp[(1− κr)Φir + (1− λz)Ωiz]
=
exp[ξij/(κrλz)− cir/λz − ciz]
exp[Ψi + (1− κr)Φir + (1− λz)Ωiz] , (C.5)
which gives P oi (j
o = j), where j ∈ Azr, r ∈ Az; see equations (6.8) and (6.16).
D Derivation of ∂ ln(mij/mi)/∂ lnYk
In the following, we derive ∂ ln(mij/mi)/∂ lnYk for k = j ∈ Azr, r ∈ Az. The other (simpler)
derivatives where k 6= j can be derived analogously. They depend on whether or not k ∈ Azr
and whether nor not z = y if k ∈ Ay`,` ∈ Ay. Since
ln
(
mij
mi
)
= ξij/(λzκr)− cir/λz − ciz −Ψi − (1− κr)Φir − (1− λz)Ωiz (D.1)
we have
∂ ln (mij/mi)
∂ lnYk
=
Yk
λzκr
− exp[Ωizλz − ciz]λz
exp[Ψi]
∂Ωiz
∂ lnYk
− (1− κr) ∂Φir
∂ lnYk
−(1− λz) ∂Ωiz
∂ lnYk
=
Yk
λzκr
− mizλz
mi
∂Ωiz
∂ lnYk
− (1− κr) ∂Φir
∂ lnYk
− (1− λz) ∂Ωiz
∂ lnYk
. (D.2)
Since
∂Φir
∂ lnYk
=
exp[ξik/(λzκr)]∑
k∈Azr exp[ξik/(λzκr)]
Yk
λzκr
=
mik
mir
Yk
λzκr
(D.3)
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and
∂Ωiz
∂ lnYk
=
exp[Φirκr − cir/λz]κr∑
`∈Az exp[Φi`κ` − ci`/λz]
∂Φir
∂ lnYk
=
mirκr
miz
∂Φir
∂ lnYk
(D.4)
equation (D.2) can be written as:
∂ ln (mij/mi)
∂ lnYk
= Yk
(
1
λzκr
− mik
mi
− (1− κr)
λzκr
mik
mir
− (1− λz)
λz
mik
miz
)
. (D.5)
E Data appendix
Table E.1. List of the 55 countries considered in the empirical analysis, by world region
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC Cuba NORTH AMERICA, WESTERN EUROPE
China Dominican Republic AUSTRALIA Austria
Japan Ecuador & NEW ZEALAND Belgium
Korea El Salvador Australia Denmark
Philippines Honduras Canada Finland
Mexico United States France
EASTERN EUROPE Peru Germany
& CENTRAL ASIA Uruguay SOUTH Ireland
Bosnia and Herzegowina Venezuela & SOUTHEAST ASIA Italy
Bulgaria India Netherlands
Poland MIDDLE EAST Pakistan Norway
Romania & NORTH AFRICA Portugal
Russia Algeria SUB-SAHARAN Sweden
Egypt AFRICA Switzerland
LATIN AMERICA Iran Angola United Kingdom
& CARIBBEAN Lebanon Cape Verde
Argentina Morocco Equatorial Guinea
Bolivia Syria Gambia
Brazil Guinea
Chile Mauritania
Colombia Senegal
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Table E.2. Data sourcesTable C. : Dat Sources
Variable Definition Data Sources
Migrant Flow
mij
Migrants who registered at municipalities in Spain between January 1, 1997
(or January 1, 2002), and December 31, 2006, by province of destination
(or region of destination) and by country of origin. Migrants are defined as
individuals whose last country of residence (other than Spain) corresponds
to their country of birth and nationality.
Spanish Residential Variation Statistics, INE,
http://www.ine.es/en/prodyser/micro varires en.htm, ac-
cessed on 10/05/2010
Migrant Skill Ratio
mhij/m
l
ij
Ratio of new high-skilled migrants over new low-skilled migrants, aggre-
gated from 2002 to 2006, by region of destination in Spain and by country
of birth. Migrants are individuals aged 16 years or older who were born
abroad and have lived in Spain for more than a year, or at least intended
to stay for more than a year at the time the survey was conducted.
National Immigrant Survey 2007, INE,
http://www.ine.es/prodyser/micro inmigra.htm,
accessed on 10/05/2010
Migrant Network
Mij
Number of settled migrants as of May 1, 1996 (or January 1, 2002), by
province of destination (or region of destination) in Spain and by nation-
ality.
Population by Nationality, Autonomous Communities and
Provinces, Sex and Year, Municipal Register, Main Population
Series since 1998, INE,
http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=%
2Ft20%2Fe245&file=inebase&L=0, accessed on 10/07/2010
Trade Flow Sum of exports and imports, by province (or region) in Spain and by coun-
try of destination/origin.
DataComex Statistics on Spanish Foreign Trade, Spanish Govern-
ment, Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade,
http://datacomex.comercio.es/principal comex es.aspx,
accessed on 10/20/2010
FDI Flow Gross FDI flow in Euros, by region in Spain and by country of the last
owner.
DataInvex Statistics on Foreign Investments in Spain, Spanish Gov-
ernment, Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade,
http://datainvex.comercio.es/principal invex.aspx, accessed
on 10/20/2010
Historical Internal
Migrant Flow
People moving from one province (or region) to another province (or re-
gion) in Spain in 1988 and 1989, by province (or region) in Spain and by
nationality.
Spanish Residential Variation Statistics, INE,
http://www.ine.es/en/prodyser/micro varires en.htm, ac-
cessed on 10/05/2010
Geographical
Distance
Distances are constructed on the basis of latitudinal and longitudinal data
for regions in Spain and countries of origin and using the STATA module
GEODIST by Picard (2010).
SpanishWikipedia/GeoHack,
http://es.wikipedia.org, accessed on 09/05/2011;
Mayer & Zignago (2006)
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Table E.2. Data sources (continued)Table C.2 continued
Variable Definition Data Sources
Indicator for
Common Lanuage
This variable is equal to one if at least 80% of a region’s population in Spain
are native speakers of a language spoken by at least 20% of the people in
the country of origin; it is zero otherwise.
Catalun˜a: Generalitat de Catalunya, Institut d’Estad´ıstica de
Catalunya (2008). Enquesta d’usos lingu¨´ıstics de la poblacio´ 2008.
Comunidad Foral de Navarra: Instituto de Estad´ıstica de Navarra
(2001). Censo 2001 de Poblacio´n y Viviendas en Navarra.
Comunitat Valenciana: Universidad de Salamanca (2007). Estudio
CIS No. 2.667. La identitad nacional en Espan˜a.
Galicia: Instituto Galego de Estat´ıstica (2008). Enquisa de
condicio´ns de vida das familias. Con˜ecemento e uso do galego.
Edicio´n 2008.
Illes Balears: Villaverde i Vidal, J. A. (2003). L’Enquesta Sociol-
ingu¨´ıstica 2003. Principals Resultats.
Pa´ıs Vasco: Universidad de Salamanca (2007). Estudio CIS No.
2.667. La identitad nacional en Espan˜a.
Countries of origin: Mayer & Zignago (2006).
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F Counterfactual cross-elasticities of the migrant network
Figure F.1. Counterfactual cross-elasticities of the migrant network
(a) Cross-elasticities for j ∈ Azr and k ∈
Az`, r 6= `
(b) Cross-elasticities for j ∈ Azr and k ∈
Ay`, z 6= y
G Measurement error
We argue that the potential non-stochastic measurement errors discussed at the end of Section
6.4.1 are unlikely to result in biased estimates. Let m˜ij < mij and M˜ij > Mij denote the
unobserved true size of the migrant flow and the migrant network, respectively. Let the
relationship between the migrant flow and the migrant network be given by the following
equation:
ln(m˜ij) = ηzr ln(M˜ij). (G.1)
Let yij denote the ratio of unobserved (i.e. “excess”) migrants to observed migrants in the
flow, and let xij denote the ratio of unobserved (i.e. unregistered) migrants to observed
migrants in the network. Hence, m˜ij = (1− yij)mij and M˜ij = (1 + xij)Mij and thus:
ln((1− yij)mij) = ηzr ln((1 + xij)Mij) , (G.2)
which can be rewritten as:
ln(mij) = ηzr ln(Mij) + ηzr ln(1 + xij)− ln(1− yij). (G.3)
The last two terms in equation (G.3), if not controlled for, may introduce a bias in the
estimation of the network coefficient ηzr. Obviously, a sufficient condition for our FE model
controlling for country-and-region fixed effects to deliver unbiased estimates is:
vij = vir, v = {x, y}. (G.4)
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Hence, the type of mismeasurement potentially present in our migration data is not a problem
per se for the estimation. For example, suppose that migrants are possibly measured with
error, so that xij ≤ 0 and yij ≤ 0 for all provinces in Spain. Furthermore suppose that these
errors are large for some regions of destination but small for others, and that they are large
for some countries of origin but small for others. Then, a mild but sufficient condition for
our estimates to be unbiased is: xij = xik and yij = yik, where j 6= k and j, k ∈ Azr.
H Testing for sample selection bias
We briefly present our procedure for identifying a potential sample selection bias in the model
for the skill structure of migration. It is a slight modification of Wooldridge (1995, 123-124),
who proposes a method for testing for sample selection bias in panel data. It will become
evident below that we impose very strong assumptions on the selection equation and the
mechanism governing selection. These assumptions would often be inappropriate if we were
to derive corrections for a sample selection bias in models with fixed effects. It turns out,
however, that they do not pose a threat to the correct testing for a sample selection bias.
For further details on this, the reader is referred to Wooldridge (1995).
We start by rewriting the model for the skill structure of migration as:
yij = µi + xijβ + uij, j = 1, . . . , J, (H.1)
where yij is the ij-specific log of the ratio of high-skilled migrations to low-skilled migrants, µi
is an unobserved country fixed effect, xij is a 1×K vector of explanatory variables (including
region dummies and interactions between region dummies and world region dummies), β is
a K × 1 vector of parameters to be estimated, and uij is an independent and identically
distributed error term. We explicitly allow for E(µi|xi1, . . . ,xiJ) 6= E(µi). Since J is fixed, the
asymptotic analysis is valid for I →∞. Now suppose that (yij,xij) is sometimes unobserved,
and that sij = (si1, . . . , siJ)
′ is a vector of selection indicators with sij = 1 if (yij,xij) is
observed and zero otherwise. Define xi ≡ (xi1, . . . ,xiJ) and si ≡ (si1, . . . , siJ) and suppose
that E(uij|µi,xi, si) = 0 ∀j, which implies that the selection process is strictly exogenous
conditional on µi and xi. Then, our FE estimator employed in the main text is consistent
and asymptotically normal even when selection arbitrarily depends on (µi,xi) (Wooldridge
1995, 118).
In our application, the explanatory variables xij are observed for all regions j = 1, . . . , J .
The variable yij is observed if sij = 1, but not otherwise. For each j = 1, . . . , J , define an
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unobserved latent variable
h∗ij = δj0 + xi1δj1 + · · ·+ xiJδjJ + vij, (H.2)
where vij is a stochastic term independent of (µi,xi), and δjp is a (K+1)×1 vector of unknown
parameters, p = 1, 2, . . . , J .48 The binary selection indicator is defined as sij ≡ 1[h∗ij > 0].
Since si is a function of (xi,vi), where vi ≡ (vi1, . . . , viJ)′, a sufficient condition for the
selection process to be strictly exogenous conditional on µi and xi is:
E(uij|µi,xi,vi) = 0, j = 1, . . . , J. (H.3)
Under (H.3), there is no sample selection bias. An alternative that implies sample selection
bias is:
E(uij|µi,xi,vi) = E(uij|vij) = ρvij, j = 1, . . . , J, (H.4)
where ρ 6= 0 is some unknown scalar. Under the alternative (H.4) we have:
E(yij|µi,xi, si) = µi + xijβ + ρE(vij|µi,xi, si) = µi + xijβ + ρE(vij|xi, si). (H.5)
Let E(vij|xi, si) = E(vij|xi, sij) and assume a standard uniform distribution for vij. Then,
E(vij|xi, sij = 1) = E(vij|xi, vij > −xiδj) = (1 + xiδj)/2. (H.6)
and
E(yij|µi,xi, sij = 1) = ρ∗ + µi + xijβ + ρ∗xiδj, (H.7)
where ρ∗ ≡ ρ/2 and xi now includes unity as its first element. The procedure to test for
sample selection bias is as follows. We first obtain estimates of xiδj by estimating region-
specific selection equations (where sij is the dependent variable) derived from equation (H.2),
using linear probability models for the full data matrix. We then estimate equation (H.7)
in an FE framework (within-transformed data), using only observations with sij = 1. We
finally test H0 : ρ = 0, using the t-statistic for ρ
∗.
48In the following, xij includes one element more than in equation (H.1), despite the fact that we use the
same notation for convenience. We thus assume that there is exactly one exclusion restriction in equation
(H.1). In the estimation, we use the log of the number of people holding country i’s nationality and migrating
from region j in Spain to any other region k 6= j within or outside Spain over the period from January 1,
2006, to December 31, 2007, as an exclusion restriction.
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Chapter7
Co-national and cross-national pulls in
international migration to Spain
This chapter is based on joint work with Nina Neubecker. It was published as an article in
October 2013 in the International Review of Economics & Finance, 28, 51-61. An earlier
draft appeared as University of Tu¨bingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance No. 46.
7.1 Introduction
Migrants are attracted to destinations hosting migrants of the same nationality as their own
(co-national migrants). In this chapter, we provide evidence that migrants are also attracted
to destinations hosting migrants from nationalities adjacent to their own nationality (namely,
migrants from countries neighboring their own country of origin). We draw on rich migration
data from the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica (INE) on large scale migration to
Spain in the period 1996-2006.
A large literature, starting with Nelson (1959) and Greenwood (1969, 1970), documents
that, other things held equal, individuals tend to migrate to where other migrants from the
same place of origin are present. An explanation of this inclination is that in all sorts of ways,
past migrants alleviate the burden of migration by transmitting information and providing
help in obtaining jobs, housing, and the like. Other explanations are that settled migrants
foster follow-up migration by remitting to those left behind, thereby financing the latter’s
move (Stark & Jakubek, 2013), and by building up certain ethnic-specific institutions in
the host country.1 We argue that whatever the precise support channel, the migrants who
1For the role of ethnic-specific institutions in migrants’ integration, see Breton (1964).
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promote further migration include not only past co-national migrants but also past migrants
from adjacent nationalities.
There are good reasons to believe that the pull effect attributed to established migrants
is not limited to co-national migrants but, rather, that it extends to migrants from adjacent
nationalities. The economic globalization of the recent decades has led to more frequent
interactions and cross references among individuals from adjacent nationalities, thus expand-
ing the set of contacts beyond one’s own nationality. Cross-national interactions are more
likely to arise the smaller the geographical and cultural distance between the nationalities
concerned.2 Relatedly, suppose that migrants from Ecuador easily integrate into the Spanish
labor market due to their language, skills, work ethics, culture, norms, and other charac-
teristics. Then, migrants from other Latin American countries could reasonably expect to
integrate well too, assuming that their skills and other productive attributes are comparable
to those of Ecuadorian migrants.
The idea of a multi-nationality pull squares well with descriptive evidence on the geograph-
ical distribution of migrants in Spain. We show that migrants from adjacent nationalities
tend to cluster in specific Spanish provinces. We also show that the geographical settle-
ment patterns of migrants from two different nationalities are more similar the smaller the
geographical distance between their countries of origin.
Methodologically, we draw upon the discrete choice literature in order to derive an empir-
ical migration function based on the multinomial logit model described in McFadden (1984,
1411-1415). We hypothesize that the value of this function depends positively on the pull
of co-national migrants. However, we augment the migration function by a cross-national
pull term so as to capture the influence of migrants from adjacent nationalities on migration
flows. We define this term as the log of the sum of all migrants settled in a certain destination
(excluding co-national migrants), weighting each migrant by the inverse distance between his
country of origin and the country of origin of a potential migrant. The migration function
is estimated with Spanish migration data detailed by country of origin and by province of
destination for the period 1996-2006.
Our estimations reveal that both the size and composition (in terms of nationalities) of
the migrant population at destination are significant determinants of migration flows. Apart
2Interactions among individuals from adjacent nationalities may be more likely than perhaps
expected. In the year 2000, for example, 7.0% of all the individuals living in Costa Rica
held a foreign nationality of another country in Latin America or the Caribbean. The corre-
sponding numbers for larger countries such as Venezuela (3.2%), Paraguay (3.0%), or Argentina
(2.0%) are smaller but still not negligible; see World Bank’s Global Bilateral Migration Database
at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-bilateral-migration-database, accessed on
09/26/2012.
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from the expected pull effect due to co-national migrants, we find that migrants move to
destinations with large representations of other migrants, ceteris paribus, when these migrants
are from adjacent nationalities. Failing to account for this cross-national pull leads to a small
omitted variable bias in the estimation of the co-national pull effect. Interestingly, we also
find evidence for a positive interaction between the co-national pull and the cross-national
pull.
This chapter is related to recent estimates of network effects in migration with aggregate
(macro-level) migration data. Studies in this literature define migrant networks in terms of
a common country of origin, a common country of birth, or a common nationality (see, e.g.,
Clark et al., 2007; Lewer & den Berg, 2008; Pedersen et al., 2008; Beine et al., 2011a,b).
The studies find strong support for the importance of networks in determining the scale of
migration.3 Another strand of the literature on network effects in migration employs micro-
level data. For instance, Bauer et al. (2007, 2009) look at Mexican migrants in the United
States, measuring migrant networks in terms of a common village of origin. Several empirical
studies have looked at the effect of migrant networks measured at the family level, exploiting
detailed information on the precise type of social ties. Davis et al. (2002) find that closer
kinship bonds result in a larger impact of the migrant network. Dolfin & Genicot (2010)
find that family networks provide information on jobs and act as a source of credit, and that
community networks are important sources of information on border-crossing. By focusing on
common origin defined at the country or sub-country level, all the afore-mentioned studies
have ignored the role of migrant networks that include adjacent nationalities in shaping
migration flows.4
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 describes the settlement
patterns of migrants from different nationalities in Spain. Section 7.3 presents our estimation
approach, the data used for estimation, and the estimation results. Section 7.4 concludes.
3Grogger & Hanson (2011), Beine et al. (2011a,b), and the analysis presented in Chapter 6 find that
migrant networks also bias the skill structure of migration toward the low-skill individuals.
4A˚slund (2005) finds that migrants in Sweden are attracted both to regions hosting co-national migrants
as well as to regions hosting foreigners in general. However, he does not distinguish between different
nationalities of these foreigners.
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7.2 Geographical distribution patterns of migrants in
Spain
In this section we provide descriptive evidence on the geographical distribution of different
migrant populations in Spain, showing that migrants prefer to settle in provinces with large
populations of migrants from adjacent nationalities.5 Information on the migrants is elicited
from the Spanish Municipal Register; it is available from the INE website. For information
on all data sources used in this chapter, see Table E.2 in Appendix E to Chapter 6.
Our first observation is that migrants are not uniformly distributed across the 52 Spanish
provinces. The four major destination provinces account for 47% of all migrants registered
in Spanish municipalities in the year 2009. These provinces are Madrid (18.8%), Barcelona
(14.2%), Alicante (8.2%), and Valencia (5.6%) and rank also among the most populous
provinces in Spain in general; the corresponding shares of the native population are 13.0%
in Madrid, 11.4% in Barcelona, 3.5% in Alicante, and 5.5% in Valencia. Still, the migrants’
concentration is considerably more pronounced than that of the native population.
Our second observation is that migrants from adjacent nationalities tend to concentrate in
specific provinces. For instance, migrants from South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern
Europe, and East Asia are all significantly more concentrated in Madrid and in Barcelona
than Spanish nationals.6 For each of these four world regions, the share of migrants residing
in either of these two provinces exceeds the corresponding share of Spanish nationals by
more than 15 percentage points. Migrants from these world regions also reside more often
than Spanish nationals in several Northern provinces (Vizcaya, Zaragoza, Girona), as well as
in several provinces along the Spanish Mediterranean coast (Tarragona, Valencia, Alicante,
Murcia, Ma´laga). We refer to this pattern of concentration of migrants relative to Spanish
nationals as clustering.
In order to find out a little more about differences in the settlement patterns across
migrant groups, we compare in Figure 7.1 the geographical distribution of migrants from each
of the four world regions with the distribution of all migrants in Spain in 2009 (in each case,
excluding migrants from the world region under consideration). For example, we compare
the share of all migrants from South America settled in Madrid to the corresponding share of
all other migrants in Madrid. Dark colors indicate a strong concentration of migrants from a
given world region relative to all other migrants, whereas light colors indicate a relatively weak
5Migrants are people who live in Spain and who are of a foreign nationality.
6South America is the most important region of origin of migrants in Spain (1.6 million migrants in the
year 2009). Eastern Europe ranks second (1.3 million), Western Europe third (1.2 million), North Africa
fourth (779,000), Sub-Saharan Africa fifth (227,000), and East Asia sixth (155,000).
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concentration. We see, for example, that migrants from South America, Eastern Europe, and
East Asia are more strongly clustered in Madrid than migrants from other world regions.
The opposite holds true for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. In Barcelona, migrants from
South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and East Asia are more strongly clustered than other
migrants, whereas migrants from Eastern Europe are clustered less than migrants from other
world regions. Differences in the degree of concentration also apply for other provinces.
<<Figure 7.1 about here>>
We also take a slightly more formal approach to look at the relationship between the
settlement patterns of migrants in Spain and the geographical proximity of their countries
of origin. In particular, we ask whether differences in the geographical distribution of mi-
grants originating from any pair of two countries correlate with the distance between the two
countries. Figure 7.2 plots the country-pair-specific “index of dissimilarity” a` la Duncan &
Duncan (1955) for any two migrant populations settled in Spain in 2009 against the log of
the distance (measured in kilometers) between the considered countries of origin. The index
of dissimilarity is a summary statistic for the differences in the geographical distributions of
two populations. It is defined as D = 0.5
∑N
1 |xj − yj| where xj is the share of migrants from
a specific nationality residing in province j, yj is the corresponding share of migrants from
a second nationality, and N is the total number of provinces in Spain. The index gives the
share of migrants from the x-nationality who would have to move to other Spanish provinces
in order to replicate the geographical distribution of migrants from the y-nationality (see
Duncan & Duncan, 1955, 211). Thus, D can only take on values in the unit interval, with
a higher value indicating a stronger dissimilarity in location choices between migrants from
two nationalities.
<<Figure 7.2 about here>>
The linear best fit in Figure 7.2 indicates a positive albeit small correlation between the
dissimilarity index and the distance variable (statistically significant at the 1% level), showing
that migrants from a certain nationality tend to settle in provinces where other migrants from
adjacent nationalities settle.
7.3 Empirical analysis
In this section we first describe our empirical model and the data that we use, and we then
present and discuss our estimation results. We also conduct a robustness analysis.
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7.3.1 Empirical model and data
Consider a large number of origin countries (indexed by i or ` = 1, . . . , I) and a large
number of destinations at the sub-country level (indexed by j or k = 1, . . . , J).7 Let an
individual’s origin country i represent one element in the set of destinations, so that we
actually have a model of location choice for all individuals (including non-migrants). Let
individuals originating from country i be indexed by o = 1, . . . ,mi.
Assume that individuals form expectations about the utility to be derived from migrating
to (and living in) each destination based on observable variables such as wages, employment,
and the presence of other migrants. We write the expected utility of individual o when
migrating from country i to destination j in an additively separable form:
U oij = Vij + e
o
ij, (7.1)
where the term Vij summarizes all utility components common to individuals migrating
from country i to destination j, and eoij is an individual-specific stochastic taste variable for
migrating from i to j.
Individuals are assumed to be utility maximizers, so that each individual moves to the
destination where he expects to receive the highest utility:
jo = argmax(U oi1, . . . , U
o
iJ), j
o ∈ {1, . . . , J}. (7.2)
The probability that individual o migrates from country i to destination j can thus be written
as:
P oi (j
o = j) = Pr(U oij > U
o
ik ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , J} : k 6= j)
= Pr(eoik − eoij < Vij − Vik ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , J} : k 6= j). (7.3)
This probability depends on the distribution assumed for the stochastic taste variables,
eoi1, . . . , e
o
iJ . Let gi = (gi1, . . . , giJ) be a (1× J) row vector with non-negative entries, and let
Hi be a non-negative function of gi with
lim
gij→∞
Hi(gi) = +∞ for j = 1, . . . , J. (7.4)
7Strictly speaking, each origin country i is associated with a unique set of destinations, so the number
of destinations and the indexing of destinations should be i-specific. We omit this index in order to avoid
notational clutter.
CHAPTER 7. CO-NATIONAL AND CROSS-NATIONAL PULLS IN MIGRATION 171
Let Hi be linearly homogeneous in gi, and let it have mixed partial derivatives of all orders,
with non-positive even and non-negative odd mixed derivatives. McFadden (1978, 80-81) has
shown that under this set of assumptions the function
Fi(e
o
i1, . . . , e
o
iJ) = exp [−Hi (exp[−eoi1], . . . , exp[−eoiJ ])] (7.5)
is a multivariate extreme value distribution function and that, if (eoi1, . . . , e
o
iJ) is distributed
Fi, (7.3) can be written as:
P oi (j
o = j) =
exp[Vij]
Hi(exp [Vi1] , . . . , exp [ViJ ])
∂Hi(exp [Vi1] , . . . , exp [ViJ ])
∂ exp[Vij]
; (7.6)
see also McFadden (1981, 226-230). Following the received literature, we assume that
Hi(exp [Vi1] , . . . , exp [ViJ ]) =
J∑
j=1
exp[Vij], (7.7)
so that we end up with the response probabilities of the multinomial logit (MNL) model:
P oi (j
o = j) =
exp[Vij]∑J
j=1 exp[Vij]
(7.8)
Aggregating over all individuals from country i, taking logs, and rearranging terms, we obtain
the following migration function:
ln (mij) = Vij − ln
J∑
j=1
exp[Vij] + ln (mi) , (7.9)
where mij is the number of migrants from country i to destination j and mi is the initial
population size of country i. Importantly, from the term ln
∑J
j=1 exp[Vij] we see that the
migrant flow from i to j is a function of the expected utility in all destinations j = 1, . . . , J .
Borrowing from the international trade literature, we refer to this term as a “multilateral
resistance term” (see Anderson & van Wincoop, 2003). Differentiating equation (7.9) with
respect to Vik yields
∂ ln (mij)
∂Vik
=
 1−
exp[Vij ]∑J
j=1 exp[Vij ]
= 1−mij/mi ≥ 0 for k = j,
− exp[Vik]∑J
j=1 exp[Vij ]
= −mik/mi ≤ 0 for k 6= j.
(7.10)
Hence, any increase in the expected utility of destination j for individuals from country i
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stimulates migration from country i to destination j, while it discourages migration from
country i to all other destinations k 6= j.
One may think of the non-stochastic part of the expected utility, Vij, as being composed of
a number of pull factors and cost factors. Among other things, these factors include the wage
rate, employment opportunities, social security and health care provisions, migration policies,
and the cultural and geographical distance between origin and destination. Other variables
such as trade and capital flows might be important, too. Trade is not only facilitated by, but
is also conducive to a good infrastructure for traveling and transportation. Capital invested
by foreign firms could create demand for specific types of labor, especially foreign labor.
More importantly, the pull and cost factors are likely to depend on the size as well as on
the composition (in terms of nationalities) of the migrant population at destination j. Using
equation (7.9), we assume that the log number of migrants from country i to destination j
can be approximated linearly by the following expression:
ln (mij) = β0 ln (Mij) + β1 ln
(∑
` 6=i
ηi`M`j
)
+ λ ·Xij + εij, (7.11)
where Mij is the number of established migrants from country i in destination j, ηi` is the
proximity between countries i and `, Xij = (Xij1, . . . , XijS)
′
is a vector of control variables,
λ = (λ1, . . . , λS) is a vector of parameters to be estimated along with β0 and β1, and εij is
an error term. As explained in more detail below, the vector Xij controls for the multilateral
resistance term, for the initial population size in the country of origin, and for a number of
other pull and cost factors.
The variable ln (Mij) is meant to capture all types of pull effects that originate from the
stock of established co-national migrants. This variable is akin to the standard network vari-
able used in the related empirical literature. We cannot discriminate among different types
of pull effects because some of them are unobserved (such as social ties between migrants).
We refer to the variable ln (Mij) as the co-national pull.
Different from the received literature, the migration model given by equation (7.11) in-
cludes the term ln
(∑
6`=i ηi`M`j
)
, which measures the pull of migrants in destination j from
countries that are culturally and geographically close to country i. This variable is a weighted
log sum of all foreign nationals living in destination j, where the weights measure the prox-
imity between countries i and `. It is meant to be a first-order approximation of all types
of pull effects that derive from the stock of established migrants from adjacent nationalities.
By analogy to the co-national pull, we refer to ln
(∑
`6=i ηi`M`j) as the cross-national pull.
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We expect to find a positive cross-national pull effect on migration, βˆ1 > 0, in addition to a
positive co-national pull effect on migration, βˆ0 > 0.
In order to estimate equation (7.11), we use data for the 55 most important countries
of origin in terms of the number of migrants in Spain in 1996.8 Spain is divided into 52
provinces (provincias) that are nested in 19 regions (comunidades auto´nomas). We exclude
the provinces (enclaves) of Ceuta and Melilla due to their specific geographical location and
thus we end up with 50 provinces.9
The migration data are taken from the local registry of Spanish municipalities provided
through INE. We have reason to believe that these data include both documented and un-
documented migrants from 2000 onwards. The “Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Aliens
in Spain and their Social Integration” provided a particular incentive for migrants to regis-
ter. When registered, migrants were entitled to free medical care under the same terms as
Spanish nationals, conditional only on registration in their municipality but not on their legal
residence status (see Ley Orga´nica 4/2000, art´ıculo 12 ). In addition, registration was one
of the requirements for regularization during the large-scale regularization process in 2005
(OECD, 2006, 214). The dependent variable in equation (7.11) is the log of the migration
flow into Spanish provinces, obtained from the Spanish Residential Variation Statistics and
aggregated from the beginning of 1997 until the end of 2006.10 We measure migrant stocks,
Mij, by the number of individuals from nationality i who live in destination j as of May
1, 1996, as reported by the Spanish Municipal Register. To retain observations with a zero
co-national pull, we add one to the number of co-national migrants.
We proxy the cultural and geographical proximity between any two nationalities, ηil, by
the inverse of the geographical distance (in kilometers) between the most populous cities
of the corresponding countries. We assume that cultural proximity (including linguistic
proximity) and geographical proximity are closely related. Data on distances are taken
from the French Centre d’E´tudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).
We control for several other potential determinants of the scale of migration, captured by the
vector Xij. In particular, we account for the impact of trade and FDI flows using data from
the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade. Trade flows are measured as the sum
of exports and imports (in Euros) between country i and province j in the year 1996. Data
on FDI are observed as inflows into Spanish regions for the year 1997, detailed by country
8These countries are listed in Table E.1 in Appendix E to Chapter 6.
9See http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/codmun/cod provincia.htm, accessed on 04/17/2012, for a list
of these provinces.
10We define migrants as individuals whose last country of residence (other than Spain) corresponds to
their country of birth and nationality.
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of origin. We add one to both variables before taking logs so as to retain observations with
zero trade or FDI flows. Furthermore, in order to control for destination-specific pull factors
other than the “pure” presence of co-national or cross-national migrants such as wages,
employment opportunities, weather conditions, and the like, we include a set of province
fixed effects. Finally, we control for the initial population size in the country of origin,
ln(mi), as well as for the multilateral resistance term, ln
∑J
j=1 exp[Vij], that is common to all
provincial destinations in Spain. We do so using the familiar fixed effects approach, computing
all variables as deviations from their country means (within-transformation). Because our
migration data refer to a single destination country, this approach wipes out all effects specific
to a given country of origin and Spain at large (for example, the Spanish migration policy
towards Ecuador). Also, this fixed effects approach has the advantage that it is compatible
with a less restrictive structure of substitutability across alternatives than is assumed in the
standard MNL model; see Ortega & Peri (2013) and our three-level NMNL model in Chapter
6.
More demanding specifications of our fixed effects model control for all effects specific
to pairs of origin countries and destination regions in Spain. These effects are eliminated
by computing all variables as deviations from their country-and-region means. This ap-
proach greatly reduces the probability of omitted variables bias because it controls for all
determinants of migration relevant for pairs of origin countries and destination regions in
Spain. These determinants include a number of prominent cultural factors (language, habits,
historical ties) as well as geographical factors (especially distance).11
Given the potential endogeneity of the co-national pull, we also employ instrumental
variables regression techniques. As excluded instruments, we use historical migration flows
within Spain, defined as the log of the number of people holding country i’s nationality and
migrating from destination j in Spain to any other destination k 6= j in Spain in 1988 and
1989, respectively. Regarding the relevance of these instruments, a large historical migrant
flow from some province j to other Spanish provinces is an indicator of a high level of the his-
torical migrant stock of province j, even though accounting logic tells us that it also reduces
that province’s historical migrant stock. The historical migrant stock can in turn be expected
to correlate with the contemporaneous migrant stock. We thus expect to find a correlation
also between the historical migration flows within Spain and the contemporaneous migrant
stocks. Our first-stage regressions attest to a positive and significant (partial) correlation
between our excluded instruments and the contemporaneous migrant stocks. For our instru-
ments to be valid, they must, of course, be uncorrelated with the structural error term. One
11For example, Catalun˜a is closer to France than Andaluc´ıa both culturally and geographically.
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could argue that considerable historical migration within Spain reflects (and signals) a poor
matching quality (for example in terms of jobs), thus discouraging further migration today.
However, it is unlikely that this signaling effect, whether empirically relevant or not, ren-
ders our instruments endogenous. This is so because, first, to the extent that the matching
quality is specific to a pair of origin country and destination region, it is absorbed into our
fixed effects; and second, because the signal as such should be captured by the (observable)
co-national pull term, given that this term itself is a function of the entire set of historical
migration flows. Hence, the signaling effect should not be part of the structural error term.
7.3.2 Estimation results
Table 7.1 shows the results of the fixed effects (FE) estimations (columns (a) to (f)) and of
the fixed effects two stage least squares (FE 2SLS) estimations (columns (g) to (l)). For each
estimator, the first three columns control for country-fixed effects and the last three columns
control for country-and-region fixed effects through a conventional within-transformation of
the data. 5.7% of the observations had to be dropped due to zero migrant flows.12
<<Table 7.1 about here>>
For the sake of comparison, we report estimation results for specifications in which we:
(i) exclude the cross-national pull; (ii) estimate the full model as given by equation (7.11);
and (iii) interact the co-national and cross-national pulls. The third set of estimations allows
us to gauge whether the two types of effects reinforce each other.
In all the specifications employed, the co-national pull effect is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient, roughly interpretable as an elasticity,
ranges between 0.52 and 0.68 in the FE estimations, and between 0.82 and 0.95 in the FE
2SLS estimations. The exact elasticity is
∂ ln (mij)
∂ ln (Mij)
= β0(1 − mijmi ) and thus it is smaller than
the estimated coefficient; see also equation (7.10). In the analysis that follows, we plausibly
assume that the fraction mij/mi is close to zero.
The cross-national pull effect is positive and statistically significant at least at the 10%
level, the FE 2SLS model with the interaction term included being the only exception. The
estimated coefficient ranges between 0.32 and 0.54 in the FE estimations, and between 0.23
and 0.29 in the FE 2SLS estimations. Our estimates thus seem to support the hypothesis
12In the specifications that control for country-and-region fixed effects, additional observations need to be
dropped due to regions consisting of a single province. Excluding then the provinces Ceuta and Melilla, the
full matrix would have included 55× 50 observations.
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that new migrants are attracted to destinations hosting migrants from the same nationality
as well as from adjacent nationalities.
In order to evaluate the cross-national pull effect in terms of its quantitative importance,
we differentiate the estimated migration function with respect to the log of the migrant pull
of a certain nationality ` 6= i:
∂ ln(mij)
∂ ln(M`j)
∼=β1 × ηi`M`j∑
` 6=i ηi`M`j
. (7.12)
This elasticity can be compared to the elasticity of the co-national pull,
∂ ln(mij)
∂ ln (Mij)
∼= β0. Given
that βˆ0 > βˆ1 and
ηi`M`j∑
6`=i ηi`M`j
≤ 1, the marginal effect due to co-national migrants is strictly
larger than the marginal effect due to migrants from adjacent nationalities. Take, as an
example, established Peruvian migrants in Barcelona and their impact on future migration
from Ecuador to Barcelona. By plugging in the relevant values for the weights, ηi`, and the
migrant stocks, M`j, and by using the estimate for β1 in column (e), we get an estimated
elasticity of approximately 0.11 for the cross-national pull.
As to the interaction term between the co-national pull and the cross-national pull, we
find a positive and significant interaction effect in the FE estimations. The results should
though be interpreted with caution because the interaction effect does not survive in the
FE 2SLS estimations. Figure 7.3 plots the marginal co-national pull effect on follow-up
migration against the size of the cross-national pull. It is based on the parameter estimates
reported in column (f). The marginal effect (straight line) is shown together with the 90%
confidence interval (dashed lines). Figure 7.3 also includes the estimated density of the
cross-national pull (dotted line). We see that the estimated elasticity is positive and that
it is significantly different from zero for relevant values of the cross-national pull, lying in
the interval between 0.42 and 0.63. Furthermore, we see that this elasticity is larger the
larger the cross-national pull. Hence, Figure 7.3 lends support to the idea that co-national
migrants exert an independent positive influence on migration, but that this influence is more
important the larger the presence of migrants from adjacent nationalities.
<<Figure 7.3 about here>>
With regard to the control variables, we do not find a statistically significant effect of trade
on migration. Yet, the estimated coefficient for the FDI variable is positive and marginally
statistically significant in the FE estimations. This suggests that, other things held constant,
migrant flows are slightly larger for country-province pairs characterized by a high inflow
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of FDI at the regional level. However, the effect of FDI is insignificant in the FE 2SLS
estimations.
The instruments used in the FE 2SLS estimations seem to be valid, relevant, and strong
according to various test statistics. In order to test for the validity of the instruments,
we perform over-identification tests of all instruments in the form of Hansen J tests. We
can never reject the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity at any reasonable level of
confidence. Furthermore, the values of the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic indicate that our
excluded instruments are relevant, given that we always have to reject the null hypothesis of
under-identification. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F test provides information on the strength
of the instruments. The corresponding test statistic is above the critical value of 10 when
the interaction term is not included (columns (g), (h), (j) and (k)).13 This suggests that
there is no problem of weak instruments. Following Baum et al. (2007, 490), we compare the
values of the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic to the critical values for the Cragg-Donald
Wald F statistic provided by Stock & Yogo (2005) in the specifications in which both the
co-national pull and its interaction with the cross-national pull are instrumented (columns
(i) and (l)).14 Based on this comparison, the instruments seem to lead to a bias of the FE
2SLS estimator relative to the bias of the FE estimator of at most 10% and 20% in the
specifications reported in columns (i) and (l), respectively. Based on exogeneity tests for the
instrumented co-national pull, we always have to reject the null hypothesis that this regressor
is exogenous at the 1% level.
7.3.3 Robustness analysis
By construction, most of the variation in the cross-national pull used for identification stems
from differences in the number of migrants from adjacent nationalities (large weights), not
from differences in the number of migrants from far-removed nationalities (small weights).
Hence, the results reported in Table 7.1 are informative about the role of the former group
of established migrants, but not the latter.
In order to gain further insight into possible differences between the effects of the two
types of migrants, we applied an alternative weighting scheme, using as weights the distance
(instead of the inverse distance) between the two countries considered. Hence, the weights
are shifted away from migrants from adjacent nationalities to those from far-removed nation-
13This comparison follows the “rule of thumb” suggested by Staiger & Stock (1997), see Baum et al. (2007,
490).
14The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is the relevant F statistic in the case that the errors are independent
and identically distributed (Baum et al., 2007, 489).
178 CHAPTER 7. CO-NATIONAL AND CROSS-NATIONAL PULLS IN MIGRATION
alities. If the estimates obtained with this alternative weighting scheme were to look similar
to those reported above, we would have had reason to believe that it is established migrants
in general who foster follow-up migration, independently of the composition of the stock of
migrants in terms of nationalities.
We find the opposite. Table 7.2 reports the corresponding estimation results. They
indicate a statistically significant negative coefficient for the (alternative) cross-national pull
in the FE estimations, and a statistically insignificant coefficient in the FE 2SLS estimations.
Hence, it is not established migrants per se who attract follow-up migration. What matters
is composition in terms of nationalities. A stock composed of migrants from far-removed
nationalities has a strictly non-positive effect on follow-up migration.
In another robustness check, we have used an indicator variable for a common official
language as a weight in the cross-national pull. The results from these estimations are
reported in Table A.1 in Appendix A. The FE estimations suggest a positive cross-national
pull effect on follow-up migration, which is again weaker than the co-national pull effect.
However, the results are not robust in the FE 2SLS estimations.
<<Table 7.2 about here>>
7.4 Conclusion
We expand the perspective of the attraction of a migrant pool from co-national migrants to
co-national migrants together with migrants from adjacent nationalities. We find that cross-
national links are relevant predictors of international migration flows, both independently
and in conjunction with co-national links. Our analysis is based on macro-level data on
migrant stocks and flows during the era of the migration boom to Spain, and is drawing on
data by countries of origin and provinces of destination.
The two novel findings of our analysis are, first, that migrants from a certain nationality
are attracted to destinations hosting migrants from adjacent nationalities. Importantly, this
holds true even when the co-national pull is small or zero. In terms of magnitude, this effect is
large enough to be relevant, but smaller than the pull effect due to co-national migrants. The
second novel finding is non-linearity in precisely this co-national pull effect, which appears
to be stronger the larger the presence of migrants from adjacent nationalities.
An obvious drawback of our analysis is that we cannot explore the precise channels un-
derlying the pull effects. The received literature attributes a prominent role to networks
fostering follow-up migration. Identification of the relative importance of each of the possible
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channels of migration dynamics is left for future research.
Figures and tables
Figure 7.1. Differences in the geographical concentration of migrant populations in
Spain, 2009†
† This figure illustrates differences in the geographical distributions of migrants in Spain from four
different world regions relative to the distribution of all migrants in Spain in the year 2009 (in each
case excluding migrants from the world region under consideration). For example, we compare
the share of all migrants from South America settled in each province to the corresponding share
of all other migrants in the same province (upper left panel). The numbers are percentage point
differences between the two shares. Dark colors indicate a strong concentration of migrants from
a given world region relative to all other migrants, while light colors indicate a relatively weak
concentration. The provinces Las Palmas and Santa Cruz de Tenerife are grouped together as
Islas Canarias. Source: Authors’ tabulations using data from INE.
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Figure 7.2. Index of dissimilarity of migrant populations in Spain and
distance between countries of origin, 2009†
† This figure plots the country-pair-specific index of dissimilarity a` la Duncan &
Duncan (1955) for any two migrant populations settled in Spain in the year 2009
against the log of the distance (measured in kilometers) between the countries
of origin considered. Larger values of the index of dissimilarity indicate stronger
dissimilarity in the geographical distributions of two migrant populations. Source:
Authors’ tabulations using data from INE and CEPII.
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Figure 7.3. Marginal effect of the co-national pull†
† This figure shows the marginal effect of the co-national pull along with its 90%
confidence interval for relevant values of the cross-national pull. It is based on
the estimation results from column (f) of Table 7.1. The figure also shows the
estimated density of the cross-national pull.
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Table 7.1. Estimations based on the inverse-distance-weighted cross-national pull†
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Table 5.1: Estimations Based on the Inverse-distance-weighted Cross-national Pull
Dependent Variable: Migration Inflow (Province-level 1997-2006)
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Two Stage Least Squares
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
Co-national Pull 0.682*** 0.660*** 0.639*** 0.539*** 0.524*** 0.515*** 0.953*** 0.945*** 0.903*** 0.825*** 0.820*** 0.868***
(Province-level 1996) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.070) (0.065) (0.049) (0.080) (0.079) (0.093)
Cross-national Pull 0.539*** 0.321*** 0.486*** 0.335** 0.293*** 0.252** 0.229* 0.236
(Province-level 1996) (0.134) (0.118) (0.131) (0.136) (0.107) (0.128) (0.136) (0.152)
Co-n. x Cross-n. Pull 0.032*** 0.022*** 0.010 -0.007
(Province-level 1996) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Trade Flow 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.006
(Province-level 1996) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
FDI Flow 0.012** 0.012** 0.011** 0.004 0.004 0.004
(Region-level 1997) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested
Country-and-Region E. No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,199 2,199 2,199 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,199 2,199 2,199
Centered R2 0.792 0.796 0.798 0.670 0.673 0.674 0.770 0.773 0.768 0.635 0.637 0.624
Hansen J Test 0.023 0.028 1.070 0.379 0.247 1.710
- p-value 0.880 0.866 0.586 0.538 0.619 0.425
Kleib.-Paap LM Test 20.13 16.79 10.95 24.27 22.38 16.31
- p-value 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.001
Kleib.-Paap W. F Test 30.70 23.75 7.741 18.48 16.78 6.371
Exogeneity Test 14.29 14.81 10.31 11.03 11.19 11.45
- p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
All variables are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered by countries or pairs of countries and Spanish regions) are given in parentheses.
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10-%, 5-%, 1-% levels, respectively. The regressions include all countries with at least 630 nationals residing in Spain in the year
1996 (55 countries of origin). In columns (g)-(l), the co-national pull and its interaction with the cross-national pull are instrumented with historical migration flows
within Spain (and the corresponding interactions). Refer to Section 5.3 for a detailed description of the variables. In column (i), two province effects are partialled
out in order to ensure full rank of the estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions.
1
07
† All variables are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered by countries or pairs of countries and Spanish regions)
are given i pare theses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. The regressions include all countries with at least
630 nationals residing in Spain in the year 1996 (55 countries of origin). In columns (g)-(l), the co-national pull and its interaction with the
cross-natio al pull are in trumented with historical migration flows within Spain (and the corresponding interactions). Refer to Section 7.3 for a
deta led escription of the variables. In column (i), two province effects are partialled out in order to ensure full rank of the estimated covariance
matrix of moment conditions.
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Table 7.2. Estimations based on the distance-weighted cross-national pull†
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Table 5.2: Esti ations Based on the Distance-weighted Cross-national Pull
Dependent Variable: Migration Inflow (Province-level 1997-2006)
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Two Stage Least Squares
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
Co-national Pull 0.682*** 0.630*** 0.305 0.539*** 0.489*** 0.121 0.953*** 0.942*** 1.137*** 0.825*** 0.800*** 1.273***
(Province-level 1996) (0.028) (0.027) (0.239) (0.029) (0.031) (0.213) (0.070) (0.084) (0.220) (0.080) (0.106) (0.387)
Cross-national Pull -0.929*** -0.989*** -1.019*** -1.055*** -0.128 -0.023 -0.189 0.128
(Province-level 1996) (0.171) (0.173) (0.153) (0.156) (0.241) (0.202) (0.316) (0.384)
Co-n. x Cross-n. Pull 0.019 0.022* -0.010 -0.022
(Province-level 1996) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018)
Trade Flow 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005
(Province-level 1996) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
FDI Flow 0.012** 0.009* 0.009* 0.004 0.004 0.004
(Region-level 1997) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested
Country-and-Region E. No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,199 2,199 2,199 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,199 2,199 2,199
Centered R2 0.792 0.796 0.797 0.670 0.677 0.678 0.770 0.772 0.755 0.635 0.641 0.610
Hansen J Test 0.023 0.023 0.235 0.379 0.302 0.836
- p-value 0.880 0.879 0.889 0.538 0.583 0.658
Kleib.-Paap LM Test 20.13 19.13 10.57 24.27 21.49 17.29
- p-value 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.001
Kleib.-Paap W. F Test 30.70 24.73 9.282 18.48 13.88 5.443
Exogeneity Test 14.29 13.43 14.27 11.03 7.662 12.10
- p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.001
All variables are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered by countries or pairs of countries and Spanish regions) are given in parentheses.
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10-%, 5-%, 1-% levels, respectively. The regressions include all countries with at least 630 nationals residing in Spain in the year
1996 (55 countries of origin). In columns (g)-(l), the co-national pull and its interaction with the cross-national pull are instrumented with historical migration flows
within Spain (and the corresponding interactions). Refer to Section 5.3 for a detailed description of the variables. In column (i), two province effects are partialled
out in order to ensure full rank of the estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions.
1
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† All variables are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered by countries or pairs of countries and Spanish regions)
are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10-%, 5-%, 1-% levels, respectively. The regressions include all countries with at
least 630 nationals residing in Spain in the year 1996 (55 cou tries of origin). In columns (g)-(l), the co- ational pull and its interaction with the
cross-natio al pull are in trumented wi h historical migration fl ws within Spain (a d the co responding interactions). Ref r to Section 7.3 for a
deta led escription of the variables. In column (i), two province effects are partialled out in order to ensure full rank of the estimated covariance
matrix of moment conditions.
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A Further robustness checks
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Table 5.3: Estimations Based on the Language-weighted Cross-national Pull
Dependent Variable: Migration Inflow (Province-level 1997-2006)
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Two Stage Least Squares
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
Co-national Pull 0.682*** 0.663*** 0.650*** 0.539*** 0.532*** 0.503*** 0.953*** 0.929*** 1.042*** 0.825*** 0.820*** 1.035***
(Province-level 1996) (0.028) (0.028) (0.036) (0.029) (0.029) (0.051) (0.070) (0.073) (0.069) (0.080) (0.084) (0.130)
Cross-national Pull 0.108*** 0.091* 0.069* 0.032 0.044 0.104* 0.012 0.129*
(Province-level 1996) (0.037) (0.047) (0.036) (0.051) (0.035) (0.057) (0.038) (0.067)
Co-n. x Cross-n. Pull 0.003 0.006 -0.012** -0.023**
(Province-level 1996) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Trade Flow 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005
(Province-level 1996) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
FDI Flow 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.004 0.005 0.002
(Region-level 1997) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested
Country-and-Region E. No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,199 2,199 2,199 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,199 2,199 2,199
Centered R2 0.792 0.794 0.794 0.670 0.671 0.671 0.770 0.774 0.751 0.635 0.636 0.599
Hansen J Test 0.023 0.029 1.017 0.379 0.353 0.445
- p-value 0.880 0.864 0.601 0.538 0.552 0.800
Kleib.-Paap LM Test 20.13 19.31 18.74 24.27 24.13 25.51
- p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleib.-Paap W. F Test 30.70 24.72 14.04 18.48 17.28 8.562
Exogeneity Test 14.29 13.02 17.08 11.03 9.977 14.16
- p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000
All variables are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered by countries or pairs of countries and Spanish regions) are given in parentheses.
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10-%, 5-%, 1-% levels, respectively. The regressions include all countries with at least 630 nationals residing in Spain in the year
1996 (55 countries of origin). In columns (g)-(l), the co-national pull and its interaction with the cross-national pull are instrumented with historical migration flows
within Spain (and the corresponding interactions). Refer to Section 5.3 for a detailed description of the variables. In column (i), two province effects are partialled
out in order to ensure full rank of the estimated covariance matrix of moment condition.
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† All variables are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered by countries or pairs of countries and Spanish regions)
are given in pare theses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10-%, 5-%, 1-% levels, respectively. The regressions include all countries with t
least 630 nationals residing in Spai in the year 1996 (55 countries of o igin). In column (g)-(l), the co-national pull and its interact on with the
cross-natio al pull are in trumented with historical migration flows within Spain (and the corresponding interactions). Refer to Section 7.3 for a
deta led escription of the variables. In column (i), two province effects are partialled out in order to ensure full rank of the estimated covariance
matrix of moment conditions.
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Chapter8
Individual attitudes towards trade:
Stolper-Samuelson revisited
This chapter is based on joint work with Ina C. Ja¨kel. It was published as an article in
September 2013 in the Open Economies Review, 24(4), 731-761. An earlier draft appeared
as University of Tu¨bingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance No. 46.
8.1 Introduction
Low- and middle-income countries such as China, India, Russia, and Brazil have (re-)entered
the stage of the world economy. These economies, home to a substantial portion of world
population, show high degrees of trade openness and have recently boasted enormous output
growth; see Freeman (2009, p. 63).1 The rapid integration of emerging markets into the global
economy promises substantial gains from trade. Yet, these gains seem endangered by anti-
free trade campaigns motivated by globalization fears. Can we explain this tension by the
well-known Stolper-Samuelson arguments? From a neoclassical point of view, the new global
economic architecture implies that developed economies like the United States or Europe
import low-skilled labor from developing countries like China, indirectly, through the factors
embodied in traded goods. This will result in changes of relative wages or unemployment,
making the scarce factors worse off and benefitting the abundant factors. In this sense,
1In the year prior to the Global Financial Crisis, China’s economy has grown in real terms by 13.0%,
followed by those of India (9.1%), Russia (8.1%), and Brazil (5.3%); the degrees of trade openness (measured
as the sum of the value of imports and exports over total output) for these economies range between 25%
(Brazil) and 75% (China) in 2007; all four countries together comprise nearly 2.8 billion people in 2007,
which was then as much as about 42% of total world population; all data come from the World Development
Indicators (2007).
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economic theory fuels the public debate on the potential link between “globalization” and
contemporaneous increases in wage inequality in many advanced countries. This is despite
the fact that it has turned out difficult to empirically disentangle the effects of globalization
on wage inequality from those originating in skill-biased technological change; see Feenstra
& Hanson (2003), Lawrence (2008), and Krugman (2008).
This paper takes an altogether different perspective on this discussion. It draws attention
to how people expect international trade to affect their income situations. Looking through
the lens of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, we ask whether the distributional predictions
of free trade are shaping individuals’ attitudes towards protection. We find a characteristic
pattern which is consistent with endowment-based views of comparative advantage high-
lighted by the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model. Given that individual attitudes towards trade
co-determine trade policy outcomes, this potentially has wider implications in a political
economy context; see Rodrik (1995). It also sheds light on the rising demand for protection
in developed countries; see Scheve & Slaughter (2007). Since unskilled labor makes the bulk
of the labor force in all countries2 , but is intensively used in the comparative disadvantage
sector only in advanced countries, the Western world would seem prone to a new wave of
protectionism.3
Empirical identification of Stolper-Samuelson effects on the formation of individual trade
attitudes comes from the variation in factor ownership (at the individual level), factor abun-
dance (at the country level), and the interaction of the two. Influential work by O’Rourke
& Sinnott (2001) and Mayda & Rodrik (2005) consults rich internationally comparable sur-
vey data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP, 1995).4 The bottom line of
these studies is that high-skilled individuals are more likely to be pro-trade than low-skilled
individuals, but only in countries with high incomes per capita. This result has been inter-
preted as support for the H-O model; see also Scheve & Slaughter (2006), O’Rourke (2006),
2In fact, there is not a single OECD economy with a majority of people having attained tertiary education,
the level of education which is typically seen as essential in qualifying for a high-skilled job. The OECD
average of people with tertiary education in 2007 is 28% for the population aged 25-64; see OECD (2009,
p. 29f.).
3Gallup’s annual World Affairs poll reports that, in January 2000, 35 percent of the
American adult population believed that trade is a “threat to the economy from foreign
imports”. This number has almost steadily increased over the years, reaching a criti-
cal level of 52 percent in February 2008, an all time high since September 1992; see
http://www.gallup.com/poll/115240/Americans-Negative-Positive-Foreign-Trade.aspx. A similar
trend can be found in Western Europe, but not in China or India; see Pew GAP (2007, p. 1).
4Recent years have seen a surge in empirical research on individual trade policy preferences. For example,
evidence from purely national surveys comes from Scheve & Slaughter (2001), Hoffman (2009), Ehrlich &
Maestas (2010), and Blonigen (2011) for the United States and from Wolfe & Mendelsohn (2005) for Canada.
Beaulieu et al. (2005) document cross-country evidence from Latin America.
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and Mayda et al. (2007). Yet, for this interpretation to be more plausible, we would have
to observe that high-skilled individuals are significantly less pro-trade than low-skilled in-
dividuals in a significant share of developing countries. With few exceptions, however, the
literature documents a non-negative effect of being high-skilled on pro-trade attitudes across
all countries.
This paper paints a more distinct and thus more convincing picture of the role of the
H-O model in shaping free trade attitudes. Using the 2007 wave of the Pew Global Attitudes
Project (GAP), we find statistically significant and economically large Stolper-Samuelson
effects, with high-skilled individuals being more pro-trade than low-skilled individuals in
high-skilled labor abundant countries, and vice versa in a significant share of low-skilled
labor abundant countries. Our findings can be attributed to the fact that our novel survey
data combine a number of desirable features which are, at least in their entirety, absent in
the existing literature. First, they contain a rather extensive set of individual attributes,
such as gender, aspects of culture, and, most importantly, income. Accounting for this set
in the empirical model is important in order to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates,
given that such characteristics correlate with the type of labor individuals supply on factor
markets.5 Second, the data allow us to employ a direct and reliable measure of a country’s
relative factor abundance. Employing such a measure in the empirical model facilitates an
unambiguous interpretation of the results obtained.6 And finally, the survey incorporates a
large set of countries from both ends of the world income distribution. This is essential for
having sufficient identifying variation in explanatory variables.7
In this paper, we also identify and address a weakness on the methodological side in
the literature. In particular, we show that the interaction effect between individual factor
ownership and a country’s relative factor abundance is not identified in a non-linear model
with country fixed effects.8 As a straightforward remedy to this shortcoming, we apply,
5For example, Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) and Mansfield & Mutz (2009) argue that high-skilled in-
dividuals are more likely to favor free trade due to a general “enlightenment” that comes with a better
educational background. In this paper, we explicitly capture individuals’ economic awareness and their in-
clinations towards nationalist ideas and carry out baseline estimations of the effects of various aspects of
individual enlightenment.
6O’Rourke & Sinnott (2001) and Mayda & Rodrik (2005) use GDP per capita as a proxy variable for a
country’s relative endowment with high-skilled labor. Mayda & Rodrik (2001) pursue a similar strategy as
we do here.
7Arguably, the blind spot in O’Rourke & Sinnott (2001) and Mayda & Rodrik (2005) is that labor-
abundant, low-income countries are scarce in the ISSP survey data. Mayda & Rodrik (2005) also employ the
World Values Survey (WVS) data collected between 1995 and 1997 and covering 40 countries from all stages
of development. However, the WVS does not allow to control for individual income, which is paramount in
the estimation. The same holds true for Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) who additionally use the 2003 wave of
the Pew GAP data including 44 countries.
8Our argument is related, but not identical, to that raised by Ai & Norton (2003) who stress the by
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inter alia, the simple linear probability model (LPM). In contrast to the widely used Probit
framework, our approach does allow for a specification with fixed country effects on the
formation of trade policy preferences. These capture potentially important “fundamentals”
such as a country’s political system, but also feedback effects from existing trade policies and
previous trade exposure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 8.2 presents our empirical
strategy, starting out with a condensed Stolper-Samuelson view on free trade preferences and
proceeding with a discussion of the econometric model and our survey data. Section 8.3 turns
to a detailed presentation of our regression results. The final section concludes the paper.
8.2 Empirical strategy
This section presents our empirical approach to studying Stolper-Samuelson effects on free
trade preferences. The first subsection explains how the distributional effects of trade lib-
eralization in the H-O model translate into different individual attitudes towards trade. In
the second subsection, we set up a simple random utility framework to discuss the relevant
econometric issues that arise in our context. In so doing, we slightly modify the existing mod-
eling approach along several dimensions. The final subsection presents our survey data in
some detail. It also looks at whether and how trade preferences correlate with governments’
policies and countries’ stages of development.
8.2.1 A Stolper-Samuelson view on free trade preferences
The distributional effects of trade policy interventions in an H-O setting with two factors of
production and two goods can be appropriately discussed by recalling the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem; see Stolper & Samuelson (1941). In its general version the theorem states that
protection of domestic import-competing industries will raise the real reward of the scarce
factor and lower the real return to the abundant factor.9 This result emerges from the
differentiated zero profit conditions, which in terms of proportional changes are given by
pˆ` = θ`LwˆL + θ`HwˆH for ` = 1, 2, (8.1)
now well-known difficulties of computing and interpreting interaction effects in non-linear models such as the
Probit or the Logit model.
9The notion of a “general” version of the theorem was introduced by Bhagwati (1959); see also Deardorff
(1993).
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where a ‘hat’ indicates a percentage change, the θ`j’s are the cost shares of high- and low-
skilled labor (with j = H,L), the p`’s are goods prices, and the wj’s are factor prices.
10
Protection, for example through an import tariff, increases the domestic relative price of
the imported good.11 From equation (8.1), goods price changes are a cost-share weighted
average of factor price changes. This implies that the pˆ`’s lie in between the wˆj’s. Let p1
denote the price of the imported commodity with pˆ1 > 0 through the imposition of a tariff.
The price of the factor which is intensively used in the import-competing sector, say low-
skilled labor (i.e. θ1L > θ2L), rises disproportionately compared to the commodity price.
By the same logic, high-skilled labor experiences a real income loss, wˆL > pˆ1 > pˆ2 > wˆH .
If we further impose the assumptions necessary to establish the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem
– identical technologies and preferences across countries and no factor intensity reversals
– it follows that protection harms the country’s abundant factor because it is intensively
employed in the export industry.
Hypothesis 1. In human-capital-abundant economies, high-skilled individuals favor free
trade, while low-skilled individuals oppose free trade. In labor-abundant economies, this con-
flict of interests is reversed.
One of the captivating features of the Stolper-Samuelson logic is that it reflects changes
in a country’s factor supply, because inputs are embodied in traded goods. As stated by
Deardorff (1993, p. 7):
“The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem [...] states what might appear obvious to many
outside of economics. In its simple form [...] it says that protection helps the
scarce factor, or, equivalently, that free trade hurts the scarce factor. [...] [Many
politicians and others in the public at large] say that of course trade lowers wages
in the United States, since it makes American labor compete with foreign labor
that may be paid only a fraction as much.”
In a wider sense, Hypothesis 1 therefore draws on how people expect international trade to
affect their incomes. Consequently, any empirical test of this hypothesis is informative as to
the extent to which individuals are sensitive towards how an integrated world economy may
affect the relative scarcity of their factors, compared to an autarky situation.
10In what follows, the terms ‘high-skilled labor’ and ‘human capital’ are used interchangeably. Analogously
for ‘low-skilled labor’ and ‘labor’.
11Metzler (1949) shows that the imposition of an import tariff raises the domestic relative price of the
imported good only if the elasticity of foreign demand for domestic exports is greater than the domestic
marginal propensity to consume the exported good. The restriction to the small economy case precludes any
terms-of-trade effects and is therefore sufficient to obtain this result.
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Hypothesis 1 also implies that whether an individual opposes or favors protection de-
pends entirely on the direction, but not the magnitude, of the predicted utility change. The
prediction for an individual’s free trade preference is solely determined by whether the fac-
tor is relatively scarce or abundant compared to the rest of the world, essentially because
individuals are confronted with a binary choice; see Balistreri (1997).
To see why the degree of relative scarcity of the two factors may also be decisive for
preference formation, we incorporate country-pair-specific trading costs. If trade costs are
prohibitively high for some country pairs, each country will only trade with a subset of
the other countries. As a result, comparative advantage is no longer defined globally; see
Deardorff (2004). We do not inspect the trade pattern of individual countries here. But it
is clear that, other things equal, the probability that a certain factor in a given country is
used intensively in the comparative advantage sector is the higher, the higher the relative
abundance of this factor in that country. We obtain the following prediction.
Hypothesis 2. A high-skilled individual is more likely to favor free trade, the higher a
country’s human-capital-to-labor ratio. The reverse holds true for a low-skilled individual.
Importantly, both hypotheses are independent of whether or not tariffs are prohibitively
high. This is because there is no role for the magnitude of an individual’s trade-policy induced
utility change and because the direction of the goods price change does not depend on the
degree of protection.
8.2.2 Econometric model
The fundamental idea in our regression analysis is that trade policy interventions in the form
of import tariffs (or the withdrawal thereof) have effects on an individual’s utility level due
to changes in personal earnings, both in expectation terms. We provide a combined test of
Hypotheses 1 and 2 and closely follow previous studies in estimating the interaction effect
between individual skill and a country’s degree of human capital abundance.
For this purpose, we set up the following random utility framework. Let the expected
utility change of individual i in country c when moving towards free trade (E[∆Uic|Free Trade])
be a linear function of the expected income change a` la Heckscher-Ohlin (E[∆wic|H-O]), which
depends on individual skill hic and the residence country’s degree of human capital abundance
hc. Let the effect of other individual attributes such as age, income, or education and that
of other country characteristics such as the political system, the stage of development, or the
actual trade policies be summarized in Aic(.) and Bc(.), respectively. Decomposing Aic(.) into
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a function of observables aic ≡ a(Xic1, . . . , XicL) and an unobservable random component µic,
and analogously for Bc(.) with bc ≡ b(Zc1, . . . , ZcK) and σc, we have
E[∆Uic|Free Trade] = E[∆wic|H-O](hic, hc) + aic + bc + µic + σc. (8.2)
We aim for an estimable equation of (8.2). An individual’s expected income change
is unobserved. Our analysis must therefore take the link between such expectations and
individual trade policy preferences as given. Assuming that this link exists, we ask whether
parameter estimates on the arguments of E[∆wic|H-O](hic, hc) can be interpreted as reflecting
a Stolper-Samuelson data generating process. Hence, we rewrite equation (8.2) as
E[∆Uic|Free Trade] = γ0 + γ1 · hic + γ2 · hic × hc + γc + αX′ic + µic, (8.3)
where γ1 and γ2 are the parameters of interest, γc ≡ γ(hc, bc, σc) is a fixed effect absorb-
ing both observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the country level, α = (α1 . . . αL) is a
row vector of parameters to be estimated, and X′ic = (Xic1 . . . XicL)
′ is a column vector of
individual-specific explanatory variables.
The left-hand side of equation (8.3), the expected utility change as such, is an unob-
servable latent variable. Following existing literature, we construct an individual-specific
pro-trade dummy variable from our survey data which serves as an indicator for the sign
of the expected change in utility, Yic
def
= 1(E[∆Uic|Free Trade] > 0). If we additionally im-
pose µic ∼ Normal(0, 1), we arrive at the familiar Probit framework, where an individual’s
probability of being in favor of free trade, conditional on all explanatory variables, reads as
Pr(Yic = 1|·) = Φ(γ0 + γ1 · hic + γ2 · hic × hc + γc + αX′ic), with Φ being the cumulative dis-
tribution function of the standard normal distribution. The main interest in our application
is with the effect of individual skill on the probability of being pro-trade,
∆ Pr(Yic = 1|·)
∆hic
= Φ′(·)[γ1 + γ2hc], (8.4)
and how this effect varies with a country’s degree of human capital abundance (interaction
effect),
∆2 Pr(Yic = 1|·)
∆hic∆hc
= Φ′(·)γ2 + Φ′′(·)[γ1 ∆γc
∆hc
+ γ1γ2hic + γ2hc
∆γc
∆hc
+ γ22hichc]. (8.5)
Given the non-linearity of the model, equations (8.4) and (8.5) both depend on all ex-
planatory variables and parameters through Φ′(·) and Φ′′(·). As Ai & Norton (2003) discuss,
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computing and interpreting interaction effects in non-linear models is thus less trivial than
it is in a linear least squares framework.12 There is another issue involved, however, which
has to do with the model’s specification with country fixed effects as given in equation (8.3).
In fact, the interaction effect, given by equation (8.5), is not identified in the model, be-
cause the derivative (or difference) ∆γc/∆hc is not identified. The reason is that the country
fixed effect absorbs the main effect of a country’s human capital abundance on individual
trade attitudes. Hence, the results reported in the existing literature need to be interpreted
with care. Notice that our concern equally applies to a wider set of non-linear models with
interaction terms and fixed effects.
We consider two simple and straightforward ways to circumvent this problem. The first
assumes the probability of being in favor of free trade, conditional on all explanatory variables,
to be equal to the right-hand side of equation (8.3), Pr(Yic = 1|·) = γ0 + γ1 · hic + γ2 · hic ×
hc + γc + αX
′
ic. This is the linear probability model (LPM), which comes at the cost that
predictions may lie outside the unit interval. Still, this is our preferred specification since
it explicitly estimates all fixed country effects. Then, ∆ Pr(Yic = 1|·)/∆hic = γ1 + γ2hc and
∆2 Pr(Yic = 1|·)/(∆hic∆hc) = γ2. Our second approach keeps the underlying latent variable
model and takes care of all arguments of γ(hc, bc, σc). The model is then specified as
E[∆Uic|Free Trade] = γ0 + γ1 · hic + γ2 · hic × hc + γ3 · hc + αX′ic + βZ′c + ηic, (8.3’)
where ηic = µic + σc with ηic ∼ Normal(0, 1), β = (β1 . . . βK) is a row vector of additional
parameters to be estimated, and Z′c = (Zc1 . . . ZcK)
′ is a column vector of country-specific
explanatory variables. The effect of individual skill is as in equation (8.4), whereas the
interaction effect now becomes
∆2 Pr(Yic = 1|·)
∆hic∆hc
= Φ′(·)γ2 + Φ′′(·)[γ1γ3 + γ1γ2hic + γ2γ3hc + γ22hichc]. (8.5’)
In this model, the interaction effect is identified, given that the parameter γ3 is identified.
In both econometric models, the LPM and the modified Probit model, the effect of being
high-skilled on an individual’s attitude towards free trade is a function of the economy’s
human capital abundance. Hypothesis 1 suggests that high-skilled individuals exhibit more
protectionist attitudes than low-skilled individuals in labor-abundant countries, and vice
12In fact, many authors have interpreted the marginal effect of the interaction term as the interaction
effect; see Ai & Norton (2003).
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versa in human-capital-abundant countries. Hence, we expect that
∆ Pr(Yic = 1|·)
∆hic
∣∣∣∣
hc<h∗c
< 0 <
∆ Pr(Yic = 1|·)
∆hic
∣∣∣∣
hc>h∗c
, (8.6)
where h∗c is the estimated threshold value which separates human-capital-abundant countries
from labor-abundant countries. Furthermore, Hypothesis 2 states that a high-skilled individ-
ual’s probability of favoring free trade is the higher, the higher his or her country’s degree of
human capital abundance. A positive cross-derivative,
∆2 Pr(Yic = 1|·)
∆hic∆hc
> 0, (8.7)
would support this idea.
8.2.3 Data
We analyze the 2007 wave of the Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP), an extensive interna-
tionally comparable survey data set with detailed information on the characteristics of more
than 40,000 individuals worldwide. These characteristics include, but are not limited to,
a respondent’s age, gender, real income, employment status, and religiousness.13 The data
comprise some 47 countries, 26 of which are developing and newly industrialized countries
from Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.14 For a combined test of Hypotheses
1 and 2, the country coverage of the survey data is particularly important. Suppose there are
two regions, America and Europe. America consists of human-capital-abundant North and
labor-abundant South, and similarly for Europe with West and East. Given that transac-
tion costs are prohibitive for trade between America and Europe, there is only intra-regional
trade. In this world, the logic of comparative advantage predicts that high-skilled individuals
in North America and Western Europe are equally affirmative towards free trade. In case
the estimation sample is biased towards human-capital-abundant economies, the data could
therefore lead the researcher to erroneously reject Stolper-Samuelson effects on preference
formation.
We deduce an individual’s preference towards trade policy by exploiting answers to the
following question: “What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between
[respondent’s country] and other countries – do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good
thing, somewhat bad thing or a very bad thing for our country?” Notice that this question
13For summary statistics and coding information of these variables, see Table A.1 in Appendix A.
14For further information on the GAP survey data, see also http://pewglobal.org/.
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does not make the trade policy argument explicit. Yet, a respondent’s skeptical view on his
or her country’s engagement in international trade can be plausibly associated only with the
desire of a reduction in trade flows. Since the government is the political institution to pursue
a pertinent policy, we argue that the relevant trade policy issue is sufficiently attached to the
survey question.
We drop all individuals who have refused to answer this question, about 5% of the entire
sample, and construct a pro-trade dummy variable Yic which takes on the value one if the
respondent’s answer is “very good” or “somewhat good” and zero otherwise. We stick to
this binary coding throughout the text since it eliminates any culturally driven inclinations
towards extreme or moderate responses. These cannot be accounted for by country fixed
effects since they come with country-specific dispersions of trade opinions instead of mean
shifts.15
The two pivotal variables in our analysis are those capturing an individual’s skill level
hic and a country’s degree of human capital abundance hc. We proxy the former by an
individual’s educational background, measured through an ordered six-valued variable of
educational attainment.16 We assume that a higher formal education is associated with
a higher probability of being employed in a job with high skill requirements.17 Existing
literature on individual trade policy preferences mostly proxies a country’s degree of human
capital abundance hc by its GDP per capita. However, GDP per capita is positively correlated
with the quality of schooling across countries and the extent to which countries participate in
intra-industry trade; see Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) and Beaulieu et al. (2011), respectively.
Both relations may alter the effect of individual skill on trade policy preferences and can thus
exacerbate identification. Therefore, we exploit the fact that each national survey sample
is representative for the country’s population as a whole. More precisely, we measure hc by
each country’s weighted average of the individual skill variable18, which is a direct measure
15We have also applied alternative dummy definitions. In particular, we have assigned non-respondents
to either the pro-trade or the anti-trade group of people. All qualitative results reported in this paper are
insensitive to this type of recoding.
16Strictly hierarchical classes are (0) no formal education or incomplete primary education, (1) complete
primary education, (2) incomplete secondary education (technical/vocational), (3) complete secondary educa-
tion (technical/vocational) / incomplete secondary education (university-preparatory) / complete secondary
education (university-preparatory), (4) some university education (without degree), (5) university education
(with degree). There is some cross-country heterogeneity in the survey categories of educational attain-
ment. More information on how we map country-specific groups of educational attainment into the above
hierarchical structure is available upon request.
17An alternative, more flexible model specification uses dummy variables for the different educational
categories. This pays attention to the fact that differences in educational attainment reflect an ordinal
instead of a cardinal scale. The estimates (not reported) do not alter any of the conclusions drawn in this
paper.
18Employing the median instead of the mean yields virtually identical results.
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of human capital abundance.19
<< Figures 8.1(a) and 8.1(b) about here >>
Rodrik (1995) points out that individual trade policy preferences are an input in the
political decision process and will therefore co-determine actual trade policies. Our survey
data allow for a rough inspection of this claim. Combining information from Global Trade
Alert (GTA) and the GAP survey, Figure 8.1(a) plots the plain count of protectionist policy
measures between May 01, 2009, and October 31, 2010, against average trade opinions in
2007 for the cross-section of 47 countries.20
The figure suggests a significant relationship between voting bodies’ preferences and im-
plemented trade policies. Countries in which people hold more trade-skeptical views tend
to have governments which are more inclined towards protectionist policies. The linear pre-
diction shows that a one-point increase in the four-valued ordered trade opinion variable is
associated with a reduction by 50 protectionist policy measures in the considered time span.
This is more than double the median number of registered policy measures.21
Figure 8.1(b) unveils an important link between a country’s stage of development and
people’s attitudes towards trade. Rich countries are on average more trade-skeptical than
poor countries. Pure country-average income differences account for as much as one-fifth
of the variation in average trade opinions. For example, there is very high acceptance of
international trade in extremely poor African countries, but also in emerging Asian and
East-Asian markets such as China, India, and Malaysia. Individuals in Arab and Latin
American countries are significantly less pro-trade, while the evidence from European Union
member countries is mixed. Finally, on average, U.S. citizens hold the least positive opinions
towards international trade.
19Sampling weights correct for deviations from random sampling.
20GTA is a recently established academic initiative for monitoring state policies that may detrimentally
affect global trade integration in one way or the other. It is coordinated by the Centre for Economic Policy
Research (CEPR), London, UK. See Table A.3 in Appendix A for a definition of protectionist policy measures
and http://www.globaltradealert.org for more information on this data source.
21The evidence also suggests that this relationship becomes tighter, the more democratic a political regime
is. To see this, we regress the count of protectionist policy measures on the main and interaction terms of the
average trade opinion and the country’s democracy index (from the Economist Intelligence Unit). Results
show that the link between voter attitudes and policies is strongest in the most democratic countries such as
Sweden, and practically non-existent in authoritarian regimes such as China.
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8.3 Regression results
In the first subsection, we present Probit estimates of a na¨ıve model of free trade preferences,
where non-linearities in the effect of individual skill on trade attitudes are not taken into
account.22 Subsection constitutes the core of our regression analysis and reports estimates
of equations (8.3) and (8.3’) in the LPM and the Probit model, respectively. In Subsection
8.3.3, we show that the relevance of the factor endowments model is independent of other
factors such as individual economic awareness and openness towards foreign cultures and
ideas. Finally, in Subsection 8.3.4, address the rather general concern that individuals’ policy
preferences are not driven solely by economic self-interest.
8.3.1 Na¨ıve Probit model
The main motivation for our na¨ıve regression model is to make two sources of endogeneity
visible which existing literature has not been able to address simultaneously. The first con-
cerns the fact that the estimation sample’s country composition exerts a significant influence
on estimated coefficients of individual skill. The second source of endogeneity is omitted vari-
able bias when not controlling for individual income. For our purposes, we split the sample
of 47 countries into two subsamples. The first covers the top 50% of countries by their GDP
per capita (“higher-income countries”), the second all remaining countries (“lower-income
countries”). Table 8.1 reports estimation results of the na¨ıve model in a Probit framework.
Columns (1) to (4) are based on the sample with higher-income countries and report
marginal effects for the average individual in the estimation sample. First and foremost,
we find a positive and robustly significant effect of individual skill on free trade preferences.
The probability of being pro-trade increases by more than one-and-a-half percentage points
for each discrete “jump” to the next higher level of educational attainment. This effect is
significant in both a statistical and an economic sense, given that we distinguish among six
education groups. Apart from individual skill, the column (1) model explains trade attitudes
by an individual’s age, gender, and a comprehensive set of country fixed effects. Our results
are in line with those reported in related literature. Specifically, we find that older and female
people hold more skeptical views towards trade.
22Throughout our analysis, we estimate heteroskedastic robust standard errors to immunize inference
against misspecification; see White (1980). Given our assumptions in Subsection 8.2.2, stochastic and non-
stochastic country effects (σc and bc) induce correlation among individual observations within country clus-
ters. Whenever we introduce country fixed effects, however, the γc’s capture any such type of within-country
correlation. At any rate, inference based on cluster robust standard errors may be misleading if the number
of clusters is small as in our case (< 50); see Cameron & Miller (2010).
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<< Table 8.1 about here >>
In columns (2) to (4) we successively control for individual income, religiousness, and
employment status, in addition to the other covariates. For our sample of higher-income
countries, the skill effect is marginally reduced when controlling for Income in column (2).
An increase in income by one percent raises the predicted probability of being pro-trade
by more than one-and-a-half percentage points. Being tied to religious beliefs is associated
with more protectionist attitudes, but the effect is quantitatively small and not statistically
different from zero.23 The opposite holds true for employed people, who feature a predicted
probability of favoring free trade which is two percentage points higher than that of their
unemployed peers.
Columns (5) to (8) report regression results for the sample of lower-income countries.
The picture is quite different from that based on higher-income countries. Most importantly,
the marginal effect of individual skill loses a great deal of its strength, even if we do not
control for income; see column (5). Once we do control for it in columns (6) to (8), it
vanishes completely. Furthermore, we find an enhanced role for individual income with a
marginal effect equal to three percentage points. In turn, other individual attributes such
as religiousness, gender, and employment status are no significant predictors of free trade
preferences.
These results uncover two important points. The first is that estimated coefficients of Skill
are upward biased if the estimation sample mostly comprises rich human capital abundant
countries (sampling bias). The second states that individual income is positively correlated
with both individual skill and free trade preferences and, if omitted from the model, results
in overestimation of the skill effect (omitted variable bias).
8.3.2 Heckscher-Ohlin model
The preliminary analysis in the previous subsection suggests that the effect of individual skill
on free trade preferences correlates with country characteristics. Although the results are in
line with the Stolper-Samuelson logic, they do not serve as a test of Hypotheses 1 and 2. This
test is the purpose of this subsection, exploiting the full country coverage of our sample. We
first turn to estimation of equation (8.3) in a linear probability model.24 Results are reported
23A drawback is that the variable is binary and does not distinguish among different religious groups; see
Daniels (2005) for the effect of religious affiliation on people’s attitudes towards a number of international
policy issues. Lewer & Van den Berg (2007) estimate a gravity equation in order to study the role of religion
for bilateral trade flows.
24Throughout most of our regression analysis, the linear models predict probabilities of being pro-trade
outside the closed unit interval for about half a percent of all estimation sample observations. Whenever
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in columns (1) to (4) of Table 8.2.
Throughout all specifications employed, the estimated coefficient of individual skill has a
negative sign while that of the interaction term is positive. The estimation outcome is robust
(in a qualitative sense) to controlling for individual income and including other individual-
level covariates such as religiousness and employment status. Our estimates suggest that
the effect of individual skill is an increasing function of a country’s degree of human capital
abundance. In accordance with Hypotheses 1 and 2, high-skilled individuals are more likely to
favor free trade than low-skilled individuals, but only if they live in countries with sufficiently
high relative levels of human capital. By contrast, in labor-abundant economies it is the low-
skilled people who are more inclined towards free trade, other things equal. Our evidence
substantially strengthens the findings in Mayda & Rodrik (2005), Scheve & Slaughter (2006),
and O’Rourke (2006), because it is based on a correctly identified interaction effect, explicit
endowment information, and a novel extensive data set.
<< Table 8.2 about here >>
To fully grasp the quantitative implications, we plot the marginal effect of individual skill
on the probability of being pro-trade against a country’s relative endowment with human
capital. Figure 8.2(a) visualizes
̂∆ Pr(Yic = 1|·)
∆hic
= γˆ1 + γˆ2 · hc (8.8)
as well as the 90% confidence intervals for the regression that corresponds to column (4)
in Table 8.2. The marginal effect of individual skill has a positive sign for countries with
a weighted mean of individual skill above h∗c = 2.1 and a negative sign for countries below
this threshold. For example, in Morocco and Tanzania, individuals with the highest skill
level (university eduction with degree) feature a predicted probability of opposing free trade
which is almost seven percentage points higher than that of an individual with the lowest
skill level (no formal or incomplete primary education), other things equal. In the U.S., on
the other end of the distribution of human capital abundance, the skill effect runs into the
opposite direction: going from the lowest to the highest skill level increases an individual’s
predicted probability of being in favor of free trade by twelve percentage points. In countries
with degrees of human capital abundance close to the threshold h∗c , the model predicts a
zero-effect on individual trade preferences for a given change in individual skill.
outside the unit interval, predictions exceed one, but only by a marginal amount.
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Importantly, we again find that omitting Income from the model implies a significant
bias in estimated coefficients.25 First, quantitative differences in the impact of Skill across
countries are magnified when we control for Income in column (2), compared to estimates
in column (1). This finding strengthens Hypothesis 2. Second, in column (1) only three
out of our 47 countries have a predicted effect of skill that is negative, where all of these
countries are on the African continent. In contrast, the subsequent models imply a much
higher threshold value h∗c . Therefore, the number of countries with a predicted marginal
effect below zero increases, with 13 countries out of 47 (more than a fourth of all countries)
featuring a negative impact of Skill on the likelihood of supporting free trade, including both
African, Middle-Eastern as well as Asian economies. This result is vital for our treatment of
the H-O model since it implies that Hypothesis 1 is supported by the data as well.26
<< Figures 8.2(a) and 8.2(b) about here >>
Next, we evaluate the robustness of the above findings in a Probit framework. Since
the Probit model does not allow us to include country fixed effects, two threats to valid
inference arise. First, omitted variables at the country level (contributing to bc) could render
parameter estimates inconsistent. Second, stochastic and (unobserved components of) non-
stochastic country effects (σc and bc) in the error term cast doubt on the validity of ordinary
and heteroskedastic robust standard errors alike. We tackle these problems by assigning each
country to one of eight world regions and controlling for effects common to all countries
located in the same world region; see Table A.2 in Appendix A. Furthermore, we include an
extensive set of country-level control variables.27
Columns (5) to (8) of Table 8.2 report marginal and interaction effects, computed from
parameter estimates of variants of equation (8.3’) and evaluated at estimation sample averages
of all covariates.28 The model again reveals a non-linearity in the relationship between
25Results from Table 8.1 seem to suggest that the impact of income on free trade preferences varies across
countries as well. However, in a robustness check to Table 8.2 where we include an interaction term of Income
with GDP per capita, we find contrary evidence in the sense that this latter interaction effect is insignificant.
26If we exclude individuals that are self-employed from the estimation sample, Hypothesis 1 is reinforced
further. This is reassuring because for self-employed individuals we would expect the impact of trade to be
driven by other factors than individual skill.
27These variables refer to both the country’s stage of development (GDP per capita, Country Mean of
Skill), institutions (Electoral Process, Political Pluralism and Participation, Functioning of Government,
Freedom of Speech and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law, Personal Autonomy and
Individual Rights), economic indicators (Trade Openness, Labor Force Share). See Table A.3 in Appendix A
for coding and data sources.
28To facilitate comparison to columns (1) to (4), in columns (5) to (8) the marginal effect of Skill is
evaluated at hc = 0 and at estimation sample averages of all other covariates. Similarly, reported marginal
effects of Country Mean of Skill are evaluated at hic = 0 when interacted with Skill.
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individual skill and free trade preferences consistent with the distributional predictions of
free trade in the H-O model. In human-capital-abundant countries high-skilled individuals
hold on average less protectionist attitudes than low-skilled individuals, and vice versa in
labor-abundant countries.
Such differences across countries can conveniently be identified through inspection of
Figure 8.2(b), which shows
̂∆ Pr(Yic = 1|·)
∆hic
= Φ′(γˆ0 + γˆ1 · h¯ic + γˆ2 · h¯ic × hc + γˆ3 · hc + αˆX¯′ic + βˆZ¯′c)[γˆ1 + γˆ2 · hc], (8.8’)
for regression results of columns (8), where αˆX¯′ic = αˆ1 · X¯ic1 + · · · + αˆL · X¯icL and βˆZ¯′c =
βˆ1 ·Z¯c1 + · · ·+ βˆK ·Z¯cK . In equation (8.8’) ‘bars’ indicate estimation sample averages and bold
letters represent vectors. The figure shows that the marginal effect of individual skill on free
trade preferences increases with a country’s relative endowment with human capital. The
range of relative endowments (Country Mean of Skill) with a negative predicted marginal
effect of individual skill is however somewhat reduced compared to the LPM. We suggest that
this highlights the importance of unobserved country effects, which are only partly captured
by the world region fixed effects and country-level variables. Overall, the data strongly
support both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, irrespective of the econometric model used.
Our country-specific variables also carry some interesting implications. Estimation re-
sults (not reported) show most such country characteristics to be significant predictors of
individual attitudes towards trade.29 For example, better functioning governments and bet-
ter associational and organizational rights are associated with more favorable views on trade.
The opposite holds true for higher degrees of political pluralism and participation as well as
personal autonomy and individual rights. Further research is needed to better understand
why free trade preferences respond differently to different aspects of the institutional archi-
tecture in which states and countries are embedded. An interesting step into this direction
can be found in Ehrlich (2007).
8.3.3 Conditioning on aspects of individual enlightenment
Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) argue that education is not a “clean” device for factor ownership,
because it could (i) spur people’s awareness of the aggregate gains from trade and (ii) make
individuals less amenable to nationalist ideas; see also Mayda & Rodrik (2005).30 Our model
29Regression results for the full set of country-level control variables are available on request from the
authors.
30The first aspect is a particularly serious concern in our application, because the question on trade
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could therefore suffer from omitted variable bias. However, this bias would apply equally
to all countries: our previous estimation results may overstate the positive effect of skill
in human-capital-abundant countries such as the United States and, by the same token,
understate the negative effect of skill in labor-abundant countries such as Tanzania. These
considerations reinforce rather than contradict our Stolper-Samuelson interpretation, because
they imply that we may have underestimated the set of countries with a negative skill effect.
In our regressions in Table 8.3 we return to the linear probability framework and condition
on aspects of both people’s economic awareness and their openness towards foreign cultures
and habits. Individual-specific controls are not applicable for Canada, the Czech Republic,
France, Germany, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
We therefore first reproduce our previous estimation results on the restricted sample for
which all of the additional control variables are available.31 The variation in the effect of Skill
across countries is reduced somewhat compared to estimates in Table 8.2, but the estimated
threshold value separating human capital abundant countries from labor abundant countries
even increases slightly.
<< Table 8.3 about here >>
In column (2), we add a four-valued ordered proxy variable to capture an individual’s
economic understanding, which could make individuals responsive to the aggregate gains
from trade (Economic Awareness). The survey design confronts respondents with a statement
which, we believe, calls for an affirmative reply of a person with some training in economics:
“Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and
some are poor.”32 The statement nicely encapsulates a basic principle of economics: that
“free markets are usually a good way to organize economic activity” but that they “can
nonetheless leave sizable disparities in economic well-being.” (Mankiw, 2008, pp. 8 & 12)33
Economic Awareness enters the model with a significant and positive coefficient, as expected.
Going from the answer category with the lowest value (“completely disagree” (0)) to that with
preferences does not address the distributional consequences of international trade within the respondent’s
country, but rather the implications for the country at large.
31To exclude the possibility that changes in estimated coefficients reflect mere changes in sample compo-
sition, we employ exactly the same estimation sample in all specifications.
32The questionnaire allows for four different answer categories, from “completely disagree” (0) to “com-
pletely agree” (3).
33Moreover, the question does not refer to issues such as international trade, trade liberalization, or
globalization, at least not explicitly. Answers to this question are thus not subject to what has been dubbed
justification bias in the literature on opinion polls. This type of bias would arise if individuals were partly
using their answers as a means of ex post justification for their (positive or negative) preferences towards
trade; see Malchow-Møller et al. (2009).
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the highest value (“completely agree” (3)) increases an individual’s probability of favoring
free trade by four-and-a-half percentage points.
Column (3) inspects the role of information in attitude formation and the possibility
that highly educated individuals are more likely to be exposed to relevant information on
the (aggregate) economic effects of trade policies. We include a measure of an individual’s
exposure to international news (Informed).34 The variable is indeed positively correlated
with an individual’s skill level (correlation coefficient equal to 0.06). Yet, our regression
results suggest that exposure to information does not exert any significant impact on trade
policy preferences.
Material self-interest may be less important for trade attitudes than perceptions of the
effects of trade on the economy as a whole; see Mansfield & Mutz (2009). A more general
treatment of this concern is delegated to Subsection 8.3.4. Here we ask whether the extent to
which individuals hold sociotropic views makes a difference for perceptions of international
trade. An individual’s affirmation of the following statement may yield informative insights
in this regard: “Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower
economic growth and some loss of jobs.”.35 The underlying question posits a trade-off between
environmental protection and economic growth and the availability of jobs, the latter securing
personal income. The positive and significant coefficient of Sociotropic Views in column (4) is
consistent with the interpretation that a tendency towards environmental protection reveals
sociotropic attitudes.
We next turn to aspects of nationalist dispositions. Column (5) controls for fears that
increasing globalization may crowd out local traditions. We exploit survey information on
whether individuals agreed or not with the following statement: “It’s good that American
ideas and customs are spreading around the world.”36 The negative and significant coefficient
of Fears of Cultural Spill-Overs shows that pro-trade views go hand in hand with openness
towards foreign cultures and habits. Column (6) incorporates feelings of national superiority
through a four-valued ordered variable constructed from individual responses towards the
34This variable is based on the following survey question: “Which of the following two statements best
describes you: ‘I follow INTERNATIONAL news closely ONLY when something important is happening.’
OR ‘I follow INTERNATIONAL news closely most of the time, whether or not something important is
happening’?”. The indicator Informed is coded (1) for individuals who choose the second statement.
35The variable Sociotropic Views takes on integer values from 0 (“completely disagree”) to 3 (“completely
agree”).
36The dichotomous variable Fears of Cultural Spill-Overs is coded (1) if respondents take a positive stance
on spreading American ideas and customs, and (0) for negative views. Obviously, answers to this question are
heavily loaded by the explicit reference to the United States. Our data show that anti-American sentiments
are popular in both developing and developed countries. That said, we argue that our indicator variable also
captures fears of the cultural impact of globalization in general, and we expect the purely American-specific
element to be independent of individual trade policy preferences.
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following statement (Nationalism): “Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior
to others.”37 “Nationalist” people are, surprisingly, more likely to be pro-trade. While this
finding conflicts with the intuition that nationalist sentiments should foster preferences for
isolationist policies, feelings of national superiority may mitigate worries that the domestic
economy is not able to cope with foreign competition.
The model in column (7) takes a closer look at the extent to which individuals are afraid
of negative economy-wide effects from international competition. The binary variable Fears
of International Competition is based on the following survey question: “Turning to China,
overall do you think that China’s growing economy is a good thing or a bad thing for our coun-
try?” Though economic growth of one country may in principle be good or bad for another
country, we expect people who perceive another country’s growth as a threat rather than an
opportunity to be more likely to retain protectionist attitudes. Indeed, individuals who fear
negative repercussions from China’s growing economy (Fears of International Competition
coded (1)) have a significantly lower probability of favoring free trade by as much as seven
percentage points.
Finally, column (8) gives results from the most encompassing model which conditions on
all aspects of individual enlightenment simultaneously. Various aspects of individual enlight-
enment exist, and most of them are significantly linked to individual trade policy preferences.
However, our main focus is on parameter estimates for Skill and its interaction with Country
Mean of Skill, which do not change significantly relative to the baseline specification in col-
umn (1). To put results into perspective, we conclude that controlling for individual income
is more important for the identification of Stolper-Samuelson effects than is conditioning on
individual’s economic awareness, aspects of culture, or the like.
8.3.4 Economic self-interest versus social values and identity
Whether social values and identity or pure material self-interest are dominant in shaping
individual political behavior is an ongoing scientific debate. The literature as it currently
stands takes the view that both factors are potentially important, depending on how clear-
cut the policy alternatives and implications are and how long the time horizon is to which
these apply; see e.g. Chong et al. (2001), Ehrlich et al. (2010), and Hunt et al. (2010). In
this paper, the assumption that individuals prefer a certain policy choice over another if it
brings about a greater (expected) personal income is pivotal. In this subsection, we exploit
the idea that in individual decision making the weight put on material self-interest is larger
37Again, the survey allows for four different answers, ranging from “completely disagree” (0) to “completely
agree” (3).
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for some individuals than for others. The absence of economic and financial concerns may
signal that material self-interest is less influential because it erodes the need for individuals
to base their decisions on mere pocketbook considerations. This should also affect the extent
to which Hypotheses 1 and 2 are borne out by the data.
Our strategy is to divide the entire sample into two groups, the first of which includes only
individuals who express economic and/or financial concerns and the second all the remaining
individuals. This distinction is based on answers to the following question in the GAP survey:
“What do you think is the most important problem facing you and your family today?” The
questionnaire allows for a maximum of three answers and is open in the sense that pollers do
not present or read out a list with possible answers to individuals. We identify responses refer-
ring to problems which are relevant from a very economic/financial perspective. Individuals
whose answers fall into at least one such category are classified as “economically/financially
concerned”.38 One might be tempted to expect the skill distribution to draw a sharp line
between the two groups of individuals, but the evidence proves contrary. For example, close
to one sixth of individuals who express economic and/or financial concerns have exposure to
at least some university education, as opposed to 23 percent for the other group. We run the
same regressions separately on each of the two subsamples, estimating the effect of Skill and
its interaction with Country Mean of Skill and bringing in different sets of control variables;
see Table 8.4.
<< Table 8.4 about here >>
We find the estimates based on the sample with “economically/financially concerned”
individuals to neatly reflect the Stolper-Samuelson logic; see columns (1) to (4). The quan-
titative implications are similar to those in the previous subsection, at least for models in
which we use the same set of control variables as in our benchmark regressions. Column (4)
applies a specification similar to that in column (8) of Table 8.3, controlling for all aspects of
individual enlightenment. In this model, the predicted negative skill effect extends to a larger
set of countries, as compared to Table 8.3. This set now includes labor-abundant China, for
example. Estimates on the subsample with individuals who do not express economic and/or
38In the survey, each of the answers is assigned to one of the following categories: “Economic/financial
problems”, “Health”, “Education and children”, “Housing”, “Social relations”, “Work”, “Transportation”,
“Crime”, “Problems related to government”, “Terrorism and war”, “Other”. Each category comprises two
to six pre-specified subcategories plus a “residual” group for answers which do not fit into any one of the
given subcategories. We categorize the following subcategories as indicating economic or financial concerns:
“Low wages”, “Unemployment”, “Poverty”, “Other economic/financial problems”, and “Lack of good jobs”.
Answers to the survey question are again not applicable for a relevant subset of countries in the GAP. We are
left with roughly 17,000 individual observations with economic and/or financial concerns and 12,000 without.
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financial concerns, while similar with respect to all control variables, yield complementary
insights; see columns (5) to (8). In particular, the data do not confirm Hypothesis 1 as there
is no country in the sample for which a given positive change in Skill entails a significant
decline in individual support for free trade.
The factor endowments model thus may have significant explanatory power in understand-
ing trade attitudes of individuals whose concerns about their personal financial situation loom
large in their preference structures. However, with other factors such as social values and
identity gaining relative importance in individual decision making, this explanatory power
seems to be reduced.
8.4 Conclusion
Motivated by the incidence of the growing North-South share in world trade and the ris-
ing demand for protection in high-income countries, this paper contributes to the empirical
literature on individual attitudes towards trade. Using a wide cross section of 47 countries
from all over the world, we focus on the interplay between individual factor ownership and
countries’ relative factor endowments. The linear probability model can be used to straight-
forwardly examine how this interplay is shaping free trade preferences. We argue that our
approach has important advantages over the commonly applied Probit model.
Our evidence suggests that the H-O model, one of the most influential models in the the-
ory of international trade, has a significant stake in explaining the formation of trade policy
preference at the individual level. Stolper-Samuelson-type distributional effects of trade pol-
icy interventions account for a significant share of the heterogeneity of free trade preferences
across individuals and countries both in statistical and economic terms. In the United States,
being high-skilled increases an individual’s predicted probability of favoring free trade by up
to twelve percentage points. In Ethiopia, the effect amounts to eight percentage points, but
in exactly the opposite direction. Our results derive from a novel survey data set, and they
are robust to conditioning on aspects of individual enlightenment.
The empirical support for the factor endowments model may appear puzzling, given that
the neoclassical assumptions are often blamed to be patently false. In fact, economists have
long struggled with bringing the Heckscher-Ohlin model to actual trading data in a meaning-
ful way. That said, our empirical analysis does prove that an individual’s revealed preference
towards trade policy includes an element which is responsive to the relative abundance of
his or her production factor in the domestic economy. This element turns out to shape atti-
tudes towards trade policies in a way that exactly mirrors the predictions of the H-O model.
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This result becomes elucidating if interpreted against the notion of factors being embodied
in traded goods and services. Broadly speaking, it tells us that people are sensitive towards
how an integrated world economy may affect the relative scarcity of their factors, compared
to an autarky situation.
Figures and tables
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Figure 8.1. Trade policy preferences and protection/GDP per capita
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Figure 8.2. The marginal effect of skill as a function of human capital abundance
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Table 8.1. Na¨ıve Probit model†Table 1: Na¨ıve Probit M ela
Dependent Variable: Individual-Specific Pro-Trade Dummy
Higher-Income Countries Lower-Income Countries
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.006*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Income 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Religious -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Unemployed -0.020** 0.006
(0.008) (0.007)
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.019*** 0.017** 0.015** 0.015** 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 15,208 13,055 13,011 13,011 23,129 20,207 20,051 19,431
Countries 24 23 23 23 23 23 23 22
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.087 0.089 0.090 0.093
a The table gives the marginal effects, evaluated at estimation sample averages, for each explanatory variable on the probability of being pro-trade
in a Probit model. For a description of individual-specific variables see the text and table A.1 in the appendix. Heteroskedastic robust standard
errors are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
2
4
† he table gives the marginal effects, evaluated at estimation sample averages, for each explanatory variable on the probability of being pro-trade in
a Probit model. For a description of indivi ual-specific variables se the text and Table A.1 in Appendix A. Heteroskeda tic robust standard errors
are given in parentheses. *,**,** denote sig ificance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, resp ctiv ly.
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Table 8.2. Heckscher-Ohlin model†Table 2: Heckscher-Ohli Modela
Dependent Variable: Individual-Specific Pro-Trade Dummy
Linear Probability Model Probit Model
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill -0.018*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.022***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Skill × 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
Country Mean of Skill (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Country Mean of Skill -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.042***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Income 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Religious -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Unemployed -0.008 -0.022***
(0.005) (0.005)
Age -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.009** 0.008* 0.007 0.006 0.010*** 0.009** 0.007 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 38,337 33,262 33,062 32,442 37,111 32,545 32,354 31,734
Countries 47 46 46 45 45 45 45 44
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
World Region Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-level Control Variables No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.068 – – – –
Pseudo-R2 – – – – 0.052 0.050 0.051 0.053
a Columns (1) to (4) give the marginal effects for each explanatory variable on the probability of being pro-trade in a linear probability model.
Columns (5) to (8) give the marginal effects, evaluated at estimation sample averages, for each explanatory variable on the probability of being
pro-trade in a Probit model. The first row for the Probit model evaluates the marginal effect of Skill at hc = 0 and at estimation sample averages
of all other covariates. Similarly, reported marginal effects of Country Mean of Skill are evaluated at hic = 0 when interacted with Skill. For a
descriptions of variables see the text and tables A.1 and A.3 in the appendix. World region fixed effects refer to world regions as in table A.2 in the
appendix. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
2
5
† Columns (1) to (4) i e t i l i a linear probability odel.
Columns (5) to (8) give the argi al ffects, l t t r ilit of being
pro-trade in a Probit odel. he first r f r t it l l t t i l ff t f ill t at esti atio sa ple averages
of all other covariates. Si ilarly, reported arginal effects of ountry ean of Skill are evaluated at hic 0 hen interacted ith Skill. For a
descriptions of variables see the text and Tables A.1 and A.3 in Appendix A. World region fixed effects refer to world regions as in Table A.2 in
Appendix A. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 8.3. Conditioning on aspects of individual enlightenment (LPM)†Table 3: Conditi ing o Aspects of Indivi l Enlightenment (LPM)a
Dependent Variable: Individual-Specific Pro-Trade Dummy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Skill × 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
Country Mean of Skill (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Income 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Economic Awareness 0.015*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003)
Informed -0.005 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Sociotropic Views 0.010*** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
Fears of -0.025*** -0.021***
Cultural Spill-Overs (0.005) (0.005)
Nationalism 0.007** 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003)
Fears of -0.074*** -0.072***
Internt’l Competition (0.007) (0.007)
Age -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 22,378 22,378 22,378 22,378 22,378 22,378 22,378 22,378
Countries 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.070 0.071 0.070 0.070 0.071 0.070 0.077 0.080
a The table gives the marginal effects for each explanatory variable on the probability of being pro-trade in a linear probability model. For
a description of individual-specific variables see the text and table A.1 in the appendix. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are given in
parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
26
† The table gives the marginal effects for each explanatory va iable on the probability of being pro-trade in a linear probability m del. For a descripti n
of individual-spec fic ariables see the text and Table A.1 in Appendix A. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are given in pa entheses. *,**,***
denote significance at th 10%, 5%, 1% l vels, r spectively.
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Table 8.4. Economic self-interest versus social values and identity (LPM)†Table 4: Economic Self-Interest versus Soci Values an Identity (LPM)a
Dependent Variable: Individual-Specific Pro-Trade Dummy
“Economically/Financially Concerned” “Economically/Financially Unconcerned”
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill -0.017** -0.015** -0.015** -0.022*** -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Skill × 0.008** 0.007** 0.007** 0.009** 0.007** 0.008** 0.008** 0.007*
Country Mean of Skill (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Income 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Religious -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.012 -0.012 -0.016*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Unemployed 0.003 0.007 -0.008 -0.008
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Age -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 17,136 16,655 16,538 12,575 12,303 12,160 12,094 9,272
Countries 38 37 37 37 38 37 37 37
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No Yes No No No Yes
R2 0.057 0.059 0.059 0.081 0.068 0.069 0.070 0.093
a The table gives the marginal effects for each explanatory variable on the probability of being pro-trade in a linear probability model. Additional
controls are Economic Awareness, Informed, Sociotropic Views, Fears of Cultural Spill-Overs, Nationalism and Fears of Internt’l Competition.
For a description of individual-specific variables see the text and table A.1 in the appendix. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are given in
parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
2
7
† he table gives t e r i l ff ts f l li r ili l. d itio l
controls are Economic Awareness, Informed, Sociotropic Views, Fears of Cultural Spill-Overs, Nationalism and Fears of Internt’l Competition. For a
description of individual-specific variables see the text and Table A.1 in Appendix A. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.1. Summary statistics for individual-level variables†Table A.1: Summary Statistics for I i idua -Level Variablesa
Arithmetic Standard
Variable Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Pro-Trade Dummy 38,684 0.86 0.34 0 1
Skill 40,637 2.50 1.56 0 5
Incomeb 35,131 6.16 1.60 -0.55 9.81
Religiousc 39,826 0.62 0.49 0 1
Unemployedd 40,515 0.34 0.47 0 1
Agee 40,614 39.57 15.55 18 97
Malef 40,826 0.49 0.50 0 1
Economic Awareness 33,978 1.86 0.92 0 3
Informed 38,842 0.54 0.50 0 1
Sociotropic Views 34,713 2.02 0.90 0 3
Fears of Cultural Spill-Overs 35,712 0.70 0.46 0 1
Nationalism 34,807 2.03 0.86 0 3
Fears of International Competition 30,987 0.28 0.45 0 1
a Summary statistics are not corrected for deviations from random sampling. Variables not described in the text are coded as follows:
b Income is measured by log of monthly real income. Survey respondents sort themselves into income groups, based on (country-specific) lists
of incomes. As a general rule, we compute individual income as the middle value of the income interval chosen by the individual, adjusted by
PPP conversion factors from the World Development Indicators, expressed in logs, and, if necessary, converted to a monthly basis. More detailed
information on this procedure is available upon request.
c Religious is based on the following survey item: “Which one of these comes closest to your opinion, number 1 or number 2?”; coded (1) “Number
2 – It is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values”/NA/refused, (0) “Number 1 – It is not necessary to believe in
God in order to be moral and have good values”.
d Unemployed is coded (1) unemployed/not employed, (0) employed.
e Age is the respondent’s age in years.
f Male is coded (1) male, (0) female.
32
† r st tistics re t c rrecte f r e i ti s fr rando sa pling. Variables not described in the text are coded as follows: bIncome
is measured by log of monthly real income. Survey respond nts ort themselves into income groups, based on (country-spe ific) lists of income .
As a general rule, w comput individual income as the middl value of the income interval ch sen by the individual, adjusted by PPP conv rsion
factors from the World Development Indicators, expressed in logs, and, if necessary, converted to a monthly basis. More detailed information on this
procedure is available upon request. cReligious is based on the following survey item: “Which one of these comes closest to your opinion, number 1
or number 2?”; coded (1) “Number 2 – It is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values”/NA/refused, (0) “Number 1 – It
is not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values”. dUnemployed is coded (1) unemployed/not employed, (0) employed.
eAge is the respondent’s age in years. fMale is coded (1) male, (0) female.
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Table A.2. Country-level information†able A.2: Country-Level I a
Country Mean of GDP Per Capita Country Mean
World Region Country Obs. Pro-Trade Dummy (in Logs) of Skill
Asia China 2,998 0.96 8.41 2.01
Pakistan 1,728 0.95 7.74 1.69
Malaysia 670 0.95 9.41 2.47
India 1,988 0.92 7.78 3.65
Bangladesh 986 0.91 7.02 1.63
South Korea 681 0.90 10.01 3.70
Indonesia 949 0.75 8.12 2.26
Japan 683 0.80 10.34 3.34
Eastern Europe Bulgaria 461 0.95 9.21 2.95
Ukraine 478 0.94 8.70 3.48
Russia 941 0.87 9.45 2.95
Slovakia 440 0.85 9.75 3.06
Poland 468 0.83 9.57 2.49
Czech Republic 446 0.80 9.97 2.94
Middle East Kuwait 481 0.95 3.61
Israel 865 0.93 10.06 3.60
Lebanon 972 0.85 9.15 2.58
Turkey 830 0.85 9.01 1.97
Jordan 974 0.74 8.41 1.74
Palestinian 771 0.72 8.16 2.83
Northern Africa Morocco 864 0.80 8.24 1.16
Egypt 957 0.63 8.48 1.74
North America Canada 485 0.85 10.48 3.48
USA 964 0.63 10.66 3.66
Rest of Africa Senegal 694 0.96 7.34 1.45
Ghana 662 0.95 7.10 2.37
Kenya 981 0.95 7.26 1.95
Cte d’Ivoire 700 0.95 7.38 2.64
South Africa 949 0.91 9.08 2.48
Ethiopia 686 0.90 6.42 2.06
Tanzania 650 0.89 6.87 1.29
Nigeria 1,107 0.87 7.35 2.67
Mali 695 0.86 6.93 1.90
Uganda 1,063 0.86 6.76 1.58
South America Chile 769 0.91 9.44 2.54
Peru 774 0.84 8.84 2.31
Bolivia 791 0.84 8.25 2.59
Venezuela 790 0.80 9.28 2.82
Mexico 796 0.80 9.38 2.25
Argentina 700 0.78 9.36 2.10
Brazil 958 0.74 9.07 2.61
Western Europe Sweden 471 0.91 10.41 3.71
Spain 456 0.91 10.23 2.49
Germany 495 0.86 10.35 3.16
UK 467 0.84 10.38 3.29
France 500 0.79 10.34 2.96
Italy 450 0.77 10.25 2.84
a In each world region, countries are ranked according to the country mean of Pro-Trade Dummy. Sampling weights
correct for deviations from random sampling. GDP data for Kuwait is not available. See the text and tables A.1 and
A.3 for coding information on all variables.
33
† In each world region, countries are ranked according to the country mean of Pro-Trade Dummy.
Sampling weights correct for deviations from random sampling. GDP data for Kuwait is not available.
See the text and Tables A.1 and A.3 for coding information on all variables.
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Table A.3. Coding information and data sources for country-level data†Table A.3: Coding Information and Data S urces for Country-Level Data
Variable Description and Coding
GDP Per Capitaa GDP per capita (in logs) as of 2006 in international dollars, calculated based on PPP conversion
factors.
Country Mean of Skillb Country average of Skill. Sampling weights correct for deviations from random sampling.
Electoral Processc Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 12; higher values correspond to better institutional
quality.
Political Pluralism & Participationc Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 16; higher values correspond to higher degrees of
pluralism and participation.
Functioning of Governmentc Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 12; higher values correspond to better functioning of
governments.
Freedom of Speech & Belief c Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 16; higher values correspond to higher degrees of freedom.
Associational & Organizational Rightsc Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 12; higher values correspond to stronger rights.
Rule of Lawc Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 16; higher values correspond to better qualities of judicial
institutions.
Personal Autonomy & Individual Rightsc Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 16; higher values correspond to higher degrees of
autonomy.
Trade Opennessd Exports plus imports over GDP.
Labor Force Sharea Share of labor force in total population as of 2006.
Protectionist Policy Measurese Count of protectionist policy measures between May 01, 2009, and October 31, 2010. By defi-
nition, protectionist policy measures have been “implemented and almost certainly discriminate
against foreign commercial interests” (red measures) or have been “either implemented and may
involve discrimination against foreign commercial interests” or have been announced/are under
consideration and would (if implemented) almost certainly involve discrimination against foreign
commercial interests” (amber measures).
Data sources:
a World Development Indicators.
b GAP survey data.
c Freedom House; data as of 2007.
d Penn World Tables.
e Global Trade Alert.
3
4
† ata so rces: aWorld Development Indicators. bGAP survey data. cFreedom House; data as of 2007. dPenn World Tables. eGlobal Trade Alert.
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Chapter9
Does factor abundance shape free
traders? Theory and evidence
This chapter is based on joint work with Ina C. Ja¨kel (previously unpublished).
9.1 Introduction
The political economy of trade policy treats observed levels of protection as equilibrium levels
of protection in the political market.1 While the supply function of protection is strongly
tied to the primitives of the political system, the demand for protection in some way derives
from domestic preferences towards trade policy. These preferences quite possibly reflect the
income effects of protection on domestic factor owners.2 Identifying the relevant factor-price
effects of trade policy can thus help understand the sorting of workers into groups of trade
skeptics and free traders, as well as observed differences in the level of protection across
countries and over time.
This paper shows that the factor-price effects of protection in the neoclassical trade model
are reflected in how individuals perceive international trade and protection in a large number
of countries. It is the first to confront the many-factor-many-good Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek
1Examples are Goldberg & Maggi (1999) and Dutt & Mitra (2002), who test the predictions of the pro-
tection for sale model (Grossman & Helpman, 1994) and the median voter model (Mayer, 1984), respectively.
For literature surveys, see Nelson (1988) and Rodrik (1995). Gawande & Krishna (2003) survey the empirical
literature.
2Saying that mere “pocketbook” considerations are the only (or predominant) force in explaining prefer-
ences towards protection would seem odd, of course. But saying that they are completely irrelevant would
surely seem equally odd. The fundamental question for economics is what model of the economy best describes
preference formation at the level of factor owners.
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(HOV) model with international survey data on public opinion.3 Extending the literature in
this direction seems important because the HOV model places no restriction on the number
of factors or goods and is compatible with (technology-induced) imperfect factor mobility
across industries.
Neoclassical trade theory draws attention to cross-country differences in (relative) factor
endowments as a source of comparative advantage. In the two-factor-two-good Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model, a country’s abundant factor gains from free trade at the
expense of the country’s scarce factor. This well-known proposition obtains by virtue of
combining the Stolper-Samuelson theorem with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. In this paper,
we derive a similar testable proposition in the more general HOV model with many factors
and many goods, drawing upon the work of Ethier (1982, 1984) and Deardorff (1980, 1982).
These and other authors have succeeded in generalizing many of the results of the HOS model
to higher dimensions, although in a much weaker form. The novel proposition that we bring
to the data states that a country’s abundant factors on average gain from free trade, relative
to the country’s scarce factors.
Confronting the neoclassical trade model with international survey data is not trivial.
The literature (e.g. Mayda & Rodrik (2005)) documents that the labor market skills of
workers, interpreted as factors employed in production, correlate with individual trade pol-
icy preferences in a way that is roughly consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson logic in the
HOS model. However, one may wonder about the correct interpretation of this result, be-
cause differences in labor market skills account in and of themselves for a large part of the
heterogeneity in workers’ attitudes towards trade. For example, high-skilled managers and
professionals welcome globalization due to their advanced educational background as well
as their private and professional network (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2006; Mansfield & Mutz,
2009). A key challenge is therefore to disentangle the factor-price effects of protection due
to comparative advantage from these other effects specific to workers’ labor market skills. It
is probably fair to say that neither the early studies in the literature (Scheve & Slaughter,
2001; O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2001; Mayda & Rodrik, 2005) nor their many follow-up papers
have done so in an entirely convincing way.4
3Empirical work based on the HOV model has a long tradition in international economics, starting with
Leamer (1980) and gaining renewed momentum with Trefler (1993, 1995). More recent contributions include
Davis & Weinstein (2001), Debaere (2003), and Romalis (2004). Balistreri (1997) invokes the HOV model
in order to examine Canadian attitudes towards the free trade agreement between Canada and the United
States.
4Papers using cross-country survey data are, for example, Beaulieu et al. (2005), O’Rourke (2006), Scheve
& Slaughter (2006), Mayda et al. (2007), and Ja¨kel & Smolka (2013). Hoffman (2009) and Blonigen (2011)
report evidence on trade policy preferences for the United States.
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We develop and apply a novel identification strategy to fill this gap in the literature. More
specifically, we exploit the within-factor variation in factor abundance across countries.5 This
allows us to hold workers’ labor market skills constant. Different from previous literature, our
approach requires outside data on endowments, trade, and production, in order to predict
each country’s vector of the (technology-adjusted) factor content of trade. We find indepen-
dent support for the neoclassical trade model in two different survey data sets, viz. the 2003
National Identity module from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the 2007
survey of the Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP). Owners of abundant factors (i.e., factors
intensively employed in comparative advantage industries) are robustly associated with more
positive attitudes towards trade than owners of scarce factors. Independently of this results,
we also find that workers with advanced labor market skills are more pro-trade than workers
with basic labor market skills. This last finding gives credit to Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006)
and Mansfield & Mutz (2009) in that it suggests individual labor market skills to exert an
independent influence on workers’ perceptions of international trade and protection.
The remainder of this paper is in four sections. Section 9.2 analyzes trade policy, factor
rewards, and individual utility in the HOV version of the neoclassical trade model. In Section
9.3, we introduce the data used in this chapter, and we discuss our empirical strategy and
estimation. In Section 9.4, we present our estimation results. The final section concludes.
9.2 Theory
There are many countries, indexed by c = 1, . . . , C; many production factors, indexed by
m = 1, . . .M ; and many industries, indexed by n = 1, . . . , N . Countries are open and small
in the sense that they trade goods (but not factors) and take prices on world markets as given.
Consumers have identical and homothetic preferences. Both goods and factor markets are
perfectly competitive and factors are perfectly mobile across industries, though technology
may be such that some factors are employed in a subset of industries only. The production
technology is linearly homogeneous but need not be identical in all countries. Each individual
living in country c is endowed with δc ∈ (0, 1) efficiency units of exactly one of the production
factors. The parameter δc thus reflects the technology level of country c (allowed to differ
across countries).6 In the following, we refer to a country’s endowment with some factor
5By the very nature of comparative advantage, a given production factor is abundant in some countries
and scarce in others.
6Trefler (1993) allows for all factors to differ in their productivities in every country relative to a bench-
mark country. Alternatively, technology differences can be modeled via differences in unit input coefficients
across countries; see Trefler (1995).
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m as its effective endowment with that factor. Factor price equalization (FPE) in terms of
effective factor prices is assumed to prevail under free trade.
In the analysis that follows, we derive policy-induced relative (rather than absolute)
factor price changes across owners of different factors. Specifically, we compare the free trade
equilibrium of some country c with a policy equilibrium in which domestic prices may differ
from world market prices. We assume that the government consumes the entire tariff revenue
from trade policy. This assumption allows us to abstract from the effects of trade policy other
than those on factor rewards.7 Relative factor price changes are therefore indicative of relative
income changes.
Assume that all goods are produced in both the policy and the free trade equilibrium.
Let pc = (p1c, . . . , pNc) and wc = (w1c, . . . , wMc) denote the vectors of goods and (effective)
factor prices, respectively. We write c(wc) = wcA(wc) for the vector of minimum unit-cost
functions where A is the (M×N) technology matrix with individual elements amn giving the
(effective) amount of factor m needed to produce one unit of good n. The market structure
implies zero profits in both equilibria. Hence, ppc = w
p
cA(w
p
c) and p
f = wfA(wf ) in the
policy equilibrium and the free trade equilibrium, respectively. Let Tfc = (T
f
1c, . . . , T
f
Nc)
denote the vector of net exports in the free trade equilibrium. Since we are interested in the
income effects of trade protection (rather than trade promotion), in the remainder of this
paper we assume that trade policy takes the form of import tariffs:
Assumption 1. pfn − ppnc ≤ 0 ∀n : T fnc < 0 and pfn − ppnc = 0 ∀n : T fnc > 0.
It follows from Assumption 1 that (pf − ppc)(Tfc )T ≥ 0, which implies
[c(wf )− c(wpc)](Tfc )T ≥ 0 (9.1)
due to zero profits. This inequality states that the cost of producing the vector of net exports
is higher when evaluated at free trade factor prices.
Define b(wc) ≡ c(wc)(Tfc )T as the cost of producing the vector of free trade net exports
evaluated at some factor price vector wc. Assume that b(wc) is continuous and differentiable
over the relevant parameter space. By virtue of the mean value theorem, there exists some
intermediate vector w˜c for which b(w
f )− b(wpc) = (wf −wpc) d b(w˜c). Noting the definitions
of b(wc) and c(wc), we have
[c(wf )− c(wpc)](Tfc )T = (wf −wpc)[A(w˜c) + w˜cdA(w˜c)](Tfc )T, (9.2)
7Alternatively, we could assume that the government redistributes any revenue from trade policy with a
poll subsidy.
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where cost minimization implies w˜cdA(w˜c) = 0. If the changes in goods prices are small
enough, we may set w˜c = w
f , so that (9.2) becomes
[c(wf )− c(wpc)](Tfc )T = (wf −wpc)A(wfc )(Tfc )T. (9.3)
Define FTc ≡ A(wf )(Tfc )T as the vector of country c’s factor content of trade in the free
trade equilibrium. The factor content of trade with some factor m, Fmc, is positive if the
amount of that factor embodied in production exceeds the amount embodied in consumption.
Define ∆fwc ≡ wf −wpc as the vector of factor price changes when switching from the policy
equilibrium to the free trade equilibrium. Then, (9.3) can be written as
[c(wf )− c(wpc)](Tfc )T = ∆fwcFTc ≥ 0, (9.4)
where the inequality derives from (9.1).
In the following, we normalize factor prices in country c to lie on the unit simplex,∑
mw
f
mc =
∑
mw
p
mc = 1. Prices are thus measured in terms of a factor bundle containing
one unit of each factor.
Proposition 1. Comparing the free trade equilibrium with the policy equilibrium, factor price
changes and the free-trade factor content of trade are positively correlated.
Proof. A positive correlation between the two variables exists if Cov(∆fwc,F
T
c ) ≥ 0. By
definition of the covariance, we have Cov(∆fwc,F
T
c ) = ∆fwcF
T
c −M Fc ∆fwc, where bars
indicate vector means. We know from (9.4) that the first term is positive. Hence, if either of
the two vectors has zero mean, we have Cov(∆fwc,F
T
c ) ≥ 0; see also Deardorff (1980). From
the normalization of factor prices,
∑
m ∆fwmc = 0 and thus ∆fwc = 0.
Proposition 1 is the cornerstone of our analysis. It states that, when switching from the
policy equilibrium to the free trade equilibrium, rewards of factors with an above-average
factor content of trade (under free trade) tend to increase relative to those of other factors.
These factor price changes are indirectly linked to the specific pattern of goods price changes.
In this sense, Proposition 1 is closely related to the higher-dimensional version of the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem in Ethier (1982, 1984).
The relationship between the factor content of trade and relative factor price changes
is also explored in Deardorff & Staiger (1988) and Deardorff (2000). These authors show
that changes in the factor content of trade between two trading equilibria are indicative of
changes in relative factor prices. Proposition 1, to the contrary, relates factor price differences
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between the policy equilibrium and the free trade equilibrium to the level of the factor content
of trade prevailing under free trade.
We now invoke the HOV theorem, which establishes the following link between factor
endowments and the factor content of trade in the integrated world equilibrium:
Fc = δcVc − sc
∑
δcVc, (9.5)
where sc is country c’s share in world consumption and δcVc = (δcV1c, . . . , δcVMc) denotes
the vector of effective factor endowments of country c.8 We refer to the right-hand side in
(9.5) as the predicted factor content of trade.
Let U(p, wmc) be the indirect utility of the owner of factor m, and let
∆fUmc ≡ U(pf , wfmc) − U(ppc , wpmc) be the corresponding utility difference when switching
from the policy equilibrium to the free trade equilibrium. Let Mc = {m : Fmc > Fc} denote
the set of factors with an above-average predicted factor content of trade in country c. Using
the HOV theorem in equation (9.5) along with Proposition 1 yields the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Comparing the free trade equilibrium with the policy equilibrium, on average
owners of factors with an above-average predicted factor content of trade gain relative to
owners of other factors: ∆fUmc ≥ ∆fUm′c, where m ∈Mc and m′ 6∈ Mc.
Proof. The inequality can be rewritten as
U(pf , wfmc)− U(ppc , wpmc) ≥ U(pf , wfm′c)− U(ppc , wpm′c).
Due to homothetic preferences, the indirect utility function U(p, w) is homogeneous of degree
one in w. Hence, the inequality can be written as U˜(pf )
(
wfmc − wfm′c
)
≥ U˜(ppc) (wpmc − wpm′c).
Due to Assumption 1, we have U˜(pf ) ≥ U˜(ppc). To prove Corollary 1, it is thus sufficient to
show that ∆fwmc ≥ ∆fwm′c. This follows from the fact that Cov(∆fwc,FTc ) ≥ 0 (Proposition
1), because m ∈ Mc and m′ 6∈ Mc, where by definition of Mc the m-factors have an
above-average predicted factor content of trade, whereas the m′-factors have a below-average
predicted factor content of trade.
We use Corollary 1 to derive testable predictions on how free trade preferences are sup-
posed to vary in a cross-section of individual factor owners. If a country’s factor content
of trade with some factor m is positive, the factor is said to be in abundant supply in that
country. Our first prediction relates to this common notion of factor abundance.
8Helpman & Krugman (1985) show that the HOV equation is actually implied by many models. Trefler
& Zhu (2010) characterize the class of models for which this is true.
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Prediction 1. Assume that in quantities the predicted factor content of trade in country c is
balanced under free trade: Fc = 0. Then, the owners of the abundant factors in that country
(m : Fmc ≥ 0) will on average hold more positive views towards free trade than the owners of
the scarce factors (m′ : Fm′c < 0).
In principle, Prediction 1 could be applied to a cross-section of individual factor owners
in a single country. This would however lead to an identification problem, because factor
ownership affects free trade preferences in and of itself. In an empirical application of Pre-
diction 1, it is therefore paramount to exploit the cross-country variation in the data, where
the same factor can be abundant in one country but scarce in another one. This can be
done without further ado by assuming that the free-trade predicted factor content of trade
is balanced in all countries we are looking at.
A problem with Prediction 1 could be that the predicted factor content of trade is not
balanced (Fc 6= 0), since this could lead to a misclassification of factors. If for example the
average predicted factor content of trade is positive, we would erroneously assign a factor
m with 0 < Fmc < Fc to the set of factors that are relatively better off in the free trade
equilibrium: Mc = {m : Fmc > Fc}. In order to get around this problem, we derive a
prediction that exploits the full variation in the predicted factor content of trade.
Prediction 2. Consider a given country c. The larger the predicted factor content of trade
for some factor m, the more likely it is that this factor belongs to the set of factors that are
relatively better off in the free trade equilibrium: Mc = {m : Fmc > Fc}. Hence, the larger
the predicted factor content of trade for some factor m, the more likely it is that the individual
factor owner will hold more positive views towards free trade.
Importantly, Prediction 2 applies to the cross-factor variation in the predicted factor
content of trade in a given country c. The first and second moments of the distribution of Fc
can be vastly different across countries. A test of Prediction 2 in a framework that exploits
the variation across both individuals and countries thus requires a careful empirical design.
9.3 Empirical approach
Corollary 1 sorts factor owners in each country into groups of winners and losers from free
trade. Predictions 1 and 2 link this result to individual attitudes towards free trade. We next
provide an empirical test of these two predictions. To this aim, we combine international
survey data on public opinion and data on country and world endowments with different
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factors of production.9
9.3.1 International survey data
Our empirical analysis explores two large-scale, internationally comparable survey data sets,
viz. the 2003 National Identity module from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP)
and the 2007 wave of the Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP). The two data sources exhibit
relevant differences in terms of content, framing of survey questions, and country coverage.
Confronting our predictions with two different datasets allows us to establish the generality
of our results and proves that findings are not driven by the features of a particular dataset.
Tables A.4 and A.5 in Appendix A provide summary statistics by country for the ISSP and
the GAP, respectively.
Our sample from the 2003 National Identity module of the ISSP includes information on
roughly 27,000 individuals from 28 countries, the majority of which are located in Europe
with middle and high incomes per capita.10 In the survey, respondents are asked for their
opinion on the use of protectionist measures:
“How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? [Respondent’s
country] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national
economy.”
We construct an individual-specific pro-trade indicator variable taking on the value one for
individuals who hold positive views towards free trade (answer categories “disagree strongly”
and “disagree”) and zero for those with neutral or negative views (answer categories “neither
agree nor disagree”, “agree”, and “agree strongly”). The binary coding mutes country-specific
tendencies towards extreme or moderate responses (extreme-response bias).11
The 2007 wave of the GAP constitutes our second survey data source. The estimation
sample includes information on 19,000 individuals from 28 countries. It offers a salient
coverage of economies at different stages of development, including developing countries in
Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. We exploit individual answers to the
following question:
9The construction of the data presented in Subsection 9.3.2 is described in more detail in Appendix A.
10For both the ISSP and the GAP, we restrict the sample to countries with information on endowments
and to individuals for which all basic survey items of interest have non-missing values.
11Calculating an index of extreme response as in Van Herk et al. (2004), we indeed find that some countries
exhibit a significantly higher share of extreme responses across survey items than do others. Cross-country
differences in the tendency to agree rather than disagree with certain statements (acquiescence-bias) are
absorbed into country fixed effects in the empirical model.
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“What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between [respon-
dent’s country] and other countries? Do you think it is a very good thing, some-
what good thing, somewhat bad thing or a very bad thing for your country?”
Again, we construct an indicator variable for being pro-trade coded one for individuals who
answered “very good thing” or “somewhat good thing” and zero otherwise (answer categories
“very bad thing” or “somewhat bad thing”).12
The framing of the survey question in the ISSP favors a skeptical view towards free trade
since the domestic economy is meant to be protected by imposing import restrictions. In
terms of our pro-trade indicator, less than 50% of respondents in each country are pro-trade.
This negative outlook on trade contrasts sharply with relatively favorable views in surveys
with a more neutral framing, most notably the GAP. In the latter survey, a majority of
individuals in all countries expresses favorable views towards trade, ranging from 60% in the
United States to 95% in Bulgaria, Malaysia and Pakistan. The respective biases towards
negative and positive attitudes raise concerns about measurement error, with consequences
for regression results provided that the framing has a nonuniform impact across individuals.
In fact, Hiscox (2006) shows that people with a poor educational background are particularly
sensitive to issue framing. In our identification strategy we accommodate this concern by in-
cluding skill specific indicators, which pick up such skill-related effects on attitude formation.
9.3.2 Factor ownership, factor abundance, and the factor content
of trade
The ISSP reports individuals’ occupations corresponding to the four-digit level of the ISCO-
88 classification of the ILO (∼ 500 occupations). At the one-digit level, these occupations
are aggregated into nine major groups based on the similarity of skills required to fulfill the
tasks and duties of the jobs. We treat each major ISCO-88 occupation as a unique factor
of production (M = 9). The GAP allows for a distinction among six strictly hierarchical
levels of educational attainment. We classify individuals with primary education (or less) as
low-skilled labor, those with secondary education as medium-skilled labor, and those with
tertiary education as high-skilled labor (M = 3). From the HOV equation in (9.5), the factor
content of trade for any factor m only depends on the effective country and world endowments
of that specific factor (as well as on the consumption share). The logic of Predictions 1 and
12We again find differences in extreme-response bias across countries. For example, individuals from
African countries are more likely to give extreme responses than people from Europe.
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2 is therefore insensitive to the presence of additional (unobserved) input factors.13
Country-specific information on endowments with each skill category are obtained from
the ILO. Raw endowments Vmc are alternatively measured in terms of occupational positions
(ISCO-88) or educational attainment (ISCED-76/ISCED-97). We aggregate education levels
in the ISCED-76/ISCED-97 classification into broader educational groups to accommodate
our three skill levels in the GAP. In consequence, the factor definitions in the endowment
data are consistent with those in our survey data. In order to derive a country’s effective
endowment with each factor, we construct the country-specific technology parameter δc ∈
(0, 1) on the basis of GDP per capita information from the WDI.14 Finally, we use trade and
GDP data from the WDI to compute countries’ consumption shares in world output sc.
The predicted factor content of trade for country c and factor m, Fmc, is given by the
m-th element of the vector δcVc − sc
∑
c δcVc. Differences in country size imply that Fmc
is not directly comparable across countries. In particular, a large country will tend to have
larger endowments of its abundant factors and a larger consumption share sc than a small
country. Hence, for factors that are scarce or abundant in both countries, we expect Fmc
to be larger (in absolute value) in the large country. We therefore normalize the predicted
factor content of trade for each factor by the country’s overall effective labor endowment,
F˜mc = Fmc/(
∑
m δcVmc). The scaling corrects for country size and makes the magnitude of
Fmc for some specific factor m comparable across countries.
15
<<Figures 9.1 and 9.2 about here>>
Figures 9.1 and 9.2 explore the plausibility of the obtained factor abundance profiles
across countries in our two samples. The nine occupations of the ISCO-88 classification can
be linked to four broad skill levels. The three top-major occupations – “Legislators, senior
officials and managers”, “Professionals” and “Technicians and associate professionals” – cor-
respond to the two highest skill levels. Figure 9.1(a) to 9.1(c) show that these occupations
tend to be more abundant in countries at a high stage of development. The group “Elemen-
tary occupations” coincides with the lowest skill level. In line with expectations, this type of
13Furthermore, even for an insufficient disaggregation of production factors into distinct skill levels, the
inequality in (9.4) still correctly predicts the (weighted) average wage change for the combined broader skill
groups. For two factors m′ and m′′ that are incorrectly treated as a single production factor m, the predicted
wage change satisfies ∆fwm = ∆fwm′
Fm′
Fm
+ ∆fwm′′
Fm′′
Fm
.
14Trefler (1995) employs the HOV equation to estimate the technology parameter. The correlation co-
efficient between the estimated parameter and a country’s observable GDP per capita is close to 0.9. We
normalize δc to unity for the country with the highest GDP per capita.
15In the ISSP, endowment data for one of the production factors is not applicable for Japan and the United
Kingdom. Their overall effective endowment can therefore not be calculated and we set F˜mc to missing for
all factors in these two countries.
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labor is abundant in developing countries such as the Philippines and Uruguay, but scarce in
the highly developed economies of Europe and Northern America; see Figure 9.1(i). The re-
maining five occupations are related to an intermediate skill level. For these occupations, the
relationship between factor abundance and GDP per capita is less clear-cut. Some occupa-
tions, such as “Clerks”, are relatively abundant in developed countries. Interestingly, “Craft
and related trade workers” and “Plant and machine operators” reveal an inverse U-shaped
relationship between GDP per capita and factor abundance.
Turning to the GAP, Figure 9.2 shows that the pattern found in our sample is again
consistent with higher skill levels being more abundant in developed countries. Importantly,
bundling low-skilled labor and medium-skilled labor into a single skill category would give a
distorted picture of factor abundance: while the former is abundant in developing countries,
the latter is often scarce in the same set of countries.
We may ask how these abundance profiles compare to those obtained in a simple model
with only high-skilled and low-skilled labor and two industries. Allowing for more than two
factors gives a more nuanced picture of factor abundance across countries. In particular, our
data reveal that only the abundance of factors at the extreme end of the skill spectrum is
consistently linked to the level of development of countries. To the contrary, intermediate skill
levels reveal a much less predictable pattern across countries. Moreover, allowing for many
factors also gives a more distinct profile of endowment structures within a given country. For
example, it allows a country to be scarce in all types of labor (while being abundant in other,
unobserved factors). According to our computations for the GAP, this is indeed the case for
some countries.
Denote by Ic the set of individuals living in country c. Define vi as a function taking on
the value m if individual i’s labor market skills correspond to factor m. For each individual
i, we construct an indicator variable equal to one if the factor content of trade is positive:
FAi ≡ FA(vi,Fc) =
1, if Fmc > 0, i ∈ Ic, vi = m0, if Fmc ≤ 0, i ∈ Ic, vi = m. (9.6)
From Prediction 1, the group of individuals with FAi = 1 will on average gain from free
trade, relative to the group of individuals with FAi = 0. For each individual i, the continuous
variable F˜i reflects the abundance of her production factor:
F˜i ≡ F˜ (vi,Fc) = F˜mc, if i ∈ Ic, vi = m (9.7)
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From Prediction 2, individuals with a higher factor content of trade, F˜i, are more likely to
fall into the group of factors with an above-average factor content of trade. Hence, they will
have higher probabilities of being pro trade.
9.3.3 Estimation
Let ∆fUi denote individual i’s change in utility when switching from the policy equilibrium
to the free trade equilibrium. We assume that this change can be approximated by the
following linear expression:
∆fUi = β · f(vi,Fc) + γc + ηm + λ ·Xi + εi, i ∈ Ic, vi = m (9.8)
where f(vi,Fc) is a measure for the abundance of individual i’s production factor. The term
γc is a country fixed effect and ηm is a fixed effect for the individual’s skill level.
16 The
vector λ = (λ1 . . . λS) is a vector of parameters, Xi = (Xi1 . . . XiS)
T is a vector of observable
attributes (such as age, gender, or income), and εi is a random term capturing the impact of
unobservable attributes (such as intelligence, social values, or political identity).
We assume that our pro-trade dummy variable, denoted by yi, is equal to one if the
individual gains from free trade (∆fUi > 0). Hence, the probability of being pro-trade,
conditional on the explanatory variables, can be written as:
Pr(yi = 1|·) = Pr(∆fUi > 0|·) = Φ(β · f(vi,Fc) + γc + ηm + λ ·Xi), i ∈ Ic, vi = m (9.9)
where the last equality requires that the random component is drawn independently from a
standard normal distribution, εi ∼ N(0, 1).
We implement two tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin Vanek model of preference formation.
The first test relates to Prediction 1 and uses FAi as a measure of factor abundance. The
second test builds on Prediction 2 and introduces the normalized factor content of trade, F˜i,
into the model. We test both predictions against the null hypothesis that factor abundance is
no significant predictor of individual attitudes towards trade (H0 : β = 0). Since Prediction
1 relies on more restrictive assumptions than Prediction 2, the risk of committing a Type-II
error is larger with the first test than with the second test.
The two predictions derived from our theoretical model relate to within-country differ-
ences in attitudes towards trade across factors. A careful design of the empirical model
16This set of dummy variables represents either the nine different occupational positions in the ISSP or
the six different levels of educational attainment in the GAP. All of our results are robust to employing a full
set of 509 occupation fixed effects at the four-digit level of ISCO-88 in the ISSP.
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nevertheless allows to make use of the cross-country variation in the data. Consider two
individuals from different countries but with the same value of F˜i. For simplicity, let us first
assume that Fc is the same in all countries. Ceteris paribus, the two individuals are then
predicted to be equally affirmative towards free trade. Comparisons are less straightforward
when Fc differs across countries. For given F˜i, individuals in countries with a higher Fc
are less likely pro trade. We introduce country fixed effects γc in order to account for such
differences in the probability of being pro trade across countries.
The cross-country dimension of the sample allows us to control for all effects common to
a given skill group via ηm. Our empirical model in (9.8) then constitutes a test of the pure
arithmetics of the factor abundance logic for preference formation. In particular, higher skill
levels are associated with more positive views towards globalization in general (Hainmueller
& Hiscox, 2006) and with less sensitivity towards issue framing (Hiscox, 2006). Moreover,
psychological factors such as loss aversion feed into opposition towards free trade (Kemp,
2007), and presumably all the more so for low skilled workers. All of these confounding factors
are absorbed into ηm. When ηm is dropped from the specification, β is upwards (downwards)
biased in a sample where countries abundant in higher (lower) skill levels prevail. This bias
results from a positive (negative) correlation between f(vi,Fc) and εi.
9.4 Results
We now report our estimation results that provide tests of Predictions 1 and 2.
9.4.1 Empirical test of Predictions 1 and 2
Table 9.1 reports estimation results for the test of Prediction 1, which employs FAi as a
measure of factor abundance.17 For both the ISSP and the GAP, we employ three differ-
ent specifications. The first controls for country fixed effects and a limited set of standard
individual-level control variables; see columns (1) and (4). In the second specification, we
introduce the fixed effects for skill levels in both samples as well as an individual’s years of
formal education in the case of the ISSP; see columns (2) and (5). In the third specification,
we add an extensive set of individual-specific control variables, including income, nationalist
attitudes, and openness towards foreign cultures; see columns (3) and (6).18 This last spec-
17Throughout the paper, we report the estimated marginal effects on the probability of being pro-trade
(evaluated at the sample means of all regressors), instead of estimated coefficients. The estimated standard
errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity.
18The set of variables is largely identical to that used in Mayda & Rodrik (2005) for the ISSP and Ja¨kel
& Smolka (2013) for the GAP; Tables A.2 and A.3 provide a comprehensive description of all variables.
238 CHAPTER 9. DOES FACTOR ABUNDANCE SHAPE FREE TRADERS?
ification significantly reduces the sample size in terms of both the number of observations
and the number of countries due to missing data. To establish comparability between differ-
ent specifications, we also report results for the second specification applied to this limited
sample; see columns (2’) and (5’).
We find a robustly positive effect of factor abundance on individual free trade attitudes
in both datasets and in all specifications that include ηm and thereby control for effects of
individuals’ skills that are unrelated to factor abundance. In the parsimonious specification
without fixed effects for skill groups, however, we obtain an upward-biased estimate in the
ISSP (3.3%-points) and a downward-biased estimate in the GAP (-0.9%-points). The differ-
ence in the direction of the bias when ηm is omitted neatly reflects our expectations, since
the ISSP predominantly covers developed economies. In the specifications with fixed effects
for skill levels, the estimated impact of FAi is similar across the two survey data sources:
being endowed with the country’s abundant factor increases an individual’s probability of
being pro-trade by 1 to 3%-points.
<<Table 9.1 about here>>
While results in Table 9.1 yield support for Prediction 1, statistical significance varies
somewhat across specifications. Deviations from the assumption of balanced factor content
trade imply measurement error in the mapping of individuals to the set of factors that gain
in relative terms from free trade. We therefore turn to an empirical test of Prediction 2,
which discards the assumption that trade is balanced in factor content terms.
Results for the estimation of equation (9.9), where factor abundance is now measured by
F˜i, are reported in Table 9.2. Specifications otherwise mirror those of Table 9.1. Table 9.2
substantiates the evidence for the factor abundance logic of trade policy preference formation.
Once we include fixed effects for skill levels in the specification, the estimated effect of F˜i
is robustly positive in both survey data sets. The larger is the normalized factor content of
trade, the more likely a factor is sufficiently abundant such that it gains from free trade, and
hence the larger is the probability that the factor owner is a free trader. Moreover, compared
to Table 9.1, results are fortified also in terms of statistical significance. Going beyond
the traditional notion of factor abundance as deployed in Prediction 1 helps to identify the
contribution of the HOV model in explaining individual preferences.
To gauge the quantitative implications, consider a one standard deviation increase in the
normalized factor content of trade. Based on column (3), the ISSP predicts an increase in
the probability of being a free trader of 2%-points for a one standard deviation increase in F˜i.
Similarly, in the GAP an increase in F˜i by one standard deviation implies a 1.5%-points higher
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probability of being pro-trade. The effect of factor abundance on preferences is therefore
meaningful, particularly when judged against the overall low percentage of individuals voicing
a pro-trade view of 25% in the ISSP.
<<Table 9.2 about here>>
The evidence in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 also illustrates that an individual’s skill is a relevant
predictor of trade policy preferences. We can interpret the estimated ηm’s as the pure skill
effects, which affect individuals’ preferences independent on their country’s endowments. In
the ISSP, the fixed effects for occupational positions are jointly significant in all specifica-
tions. People working as Legislators, senior officials and managers (the reference category)
or Professionals are more likely pro-trade than people in any of the other occupational po-
sitions. Interestingly, individuals employed as Skilled agricultural and fishery workers hold
by far the most skeptical views towards free trade, with a predicted probability of being pro-
trade 15%-points below that of the reference group. Although their skill level is higher, their
probability of being pro-trade is even lower than that of individuals employed in Elementary
occupations. We may attribute this finding to a high degree of industry-specificity, making
workers particularly vulnerable to the impact of trade. To the contrary, Service workers and
shop and market sales workers have moderate views on trade, despite the fact that these are
occupational positions regarded as low-skilled. However, workers employed in the non-traded
sector are plausibly less exposed to the disruptive effects of trade liberalization.
Apart from labor market skills, increasing an individual’s exposure to education by one
year increases her probability of being pro-trade by 1%-point. Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006)
argue that the effect of education on pro-trade attitudes is larger in developed countries than
in developing countries due to differences in the quality of educational systems. In unreported
regressions, we find that an interaction between educational attainment and a country’s GDP
per capita (as a proxy for institutional quality) enters positively, confirming their priors. The
effects of all other variables remain virtually unchanged.
The estimation results for the GAP strengthen the interpretation that the forces of factor
abundance and pure skill effects coexist and jointly determine individuals’ attitudes. In
columns (5) and (5’) of both tables, the fixed effects for educational attainment are jointly
significant. Moreover, the highest levels of educational attainment (exposure to university
education with or without degree) are associated with the most positive views towards free
trade. When we add the whole set of individual-specific control variables in column (6),
the set of fixed effects for skill levels is no longer jointly significant, but the estimated effect
of factor abundance is unaltered. Factors such as individual income, nationalist attitudes,
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and openness towards foreign cultures are thus correlated with an individual’s educational
background, but not with the factor abundance status of her production factor.
9.5 Conclusion
Trade theory can help identify the winners and losers of globalization. The implications of
the neoclassical trade model with two goods and two factors are extreme. They have in
fact provoked heated discussions among economists for decades. High-skilled individuals in
high-skill abundant regions such as Europe or the United States gain from free trade in real
absolute terms. Low-skilled individuals lose in real absolute terms. The opposite pattern
applies to low-skill abundant countries such as China or India.
It is well-known that this proposition breaks down as soon as the model allows for more
than two factors or goods. Building on Ethier (1982, 1984) and Deardorff (1980, 1982), we
have shown in a rigorous way that with an arbitrary number of goods and factors it is still
possible to identify groups of relative winners and losers. A country’s abundant factors on
average gain from free trade relative to the country’s scarce factors (in real terms).
We have found strong empirical support for this novel proposition in two different inter-
national survey data sets on public opinion. The empirical strategy that we have developed
in this paper neatly identifies the factor-price effects of protection due to comparative ad-
vantage, controlling for other effects specific to workers’ labor market skills. This issue has
troubled a number of earlier studies in the literature on individual trade policy preferences
(e.g. Mayda & Rodrik (2005); Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006)).
CHAPTER 9. DOES FACTOR ABUNDANCE SHAPE FREE TRADERS? 241
Figures
Figure 9.1. Factor content of trade and GDP per capita, ISSPFigure 1: Factor content of trade an the level of development, ISSP
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(a) Legislators, senior officials &
managers
AUS
AUTBGR
CAN
CZE
DNK
FIN
DEU
HUN
IRL
ISRLVA
NLD
NZL
NOR
PHL
POL
PRT
RUS
SVK
SVN
KOR
ESP
SWECHE
URY
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 F
ac
to
r C
on
te
nt
 o
f T
ra
de
8 9 10 11
GDP per Capita (in Logs)
(b) Professionals
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(c) Technicians & associate profes-
sionals
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(d) Clerks
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(e) Service workers & sales workers
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(f) Skilled agricultural workers
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(g) Craft and related trade workers
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(h) Plant and machine operators
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(i) Elementary occupations
of its abundant factors and a larger consumption share sc than a small country. Hence, for
factors that are scarce or abundant in both countries, we expect Fmc to be larger (in absolute
value) in the large country. We therefore normalize the predicted factor content of trade for
each factor by the country’s overall effective labor endowment, F˜mc = Fmc/(
∑
m δcVmc). The
scaling corrects for country size and makes the magnitude of Fmc for some specific factor m
comparable across countries.7
Figures 1 and 2 explore the plausibility of the obtained factor abundance profiles across
countries in our two samples. The nine occupations of the ISCO-88 classification can be linked
to four broad skill levels. The three top-major occupations – “Legislators, senior officials and
7In the ISSP, endowment data for one of the production factors is not applicable for Japan and the United
Kingdom. Their overall effective endowment can therefore not be calculated and we set F˜mc to missing for all
factors in these two countries.
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Figu e 9.2. Factor content of trade and GDP per capita, GAPFigure 2: Factor con ent of trade an the level of development, GAP
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(a) High-skilled workers
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(b) Medium-skilled workers
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(c) Low-skilled workers
managers”, “Professionals” and “Technicians and associate professionals” – correspond to the
two highest skill levels. Figure 1(a) to 1(c) show that these occupations tend to be more
abundant in countries at a high stage of development. The group “Elementary occupations”
coincides with the lowest skill level. In line with expectations, this type of labor is abundant in
developing countries such as the Philippines and Uruguay, but scarce in the highly developed
economies of Europe and Northern America; see figure 1(i). The remaining five occupations
are related to an intermediate skill level. For these occupations, the relationship between factor
abundance and GDP per capita is less clear-cut. Some occupations, such as “Clerks”, are
relatively abundant in developed countries. Interestingly, “Craft and related trade workers”
and “Plant and machine operators” reveal an inverse U-shaped relationship between GDP per
capita and factor abundance.
Turning to the GAP, figure 2 shows that the pattern found in our sample is again consistent
with higher skill levels being more abundant in developed countries. Importantly, bundling
low-skilled labor and medium-skilled labor into a single skill category would give a distorted
picture of factor abundance: while the former is abundant in developing countries, the latter is
often scarce in the same set of countries.
We may ask how these abundance profiles compare to those obtained in a simple model
with only high-skilled and low-skilled labor and two industries. Allowing for more than two
factors gives a more nuanced picture of factor abundance across countries. In particular, our
data reveal that only the abundance of factors at the extreme end of the skill spectrum is
consistently linked to the level of development of countries. To the contrary, intermediate skill
levels reveal a much less predictable pattern across countries. Moreover, allowing for many
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Table 9.1. Test of Prediction 1 in a Probit frameworkaTable 1: Test of Prediction ?? in a Frameworka
Dependent Variable: Individual-Specific Pro-Trade Dummy
ISSP 2003 GAP 2007
(1) (2) (2’) (3) (4) (5) (5’) (6)
FAi 0.033*** 0.011 0.026** 0.028** -0.009 0.014* 0.022* 0.021*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Agei -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Malei 0.076*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.060*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.019**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Citizeni -0.092*** -0.096*** -0.146*** -0.108**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.047) (0.054)
Education (in years)i 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Incomei 0.046*** 0.017***
(0.009) (0.005)
Number of Observations 27,096 27,096 10,843 10,843 19,379 19,379 9,083 9,083
Number of Countries 28 28 26 26 28 28 20 20
Country Fixed Effects (γc) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects for Skill Levels (ηm)
b No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
– Joint Significancec – 278.3*** 152.2*** 64.6*** – 61.8*** 14.5*** 6.3
Additional Individual-Specific Controlsd No No No Yes No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.09
Log Pseudolikelihood -14,153.43 -13,729.81 -5,911.02 -5,605.62 -7,807.78 -7,771.29 -3,545.26 -3,459.57
a The table gives the marginal effects for each explanatory variable on the probability of being pro trade, evaluated at the sample means. For the FA indicator variable,
the table reports the effect of a discrete change from zero to one. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
b Skill levels refer either to the nine different occupational positions (ISCO-88 classification at the one-digit level; ISSP) or to the six different levels of educational
attainment (akin to ISCED-76/ISCED-97; GAP).
c Gives the χ2 statistic for the test of joint significance of the fixed effects for skill levels.
d See tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix for a description of all additional individual-specific control variables. Countries dropped in columns (2’) and (3): Israel,
United Kingdom. Countries dropped in columns (5’) and (6): Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Slovak Republic, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.
13
a e table gives the marginal effects for e ch expl n tory variable on the probability of being pro trade, evaluated at the sample means. For
t e FA indicator variable, the table reports the effect of a discrete change from zero to one. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in
parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
b Skill levels refer either to the nine different occupational positions (ISCO-88 classification at the one-digit level; ISSP) or to the six different levels
of educational attainment (akin to ISCED-76/ISCED-97; GAP).
c Gives the χ2 statistic for the test of joint significance of the fixed effects for skill levels.
d See Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A for a description of all additional individual-specific control variables. Countries dropped in columns (2’)
and (3): Israel, United Kingdom. Countries dropped in columns (5’) and (6): Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Slovak Republic, Sweden,
United Kingdom, United States.
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Table 9.2. Test of Prediction 2 in a Probit frameworkaTable 2: Test of Prediction ?? in a it Frameworka
Dependent Variable: Individual-Specific Pro-Trade Dummy
ISSP 2003 GAP 2007
(1) (2) (2’) (3) (4) (5) (5’) (6)
F˜i 0.378*** 0.195*** 0.346*** 0.389*** -0.019 0.035** 0.057** 0.054**
(0.061) (0.076) (0.125) (0.128) (0.014) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025)
Agei -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.000* -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Malei 0.076*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.060*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.019**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Citizeni -0.082*** -0.087*** -0.147*** -0.110**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.048) (0.054)
Education (in years)i 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Incomei 0.046*** 0.016***
(0.009) (0.005)
Number of Observations 25,879 25,879 10,729 10,729 19,379 19,379 9,083 9,083
Number of Countries 26 26 25 25 28 28 20 20
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects for Skill Levels (ηm)
b No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
– Joint significancec 261.36*** 147.53*** 62.03*** . 64.51*** 16.58*** 7.79
Additional Individual-Specific Controlsd No No No Yes No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.09
Log Pseudolikelihood -13,512.18 -13,116.22 -5,850.43 -5,547.98 -7,807.8 -7,770.74 -3,544.55 -3,459.06
a The table gives the marginal effects for each explanatory variable on the probability of being pro trade, evaluated at the sample means. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
b Skill levels refer either to the nine different occupational positions (ISCO-88 classification at the one-digit level; ISSP) or to the six different levels of educational
attainment (akin to ISCED-76/ISCED-97; GAP).
c Gives the χ2 statistic for the test of joint significance of the fixed effects for skill levels.
d See tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix for a description of all additional individual-specific control variables. Countries dropped in columns (2’) and (3): Israel.
Countries dropped in columns (5’) and (6): Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Slovak Republic, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.
14
a he table gives the marginal effects for each explanatory variable on the probability of being pro trade, evaluated at the sample means.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
b Skill levels refer either to the nine different occupational positions (ISCO-88 classification at the one-digit level; ISSP) or to the six different levels
of educational attainment (akin to ISCED-76/ISCED-97; GAP).
c Gives the χ2 statistic for the test of joint significance of the fixed effects for skill levels.
d See Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A for a description of all additional individual-specific control variables. Countries dropped in columns (2’)
and (3): Israel. Countries dropped in columns (5’) and (6): Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Slovak Republic, Sweden, United Kingdom,
United States.
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Appendix
A Data
All data used for the ISSP and the GAP pertain to the years 2003 and 2007, respectively,
unless indicated otherwise.
Endowments. Data on country-specific endowments are taken from the ILO labor statis-
tics. For countries for which ILO data are not available in the survey years, we take data
from the closest applicable year and adjust for population growth from that year to the sur-
vey year, treating the endowment distributions as constant. Population data come from the
World Development Indicators (WDI).
The ISSP sample uses data on the total economically active population by occupational
position (nine occupations). The ILO data disaggregate labor into ten occupations in line
with the major groups of the one-digit ISCO-88 classification.19 We exclude “Armed forces”,
because its scope is independent of skill requirements. We drop countries for which data refer
to the ISCO-68 classification, since it cannot be mapped with the ISCO-88 classification in
any consistent way. We are left with 75 countries for the computation of world endowments,
which account for roughly 75% of world GDP, 79% of world exports and 80% of world
imports in 2003. We consider each of the nine occupational positions as a separate factor of
production.
The GAP sample uses data on the total economically active population by levels of ed-
ucational attainment (nine strictly hierarchical groups). The ILO data include information
on educational attainment according to the International Standard Classification of Educa-
tion (ISCED). We bring the older ISCED-76 classification in line with the recent ISCED-97
classification according to Table A.1. The 90 countries we use to compute world endowments
account for 75% of world GDP, 80% of world exports and 84% of world imports in 2007.
We map the information in the GAP survey with the ILO data according to Table A.1 and
distinguish three labor inputs (high-skilled, medium-skilled, and low-skilled labor).
Technology. In order to compute technology parameters, we use WDI information on
countries’ GDP per capita. The country with the highest GDP per capita (Norway) provides
the benchmark technology (δc = 1).
20. We define the country-specific efficiency parameter as
the ratio of each country’s GDP per capita relative to the GDP per capita of the benchmark
economy.
19See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/index.htm (accessed on February 21,
2013) for details.
20Luxembourg and Qatar are excluded from these computations.
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Factor content of trade. We compute the factor content of trade for each factor accord-
ing to equation (9.5), given data on effective country and world endowments. Consumption
shares are defined as sc = (Yc−Bc)/Yw, where Bc represents country c’s trade balance. Both
GDP and trade data are from the WDI. World GDP, Yw, is the sum of GDP over all countries
for which endowment data are available.
Individual-level survey variables. Tables A.2 and A.3 give a comprehensive list of
all individual-level survey variables that we employ in our regression analysis for the ISSP
and the GAP, respectively. Whenever survey items allow for more than two ordered answer
categories, we implement a binary coding for the corresponding variable, in order to mitigate
the problem of extreme-response bias.
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Table A.1. Harmonization of ISCED-76/ISCED-97 and GAP 2007 education dataTable A.1: Harmonization of I CED-76/ISCED-97 and GAP 2007 Education Data
ISCED-76 ISCED-97 GAP 2007 Production Factor (HOV) Production Factor (HOS)
X No formal schooling X No schooling 0 No formal education;
Incomplete primary edu-
cation
Low-skilled labor Low-skilled labor
0 Education preceding the
first level
0 Pre-primary education
1 First level 1 Primary-education or
first stage of basic educa-
tion
1 Complete primary educa-
tion
2 Second level, first stage 2 Lower secondary educa-
tion or second stage of
basic education
2 Incomplete secondary
education (techni-
cal/vocational)
Medium-skilled labor Low-skilled labor
3 Second level, second
stage
3 Upper secondary educa-
tion
3 Complete secondary
education (techni-
cal/vocational);
Incomplete secondary
education (university-
preparatory);
Complete secondary
education (university-
preparatory)
5 Third level, first stage
(not equivalent to univer-
sity qualification)
4 Post-secondary non-
tertiary education
4 Some university educa-
tion (without degree)
High-skilled labor High-skilled labor
6 Third level, first stage
(leading to university
qualification)
5 First stage of tertiary
education (not leading to
research qualification)
5 University education
(with degree)
7 Third level, second stage
(post-graduate)
6 Second stage of tertiary
education (advanced re-
search qualification)
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Table A.2. Coding of individual-level survey variables, ISSP 2003aTable A.2: Coding of Indiv dual-L Survey Variables, ISSP 2003
Variable Description & Coding
Age Respondent’s age in years.
Male Coded (1) male; (0) female.
Education (in years) Respondent’s education in years; upper bound at 20 years.
Income Log of real income; calculated on the basis of income information in local currency and PPP conversion factors.
Citizen Coded (1) citizen; (0) otherwise.
Unemployed Coded (1) unemployed; (0) otherwise.
Social class Subjective social class: six categories, higher values correspond to higher social classes.
Residence Respondent’s urban-rural self-assessment of the type of community: five categories, higher values correspond to more
rural residences.
Product quality “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? ‘Free trade leads to better products becoming
available in [respondent’s country].’ ”; coded (1) “agree strongly”, “agree”; (0) “neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree”,
“disagree strongly”.
Party affiliation Respondent’s party affiliation: categories (1) “far left” to (5) “far right”.
Trade union Trade union membership: coded (1) yes; (0) no.
Patriotisma “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? ‘I would rather be a citizen of [respondent’s
country] than of any other country in the world.’ ”; coded (1) “agree strongly”, “agree”; (0) “neither agree nor
disagree”, “disagree”, “disagree strongly”.
Nationalisma “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? ‘Generally speaking, [respondent’s country] is a
better country than most other countries.’ ”; coded (1) “agree strongly”, “agree”; (0) “neither agree nor disagree”,
“disagree”, “disagree strongly”.
National interestsa “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? ‘[Respondent’s country] should follow its own
interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other countries.’ ”; (1) “agree strongly”, “agree”; (0) “neither agree nor
disagree”, “disagree”, “disagree strongly”.
Pride democracya “How proud are you of [respondent’s country] in [...] the way democracy works”; coded (1) “very proud”, “proud”;
(0) “not very proud”, “not proud at all”.
Pride influencea “How proud are you of [respondent’s country] [in its] political influence in the world?”; coded (1) “very proud”,
“proud”; (0) “not very proud”, “not proud at all”.
Pride economya “How proud are you of [respondent’s country] [in its] economic achievements?”; coded (1) “very proud”, “proud”; (0)
“not very proud”, “not proud at all”.
Pride sociala “How proud are you of [respondent’s country] [in its] social security system?”; coded (1) “very proud”, “proud”; (0)
“not very proud”, “not proud at all”.
a Binary coding applied in order to mitigate problems of extreme-response bias.
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Table A.3. Coding of individual-level survey variables, GAP 2007aTable A.3: Coding of Individual-L l Survey Variables, GAP 2007
Variable Description & Coding
Male Coded (1) male; (0) female.
Income Log of monthly real income. Survey respondents sort themselves into income groups, based on (country-specific) lists
of incomes. As a general rule, we compute individual income as the middle value of the income interval chosen by
the individual, adjusted by PPP conversion factors from the World Development Indicators, expressed in logs, and, if
necessary, converted to a monthly basis. More detailed information on this procedure is available upon request.
Unemployed Coded (1) unemployed/not employed; (0) otherwise.
Religious “Which one of these comes closest to your opinion, number 1 or number 2?”; coded (1) “Number 2 – It is necessary
to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values”/NA/refused; (0) “Number 1 – It is not necessary to
believe in God in order to be moral and have good values”.
Economic awarenessa “Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following
statement. ‘Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor’
”; coded (0) “completely disagree”, “disagree”; (1) “agree”, “completely agree”.
Informed “Which of the following two statements best describes you: ‘I follow INTERNATIONAL news closely ONLY when
something important is happening’ OR ‘I follow INTERNATIONAL news closely most of the time, whether or not
something important is happening’?”; coded (1) “Most of the time, whether or not something important is happening”;
(0) “Only when something important is happening”.
Sociotropic viewsa “Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following
statement. ‘Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some
loss of jobs.’ ”; coded (0)“completely disagree”, “mostly disagree”; (1) “mostly agree”, “completely agree”.
Fears of cultural
spill-overs
“I am going to read some phrases which have opposite meanings. Tell me which comes closer to describing your
views.”; coded (1) “It’s bad that American ideas and customs are spreading around the world”; (0) “It’s good that
American ideas and customs are spreading around the world”.
Nationalisma “As I read another list of statements, for each one, please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly
disagree or completely disagree with it. ‘Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.”; coded (0)
“completely disagree”, “mostly disagree”; (1) “mostly agree”, “completely agree”.
Fears of interna-
tional competition
“Turning to China, overall do you think that China’s growing economy is a good thing or a bad thing for our country?”;
coded (1) “bad thing”; (0) “good thing”.
a Binary coding applied in order to mitigate problems of extreme-response bias.
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Table A.4. Descriptives on survey, technology, and endowment data, ISSP 2003aTable A.4: Descriptives on Survey, Technology, Endowment D ta, ISSP 2003a
Country N yi δc FAi Factors with
Fmc > 0
b
Australia 2,098 0.14 0.73 0.68 1,2,3,4,8
Austria 954 0.23 0.73 0.71 2,3,4,7,8,9
Bulgaria 945 0.12 0.18 0.43 2,8,9
Canada 1,162 0.27 0.74 0.70 2,3,4,8,9
Czech Republic 1,183 0.26 0.40 0.59 2,3,7,8
Denmark 1,232 0.48 0.71 0.50 2,3,8,9
Finland 1,263 0.39 0.64 0.43 2,3,8
Germany 1,205 0.33 0.66 0.30 2,3
Hungary 970 0.14 0.34 0.47 2,7,8
Ireland 1,042 0.27 0.79 0.50 1,2,4,8
Israel 1,037 0.25 0.47 0.45 2,4,8
Japan 1,024 0.28 0.64 0.60 1,3,4,7
Latvia 981 0.16 0.24 0.37 2,6,8,9
Netherlands 1,714 0.40 0.74 0.67 1,2,3,4
New Zealand 996 0.21 0.53 0.64 1,2,4,6,8
Norway 1,383 0.36 1.00 0.58 2,3,5,8
Philippines 1,180 0.11 0.06 0.42 6,9
Poland 1,219 0.12 0.27 0.28 2,6,8
Portugal 1,394 0.19 0.44 0.54 6,7,8,9
Russia 2,212 0.21 0.23 0.77 2,3,7,8,9
Slovakia 1,152 0.10 0.32 0.62 3,7,8,9
Slovenia 1,056 0.28 0.46 0.42 2,3,6,8
South Korea 1,295 0.25 0.44 0.60 4,5,6,8,9
Spain 1,159 0.15 0.58 0.35 2,8,9
Sweden 1,102 0.35 0.67 0.65 2,3,5,8
Switzerland 1,021 0.43 0.76 0.64 2,3,4,7
United Kingdom 838 0.17 0.67 0.71 1,2,3,4,8
Uruguay 1,049 0.13 0.17 0.23 9
a The table reports the number of observations (N) as well as descriptive statistics for the pro-trade dummy variable, yi;
the technology index, δc; the indicator for factor abundance FAi; and the factor content of trade, Fmc. Bars indicate
country means. Chile, France, South Africa, and Venezuela participated in the ISSP 2003 but are excluded due to lack
of ILO endowment data. The United States are excluded due to missing endowment data for some occupations. West
Bank & Gaza is excluded due to missing trade data.
b Factors m = 1, . . . , 9, are (1) “Legislators, senior officials and managers”, (2) “Professionals”, (3) “Technicians and
associate professionals”, (4) “Clerks”, (5) “Service workers and shop and market sales workers”, (6) “Skilled agricultural
and fishery workers”, (7) “Craft and related trade workers”, (8) “Plant and machine operators and assemblers”, and (9)
“Elementary occupations”.
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a e table reports the number of observations (N) as well as descriptive statistics for the pro-trade
dummy variable, yi; the technology index, δc; the indicator for factor abundance FAi; and the factor
content of trade, Fmc. Bars indicate country means. Chile, France, South Africa, and Venezuela
participated in the ISSP 2003 but are excluded due to lack of ILO endowment data. The United States
are excluded due to missing endowment data for some occupations. West Bank & Gaza is excluded due
to missing trade data.
b Factors m = 1, . . . , 9, are (1) “Legislators, senior officials and ma agers”, (2) “Professionals”, (3)
“Technicians and associate professionals”, (4) “Clerks”, (5) “Service workers and shop and market sales
workers”, (6) “Skilled agricultural and fishery workers”, (7) “Craft and related trade workers”, (8)
“Plant and machine operators and assemblers”, and (9) “Elementary occupations”.
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Table A.5. Descriptives on survey, technology, and endowment data, GAP 2007aTable A.5: Descriptives on Survey, Technology, Endowment D ta, GAP 2007a
Country N yi δc FAi Factors with
Fmc > 0
b
Argentina 700 0.78 0.24 0.00 none
Bolivia 791 0.84 0.08 0.23 1
Brazil 958 0.74 0.18 0.85 1,2
Bulgaria 461 0.95 0.21 0.60 2
Canada 485 0.85 0.73 0.97 2,3
Chile 769 0.91 0.26 0.83 1,2
Czech Republic 446 0.80 0.44 0.72 2
France 500 0.79 0.64 0.83 2,3
Germany 495 0.86 0.65 1.00 2,3
Indonesia 949 0.75 0.07 0.34 1
Israel 865 0.93 0.48 0.49 3
Italy 450 0.77 0.58 0.67 2
Japan 683 0.80 0.64 0.06 1
Malaysia 670 0.95 0.25 0.24 1
Mexico 796 0.80 0.24 0.36 1
Morocco 864 0.80 0.08 0.71 1
Pakistan 1,728 0.95 0.05 0.47 1
Peru 774 0.84 0.14 0.00 none
Poland 468 0.83 0.30 0.60 2
Slovak Republic 440 0.85 0.35 0.69 2
South Africa 949 0.91 0.18 0.00 none
South Korea 681 0.90 0.46 0.94 2,3
Spain 456 0.91 0.57 0.67 2,3
Sweden 471 0.91 0.68 1.00 2,3
Turkey 830 0.85 0.17 0.56 1
Ukraine 478 0.94 0.12 0.64 2
United Kingdom 467 0.84 0.66 0.42 2
United States 964 0.63 0.88 0.97 2,3
a The table reports the number of observations (N) as well as descriptive statistics for the pro-trade dummy variable,
yi; the technology index, δc; the indicator for factor abundance, FAi; and the factor content of trade, Fmc. Bars
indicate country means. The following countries participated in the GAP 2007 but are excluded due to lack of ILO
endowment data: Bangladesh, China, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali,
Nigeria, Russian Federation, Senegal, Uganda. Kuwait is excluded since its GDP per capita is not commensurate with
its state of technology. Due to missing trade data, observations from West Bank & Gaza were also excluded from the
sample.
b In the HOV model, factors m = 1, . . . , 3, are (1) low-skilled labor, (2) medium-skilled labor, and (3) high-skilled labor;
see table A.1.
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a The table reports the number of observations (N) as well as descriptive statistics for the pro-trade
dummy variable, yi; the technology index, δc; the indicator for factor abundance, FAi; and the factor
content of trade, Fmc. Bars indicate country means. The following countries participated in the GAP
2007 but are excluded due to lack of ILO endowment data: Bangladesh, China, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Senegal, Uganda.
Kuwait is excluded since its GDP per capita is not commensurate with its state of technology. Due to
missing trade data, observations from West Bank & Gaza were also excluded from the sample.
b In th HOV model, factors m = 1, 2, 3, are (1) low-skilled labor, (2) medium-skilled labor, and (3)
high-skilled labor; see Table A.1.
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Chapter10
Summary and outlook
This thesis presents original research on three questions in international trade and migration.
The first question asks which firms source their inputs intra-firm when engaging in offshoring,
i.e., when moving the source of their formerly domestic input supply abroad. I present
evidence based on Spanish firm-level data that supports recently developed models of global
sourcing in the spirit of the property rights theory of the firm. An interesting avenue for future
research could be to incorporate credit constraints into the hold-up model of global sourcing.
Credit constraints have the potential to severely restrict the global sourcing activities of firms,
and to hamper global economic integration. The Global Financial Crisis led to a drastic (and
unforeseen) reduction in credit supply worldwide. This is a quasi-natural experiment, and it
would be interesting to see how firms adjusted to this credit supply shock along the ownership
dimension of sourcing as well as the locational dimension of sourcing.
The second question addressed in this thesis has to do with the determinants of inter-
national migration. I ask how a pool of existing migrants (a ‘migrant network’) influences
the size and the skill composition of subsequent migration flows. Migrants feel attracted to
destinations hosting other migrants that are culturally alike, for example because they receive
assistance in finding jobs or housing. I show in this thesis that the network effect is strong
among co-national migrants, that it biases the skill content of migration flows towards the
low-skilled individuals, and that it is present even among migrants from ‘adjacent’ nation-
alities. Preliminary extensions of my work presented in this thesis point towards significant
cross-country differences in the effect of migrant networks. I am concerned about how these
differences can be reconciled with the characteristics of both the countries of origin and the
countries of destination. The results of my research will lead to more informed statements
about the structure of international migration flows.
The final question discussed in this thesis derives from the field studying the political
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economy of trade policy. The Global Financial Crisis has prompted governments to imple-
ment policies that can slow down (and be harmful to) the process of globalization; see the
recent report “The gated globe” in The Economist, Oct 12th, 2013. In this thesis, I have
asked whether public attitudes towards trade and globalization, an important ingredient in
the government’s decision problem, can be explained by standard economic theory. I show
that comparative advantage in the neoclassical trade model can explain the formation of
protectionist attitudes at the individual level. In future work, I plan to examine public at-
titudes towards China, a global player that has re-entered the stage of the world economy
and that is transforming global production and consumption patterns in a profound way. I
would like to understand which model of the economy best explains differences in attitudes
towards China’s growing economy, both across countries and across individuals.
